the German Empire, the claim of the German ambassador, founded upon the "most favored nation clause," must be pronounced untenable for at least two conclusive reasons.

In the first place, the "most favored nation clauses" of our treaties with foreign powers have from the foundation of our Government been invariably construed both as not forbidding any internal regulations necessary for the protection of our home industries, and as permitting commercial concessions to a country which are not gratuitous, but are in return for equivalent concessions, and to which no other country is entitled except upon rendering the same equivalents. Thus, Mr. Jefferson, when Secretary of State in 1792, said of treaties exchanging the rights of the most favored nation that "they leave each party free to make what internal regulations they please, and to give what preference they find expedient to native merchants, vessels, and productions." In 1817 Mr. John Quincy Adams, acting in the same. official capacity, took the ground that the "most favored nation clause only covered gratuitous favors and did not touch concessions for equivalents expressed or implied." Mr. Clay, Mr. Livingston, Mr. Evarts, and Mr. Bayard, when at the head of the Department of State, have each given official expression to the same view. It has also received the sanction of the Supreme Court in more than one wellconsidered decision, while in Bartram v. Robertson (122 U. S. 116). Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the whole court, expounded the stipulations of the "most favored nation clause" in this language (p. 120):

They were pledges of the two contracting parties, the United States and the King of Denmark, to each other, that, in the imposition of duties on goods imported into one of the countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other, there should be no discrimination against them in favor of goods of like character imported from any other country. They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation in that respect.

This interpretation of the "most favored nation clause," so clearly established as a doctrine of American law, is believed to accord with the interpretation put upon the clause by foreign powers-certainly by Germany and Great Britain. Thus, as the clause permits any internal regulations that a country may find necessary to give a preference to "native merchants, vessels, and productions," the representatives of both Great Britain and Germany expressly declared, at the International Sugar Conference of 1888, that the export sugar bounty of one

country might be counteracted by the import sugar duty of another without causing any discrimination which could be deemed a violatron of the "most favored nation clause." So both Germany and Great Britam acquiesced in the position of the United States, that our treaty with Hawan did not entitle those nations to equal privileges in regard to imports with those thus obtained by the United States, the privileges granted to the United States being in consideration of concesstons by the United States which Germany and Great Britain not only did not offer to make, but, in the nature of things, could not make.

If these established principles be applied to the case in hand but one result seems to be possible. The form which the provisions of our recent tariff act relating to salt may have assumed is quite immaterial. It enacts, in substance and effect, that any country admitting American sa't free shall have its own salt admitted free here, while any country petting & duty on American salt shall have its salt dutiable here

der de preevsting statute. In other words, the United States conmis `ire st?" to any nation which concedes "free salt" to the United Sunes Germany, of course, is entitled to that concession upon returnng the are equalent. But otherwise she is not so entitled, and thee & wine et favored nation clause" which compels the Three States to discriminate against other nations and in favor Pb granting gratuitory to the latter privileges which it were former och spon the payment of a stipulated price. dhe vet nie, even if the provisions of our recent tarif act vanje Zaferarve could be deemed to contrave the mos-favoredupor dues” of the man with Germany-as they can not be for fact is a

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immediately upon its arrival in port. In short, the claim is that there is no discrimination against American salt, which is the evil our statute aims to prevent; that American salt and German salt are in reality treated on a footing of entire equality.

The validity of this proposition I do not think I am in a position to judge of, for want of sufficient data. The laws of Germany I do not and can not be expected to know, and, like other foreign laws, are facts to be proved by competent evidence. The statement respecting them made by the German ambassador in a communication to the Secretary of State (copy of which you inclose) are undoubtedly correct, but they leave me in doubt upon what seems to me a vital point, viz, whether the internal excise tax on salt referred to is imperial in character-that is, is levied by and belongs to the Imperial Government or is local, and is levied by and belongs to one or more constituent states of the Empire. If it is of the latter character, it probably can not be considered in relation to the matter in hand any more than a like domestic tax of any one or more of the States of the United States could be considered in the same relation. If, however, it could be considered under any circumstances, then it is obviously material to know whether such tax is levied by all of the constituent states of the Empire, without exception, and actually or necessarily at the same

rate.

As at present advised, therefore, salt imported from the Empire of Germany is, in my judgment, legally dutiable under the statute above quoted.

Respectfully, yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

RICHARD OLNEY.

Decisions of Federal Courts

THE BARK ELWINE KREPLIN 1

Seamen's Wages.-Desertion.-Imprisonment on Shore.-Consul.— Treaty With Prussia.—Jurisdiction.-Parties.-Practice.-Minor. -Executive Recognition.

A Prussian bark, with a crew whose term of service had not expired, was laid up at Staten Island, on account of the war between Prussia and France. A difficulty arose between the captain and the crew, and they demanded leave to go and see the consul. This the captain refused to allow, but agreed that one of them, named L., might go. They insisted that they would all go, and the captain went ashore to get the aid of the police. After he had gone, the crew informed the mate that they were going to see the consul, and went ashore, without serious objection from the mate. The captain, returning, was told by the mate that the men had gone ashore, and high words passed between them, which resulted in the mate's saying that he would go too, and he went ashore, without objection from the captain. The captain, with a police officer, overtook the crew, and all hands went before a police justice, where the captain made a complaint against the mate and the crew for mutiny and desertion. The justice informed the captain that he had no jurisdiction, but he directed a policeman to take the men into custody, and they were locked up. The captain then went before the Prussian consul, and made complaint, requesting that the crew be punished, and that they be kept in custody preliminarily, and stating that he could not receive the mate on board again. The consul then issued a requisition to a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States, stating that the men had deserted, and asking for a warrant to arrest the men, and, "if said charge be true," that they be detained until there should be an opportunity to send them back. The requisition the captain took to the police justice, who thereupon, without examination, committed all the men to the county jail, where they lay for ten days. On the direction of the consul, they were then released, and came to the consul's office, where they were advised to go to the ship, and ask the captain for their wages. Some of them went, and the captain agreed to meet the crew at the consul's office next day. He came there, but the parties failed to meet each other, and thereafter the seamen executed assignments of their wages to the mate,

18 Fed. Cases, 592 (Case 4,427); 4 Benedict, 413.

NOTE. This case was reversed by the Circuit Court, on the ground that this Court was prohibited, under the treaty with Prussia, from exercising jurisdiction. An application was made to the Supreme Court for a mandamus, to compel the Circuit Court to pass upon the merits, but was denied. Fed. Cases (No. 4426), vol. 8; 588.