points which had been the main matter of England's pretensions and because of which England had protested against the treaty of the armed neutrality, constitute so many retrograde steps in the regulation of the rights of neutrals; and they carried with them the abrogation of the essentials of the liberal principles proclaimed by the league of 1780-1800, to wit: The inviolability of the neutral flag, the effective quality of biockades, and the abolition of the search of convoys. On the other hand, the convention of 1801 contained, no doubt, besides these restrictions, various other provisions favorable to neutrality. It stipulated explicitly the freedom of traffic between the open parts of a belligerent and a neutral, and removed the unjust prohibitions to any commerce with the enemy which were so frequently decreed during the wars of the Revolution. It also limited in a reasonable way the idea of war contraband. And finally, to make the blockade legal, it required a certain number of war vessels which, though the number thereof was left to the subjective appreciation of the belligerents, was nevertheless calculated to exclude purely fictitious blockades. In principle the latter were at least disapproved of. Thanks to these rather liberal provisions, the convention might have been regarded as a slight step in advance toward the development of neutrality, if it had been loyally executed and scrupulously applied. It was certainly the first international act of general interest through which England modified somewhat her ancient pretentions of dictatorship without any regard whatever for the opinions of the other nations. For the first time, the British Government made important concessions to the neutrals; she bound herself by explicitly clear conventional dispositions and to a certain degree broke with her traditional system, followed by all her ministries, in avoiding precise stipulations in order to avail herself of the obscurity and ambiguity of expressions according to her purposes which varied with circumstances, and in order to be able to apply the rules in partial manner toward such or such another people, and in more considerate manner toward this or that nation. It is true that the convention was far behind the armed neutrality with regard to the protection of the right of the neutrals. Nevertheless, it offered at least the advantage, not only of constituting a compact between two adverse parties which theretofore had not been able to reach an understanding, but even of binding by definite laws the greatest maritime power which theretofore had not allowed herself to be bound by anything. Unfortunately, this advantage of the convention was considerably reduced by the fact that, in large part, it remained a dead letter. England realized ere long that she had granted too much, while the neutrals thought that she had granted too little. Their right had indeed been sacrificed to her. Both parties were dissatisfied with the new order of things, and by all means available they sought to liberate themselves. Ere long, the opportunity to do so presented itself. MANNING: Commentaries on the Law of Nations. London, 1839. William Oke Manning. English publicist; born in 1809; died in 1878. In 1839 he published Commentaries on the Law of Nations. There was then no English treatise on the subject (though there were two by Americans), and Manning's book was noticeable for its historical method, its appreciation of the combination of the ethical and customary elements in international law, as well as for the exactness of its reasoning and its artistic completeness. The book at first attracted little attention, but was gradually found useful by teachers, and was cited as an authority in the courts. The new edition, issued in 1875, was revised and enlarged by Professor Sheldon Amos, with a preface by Manning. Page 257-The commencement of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, may be traced to a circular issued by the Russian court to different European powers, dated 28th February, 1780. This document, after setting forth the great tenderness which the Empress had herself evinced in regard to neutral commerce, and the vexations, on the other hand, which neutral commerce, especially Russian, had been subjected to during the existing war, went on to state that her Imperial Majesty felt called upon to take measures to maintain her own dignity and the welfare of her subjects; and that, to prevent future misunderstanding, she had determined to communicate the principles on which she proposed to act, which she did with the greater confidence, as these principles were based on the primitive rights of nations, were such as every nation had a right to insist on, and were such as the belligerent states could not invalidate without violating the laws of neutrality, and without disavowing the maxims which they themselves had adopted, especially in different treaties and public engagements. The principles referred to consisted of the following provisions: I. That neutral ships might freely trade from port to port, and upon the coasts of nations at war. II. That the property of the subjects of belligerent powers should be free on board neutral ships, excepting goods that were contraband. III. That with regard to contraband goods, the Empress bound herself by what was contained in the arts. X and XI of her treaty with Great Britain, extending these obligations to all belligerent powers. IV. That to determine what characterises a blockaded port, this term shall be confined to places where there is an evident danger in entering, from the arrangements of the power which is attacking, with vessels stationary and sufficiently close. V. That these principles shall serve for a rule in the proceedings and judgments on the legality of prizes. To support these principles, the Empress added that she had fitted. out a considerable portion of her fleet, which she, nevertheless, trusted that the interests of her subjects, or the honour of her flag, would not render it necessary to employ.1 3 This Manifesto, with the second article of which we are at present. alone concerned, was forwarded to different belligerent and neutral powers. In reply to this communication, France, Spain, and the United Provinces, immediately expressed their concurrence in its provisions. But Great Britain never acquiesced in the pretensions of the Russian Memorial, and the reply of our court to the Russian communication stated, that "his Majesty hath acted towards friendly and neutral powers according to their own procedure respecting Great Britain, and conformably to the clearest principles generally acknowledged as the Laws of Nations, being the only law between powers where no treaties subsist, and agreeably to the tenor of his different engagements with other powers, whose engagements have altered this primitive law, by mutual stipulations proportioned to the will and convenience of the 1De Martens, Recueil, vol. iii, pp. 158–160. 2Ibid. 162. 3Ibid. 164. *Ibid. 168. contracting parties:" that precise orders had been given respecting the flag and commerce of Russia, according to the Law of Nations and the tenor of our treaty of commerce; that it was to be presumed that no irregularity would happen, but that otherwise redress would be afforded by our courts of Admiralty, judging according to the Law of Nations, "in so equitable a manner, that her Imperial Majesty shall be perfectly satisfied, and acknowledge a like spirit of justice which she herself possesses." "1 Negotiations subsequently took place between some of the Northern Powers, explanatory, of the assistance that was to be afforded in case the concurrence in an association should draw down an attack upon one of the confederates. In July, 1780, Denmark, and afterwards Sweden, forwarded circulars to the courts of London, Paris, and Madrid, stating their intention to abide by the five articles of the Russian Manifesto, which were copied verbatim, with the exception of the alteration of the date of the respective treaties defining contraband. In reply to these circulars France and Spain returned answers highly applauding the proceedings of the Northern courts, and stating their acquiescence in the provisions of the new arrangements.3 But Great Britain appealed to the faith of treaties, of which the conduct of Denmark and Sweden was in direct violation. In the British Note to Denmark, dated 25th July, 1780, it was stated that the Danish commerce had always been treated by us in conformity with the treaties which had subsisted between the two nations for upwards of a century (the treaty of 1670 being still in full force), that "their reciprocal rights and duties were evidently traced by these solemn ngagements, which would become illusory could they be changed Cerwise than by mutual consent. They subsisted at the present ment in their full force, and, equally obligatory on each of the ntracting powers, they formed an inviolable law for both." Our vernment had always followed their stipulations, and expected the me conduct from the court of Denmark.a กระ the same manner, in the British reply to the Note of Sweden, it Itated that the articles of our treaties with Sweden offered a direct swer to her novel pretentions. The twelfth art. of our treaty of Tartens, Recueil, vol. iii, 160, and Annual Register for 1780. p. 115. mens, vol. iii, pp. 175, 187. 1661 was cited, wherein it is expressly stated that the goods of enemies shall not be concealed on board the ships of the other confederate; and that the goods of enemies found on board the ships of either confederate shall be made prize. But the goods of the subjects of the confederate shall be restored. Treaties, it was added, can not be altered, unless by the mutual consent of the contracting parties; they are equally obligatory on both, and the King would observe and maintain them as a sacred and inviolable law.1 Appeal to the faith of treaties had, however, no effect on the conduct of these courts. Not that the obligation of these treaties was, or could be, denied. So far from it, these treaties were expressly cited. by these courts themselves; and, with what would be called impudence in private transactions, some of the articles of these treaties were appealed to as still existing, by both Sweden and Denmark, while other articles of the same treaties were flagrantly violated at the same moment. Thus Denmark, in her treaty with Russia, stated in art. III, that she would abide by her treaty with Great Britain of 1670, for her definition of contraband between herself and England; yet, by this same treaty, provision was made to prevent the goods of enemies from being concealed on board the ships of friends. And in art. II of the treaty between Sweden and Russia, Sweden refers expressly to art. XI of her treaty of 1661, for her definition of contraband between herself and England:3 yet, by the very next article, the twelfth, it was engaged that the goods of enemies should be taken from the ships of friends. Yet it was with such a flagrant violation of right, for the sake of a transient interest, that these powers entered upon treaties, based, according to their highsounding preamble, on the dignity of the contracting sovereigns, their care for the happiness of their people, and their solicitude for the rights of mankind in general. On the 28 June/9 July, 1780, was made the treaty between Russia and Denmark, which was the first of the series establishing the confederacy of the Armed Neutrality. By article III of this treaty, it was stated, that "their Majesties after having already insisted, in their declarations to the belligerent powers, on the general principles of natural right, of which the freedom of commerce and navigation as 1 De Martens, vol. iii, p. 188. 2 Ibid. 191. 3Ibid. 200. |