the law, impairs the obligation of contracts, and is inoperative upon executions issu-
ing on judgments founded on contract. McCracken v. Hayward, 228.
2. As to existing mortgages, foreclosable by a sale, the legislature could not prohibit
the sale for less than half the appraised value of the land, because such a law im-
pairs the obligation of a contract. Gantley's Lessee v. Ewing, 608.
3. Where the legislature of a State accepted from banking corporations a bonus, as a
consideration for the franchise granted, and pledged the faith of the State "not to
impose any further tax or burden upon them, during the continuance of their char-
ters under this act," — Held, that a tax upon the stockholders, by reason of their
stock, was a violation of this contract, and the tax was illegal. Gordon v. Appeal
Tax Court. Cheston v. Appeal Tax Court, 338.
4. But the exemption lasted only during the continuance of the charters under that
act; and when extended without any such promise, the power to tax revived. Ib.
BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY; BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 1. 5;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CUMBERLAND ROAD; Guarantee, 1-3.
1. A provision in the charter of a corporation that transfers of its stock shall be made
only on its books, is for the benefit of the corporation, and bonâ fide purchasers;
third persons cannot take advantage thereof. It applies only to transfers of the legal,
not of the equitable title. Black v. Zacharie, 527.
2. Though the positive or customary law of the place where the corporation is created
governs the transfer of its shares, yet if there be no positive or customary law to
the contrary, a transfer good by the law of the place of the owner's domicile is valid
everywhere. lb.
CHARITY; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 18.
The matter of costs in the admiralty are not, per se, the subject of an appeal; and as
they are in the sound discretion of the court, an appellate court should not, ordi-
narily, interfere with that discretion. Harmony v. United States, 91.
COTTON BAGGING.
REVENUE LAWS, 2.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. This court has not original jurisdiction of a petition for a habeas corpus by an alien
who is a private person. Ex parte Barry, 34.
2. No court of the United States can issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring up a pris-
oner confined by state process, for any other purpose save to examine him as a
witness. Ex parte Dorr, 320.
3. This court has not power, by a writ of prohibition, to revise the proceedings of the
district court. Ex parte Christy, 451.
4. The amount necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, is the sum in controversy at
the time of the judgment, and interest afterwards cannot be considered. Knapp v
Banks, 37.
5. If the plaintiff claims on the record more than $2,000, and recovers less than that
sum, he may have a writ of error. Ib.
6. The judgment must be for more than $2,000 to enable the defendant to have a writ
of error. Knapps v. Banks, 37.
7. In an action brought by the United States against a notary public, to recover damages
laid at $1,000, for having failed to give notice to the indorsers of a promissory note,
for $537.27, put into his hands for protest, there was a verdict and judgment for the
sum of $750.36, and upon this judgment, a writ of error was brought, and it was held
that the matter in dispute was below the amount necessary to give jurisdiction to this
court, and the writ of error was dismissed. Winston v. United States, 638.
8. Where the question is whether property of greater value than $2,000 is liable to be
taken in execution for a less sum than $2,000, the latter is the amount in dispute,
and there can be no appeal. Ross v. Prentiss, 639.
9. This court has no power to review its decisions; and after the expiration of the term
at which a decree is entered, it becomes finally binding and conclusive, though the
decree of affirmance was by a divided court. Washington Bridge Company v. Stew-
art, 498.
10. Though this court has not jurisdiction under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, (1 Stats. at Large, 85,) to examine a perfect Spanish title, and decide
whether the state court had given due effect thereto, yet if an imperfect Spanish
title has been acted on by congress, and this court is called on to review the decision
of a state court upon such statute title, this court must examine the Spanish title, for
the purpose of ascertaining what effect the act of congress had thereon. Chouteau v.
Eckhart, 136.
11. The treaty between the United States and France for the acquisition of Louisiana,
confirmed titles as they existed under the local law; and the decision of the supreme
court of Louisiana, upon a question of boundary of one of the grants made before
the treaty, cannot be considered as denying a title claimed under a treaty, but only
as applying that title, whose existence is admitted, to the land; and, consequently,
this court has not jurisdiction under the 25th section of the judiciary act, (1 Stats. at
Large, 85.) McDonogh v. Millaudon, 604.
12. And the same view is applicable to a confirmation of a French title by commis-
sioners, under an act of congress, not by specific metes and bounds; they confirmed
it as it existed, and it is for the local tribunals to ascertain its bounds. Ib.
13. On a petition to alter a mandate, originally issued in a Florida land case, in 1836,
and concerning which a further order was made in 1838, asking to have the man-
date so changed that the petitioner should be enabled to take the 16,000 acres, to
which he was held entitled, out of any ungranted public lands in East Florida; it
was held that the court had no power to grant the relief prayed. Sibbald v. United
States, 187.
14. If a circuit court misconstrue one of the rules made by this court for regulating the
equity practice of circuit courts, and dismiss the bill, this court will, upon appeal,
reverse the decree, and remand the cause for further proceedings. Poultney v. City
of Lafayette, 295.
15. The authority conferred on the courts of the United States by the act of May 19,
1828, (4 Stats. at Large, 278,) to alter final process, so as to conform it to any change
which may be made in the laws of the States, does not empower the courts to adopt
a state law in part, or with modifications; it must be adopted as enacted, if at all.
McCracken v. Hayward, 228.
16. The Process Act of 1828, (4 Stats. at Large, 278,) adopted so much of the act of
the State of Mississippi as authorized a judgment, by motion, against a sheriff for
failing to pay over moneys collected on execution, and this is a proceeding in the
original suit, over which a circuit court there has jurisdiction, though the plaintiff
and the marshal are both citizens of the same State. Gwin v. Breedlove, 16.
17. The penal clauses of the act are not adopted. lb.
18. A railroad corporation, chartered by the State of South Carolina, to build and
manage a railroad in that State, may be sued by a citizen of New York, in the cir-
cuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, although some of
the owners of shares of the capital stock are not citizens of South Carolina, and the
State of South Carolina owned some of the shares. Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charles-
ton Railroad Company, v. Letson, 193.
19. A citizen of one State having the legal title, may sue a citizen of another State in
a circuit court, without reference to the citizenship of the plaintiffs cestuis que trust.
Bonnafee v. Williams, 558.
20. The statute of Mississippi, requiring payees and indorsees to be joined in a suit by
the holder of a promissory note, will not enable an indorsee to sue the maker and
indorser in a circuit court of the United States, if the maker and payee were citizens
of the same State. Dromgoole v. Farmers and Merchants' Bank of Mississippi,
108.
21. The circuit court has jurisdiction, under the 11th section of the judiciary act of
1789, (1 Stats. at Large, 78,) of a suit in the name of the governor of a State on a
sheriff's bond to the governor, if the parties beneficially interested in that suit be
citizens of another State, and competent to sue the defendant. McNutt v. Bland, 1.
22. The circuit court may quash a writ of supersedeas granted upon an appeal, if it
becomes satisfied that sufficient security was not taken, and this court cannot review
its proceeding, or issue a new writ of supersedeas, upon an inquiry and finding that
the security was sufficient. Black v. Zacharie, 527.
AMENDMENT; Appeal ; Bankrupt, 4; Bond, 1; CITATION; DEVISE, &c. 7; Ex-
CEPTIONS, 5. 6; LOUISIANA, 1; POOR DEBTOR; PUBLIC LANDS, 15; SUPER-
SEDEAS; TRUST, 1; WILL; WRIT OF ERROR.
1. The act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, passed in 1836, imposing a toll upon car-
riages carrying the mail of the United States over that part of the Cumberland road
within that State, is in conflict with the compact between that State and the United
States, arising from the act of congress of March 3, 1835, (4 Stats. at Large, 772,)
under which the State took possession of the road. Searight v. Stokes, 346.
2. The act of the legislature of Ohio, imposing a toll upon passengers in mail stage-
coaches, over the Cumberland road, to the exclusion of all other passengers, does, in
effect, exact a toll of mail coaches, and thus imposes upon the United States a part
of the burden of supporting the Cumberland road, contrary to the compact between
the State and the United States, under which the State took the road. Neil v. Ohio,
616.
CUSTOM AND USAGE.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 5.
If a postmaster-general wrongfully refuse to give a credit to a contractor, and if the
latter should be entitled to his action for damages, he cannot recover special dam-
ages for detention of the money, beyond interest. Kendall v. Stokes, 296.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 10–12.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
COLLATERAL Security.
The act of Virginia of 1776, entitled "An act to enable persons living in other coun-
tries to dispose of their estates in this commonwealth with more ease and conven-
ience," adopted by Kentucky, stood unrepealed in March, 1811, in Kentucky, so far
as respects the mode of acknowledging a deed before a mayor or other chief magis-
trate of a city, &c. Daviess v. Fairbairn, 573.
DEMURRER.
PLEADING, 2. 3.
1. A devise to E. M. during his natural life, and in case he should have heirs lawfully
begotten of him, then to him, his heirs and assigns; but if he should die without
such an heir, the land to be sold, &c., gives to E. M. only an estate for life, to be
enlarged into a fee on the happening of the contingency, according to the laws of
Maryland. Shriver's Lessee v. Lynn, 25.
2. A testator, directing the continuance of a partnership of which he was a member at
the time of his death, may either bind all, or a specific part, or only so much of his
assets as are embarked in the business of the firm. Burwell v. Cawood, 203.
3. An intention to render the general assets liable, is only to be made out by the use
of unambiguous language; and as the will in question does not clearly manifest that
intent, the creditors of the firm have no claim upon the general assets. Ib.
4. The words "residuary legatee" may carry the real estate, where such can be made
out, from other parts of the will, to have been the testator's intention. Ib.
5. Bequest to a daughter, to be delivered to her when she arrives at the age of eight-
een years; but if she should die under that age, leaving no heir of her body, then
over; she married at the age of sixteen. Held, that the husband could take nothing
by his marital right till the wife arrived at the age of eighteen. Price v. Sessions,
569.
6. A testator, after having made provision for his wife and sons, and directed his exec-
utors to lay off a portion of his lands into lots for the site of a town, declares: "I
wish my executors to remember that the town lots now laid off, and hereafter to be
laid off, on the aforementioned two hundred acres of land, should be sold to pay my
just debts, or other engagements, in preference to any other of my property, for the
use and benefit of all my heirs." The words "for the use," &c., appeared to have
been interlined. Held, that sales were directed of all the lots, and not merely of
enough to pay debts. Lane v. Vick, 514.
7. This court does not hold itself bound by the construction of a will of lands, made by
the highest court of a State, unless the construction arises from a settled rule of prop-
erty. Ib.
DISCHARGE FROM IMPRISONMENT.
POOR DEBtor.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Though the two counties of the District of Columbia are under the same political
organization, yet congress has caused the laws of Virginia to continue in force within
the one, and the laws of Maryland within the other; and a person declared by the
laws of Maryland to be made free, by being brought within that State, is entitled to
his liberty, though brought into the county of Washington, which was ceded by
Maryland, from the county of Alexandria, which was ceded by Virginia, and though,
by the law of Maryland, the owner could not directly manumit the slave, who was
over forty-five years of age. Rhodes v. Bell, 152.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 2. 5. 6; COLLATERAL SECURITY.
PUBLIC LANDS, 1. 2. 5. 7. 8.
1. A decree having been made for a sale of real property conveyed to a trustee to
secure payment of a debt, a bill does not lie to restrain the sale on account of a claim
to set-off an independent debt, no peculiar equity, such as the insolvency of the
debtor, the plaintiff in the first suit, having intervened. Dade v. Irwin, 146.
2. Courts of equity do not take jurisdiction to compel offsets of unconnected debts,
generally; there must be some special ground for the relief, such as mutual credit
on the faith of the debts. Ib.
3. A court of equity will not interfere to compel an offset of a stale and suspicious
claim. Ib.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 14; EXCEPTIONS, 5.6; JUDGMENT, &c.; MULTI-
FARIOUSNESS; PUBLIC LANDS, 6. 12. 18; TRUST; WILL; WRIT OF ERROR, 2.
ESTOPPEL.
GUARANTEE, 3; Heirs.
1. Though a refusal to produce books which are in a party's possession will warrant a
jury in making all fair intendments in favor of the secondary evidence which is thus
let in, yet this refusal is not an independent element, from which any thing can be
inferred as to the point which was sought to be proved by the books, if produced.
Hanson v. Eustace's Lessee, 249.
2. Where a witness states facts, and his inferences, it is proper to instruct the jury
that they must determine from the facts whether the inferences are correct. Walker
v. Bank of Washington, 289.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 5. 13; EXECUTION, 2; JURISDICTION, 8; LIBEL, 3;
PUBLIC LANDS, 16; REVENUE LAWS, 4. 11. 12; SHIPS, &c. 2.
1. The court is not bound to give a modified instruction, different in substance from
what is requested; and if an instruction be not substantially correct, in reference to
the evidence, in the terms in which it is prayed for, its refusal is not error. Catts v.
Phalen, 142.
2. The court cannot give an instruction which makes the case turn on one point only,
when there are other grounds necessary to be passed upon by the jury; nor one
which assumes as true a controverted fact. Adams v. Roberts, 187.
3. A refusal to give an instruction not applicable to the evidence, is not error. Rhett
v. Poe, 167.
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