wise, and the holding, management, and dis-ing the use of the basins and slips as in their position of shares of the capital stock of judgment would best promote the general companies, corporations, and joint-stock as- convenience. Hecker v. New York Balance sociations organized for certain purposes, the Dock Co. (N. Y.) 24 Barb. 215, 221, 222. word "disposition" should be restricted to its more primitive and general import, which does not necessarily imply a barter, sale, or alienation. Gould v. Head (U. S.) 41 Fed. 240, 244. think proper. DISPOSSESS. A lease provided that, in case the sale of the land from the state to the lessee should be rescinded during the term, the lessee should pay only for that portion of the term up to the time he should be legally dispossessed. Held, that the word "dispossessed" meant put out of possession. Munroe (N. Y.) 21 Hun, 74, 82. DISPOSSESSION. Mattoon V. and injury, and therein it differs from disposDisseisin is an estate gained by wrong session, which may be by right or wrong. This is the uniform language of the best authorities from the time of Littleton. Smith v. Burtis (N. Y.) 6 Johns. 197, 217, 5 Am. Dec. 218; Slater v. Rawson, 47 Mass. (6 Metc.) 439, 444; Draper v. Monroe, 28 Atl. 340, 18 R. I. 398. Testator declared: "It is my will that my daughter E.'s portion be paid to her, to make whatever disposition of it she may It is my will that my daughter T.'s portion be paid over to the guardian of her children for their special benefit." Held that, construing both clauses DISPROVE. together, the words "to make whatever disposition of it she may think proper" only operated to vest an absolute title in the daughter, and did not operate to exclude her husband from his arital rights in the property, either during coverture or as her survivor. Noland v. Chambers, 2 S. W. 121, 122, 84 Ky. 516. * The amendment of April, 1887, to Code, 8 831, provides that "a husband or wife is not competent to testify against the other, except * to disprove an allegation of adultery." Held, that the word "disprove" means to prove to be false or erroneous; and hence a husband or wife is competent to give all testimony material in convincing or persuading the minds of the jury, either di "Disposition," as used in a will providing that the portions of property given there-rectly or by necessary inference, that the by to testatrix's granddaughters should be so secured to their use and benefit as not to be subject to the control and disposition of their husbands, means the disposition in the exercise of the husband's marital rights, and allegations are unfounded, and is not confined merely to denying such allegation. Irsch v. Irsch, 12 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 181, 182. not from any disposition procured by the DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION. just and natural influence arising from the marital relation. Deering v. Tucker, 55 Me. 284, 288. As arrangement. In a city ordinance providing for the appointment of a dock master to direct the removal and disposition of vessels, the word "disposition" clearly implies arrangement or classification, and it clearly imports authority to give those orders and directions upon a plan or system. These officers have by immemorial usage exercised the authority for promoting public convenience and increasing the accommodation for ships and vessels, and classifying them in their use of the basins, piers, and wharves by habitually sending large ships to basins having deep water and small vessels to slips having shallow water, distributing them also according to the locations for business, and generally so arrang Disputable presumptions are inferences which the law requires to be drawn from given facts, and which are conclusive until disproved by evidence to the contrary. Thus an infant between 7 and 14 is considered inca pable of committing a felony, but evidence may be given to prove a felonious intent. Joyner v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 1 S. E. 52, 55, 26 S. C. 49. Disputable presumptions are inferences of law, which hold good until they are invalidated by proof or a stronger presumpBrandt v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1002, 1004, 81 App. Div. 183. tion. DISPUTE. See "Amount in Dispute"; "Matter in All disputes, see "All." A dispute, as it is found in Wharton's gave the board power to arbitrate where it definition of the word "lis," as meaning a was denied that any damage was done and suit, action, controversy, or dispute, means a that any amount was due. Bradby v. Local conflict or contest. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Board of Health, 4 El. & Bl. 1014, 1020. Guinotte, 57 S. W. 281, 283, 156 Mo. 513, 50 L. R. A. 787 (citing Stand. Dict.). "Dispute," as used in Act May 29, 1885 (P. L. 34, § 12), providing that the court shall settle a dispute between natural gas companies and boroughs, etc., should be construed to include a dispute arising from the passage of an ordinance requiring a gas company to pay a license fee alleged to be exorbitant before it could make excavations for relaying its pipes. A dispute which arises from the denial of the right to the company to make excavations in order to reach and repair its pipes is as clearly a dispute within the meaning of the statute as one which arises from the refusal of the company voluntarily to make needed repairs; and a dispute may exist, although the denial of the right is not absolute and unqualified, but is conditional upon the payment of a license fee which the company considered unreasonable in amount and unauthorized by law. Ft. Pitt Gas Co. v. Borough of Sewickley, 47 Atl. 957, 958, 198 Pa. 201. A dispute arises when there are conflicting claims made to the same property, which, unless abandoned by the one or the other of the parties, or compromised, will result in litigation; and it is as to such a matter that communications made in a consultation in relation thereto with an attorney are privileged. Slaven v. Wheeler, 58 Tex. 23, 25. Controversy synonymous. The term "dispute," as employed in Rev. St. § 639, declaring that any suit commenced in any state court wherein the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $500, may be removed for trial in the Circuit Court, is to be construed as exactly synonymous with the term "controversy" in the second section of the third article of the Constitution, which declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "controversies" between citizens of different states, etc. In order, therefore, that there be a controversy or dispute, there must be a matter either of law or fact asserted on one side and denied on the other. Thus, if the matter alleged by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant, there is no controversy and no dispute, and therefore no case for removal. Keith v. Levi (U. S.) 2 Fed. 743, 745. Denial of liability. St. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 112, § 69, enacting that compensation is to be given to all persons sustaining damage to their property by reason of certain improvements, and that in case of a "dispute as to the amount" the matter shall be referred to arbitration, would not include cases where the liability to make any compensation is denied. Reg. v. Commissioner of Sewers, 1 El. & Bl. 694, 701. DISPUTED CLAIM. Rev. Laws, § 2148, authorizing the reference of a disputed claim between an executor and administrator, includes disputed claims of every character. Noyes v. Phillips, 57 Vt. 229, 230. ed that one having a disputed or rejected 2 Rev. St. p. 89, § 38, in substance enactclaim against a decedent should be barred of any action within a certain time. Held that, to entitle an administrator or executor to the benefit of the statute, his act in disputing or rejecting the claim must be decided and absolute, and whatever the language, if at the same time he does or says anything from which the claimant may reasonably infer that the determination to reject is not final, the claim is not disputed or rejected within the meaning of the statute. Plaintiff presented to defendant, as executor of W., claims against the estate, and the executor served a notice that he declined to pay the claims, stating that he had no means of in formation as to them and would like a bill of particulars. The claims were against two No steps had been taken to collect them of had not been disputed or rejected within the the surviving partners. Held, that the claims statute. Hoyt v. Bonnett, 50 N. Y. 538, 543. firms in which testator had been a partner. DISPUTED DEMAND. Within the rule that a promise by a creditor, having a liquidated and undisputed demand against his debtor which is wholly due and payable, to discharge the residue upon receiving payment of a part, is nudum pactum, a demand is not a disputed demand merely because the debtor refuses to pay or recognize it; for, if this were true, no case would ever arise for the application of the rule. It is disputed, within the meaning of the rule only, when it is so far disputable as to present a proper case for litigation. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Clark (U. S.) 92 Fed. 968, 985, 35 C. C. A. 120 (citing Tuttle v. Tuttle, 53 Mass. [12 Metc.] 551, 46 Am. Dec. 701; Zoebrisch v. Von Minden, 120 N. Y. 406, 24 N. E. 795; Honeyman v. Jarvis, Public Health Act 1818, § 144, giving a board power to arbitrate as to the amount of compensation for damages done to land by certain improvements, where there was a "dispute as to the amount of compensation," 79 Ill. 318). DISQUALIFY. Otherwise disqualify, see "Otherwise." Webster defines the verb "disqualify," of which “disqualified" is the past participle, as follows: "(1) To deprive of the qualities or properties necessary for any purpose; to render unfit; to incapacitate; usually with 'for.' (2) To deprive of a legal capacity, power, or right; to disable, as a conviction of perjury disqualifies a man to be a witness." The natural and ordinary sense of "disqualify" is to incapacitate, to disable, to devest or deprive of qualifications; and that is the sense in which it is used in Const. art. 20, § 18, which provides that "no person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business vocation or profession." Hence an ordinance prohibiting the employment of females in dance cellars, etc., is unconstitutional and void. In re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 606, 40 Am. Rep. 125. statutes declaring that disqualified judges shall not sit. State v. Blair, 53 Vt. 24, 28. A justice of the peace was not disqualifiled from presiding in a case when one of the parties married a cousin of the justice's wife; the party and the justice not being otherwise related. Blalock v. Waldrup, 10 S. E. 622, 84 Ga. 145, 20 Am. St. Rep. 350. A person is disqualified when he is deprived of legal capacity, power, or right, as a conviction of perjury disqualifies a man to be a witness. In re Tyers' Estate, 84 N. Y. Supp. 934, 935, 41 Misc. Rep. 378. DISQUALIFYING OPINION. A disqualifying opinion in relation to a juror must be a fixed, positive, absolute, definite, settled, decided, unconditional opinion. The rule is uniformly laid down by the use of one of these words, or words of equivalent force. State v. Hebert, 28 South. 89S, 104 La. 227. The opinion which disqualifies a juror is not a merely passing or transitory inclination of the mind, based on such account of the defendant's alleged offense as the juror has Under Rev. St. c. 3, § 18, which provides that administration shall be granted to the husband upon the estate of his wife, if he will accept the same and is not disqualified, a husband is not "disqualified," so as to justify the county court in refusing him let-read, having made no inquiry as to the truth ters of administration, because of a postnuptial contract by which he relinquished all his right and interest in his wife's estate. Orear v. Crum, 25 N. E. 1097, 1098, 135 III. 294. "Disqualified," as used in Const. art. 2, § 6, providing that every person shall be "disqualified" for holding office during the term for which he may have been elected who shall have given or offered a bribe, etc., to secure his election, is synonymous with, and means the same as, the word "ineligible," as used in Rev. St. 1894, § 6312 (Rev. St. 1881, § 4756, subsec. 2), which provides that an election may be contested when the contestee was ineligible. Hence, in an election contest, where it is alleged that the contestee was ineligible, evidence of having given bribes for votes at such election is competent. Carroll v. Green, 47 N. E. 223, 224, 148 Ind. 362. Generally speaking the disqualification of a judge consists either in any interest in the of the account, and no investigation in reference to the crime imputed to the defendant, for the purpose of satisfying the mind as to his guilt or innocence. Such an opinion is merely the opinion an intelligent man almost irresistibly forms from hearing or reading newspaper accounts of crime, relying on the truthfulness of the published accounts, which are always subject to be changed and altered by contradictory accounts. Such opinions rarely disqualify intelligent men from fairly considering the evidence given on a trial, when called on to act as jurors. The mere and rendering an impartial verdict thereon, formation and expression of an opinion of a juror as to the guilt of a defendant, based on but, in order to be a disqualification, the newspaper reports, is not a disqualification; opinion must be an abiding bias of the mind, based on the substantial facts in the case, in the existence of which the juror believes. State v. Meyer, 3 Atl. 195, 197, 58 Vt. 457. subject-matter of the litigation, relationship DISQUE. to one or more of the parties to it, and statutory prohibitions. In re Nevitt (U. S.) 117 Fed. 448, 451, 54 C. C. A. 622. "Disqualification," as used with reference to the disqualification of a judge, in its ordinary signification, means some interest in the subject-matter or a relationship to the parties in interest. The disqualification or inability, however, may result from physical The word "disque," when used as part of the name of an electric battery, is descriptive of the form of the battery, and is used to distinguish it from the prism and other forms of battery. Leclanche Battery Co. v. Western Electric Co. (U. S.) 23 Fed. 276, 277. DISREGARD. causes, as well as from interest or relationship; and this is the sense in which the ex- In an instruction to the jury that "you pression "legal disqualification" is used in are not at liberty to disregard the testimony of a witness, where you may believe from the evidence that such witness is corroborated by other competent evidence and the circumstances in proof in the case," the word "disregard" will be construed to have been used in the sense of “reject,” so that the instruction is erroneous. People v. Compton, 56 Pac. 44, 46, 123 Cal. 403. A report of a commissioner, stating that he disregards the evidence of the tax returns, does not mean that he rules it to be inadmissible, but that, as a judge of facts, he finds it untrustworthy and uninstructive. National Bank of Commerce v. City of New Bedford, 56 N. E. 288, 289, 175 Mass. 257. A clause in a will that testator's executor shall disregard the statute of limitation and pay the principal of testator's debts, but not the interest, operates to require the executor to pay such debts, even though it may not constitute a new promise which will take the same out of the bar of the statute of limitations. Campbell v. Shotwell, 51 Tex. 27, 35. DISSATISFACTION. The word "dissection," as used in a statute punishing a person who shall remove a dead body from the grave for the purpose of dissection, is to be understood as it is ordinarily used. It is defined as the act of dissecting or cutting in pieces an animal or vegetable for the purpose of ascertaining the structure and uses of its parts, and the removal of a body from the grave by a parent, and taking from the body a small portion of fractured bone, to be used as evidence in an action for malpractice, is not within the meaning of the word as used in the statute. Rhodes v. Brandt (N. Y.) 21 Hun, 1, 3. DISSEISE. The word "disseised," in an inquisition in the case of a forcible entry and detainer, stating that the prosecutor was "disseised," necessarily implied a previous seisin. Commonwealth v. Fitch (Pa.) 4 Dall. 212, 1 L. Ed. 805. Though the word "disseisivit" may be taken to imply a freehold, yet it is not sufficient, when used in an indictment for forcible entry and detainer, without showing what estate the person disseised had; but an indictment that plaintiff “was peaceably possessed in his demesne as of fee in certain lands, and continued so seised and possessed until F. and L. thereof disseised him, and him, so disseised and expelled, did keep out," etc., seems sufficient to show that plaintiff was seised of a freehold estate. Fitch v. Rempublicam (Pa.) 3 Yeates, 49, 50. In a suit by a workman, who has agreed to do the work to the satisfaction of his employer, there is a distinction between being dissatisfied with his work and discharging him because of dissatisfaction. An employer may be dissatisfied with the work of one of his men, and yet retain the workman in his employment, or he may be dissatisfied, and may discharge the workman, not because of dissatisfaction, but because of some other DISSEISIN. reason; and in the action by the workmen, they are complaining not of dissatisfaction, but of discharge, and hence the question whether the employer ought to have been satisfied does not arise under the contract, so that it would not be legitimate for either workman to prove that in his opinion or the opinion of the other he had done good work, but proof may be directed to the question whether the employer was dissatisfied, and whether he discharged because of dissatisfaction. Gwynn v. Hitchner, 52 Atl. 997, 998, 67 N. J. Law, 654. A disseisin occurs when one enters on land, intending to usurp the possession and to oust another of his freehold, and therefore "querendum est a judice quo animo hoc fecerit" why he enters and intruded. Blunden v. Baugh, Cro. Car. 302, 303 (citing Lord Coke, 1 Inst. 153); Probst v. Trustees of Board N. E. 275, 276, 177 Mass. 139, 83 Am. St. Rep. against the will of the occupant." Spalding | in possession will not operate as a disseisin v. Mayhall, 27 Mo. 377, 378. of the mortgagee, but will be regarded as im A disseisin is the wrongful putting out provements made to enhance the value of the of him that is seised of the freehold. Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497, 518. Actually taking possession of land under claim or color of title is a disseisin. Inhabitants of Town of Weston v. Inhabitants of Town of Reading, 5 Conn. 255, 257. "Disseisin" is defined by Littleton to be "where a man entereth into any land or tenements where his interest is not congeable and ousteth him who hath the freehold." Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 590, 49 Am. Rep. 100; Bates v. Norcross, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 224, 228. Disseisin is a privation of seisin; the act of wrongfully depriving a person of the seisin of land. Roberts v. Niles, 49 Atl. 1043, 1044, 95 Me. 244. Disseisin is the act of devesting the owner of real estate of his seisin and possession of the land, and substituting in its place the ownership and possession of the disseisor. In its origin, when the seisin constituted the title of the owner to his freehold, it was the forcible expulsion of the tenant or the wrongful entry upon him, and the forcible holding by the intruder was called a "disseisin"; and in those days force would naturally be employed to effect a change of possession by a wrongdoer. But in after times, when titles to lands became more complex and possessions more diversified, other acts were held to be disseisins. It would be as preposterous to look for the same acts of disseisin in our day that usually occurred in the simple times of high antiquity as to expect to find the same customs and manners in these days that were characteristic in those. Clapp v. Bromagham (N. Y.) 9 Cow. 530, 553. Disseisin is an estate gained by wrong and injury. The rightful owner must have been expelled, either by violence or by some act which the law regards as equivalent in its effect. A mere entry on another's land is no disseisin, unless it be accompanied by expulsion. Arden v. Thompson (N. Y.) 5 Cow. 371, 374. Disseisin is not only the dispossession of the freeholder, but also a substitution of the disseissor as tenant to the lord and as one of the pares curiæ in place of the disseisee. McCall v. Neely (Pa.) 3 Watts, 69, 71. There are two kinds of disseisin: A disseisin at the election of the owner of the land, and a disseisin in spite of the true owner. Porter v. Hammond, 3 Me. (3 Greenl.) 188, 190. Building on mortgaged premises. The erection of buildings on mortgaged premises by the mortgagor while remaining equity of redemption. Hunt v. Hunt, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 374, 386, 25 Am. Dec. 400. Claim of right. "Disseisin is an actual, visible, and exclusive appropriation of land, commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation, to hold the land against him who was seised." Portis v. Hill, 3 Tex. 273, 279; Gildehaus v. Whiting, 18 Pac. 916, 919, 39 Kan. 706. Disseisin is an actual entry on land, with palpable intention to claim possession as owner; and this claim of possession must not be the assertion of a previously existing right, but the assuming of a right to the land from that time and a subsequent holding with assertion of right. This intention to claim and possess the land is one of the qualities indispensable to constitute a disseisin, as distinguished from a trespass. Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Minn. 361, 368 (Gil. 335). a Blackstone defines "disseisin" as wrongful putting out of him that is seised of the freehold. 3 Bl. Comm. 169. Disseisin, therefore, must mean in some way or other turning the tenant out of his tenure, and usurping his place and feudal relation. Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burrows, 107. It must be with intent to usurp the place of the true owner and put him out of possession. Unger V. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100. Richardson, C. J., in Towle v. Ayer, 8 N. H. 57, says "there is an actual disseisin when one man wrongfully enters upon the land of another with intent to usurp, and, retaining the possession, actually turns the owner out, or at least keeps him out." Occupation such as will constitute a disseisin of the true owner and give title by adverse possession must be accompanied by a claim of title. v. O'Neill (Or.) 58 Pac. 95, 96. Dispossession distinguished. Altsch All the books seem to agree that the ancient learning on the subject of the general doctrine of disseisin has become abstruse. Disseisin, in the age of Bracton, was considered in an extensive sense, and far beyond the idea which was first applied to it. Disseisin by election, in opposition to actual disseisin, was introduced very early, and be came prevalent, in order to extend the remedy by writ of assize, which was devised by Glanville in the reign of Henry II. It must therefore be difficult in many cases to know what species of disseisin was intended, though it is said that the old books, and particularly the book of assize, when they mentioned disseisins, generally relate to dis |