vantages, she was forced into consenting that the Maritime Convention of June 17, 1801,1 should by its Article 3 sanction the following principles: 1. Neutral vessels may freely sail to the ports and along the coasts of the belligerent nations. 2. Merchandise on board shall be free, excepting the so-called war contraband and enemy property, merchandise of enemy origin, but purchased and carried by the neutral preserving at all events the advantages accrued to the flag of the latter. 3. In order to remove all doubt as to the nature of the objects which constitute war contraband, the contracting parties refer to Article XI of the Treaty of Commerce concluded between themselves on February 21, 1797.2 4. A port shall be regarded as blockaded only in case entrance thereto offers a real danger by reason of the number of war-ships charged with inhibiting access thereto. 5. Judicial action against neutral vessels captured because of established suspicions or of evidently culpable facts shall be had without. delay, and the mode of procedure shall be uniform and strictly legal. all The dispositions which follow shall be rigorously imposed upon the States wishing to adhere to the treaty. The so delicate question of the visit of convoyed ships was resolved in these terms by Article 4: 1. The right of searching merchant vessels owned by the subjects of one of the two Powers and sailing under the escort of a war-ship of their nation belongs exclusively to vessels of like rank of the belligerent State, and may not be exercised by private ship owners nor by corsairs. 2. The owners of vessels destined to sail in or convoy under the escort of a war-ship shall, before receiving their nautical instructions, present to the chief of the convoy their passports and their sea certificates, in the form established by the treaty. 3. When a convoy is made by a war-ship of the belligerent parties, the latter, unless the weather conditions upon the sea or the vicinity in which the encounter takes place prevent it from doing so, shall hold itself beyond cannon range and send a longboat to the convoying vessel in order to proceed in common accord to the examination of the 1Hertslet, vol. i, p. 208; Martens, first edit., Supplément, vol. ii, p. 476; second edit., vol. vii, p. 260. 2 Martens, first edit., vol. vi, p. 722; second edit., vol. vi, p. 358. papers and certificates declaring that the one is authorized to escort such or such ships with such or such cargo from port A to port B, and that the other really belongs to the royal or imperial marine of the nation whose flag she flies. 4. After the regularity of the papers has been recognized, any legitimate suspicion shall be regarded as having been removed, in the contrary case, the chief of the convoy, after having been invited thereto in due form by the belligerent shall stop long enough in order to permit the belligerent war-ship to proceed with the search of the vessels composing the convoy. 5. If after the examination of the papers, the captain of the warship believes that he has good reason to detain one or several of the convoyed vessels, he shall be free to do so by preliminarily placing the captain of the crew at the disposal of the chief of the escort, who in turn shall be entitled to place on board the sequestered vessels any one of his officers to follow the procedure of the investigation which it will be necessary to perform. The captured vessel shall then be conducted forthwith to the nearest and most convenient port of the belligerent nation in order to subject it to a regular examination. A last article, the fifth, forbids the chief of the convoy to resist by force the execution of the acts prescribed by the commander of the belligerent vessel. Various accessory stipulations of this treaty sanctioned under the guaranties in the interests of the neutrals; one of these in particular states that in case of an ill-founded detention or of the violation of the established laws, a proper indemnity shall be due the owners of the vessel and of the cargo in proportion to the losses they shall have sustained. In order to forestall the abusive use of third flags, Article 7 establishes that, in order that a vessel may be regarded as legitimately belonging to the nation whose colors she flies, the captain and half of the crew must be subjects of the same nation. Finally, Article 8 declares applicable to all maritime rules undertaken by the contracting parties, the principles of this treaty adhered to by Denmark on October 23, 1801, and by Sweden on March 30, 1802.2 1Hertslet, vol. i, p. 204: Martens, first edit., Supplément, vol. iii, p. 193; second edit., vol. vii, p. 273. 2 Martens, first edit., Supplément, vol. iii, p. 196; second edit., vol. vii, p. 276. § 2506.-As also seen from this analysis, it was the purpose of the Anglo-Russian Treaty to consolidate through general formulas, the rules established by the two armed neutralities of 1780 and of 1800 with the traditional principles of the maritime law of Great Britain. Looked at from this point of view, it must be acknowledged that this arrangement was only a compromise between two opposite elements; it had, however, for its final result the partial abandonment of the violent policy of the London ministry. The nations of the North did indeed consent to weaken in fact the rigor of the doctrine that the free vessel protects the cargo it bears, and to submit to the right of search which they had hitherto opposed; but they obtained at the same time recognition for the principles of armed neutrality with regard to effective blockades and to the commerce with the colonies and along the coasts of the enemy. To feel convinced that this was the real meaning of the St. Petersburg Treaty, it will suffice to refer to the discussions which took place in the House of Lords, at the sitting of November 12, 1801. Lord Grenville spoke first and declared that what had been stipulated was in manifest contradiction with the previous attitude of the ministers of his Britannic Majesty, and that the exaggerated pretensions of the Baltic Powers had been singularly favored by the weak and vacillating policy of England during the last years of the war waged against the United States. According to the same orator, the Government had assumed a yielding attitude whose tendency could not be controlled. and gradually it had followed a course it had not dared acknowledge one year before, while on their part the other Powers had little by little yielded of their pretensions which they had maintained relative to this question and exposed themselves, by following in the footsteps of the Russian Government, to yield by making first one and then another concession, to the reestablishment of the ancient maritime law and to the notification of conquests so laboriously realized by the neutrals during the previous twenty-five years. § 2507. The final result was that the treaty of June 17, 1801.1 proved unsatisfactory to all of the contracting parties: to England because it interfered with her policy; to the neutrals because it restricted their rights; and for this reason also Russia denounced the treaty in the course of the year 1807 by proclaiming again the prin 1Hertslet, vol. i, p. 208; Martens, first edit., Supplément, vol. ii, p. 476; second edit., vol. vii, p. 260. ciples which formed the basis of the armed neutrality of 1801 and by pledging herself to abide by it faithfully in the future. Thus freed from its conventional engagements, the English Government reestablished its ancient doctrines not only against Russia, but even against all the other neutral Powers. One fact worthy of our notice is that not a peace treaty or a commercial treaty concluded since by England, either with Sweden, or with Denmark, contains the slightest stipulation concerning the principles of maritime law in the interest of the neutrals who had for such a long time roused the attention of Europe.1 Volume IV, page 518, § 2638.-The neutral State shall not merely observe neutrality, but even have its situation respected by third parties and to that effect take all necessary measures. If need there be, it may equip land and sea forces in order to safeguard its rights against any attack and to prevent the belligerents from entering its territory: This is what is termed armed neutrality. Neutrality, when the State which proclaims it is not in position to make it respected by an eventual recourse to armed force, is doubtless a rather precarious guaranty. It is therefore admitted that the neutral who does not feel himself strong enough to defend himself alone is entitled to ally himself with others to perfect an action and help against attacks which the belligerents might direct against their common neutrality, thus, at the end of the last century and at the beginning of the present one, we have seen the maritime Powers of the North of Europe unite collectively and mutually to protect their rights against the pretensions of England which violated the independence and the immunities of maritime neutrality." 1Ortolan, Règles, vol. ii, pp. 153-156; Cauchy, vol. ii, pp. 339, et seq.; Gessner, pp. 44-46; Wheaton, Elem., pt. 4, chapter iii, § 23; Klüber, Droit, §§ 307, et seq.; Martens, Précis, § 326a; Cussy, Phases, vol. ii, pp. 203, et seq.; Vergé, Précis de Martens, vol. ii, p. 355; Manning, pp. 274, et. seq. зFiore, vol. ii, p. 369; Bluntschli, §§ 748, 778; Klüber, Droit, § 282; Heffter, §§ 145, 149. HALL: The Rights and Duties of Neutrals. London, 1874. William Edward Hall. British publicist and member of the Institute of International Law, born in 1835, died in 1894. Mr. Hall is known in international law for his Rights and Duties of Neutrals, 1874, and especially for his masterly Treatise on International Law, first published in 1880. The latter work has run through six editions, and has been regarded as an authority-indeed, a classic-from the date of its appearance, in 1880. The writer's national bias crops out at times, and has subjected the work to no little criticism. Page 106.-It was natural, however, that the secondary maritime powers should in time accommodate their theories to their interests. They were not sure of being able as belligerents to enforce a stringent rule; they were certain as neutrals to gain by its relaxation. Accordingly, in 1780 Russia issued a declaration of neutral rights, among the provisions of which was one limiting articles of contraband to munitions of war and sulphur. Sweden and Denmark immediately adhered to the declaration of Russia, and with the latter power formed the league known as the First Armed Neutrality. Spain, France, Holland, the United States, Prussia, and Austria, acceded to the alliance in the course of the following year. Finally it was joined in 1782 by Portugal, and in 1783 by the Two Sicilies. It is usual for foreign publicists to treat the formation of the Armed Neutrality as a generous effort to bridle the aggressions of England, and as investing the principles expressed in the Russian declaration with the authority of such doctrines as are accepted by the body of civilized nations. It is unnecessary to enter into the motives which actuated the Russian Government; but it is impossible to admit that the doctrines which it put forward received any higher sanction at the time than such as could be imparted by an agreement between the Baltic powers. The accession of France, Spain, Holland, and the United States was an act of hostility directed against England, with which they were then at war, and was valueless as indicating their settled policy, and still more valueless as manifesting their views of existing international right. It was the seizure by Spain of two sian vessels laden with wheat which was the accidental cause of the Rus The intrigues which led to the issue of the Russian declaration are sketched by Sir R. Phillimore, iii, Sec. 186; see also Lord Stanhope, History of England, chap. Ixii. |