Distillers were originally defined, under 12 Stat. 456, as persons who distilled or brewed for sale; but the word "brewers" has DISTILLERY BONDED WAREHOUSE. been left out of all the later statutes. It is conceded on all hands that a person who Under Ky. St. § 4105 et seq., providing distills spirits or brews beer, though not for for the assessment of distilled spirits in

"distillery bonded warehouses," such phrase | eral distinct parcels or lots, or it might be dimeans, not only the bonded warehouses kept at the distillery, but the bonded warehouses, wherever kept or by whomsoever owned, in which the products of the distillery were stored, pursuant to United States laws and under the supervision of its officers. City of Louisville v. Louisville Public Warehouse Co., 53 S. W. 291, 292, 107 Ky. 184.

A vessel is in distress when in a state of

Rev. St. 1874, c. 86, § 1, providing for the appointment of a conservator of any distract- danger or necessity, as from want of provied person having any estate, means one in- sions or water, etc. (Webst. Dict.); or "in capable of acting rationally in the ordinary a situation of misfortune or calamity, as a affairs of life and of comprehending the na- steamer in distress" (Stand. Dict.). A vesture and value of property, so as to be incap-sel, of course, is also in distress when wreckable of transacting or procuring to be trans-ed and needing salvage service. The Saeacted ordinary business. Snyder v. Snyder, helm (U. S.) 99 Fed. 456, 458, 39 C. C. A. 600. 31 N. E. 303, 304, 142 Ill. 60.

DISTRAIN.

At common law to distrain was to take the personal property of another into possession and hold it as a pledge or security until satisfaction was obtained by the payment of a debt, the discharge of some duty, or reparation for an injury done, with the right in certain cases to sell it to obtain satisfaction, of which the impounding of cattle for damages feasant, or the taking by the landlord of the goods and chattels of the tenant upon the premises for the nonpayment of rent, are familiar examples. Boyd v. Howden (N. Y.)

For rent.

seize

rent.

See "Sufficient Distress"; "Unreasonable
Distress."

Distress is the right of the landlord to and hold property for the payment of The liability to distraint arises from the fact that the property found on the premises and not from the ownership. The goods of a stranger are liable, with those of the tenant. This right is an ancient privilege of the common law, which had its origin in the feudal tenures. Lord Coke informs us that it was an inseparable incident of the seigniory. It is a remedy which is confined to the land out of which the rent issues, and does not it is true, owes the rent; but the remedy is follow the person of the tenant. The tenant, enforced against the land, and not against him. His personal liability is not regarded, and the proceeding is conducted as if the land were the debtor. Distresses seem to have originated from two more ancient remedies of the common law. By the process of gavelet and cessavit the landlord could seize the land itself for rent in arrear and hold it until payment was made. These processes have been obsolete for ages, and exist only in the memory of legal antiquaries. Emig v. Cunningham, 62 Md. 458, 460.

Distress is the taking of a personal chattel out of the possession of a wrongdoer into the custody of the party injured to procure satisfaction for a wrong committed, as for nonpayment of rent. Hard v. Nering (N. Y.) 44 Barb. 472, 488 (citing 3 Bl. Comm. 6); Owen v. Boyle, 22 Me. (9 Shep.) 47, 61.

It is well settled in England that whatever goods and chattels a landlord finds on the premises of the tenant who is in arrears for rent are distrainable by the landlord, whether they in fact belong to the tenant or a stranger; but there are exceptions to this rule, and certain articles are exempt from distress, not only those belonging to strangers, but to the tenant himself. Animals feræ naturæ cannot be distrained. Whatever is in the personal use and occupation of any

intestate's property, the word "descend" is used where land is to go to the heirs, and the word "distribute" where money is to be divided, the use of the word "distribute" in a part of the act which provides that, if land be sold for more than the computation of the value thereof, then the administrator shall "distribute the same as by this act is required for the intestate's real estate," is the land, though to go to the heirs, is to have significant as showing that the proceeds of the character of and otherwise be treated as money. Grider v. McClay (Pa.) 11 Serg. &

R. 224, 232.

As postponing vesting of estate.

A will giving to a beneficiary a certain sum absolutely, to be "distributed" to him at the expiration of three years, or in a certain contingency in five years, from the testator's death, gives to such beneficiary a vested interest in fee in the devise, postponed merely in enjoyment. Williams, 14 Pac. 394, 396, 73 Cal. 99.

Williams V.

man is for the time privileged and protected. Valuable things in the way of trade are not liable to distress, as a horse standing at a smithshop to be shod or in a common inn, or cloth at a tailor's house, or corn sent to a mill; for all these are protected and privileged for the benefit of trade, and are sup- Testator devised to his children a cerposed in common parlance not to belong to tain portion of his real estate and all his the owner of the house, but to his customers. personal estate to be distributed, when reOwen v. Boyle, 22 Me. (9 Shep.) 47, 61. quired, at mature age or maturity, in equal Distress is a remedy that can be em-lated to the division of the estate at the time parts. Held, that the word "distributed" reployed only for the recovery of what is properly rent and is reserved as such. It may be sustained where the sum originally stipulated for has been increased by agreement, but covenants that relate to the use of the premises, but not to the payment to the lessor for the use, do not give the right to dis- DISTRIBUTABLE PROPERTY. train, and a breach of a covenant in a lease not to engage in a certain business on the premises under penalty does not give a right to distrain for such penalty. Evans v. Lincoln Co., 54 Atl. 321, 322, 204 Pa. 448 (citing

Latimer v. Groetzinger, 139 Pa. 207, 227, 21
Atl. 22).

fixed by the will, and not to the vesting of the estate, so that until that time the devisees took the lands as tenants in common. Chighizola v. Le Baron, 21 Ala. 406, 411.

The movable property of a railroad other than its rolling stock is termed, for the purpose of taxation, "distributable properSt. Ry. Co., 61 S. W. 603, 605, 161 Mo. 188. ty." State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Metropolitan

Distributable property of a railroad company, for the purposes of taxation, is defined in Acts Tenn. 1897, c. 5, § 7, as consisting of the roadbed, rolling stock, franchises, choses in action, and personal property having no actual situs. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. King (U. S.) 120 Fed. 614, 621, 57 C. C. A. 278.

DISTRIBUTABLE SURPLUS.

With respect to decedents' estates, the term "distributable surplus" is applicable to street (Va.) 3 Rand. 559, 561. personal estate only. Williams v. Stone

DISTRIBUTEE.

As legal representative, see "Legal Representative."

The word "distributees" means "persons who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the personal estate of one who

is dead intestate." Henry v. Henry, 31 N. C. 278, 279.

The word "distributees" is popularly used to mean the persons who are entitled, under the statutes of distribution of the state, to the personal estate of one dying intestate. No other word has been used to convey the same idea, and the word commends itself because it has not been appropriated to any other use. The word is in common use among the legal profession, and the fact that it had been adopted by the profession and by the legislature, notwithstanding the severe rebuke given to it by Hindman, C. J., in Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C. 393, is a convincing proof that a necessity for a new word really existed. Henry v. Henry, 31 N. C. 278, 279. Ruffin, C. J., in a dissenting opinion, however, says: "Distributees' is not a word at all known in the law, and, until my Brothers told me that they understood what it meant, I must humbly beg pardon for saying that I looked upon it as a newly invented barbarism and without settled sense; indeed, I do not now understand from what source the meaning of the term is derived. I believe it is a phrase which is sometimes used in common parlance by persons who are not speaking of the profession, and do not aim at accuracy in speaking on legal subjects. Some members of the bar have fallen into the use

In a contract for the publication of an advertisement in a certain periodical, and to pay therefor at the rate of $20 for each and every thousand copies of the total number printed and delivered for distribution, the term "distribution" means a delivery for the purpose of supplying subscribers or purchasers of the paper. The act of leaving the periodical at houses in the principal streets of the city, four copies at a time, by boys employed for that purpose, is not a "distribution" within the meaning of such contract. Dawley v. Alsdorf (N. Y.) 25 Hun, 226, 227.

In a will by one who had deeded his property to his wife subject to the distribution of his legal heirs, reciting that he deemed it proper that he should make a distribution of the property, "distribution" should not be construed in the sense of taking by the statute of distribution, but in the sense of division by himself among his heirs as he saw fit. Sasser v. McWilliams, 73 Ga. 678, 683.

Of estate.

"Distribution," has been defined to be the division of an intestate's estate according to law. Rogers v. Gillett, 9 N. W. 204, 205, 56 Iowa, 266 (citing 1 Bouv. Law Dict. 438).

The "distribution" of an estate includes law are entitled thereto, and also the prothe determination of the persons who by portions or parts to which each of these pertion is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, sons is entitled. A proceeding for distributhe res being the estate which is in the hands of the executor, under the control of the court, and which he brings before the court

for the purpose of receiving direction as to Lawler, 48 Pac. 323, 116 Cal. 359.

its final distribution. William Hill Co. v.

Same-As relating to real estate.

of it, sometimes in discussion, when precision of expression is of the less importance, as there is opportunity for exception; but those who indulge themselves in that mode of speech are so sensible of its impropriety that, as Judge Henderson remarked in Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C. 393, they seldom use 'distributee' without an apology, knowing that it is not to be found in any English dictionary or English book, much less in a lawbook. I believe that up to this day it has not obtained admission into any American dictionary, though at least one of them has been supposed to have taken every word that can possibly be tolerated, but when used it has not seemed, to me at least, to be in any definite sense." In a subsequent case, Mardree v. Mardree, 31 N. C. 295, 306, Judge Ruffin himself uses the words "the only distributees," placing them in quotation marks. A creditor of an estate who has recover-erty, real or personal, by direct bequest, de ed a judgment on his claim in the county court is not a "distributee" of the estate, within Rev. St. c. 3, §§ 116, 117. Wolf v. Griffin, 13 Ill. App. (13 Bradw.) 559, 560.

DISTRIBUTION.

With respect to decedents' estates, the term "distribution" is applicable to personal estate only. Williams v. Stonestreet (Va.) 3 Rand. 559, 561.

Act 1839, art. 4, § 1, relative to married women, provides that any married woman may become seised or possessed of any prop

word "distribution" applied as well to real mise, gift, or distribution. Held, that the estate derived by descent, as to personalty received from the estate of an ancestor. Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 690, 707.

A father died leaving six children, devising all his land to a son, subject to a life

See "Final Distribution"; "Valid Distri- estate to his mother. A controversy bebution."

"Distribution is the act of dividing or making an apportionment." In re Creighton, 11 N. W. 313, 12 Neb. 280.

tween a daughter and the administrator was settled by a stipulation, signed by all the children, that, in consideration of her dismissing her claim, she, in the distribution of their father's estate, should receive an