the grantee of the reversion, took the same with the covenants which rested upon the original grantor, Martin, and to hold that his deed would destroy the contingent remainders would be to permit him to avoid the covenants of warranty of his grantor.

Counsel also contend that this court has adopted the rule that where contingent remainders are created by statutory warranty deed they are nevertheless destructible by the act of the grantor, who holds the reversion, in conveying the property to the party holding the life estate, upon which the contingent remainders are vested, and they cite in support thereof Stoller v. Doyle, 257 Ill. 369. In that case Lawrence Doyle and his wife executed a deed to Frank Doyle creating a future interest therein, and later the same grantors executed a second deed of the same premises to the same grantee, omitting the restrictions and conditions and containing a statement that it was made for the purpose of removing the restrictions in the former deed and was meant to give the grantee an absolute title to the premises. It was there held that under sections 9 and 13 of the Conveyance act the first deed was a fee simple except as limited by the deed; that it was subject to a conditional limitation which might terminate it, but unless the contingent events took place it would last forever, and that there was not created a contingent remainder. It will therefore be seen that Stoller v. Doyle is not authority for the proposition that the grantor shall be allowed to destroy the contingent remainders created by him.

Counsel also cite Hill v. Hill, 264 Ill. 219. In that case it was urged that the life tenant, Mary J. Hill, having conveyed her interest to John Niccolls and William H. Hodge, and the original grantor having agreed by his bond to transfer the reversion to Niccolls, the contingent remainders created in the children of Mary J. Hill by the deed of Hodge were destroyed. That case does not hold that such a deed on the part of Hodge to Niccolls would de

stroy the contingent remainders, and the question whether or not he would in equity be allowed to destroy the contingent remainders by making such a deed was not decided in that case. Hodge did not make the deed in question, and the court merely held that his giving bond to do so was not equivalent to making such a deed.

The case of Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576, also cited by appellee as authority for his contention that the contingent remainders were destroyed in this case, was a case arising under a will, and therefore the effect of covenants of warranty did not there arise.

It is contended by appellee that the remainder to the children of Zachariah Martin being contingent, it was not such an interest as was affected by the covenants of warranty. It is the general rule that covenants of warranty extend to the right or interest granted, whatever that might be. (Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 514.) It was said by Lord Hardwicke in Mann v. Ward, 2 Atk. 226, that "when a man has granted and conveyed, be it a right real or pretended, the very words 'grant' and 'convey' imply a warranty for quiet enjoyment." While by the statute Quia Emptores and by the use of charters and deeds implied warranties gave way to express warranties, and while the common law rule of implied warranties is not in existence in this State unless where all the words of the statute are used, (Wheeler v. County of Wayne, 132 Ill. 599,) express warranties are given the same effect as implied warranties at common law.

While it is true that under the rule in this State a contingent remainder is not an estate that may be conveyed voluntarily by deed except by way of release or estoppel, yet it is a valuable right conveyed to the remainder-men in the land conveyed by the grantor, and having made this deed, by which the reversion is retained in him, he has, in effect, covenanted that upon the happening of such contingency the remainder-men, members of which class are

now in esse in this case, shall then have the quiet enjoyment of such remainder. It is therefore inequitable that he should be allowed to breach his covenants of warranty merely because it happens that at the time such breach is attempted the interest granted by him has not yet become vested and those entitled thereto not yet fully determined. This view does not give rise to a conveyance of such reversion by estoppel, as is thought, but the grantor, who holds the reversion, is estopped by his covenants of warranty to destroy the contingent interest which he has by his deed created.

We are of the opinion that, under the circumstances of this case, to apply the common law rule relating to the destruction of contingent remainders would be to contravene the rule relating to covenants of warranty. The situation here presented must be taken as affording a qualification of the rule relating to the destruction of contingent remainders. By reason of his covenants of warranty John B. Martin would be estopped to carry out the destruction of the contingent remainders created by him. The complainant, who is the grantee of the reversionary interest of Martin, is bound by the covenants of Martin, and is, like him, estopped to breach such covenants or attack the title warranted by the grantor. His deed of December 17 to Longan, by which he attempted by conveyance of the reversion to effect a destruction of all contingent and future interests, was an attack upon the title and a breach of the covenants of his grantor, which neither he nor his grantor is allowed to make. Martin being estopped to do any act which would defeat the contingent remainders granted by him, the complainant, as his grantee, is likewise estopped, and the deed of the complainant to Longan therefore did not operate to destroy the contingent remainders granted in the Martin deed. Complainant's deed of December 16 to Longan passed the right of Martin to rentals reserved by his (Martin's) deed. Complainant's second deed to Lon

gan operated to pass the reversionary interest of Martin subject to his covenants of warranty that if the issue of Zachariah survive him, Zachariah, they should take the fee. Martin's right to vest the reversion in fee in a grantee by conveyance is contingent on the death of Zachariah leaving no issue surviving him. If that contingency happens the reversionary interest ripens into a fee, and by the deed of Biwer to Longan the fee will have vested in the latter. (Pinkney v. Weaver, 216 Ill. 185.) Until this contingency happens Martin's reversionary interest held by Biwer can not be so conveyed as to defeat the rights of the contingent remainder-men. To apply this rule in this case is consonant with equity and justice and contravenes no settled rule of law. Longan by his re-conveyance to Biwer could not convey a title which he did not own. The effect of Longan's deed to Biwer was to pass to Biwer an undivided one-fifth interest in the rentals reserved by the Martin deed, also a one-fifth interest in the life estate of Zachariah, and in the reversion subject to the contingency named.

The chancellor therefore erred in holding that the conveyance herein referred to destroyed the contingent remainders granted by the John B. Martin deed and in holding that the complainant, Peter M. Biwer, was vested with a fee to an undivided one-fifth of said lands and that Frederick Longan was vested with the fee to an undivided fourfifths thereof and in decreeing accordingly. For this error the decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

DUNN and DUNCAN, JJ., dissenting.

(No. 13403-Decree affirmed.)

ROSE CASSIDY, Appellant, vs. Margaret LENAHAN et al.

Appellees.

Opinion filed October 23, 1920.

1. LIMITATIONS-title may be acquired by limitation where parties are ignorant as to location of lot line. The party in possession, for the statutory period, of improvements built over a lot line acquires title by limitation to that portion of the adjoining lot on which the improvements extend without having made oral declarations of his claims, and the facts that the improvements were inexpensive and that the parties were ignorant as to the location of the lot line will not affect the operation of the statute.

2. SAME-negotiations with party in possession will not re-vest title after statute has run. After title by limitation has become vested in the owner of a lot whose improvements were built over the line of the adjoining lot through ignorance as to its location, ineffectual negotiations for the removal of the improvements can not be set up by the owner of the adjoining lot as a recognition of her title, as the bar of the statute, when once complete, cannot be destroyed except by purchase, by limitation or in some other manner recognized by law.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. W. PINCKNEY, Judge, presiding.

GEORGE A. MASON, (HENRY E. MASON, of counsel,) for appellant.

RUDOLPH D. HUSZAGH, and Edward G. Berglund, for appellee David Braverman.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court:

On May 5, 1900, the appellant, Rose Cassidy, acquired title to lot 8 of Givins & Gilbert's subdivision of a tract of land on the north side of West Twelfth street, in Chicago. Her lot fronted on that street, and on May 22, 1917, she filed her petition in the circuit court of Cook county