Mightinesses had encouraged the exportation of naval stores for France, by suspending the usual duties on those commodities, whilst it is known to all the world, that such a suspension has never taken place, and that the Republic had a right to export those commodities, not only agreeably to the treaty in 1674, but also in conformity to the principles laid down by the neutral Powers in the convention of armed neutrality. That consequently it would be needless to enter any farther into the merits of the said manifesto; as His Swedish Majesty has it in his power to appreciate himself its value, and must, moreover, be fully persuaded that the line of conduct pursued by their High Mightinesses since the beginning of the troubles with America, is an evident proof, that they have never favored or countenanced the revolted colonies; witness the many partial condescensions in favor of England, which were merely gratuitous on the part of their High Mightinesses, by circumscribing the trade within their own colonies; by refusing to grant the protection of their convoys to vessels laden with ship timber: and by recalling the Governor of St. Eustatia on some ill-grounded complaints of the British ministry: condescensions which have been rewarded by the attack and seizure of the convoy of Count Byland; by a violation of the territories of this Republic, and by the taking by force some American vessels from under the very batteries of the island of St. Martin.

That Their High Mightinesses having thus faithfully adhered to the system of moderation, it is evident that the resentment of His Britannic Majesty arises merely from their accession to the treaty of armed neutrality and that, consequently, Their High Mightinesses are fully authorized to claim the performance of the conditions stipulated in the Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the treaty of armed neutrality, which form the basis of that union and alliance contracted between Their Imperial and Royal Majesties and the Republic. That therefore no obstacles can hinder or delay the fulfilling of the engagements contracted by virtue of the said confederation, of which the Republic ought to be considered as a member from the very moment in which their High Mightinesses acceded to the same resolution at The Hague; and dispatched their declaration, in conformity to the said accession and convention, to the belligerent Powers.

That if Their High Mightinesses had to complain only of a single act of offense, or an attack committed against them, which was likely to be redressed by the friendly interposition of their allies, they would

have claimed their intervention rather than have recourse to arms; but as their High Mightinesses find themselves actually and suddenly attacked in an hostile manner by His Britannic Majesty, in consequence of, and from mere resentment of the above mentioned alliance, they find themselves under the necessity of repelling force by force, and to return hostilities for hostilities; being fully persuaded that the allied Powers will not hesitate to make this their common cause, and to procure to their Republic due satisfaction and indemnity for the losses. occasioned by an attack equally unjust and violent; and that the said Powers will moreover, in conjunction with the States-General, take such farther measures, as the exigences of the present circumstances may require. This Their High Mightinesses solicit with great earnestness, and rely upon it with so much more confidence, as they are firmly. persuaded, that the generous and equitable sentiments, which actuate. Their Imperial and Royal Majesties, will not suffer them to let the Republic fall a victim to a system of politics, not less glorious than founded in equity, and established for the security of the rights of neutral nations: and especially as the Republic, if left singly exposed to the iniquitous and violent attacks of England, would hardly be able to cope with that overbearing Power, and thus run the hazard of becoming totally useless to the said confederation.

For these reasons, the underwritten envoy extraordinary, insisting on the motives urged here above, and fully persuaded that the ratifications of the treaty signed at Petersburg will take place as soon as possible, has the honor, in the name and by express order of his masters, to claim the performance of the engagements stipulated in the Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the said treaty, and to require, in virtue thereof, a speedy and adequate assistance from His Swedish Majesty, whose noble and equitable sentiments, acknowledged by all Europe, will not permit him to abandon the complete establishment of a system worthy the highest praise.

The friendship and affection of Your Majesty towards their High Mightinesses, leave them no doubt of Your Majesty's willingly granting the assistance which they now claim, and also promise to the underwritten envoy a speedy and satisfactory answer, which he solicits the more anxiously, as every moment's delay may be attended with heavy and irreparable losses to the Republic.

STOCKHOLM, February 28, 1781.

(Signed) D. W. VAN LYNDEN

Rescript of Her Majesty the Empress of Russia to Count de Moussin Pouschkin, Her Minister to Sweden, 17811

Your reports and the communications of Baron Nolken, the Swedish Minister, informed us at approximately the same time both of the disposition of the Court of Sweden with regard to the war which has broken out between the two maritime Powers and of the desire of His Swedish Majesty to learn our own sentiments on this subject. Accustomed as we are to reply in kind to the confidence of our allies, we are still less inclined to deviate from this rule in the present circumstances, in which consideration for our respective engagements with regard to armed neutrality must elicit in the same degree our attention and our interest. Therefore, you are authorized to speak confidentially with Count Scheffer, so that he may inform his master, telling him that as soon as we learned of the sudden departure of the Duke of York from The Hague, we hastened to make the strongest kind of representations to the Court of London, to prevent it from entering upon active hostilities. We were then ignorant of the fact that hostilities were to follow immediately upon the departure of its Ambassador. Being convinced of this fact a few days later and realizing the futility of any step to prevent hostilities, we turned our attention to new measures better adapted to the times and crcumstances, which would be capable of extinguishing the sparks of war at the outset. We were led to this course by a twofold reason: the thought of humanity suffering from the shedding of innocem. blood, and the interests of neutral nations with regard to their conmerce with belligerents. Although, after the formal request of the King of England for our mediation, conjointly with the Emperor Di the Romans, to bring about peace between him and the Courts of France and Spain, there seemed to be some hope for opening peace negotiations, nevertheless, as time was required to discuss the matter with the two Crowns and to receive their mutual consent, we have deemed it advisable to find a shorter way to reconcile England and Holland and have offered our separate mediation for that purpose It was our intention by this action to prevent in this reconciliation the discussion of any subject that is foreign to them, especially the que tion of the independence of the Americans, which would have caused the chief difficulty. The States-General received our offer witt

1Translation. French text at Martens, Recueil de Traités, vol. 3, 1. 24

gratitude, and were eager to take advantage of it, as you will see from the enclosure herewith. England, on the contrary, declined, postponing its reconciliation with the Republic until the general peace negotiation, under the joint mediation of the two Imperial Courts. When that takes place, we shall not fail to exert our own efforts in favor of the Republic of Holland as well as to interest His Majesty the Emperor in its behalf, in order that it may be included in the general pacification. After having given assurances to the StatesGeneral, we promised them at the same time to confer amicably with our allies with a view to a further common and unanimous effort with the Court of London, to bring it to a moderate course and to the love of peace.

We hesitated the less to give these assurances to their High Mightinesses, because we noted in the memorandum of February 17, communicated by Baron Nolken, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for your information, a decided determination on the part of His Swedish Majesty to follow a similar course. The entire contents of this memorandum show, on the one hand, the profound penetration of that Prince, and, on the other hand, a point of view in perfect accord with ours. In truth, the time and the circumstances in which Great Britain has attacked her old ally, the Republic of Holland, indicate sufficiently that the real cause of her aggression lies in the accession of the States-General to our maritime conventions, the more so because Holland thereby protected the navigation and commercial industries of her subjects, the greater part of which was carried on with the enemies of England.

But, on the other hand, it is no less true that the actual rupture preceded the formal accession of their High Mightinesses to the conventions of Copenhagen and Petersburg, and that the reasons set forth antedate and are foreign to the cause of the allies of the armed neutrality. In the first part of this argument, Articles 7, 8, and 9 are entirely favorable to the Dutch; but Article 6 frees us, in terms no less clear, from the duty of participating in their war with England. So essential a difference in the stipulations of these conventions leaves the three allied Courts free to follow the course that is most advantageous and the most in harmony with their interests.

There could be no more judicious or wiser appraisement of the delicacy of the decision to be made than that adopted in the Swedish memorandum. The drawbacks on each side were discussed and

shown in their true light, with an indication of the best way to avoid them. In admitting this method-that is to say, the observance of neutrality as the rule of conduct for the three allied Crowns in the new war between maritime Powers,--we did not fail to inform at once the Courts of Stockholm and Copenhagen of the orders which we had transmitted to our commanding officers at sea to regard the Republic of the United Provinces as a neutral Power with respect to the two branches of the House of Bourbon, and belligerent with respect to England. In calculating the time, we shall expect to hear soon from you and from the Councilor of State, Mr. Sacken, that the Kings our allies have likewise given similar orders in their States, so that all our actions and all the steps that we take shall be everywhere entirely uniform in all respects, and bear witness to the close union among us, which in the centuries to come must justify this beneficent system of neutral merchant navigation.

After having taken the measures that we owe to the welfare of our own States before all foreign interests, we shall not fail, as we have said heretofore, to employ in favor of the Republic of Holland all means compatible with this paramount duty. Consequently we willingly give our support to the idea of His Swedish Majesty that suitable representations be made at the Court of London in the name of the three allied Courts. In the Swedish memorandum there is question of a declaration, but a declaration might by its very nature carry us beyond our intentions, while a mere verbal hint, expressing the same views with the same force, can bind us in no way against our will and desire. This observation, as simple as it is essential, will not escape Count Scheffer's sagacity, with whom you are to confer as to the wording of these representations, as to the time when they shall be made at London, and as to the manner in which our respective Ministers at that Court shall make them.

We should not have placed any obstacle in the way of the adoption of the very wording proposed in the above-mentioned memorandum, since we found it as moderate as it was in keeping with the purpose in view, if circumstances, which have now become well known to the Court of Stockholm, did not seem to require certain changes. To this end, you will find hereto annexed a new draft of the representations, which you will bring to the knowledge of Count de Cheffer, telling him that in our opinion, in order that they may be more readily understood by the English Ministry, they might be delivered in writ