Proc. art. 394, providing that the state's the imperfect working is not permanent, and attorney may come before the grand jury at any time except when they are discussing the propriety of finding a bill of indictment, is equivalent to the phrase “deliberating upon the accusation against the defendant" in article 523, providing that an indictment may be set aside for the presence of any person, not authorized by law, when the grand jury were deliberating upon the accusation against the defendant. Stuart v. State, 34 S. W. 118, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 440.

DISEASE.

See "Bad Disease"; "Heart Disease"; "Infectious Diseases."

The term "disease," in an insurance application that insured is free from disease, can hardly be said to characterize an ailment which produces no disorder, and of the presence of which the person affected is unconscious. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Yung, 15 N. E. 220, 222, 113 Ind. 159, 3 Am. St. Rep. 630.

The word "disease" may include, and is often used to designate, ailments more or less trivial. The false answer by an applicant for insurance, to a question constituting a warranty, as to whether he ever had any of certain enumerated diseases and ailments, will constitute a breach of the contract, though such disease or ailment is not material to the risk, unless the same was not inherent, but temporary, and due to extraordinary and exceptional outside causes, such as excessive work or heat. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 31 S. W. 501, 502, 88 Tex. 333, 28 L. R. A. 765, 53 Am. St. Rep. 757.

As accident.

See "Accident-Accidental."

Cold.

In an application for reinstatement of an insurance policy which stated that the insured had not since the policy was issued been "sick or afflicted with any disease," a cold will not be included, and, in the absence of proof that the cold referred to produced disease or sickness, the words cannot be construed as meaning absolute freedom from any bodily ills, but rather freedom from such ills as would ordinarily be called "disease" or "sickness." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McTague, 9 Atl. 766, 768, 49 N. J. Law (20 Vroom) 587, 60 Am. Rep. 661.

Fainting spell.

In a broad generic sense, any temporary trouble by reason of which a man loses consciousness is a "disease." It is a condition of the body not normal, and produced by the imperfect working of some function; but as

the body returns at once or in a short period of time to its normal condition, it does not rise to the dignity of a "disease." A fainting spell produced by indigestion or a lack of proper food for a number of hours, or from any other cause which would not indicate any disease in the body, but would show a mere temporary disturbance or enfeeblement, would not come within the meaning of the words "disease and bodily infirmity," as used in an insurance policy providing that the risk shall not extend to death caused by disease and bodily infirmity Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan (U. S.) 58 Fed. 945, 955, 7 C. C. A. 581, 22 L. R. A. 620.

Headache

A headache which is produced temporarily by overwork, and leaves no permanent effect upon the constitution, is not, in the sense of an application for insurance, a "disease." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson (Tex.) 28 S. W. 837, 838.

Insanity.

"Disease," when used without restrictive words, includes "diseases of the mind as well as of the body," so that a clause in a life policy providing that the policy shall be avoided by suicide, unless the same is the direct result of disease, does not render the policy void upon self-destruction as the result of insanity. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 14 Sup. Ct. 155, 157, 150 U. S. 468, 37 L. Ed. 1148.

As used in an accident policy providing that the insurer shall not be liable for death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease, "disease" does not include a selfinflicted injury or death during the insanity of the insured. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 7 Sup. Ct. 685, 687, 120 U. S. 527, 30 L. Ed. 740.

Kidney trouble.

An answer in the proofs of death that the injured had had kidney trouble is not inconsistent with an answer in an application that he never had "disease of the kidneys," since there might have been kidney trouble from accident, or from some other temporary cause, such as to produce sickness, when it could not properly be said that there was disease of those organs. Hogan v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 41 N. E. 663, 664, 164 Mass. 448.

Malignant pustule.

"Disease," as used in a policy of accident insurance providing that the benefits thereof should not extend to any death or disability which might be caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease ex

isting prior or subsequent to the date of consciousness. Meyer v. Fidelity & Casualthe policy, should be construed to include ty Co., 65 N. W. 328, 96 Iowa, 378, 59 Am. a malignant pustule, caused by the infliction St. Rep. 374. upon the body of putrid animal matter conThe term "disease," in an application for taining poisonous bacillus anthrax, which rea life policy containing representations as sults from touching or handling vermin coming from the hide or hair or wool of animals to the freedom of insured from disease, does suffering from this disease, from their flesh not include any temporary ailment, unless sometimes, or from the feathers of birds it be such as to indicate a vice in the conthat have been feeding upon this peculiar kind of carrion, and then bringing the mat-ing, at least, on the general health and con

stitution, or so serious as to have some bear

ditions of life, or such as, according to com-
mon understanding, would be called a "dis-
ease."
Rand v. Provident Sav. Life Assur.

ter in contact with the skin or thin mucous
membrane, or it may be transported by in-
sects, flies, or mosquitoes. It has been call-
ed "wool sorter's disease," because it hap- Soc., 37 S. W. 7, 8, 97 Tenn. 291.
pens among people who handle wools and
hides, such as tanners, butchers, and herds-
men, and those people that are engaged in
business where they are brought in contact
with that sort of thing, and there have been
epidemics of it. Bacon v. United States
Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 25 N. E. 399, 123 N. Y. 304,
9 L. R. A. 617, 20 Am. St. Rep. 748.

Sunstroke.

"Disease," as used in a life insurance policy providing that the insurance did not cover injuries resulting from any disease or bodily infirmity, is practically synonymous with "infirmity," and will not be held to refer to a slight or temporary disorder. Meyer v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 65 N. W. 328, 330, 96 Iowa, 378, 59 Am. St. Rep. 374 (citing Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Heimann, 93 Ind. 24; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. MeTague, 49 N. J. Law [20 Vroom] 587, 9 Atl. 766, 60 Am. Rep. 661; Pudritzky v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, 76 Mich. 428. 43 N. W. 373; Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 306, 32 N. W. 610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 894; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Daviess' Ex'r, 87 Ky. 541, 9 S. W. 812).

In a policy of insurance against injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means, and excepting disease or bodily infirmity, "disease" should be construed to include sunstroke or heat prostration, which is a disease of the brain. "Sunstroke" is a term applied to the effects on the central nervous system, and through it on other organs of the body, by exposure to the sun or to overheated air. Dozier v. FiThe representation, in an application for delity & Casualty Co. of New York (U. S.) life insurance, that the insured had not been 46 Fed. 446, 447, 13 L. R. A. 114.

Temporary, ailment or disorder.

Wounds or injuries.

subject to or had any "disorders or diseases," such as open sores, lumps, or swellings of any kind, should be construed to mean only A temporary ailment from which a per- such as result by defective action of some son recovers cannot be considered a "dis-function, and which were to some extent perease" within the meaning of a life insur-manent or continuous, and of such nature ance policy. Corbett v. Metropolitan Life as would be of reasonable significance for Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. S. 775, 780, 37 App. Div. the purpose of the inquiry, and not from 152 (citing Cushman v. United States Life wounds or injuries. Home Mut. Life Ass'n Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 72). v. Gillespie, 1 Atl. 340, 343, 110 Pa. 84.

In an application for a life policy stating that insured had no disease, the term "disease" does not include any slight ill in no way seriously affecting the applicant's health or interfering with his usual avocations; but a temporary ailment in the nature of a headache or a cold may be of such a serious nature that it is a sickness, within the meaning of such a representation. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Francisco, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 672, 680, 21 L. Ed. 698.

DISFIGURE.

"Disfigure," as used in Code, § 2678, making it criminal to maliciously kill, maim, or disfigure any horse, cattle, etc., includes injuries which are not of a permanent character. "It embraces any injury, however slight, which is made with malice toward the owner, and which is of a character to lessen the value of the animal." State v. Harris, 11 Iowa, 414, 415.

The words "disease or bodily infirmity," as used in a provision in an accident policy Within a statute punishing the mutilaexempting insured from liability for injuries tion or disfigurement of an animal the shavcaused thereby, mean practically the same ing off of all the hair from the mane and thing, and only include an ailment or dis- tail of a horse would be sufficiently describorder of a somewhat established or settled ed by the word "disfigure." It is the very character, and merely a temporary disorder term which would be used, and maliciously arising from sudden and unexpected derange- to impair the use and value of a horse by ment of the system, though it produces un- injuring his appearance and marring his

beauty in removing of those parts alike ornamental and useful, falls entirely within the mischief which the act seeks to prevent. Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 39, 40.

DISFRANCHISEMENT.

Distinguished from amotion, see "Amotion."

Disfranchisement destroys or takes away ine franchise or right of being a member of a corporation. Richards v. Clarksburg, 4 S. E. 774, 778, 30 W. Va. 491.

The disfranchisement of a member of a corporation is an expulsion of the member and the taking away of his franchise, which cannot be done unless the power is given by the charter creating the corporation, or the member has been guilty of a crime, the conviction of which would work a forfeiture of all civil rights, or has committed acts which tend to the destruction of the corporation, such as the defacing of its charter, the alteration of its records, or other acts tending to impair or destroy its title to its rights or privileges. White v. Brownell (N. Y.) 4 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 162, 192.

DISGRACE.

Disgrace is a sense of shame or reproach; that which dishonors; a state of ignominy, dishonor, or shame. And this is the gravamen of an aggravated assault, which is defined as an assault which inflicts disgrace. Slawson v. State, 45 S. W. 575, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 176, 73 Am. St. Rep. 914.

DISGUISE.

Waste is the "disherison" of the remainderman or reversioner. "Disherison" is defined to be disinheriting, depriving, or putting out of an inheritance (Burrill, Law Dict.), and the old writ of waste called upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he had committed waste and destruction in the place named to the "disherison" of the plaintiff. Abernethy v. Orton, 71 Pac. 327, 329, 42 Or. 437, 95 Am. St. Rep. 774.

DISHONOR.

See "Notice of Dishonor."

"Webster defines the word 'dishonor' to be to refuse or decline to accept or pay, when it is used in a commercial sense; and Mr. Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, gives a similar meaning. In Shelton v. Braithwaite, 7 Mees. & W. 436, the Court of Exchequer held that the word 'dishonor' had a technical signification, and imported that the bill had been presented for payment and had not been paid." Brewster v. Arnold, 1 Wis. 264, 276.

A negotiable instrument is dishonored when it is either not paid or not accepted according to its tenor on presentment for the purpose, or without presentment where that is excused. Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 4070; Rev. St. Wyo. 1899, § 2368; St. Okl. 1903, § 3634; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 4895; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 2210.

"In disguise" is an expression importing a meaning totally different from the DISHONORABLE CONDUCT. phrase "in ambush," or the word "concealed."

The word "disguised," when employed as a noun, means a counterfeit habit; a

dress intended to conceal the person who

Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, as ground for refusing a certificate to practice medicine, is (1) the procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring a criminal abortion; (2) the obtaining of a fee on the assurance that a manifestly incurable disease can be permanently cured; (3) betrayal of a professional secret to the detriment of a patient; (4) causing the publication and circulation of advertisements of any medicine or means whereby the monthly periods of women can be regulated, or the menses can be established if suppressed; (5) causing the publication and circulation of advertisements of any kind relative to diseases of the sexual organs, tending to injure the morals of the public. Cobbey's Ann. St. Neb. 1903, § 9428.

wears it. So it is held that, where the evidence showed that a murder was committed by one in ambush or concealed in bushes, a charge relative to the commission of the crime by a person in disguise was unsupported by the evidence. The attempt, says the court, to construe the mere position of a person in ambush or concealed in the bushes as synonymous with, or similiar to, the mere dress or mask of a person in disguise, would be a wanton outrage upon good sense and logic. A person in disguise is one who is visible to the eye, but who cannot be identified because of the dress or mask which he wears. A person in ambush or who is concealed is one not visible to the eye, and may not be in disguise. "Disguise" has reference solely to the dress or mask assumed by To "disinter" means to unbury; to take which the party cannot be recognized when out of the grave; to exhume; so that as used

DISINTER.

in Pen. Code, § 290, providing that every person who disinters or removes a dead body "Disinterested," as used in a statute reof a human being without authority of law quiring that the commissioners appointed on is guilty of a felony, it will not include one a petition for laying out a highway should be who merely dug down to a coffin to search disinterested freeholders, meant those so sitthe body for valuables, without removing it.uated that the establishment of the highway, People v. Baumgartner, 66 Pac. 974, 975, 135 Cal. 72.

A son-in-law of a judgment creditor is not a disinterested person within Rev. St. c. 73, § 3, providing for the appointment of ap-ested persons, the term would not include a praisers on execution sale of a disinterested and discreet person. One of the definitions of "disinterested" given by Webster is "indifferent." Worcester gives as one meaning "superior to private regards," and he defines "indifferent" as having no choice or preference. It does not mean only one having no pecuniary interest. Wolcott v. Ely, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 338, 340.

Rev. St. c. 113, § 28, requires an applica- DISINTERESTED WITNESS. tion by a debtor to disclose and take the poor debtor's oath to be made before two disinter

ested justices of the peace. Held, that the word "disinterested" meant a legal, positive interest, either by way of relationship to some of the parties, or by way of some accruing pecuniary gain or loss from the result, and not a mere intellectual, moral, or sympathetic interest; hence it did not follow, because a justice had heard and adjudged a prior application by the same petitioner, that he was disqualified, or was not disinterested to hear subsequent applications. McGilvery V. Staples, 16 Atl. 404, 405, 81 Me. 101.