ordinary sense, generally signifies a percent- | Falls Bank v. Leyser, 116 Mo. 51, 71, 22 S. W. age upon the amount involved in the trans- 504, 509 (citing Niagara County Bank v. Baaction. Swift v. United States (U. S.) 18 Ct. ker, 15 Ohio St. 68). Cl. 42, 57. Sale distinguished. A "discount," as distinguished from a sale of a note, is that where a note is discounted money is loaned thereon by a bank taking interest in advance, and the person offering the note for discount becomes liable thereon as an indorser; while a sale of the note implies a transfer of title only, by which the seller parts with all interest in and liability on the paper. Neilsville Bank v. Tuthill, 30 N. W. 154, 155, 4 Dak, 295. "Discount," as applied to the ordinary transaction of discounting a note, is the lending of money. The party discounting does in fact lend money on interest, to be repaid either by the person receiving, or by some other party to the bill, at a certain period. The term "discount." in its appropriate mercantile sense, is distinguished from a "sale" of the note or bill, for whoever gets a bill or note discounted at a bank is required to indorse the note, and thereby assume the obligations of an indorser. By the transaction he gets a loan, and literally borrows money, while in the case of a sale of negotiable paper all that would be required would be an assignment, sufficient merely to pass title as an indorsement without recourse. Freeman v. Brittin, 17 N. J. Law (2 Har.) 191, 206. As a deduction on advances. A discount is an allowance or deduction generally of so much per cent. made for prepayment or for prompt payment of a bill or cash payment, from the price of the thing account; a sum deducted, in consideration of usually sold on credit; any deduction from the customary price, or from a sum due or to be due at a future time. Carroll v. Drury, 49 N. E. 311, 312, 170 Ill. 571. The term "discounting," as applied to a banking transaction, means the deduction of a sum, according to the standards of recognized uniformity, as applied to the amount and time for which the paper has to run which is the subject of negotiation. Ridgway v. National Bank of New Castle, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 216, 220. "Discounting," as used in a note payable in a certain time from date, but bearing the written consent of the makers that the bank may collect it at any time by discounting a proportional amount of interest that shall have been paid in advance, means that a deduction should be made from the face of the note. This is the ordinary meaning of "discount" and "discounting," especially as used by banks and in banking business. Dawley v. Wheeler, 52 Vt. 574, 576. The "discounting" of notes is the advancing of money on them, the interest being deducted and received by the person discounting, and retained and reserved at the time of, or as a part of, the advance. Bobo v. People's Nat. Bank, 21 S. W. 888, 889, 92 Tenn. 444. As the difference between the price and debt. By the language of the commercial world and the settled practice of bankrupts, a “discount" by a bank means, ex vi termini, a deduction or drawback made upon its advances or loans of money upon negotiable paper or other evidences of debt, payable at a future day, which are transferred to the "Discount" is the difference between the bank. Fleckner v. Bank of United States, 21 price and the amount of the debt, the eviU. S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 350, 5 L. Ed. 631; Ni- dence of which is transferred. First Nat. agara County Bank v. Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68, Bank v. Sherburne, 14 Ill. App. (14 Bradw.) 87; Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Sav-566, 570; Anderson v. Cleburne Building & ings Co., 12 South. 579, 95 Ala. 521, 20 L. R. Loan Ass'n (Tex.) 16 S. W. 298, 299; National A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245 (citing 5 Am. & Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 276, 26 L. Ed. Eng. Enc. Law, 678, 679); Nicholson v. Na-742; Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & tional Bank (Ky.) 17 S. W. 627 (quoting 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 618); Greenville First Nat. Bank v. Sherburne, 14 Ill. App. 566, 568; First Nat. Bank v. Carleton, 59 N. Y. Supp. 635, 636, 43 App. Div. 6 (citing Commonwealth v. Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania, 28 Pa. [4 Casey] 396). The term "discount," when used in a general sense, is applicable to either business or accommodation paper, and is appropriately applied either to loans or sales by way of discount, when a sum is counted off or taken from the face or amount of the paper at the time the money is advanced upon it, whether that sum is taken for interest upon a loan, or as the price agreed upon a sale. Salmon Savings Co., 12 South. 579, 95 Ala. 521, 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245. That difference represents interest charged, but at some rate according to which the price paid, if invested until the maturity of the debt, would produce its amount. National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 276, 26 L. Ed. 742. The discount payable, as understood in the business of banking, is only a mode of loaning money with the right to take the interest allowed in advance. Niagara County Bank v. Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68, 87. As interest. "Discount" is defined to be interest reserved from the amount lent at the time of making a loan. The Century Dictionary de-ing the interest or premium in advance. City fines "discount" in finance, "to purchase, or Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507, pay the amount of in cash, less a certain per 515. "The word 'discount' does not necescent., as a promissory note, bill of exchange, sarily imply a purchase and sale. It is quite etc., to be collected by the discounter or pur- consistent with a loan upon the security of chaser at maturity. Bank discount is simple the notes of a third party, as well as with interest paid in advance and received, not on the sale of them." In re Weeks (U. S.) 29 the sum advanced in the purchase, but on Fed. Cas. 575; Smith v. Exchange Bank, 26 the amount of the note or bill." Eastin v. Ohio St. 141, 151; Niagara County Bank v. Third Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 19 Ky. Law Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68, 87; Penn Mut. Life Rep. 1043, 1044, 42 S. W. 1115, 1116, 102 Ky. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 40 Ohio St. 260, 265. 64. Discount is the taking out of the principal sum, and the retention by the lender, at the time of the loan, of the interest charged for the use of the principal. Planters' & Merchants' Bank v. Goetter, 19 South. 54, 55, 108 Ala. 408 (citing Saltmarsh v. Planters' & Merchants' Bank, 14 Ala. 668, 677; Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., 95 Ala. 521, 12 South. 579, 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245). The term "discount," as a substantive, signifies the interest allowed in advancing on bills of exchange or negotiable securities. Saltmarsh v. Planters' & Merchants' Bank, 14 Ala. 668, 677. To discount a bill is to buy it for a less sum than that which upon its face is payable. Anderson v. Timberlake, 22 South. 431, 433, 434, 114 Ala. 377, 62 Am. St. Rep. 105 (citing Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Saving Co., 95 Ala. 521, 12 South. 579, 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245). "Discount is interest, either paid in advance or reserved in the note." First Nat. Bank v. Childs, 133 Mass. 248, 252, 43 Am. Rep. 509. "Discount" is the interest reserved from To "discount" paper is only a mode of loaning money with a right of taking the interest allowed by law in advance. The ordinary meaning of the term "to discount" is to take interest in advance, and in banking is a mode of loaning money. It is the advance of money not due till some future period, less the interest which would be due thereon when payable. Black v. First Nat. Bank, 54 Atl. 88, 94, 96 Md. 399. Although the "discounting" of notes or bills, in its most comprehensive sense, may mean lending money and taking notes in payment, as is said in 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 699, yet it is believed that in its more ordinary sense the "discounting" of notes or bills means advancing a consideration for a bill or note, will accrue for the time the note has to run. deducting or discounting the interest which Philadelphia Loan Co. v. Towner, 13 Conn. 249, 259. "The 'discounting' of notes is only lending money and taking notes in payment." New York Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Sturges (N. Y.) 2 Cow. 664, 669. To "discount" a note before its maturity than that expressed in the note, on the payis to advance a sum of money thereon, less ee's transfer of the title to the one advancing the money. United States v. Fay (Ala.) 9 Port. 465, 469. the amount lent at the time of making a loan, or, used as a verb, the term means to purchase or pay the amount of in cash, less a certain per cent., as a promissory note, bill of exchange, etc., to be collected by the discounter or purchaser at maturity. "Bank "Discounting," as used in General Incordiscount" is simple interest paid in advance, poration Law, art. 16, § 127 (Gen. St. p. 225), and received, not on the sum advanced in the giving saving associations the power of dispurchase, but on the amount of the note or counting negotiable notes and notes not nebill. Eastin v. Third Nat. Bank of Cincinna-gotiable, includes purchase as well as loan. ti, 42 S. W. 1115, 1116, 102 Ky. 64, 19 Ky. Law. Rep. 1043. The term "discount," as a substantive, means the interest reserved from a sum of money lent at the time of making the loan. State v. Boatmen's Sav. Inst.. 48 Mo. 189, 191. As loan, When interest is taken in advance it is a "discount," but when taken at the expiration of a credit it is a "loan." Bailey v. De Graff (Mich.) Walk. Ch. 424, 425. To 'discount' signifies the act of buying a bill of exchange or promissory note for a less sum than that for which on its face is payable." "It is also undeniably clear that the term 'discount,' when used in a general sense, is equally applicable to either business or accommodation paper, and is appropriately applied either to loans or sales by way of discount when a sum is counted off or taken from the face or amount of the paper at the time the money is advanced on it, whether that sum is taken for interest on a loan or as the price agreed on a sale." Pape v. Capitol Bank of Topeka, 20 Kan. 440, 446, 27 The "discounting" of a note by a bank Am. Rep. 183 (citing Niagara County Bank v. consists in lending money on it, and deduct- | Baker, 15 Ohio St. 85). "The ordinary meaning of the term 'to discount' is to take interest in advance, and in banking is a mode of loaning money. It is the advance of money not due till some future period, less the interest which would be due thereon when payable." As used in Act Cong. June 3, 1864, authorizing national banks to "discount" negotiable notes, it does not include the selling of railroad bonds for third parties on commission. Weckler v. First National Bank, 42 Md. 581, 592, 20 Am. Rep. 95. The "discount" of paper, as it is understood in the business of banking, is only a mode of loaning money, with the right to take the interest allowed by law in advance. To "discount" a bill is to buy it for a less sum than that which on its face is payable. Anderson v. Cleburne Building & Loan Ass'n (Tex.) 16 S. W. 298, 299. "Discount," in its literal sense, means to pay back or to count back, and a "discount" is the sum expended in a bargain; but the word has acquired a restricted meaning, at least in its legal and commercial use, and is now used among traders, merchants, and bankers as meaning a deduction of a sum for advanced payment, particularly the deduction of the interest on a sum loaned at the time the loan is made; and the word is generally used in its banking sense. Building Ass'n v. Seemiller, 35 Pa. (11 Casey) 225, 226, note. "Discount," as used in Loc. Laws, vol. 32, p. 343, providing that it shall be lawful for a bank to loan money, buy, sell, or negotiate bills of exchange, checks, and promissory notes, and to discount, on banking principles and usages, bills of exchange, post notes, promissory notes, and other negotiable paper or obligation for the payment of any sum or sums of money certain, providing that such bank shall not take more than 6 per cent. per annum in advance on its loans and discounts, should be construed as referring only to transactions in the nature of a loan. The term "discount" is used in a more limited and technical sense than as a "counting off" of an allowance or deduction made from a gross sum on any account whatever, but is applied to transactions in which the bank may take interest in advance, and is a power distinct from and additional to the power to buy, sell, and negotiate promissory notes. Dunkle v. Renick, 6 Ohio St. 527, 534. As either loan or purchase. "The term 'discount,' when used in its general sense, is equally applicable to either loans or sales by way of discount, when a sum is counted off or taken from the face or amount of the paper at the time the money is advanced upon it, whether that sum is taken for interest upon a loan, or as the agreed price upon a sale." Neilville Bank v. Tut hill, 30 N. W. 154, 156, 4 Dak. 295. The terms "purchase” and “discount,” when used in reference to the transfer of a negotiable paper, are generally used as correl ative terms. Nevertheless the legal meaning of "discount" varies according to the transaction to which it is applied. When an ac commodation note or bill made for the sole purpose of raising money is "discounted" for that purpose, and with knowledge on the part of the party discounting that it was made for that purpose only, the cases call it a "loan," and hold it subject to the usury laws. But when a valid and subsisting obligation is made by one person and discounted by another, whether at the rate fixed as the legal interest or at some other rate, such discount is held to be a purchase of the paper. Niagara County Bank v. Baker, 15 Ohio St. 68, 74, 75. As purchase. A charter authorizing a party to "discount" and negotiate promissory notes, of debt, is held to expressly confer power to drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences purchase checks. First Nat. Bank v. Harris, 108 Mass. 514, 516. Under the terms of the national banking act giving national banks power to "discount and negotiate" promissory notes, etc., it is held that such banks have no power to acUnion Bank, 52 Md. 78, 124, 36 Am. Rep. 355. quire a note by purchase. Lazear v. National An allegation that a note was discounted by plaintiff means that plaintiff purchased or acquired the note and advanced upon it, in money, the amount thereof, less such percentage as it retained for interest. First Nat. Bank v. Carleton, 57 N. Y. S. 674, 675, 26 Misc. Rep. 536 (citing National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 276, 26 L. Ed. 742). In Saltmarsh v. Planters' & Merchants' Bank, 14 Ala. 677, it is said to "discount" a bill is to buy it for a less sum than that Cleburne Bldg. & Loan Ass'n (Tex.) 16 S. W. which upon its face is payable. Anderson v. 298, 299, 4 Willson's Civ. Cas. Ct. App. 174. Where a note was taken by a bank and indorsed by the holder, and the proceeds credited to such holder's account, the transaction amounted to a "discount" of the note, within the authority given in the bank charter, though the complaint by the bank alleged that the holder "sold and delivered the note," and the bank's cashier also testified that he "purchased" the note from the hold er. Neilsville Bank v. Cuthill, 30 N. W. 154, 4 Dak. 295. Rev. St. § 5197, providing that any national bank may not take more than the rate of interest allowed by the laws of the state where it is located on any loan or "discount" made, should be construed to include the purchase of accepted drafts from the holder without his indorsement, for a "discount" by a bank means a deduction or drawback made on its advances or loan of money on negotiable paper or other evidences of debt, payable at a future day, which are transferred to the bank, and embraces as well a transaction where money is advanced on paper transferred without the indorsement of the previous holder, as a case of a strict loan thereon, where the relation of debtor and creditor is created. The term "discounting" includes purchase as well as loan. "Discount," in the ordinary acceptance of the term, includes what is called "purchase." Danforth v. National State Bank of Elizabeth (U. S.) 48 Fed. 271, 272, 1 C. C. A. 62, 17 L. R. A. 622. As set-off or counterclaim. A "discount," properly speaking, is of some cause, matter, or defense not necessarily arising out of or connected with the cause of action. Brown v. McMullen (S. C.) 1 Hill, 29, 31. The word "discounts" conveys the idea of something to be discounted, or taken from the claim itself by reason of any agreement, express or implied, between the parties; and hence the phrase "over and above all discounts and set-offs," in an affidavit for attachment, does not mean the same as "over and above all counterclaims." Lampkin v. Douglass (N. Y.) 63 How. Prac. 47, 48. An affidavit of a claimant against the estate of a deceased person, averring that the demand was just and due him and was wholly unpaid, and there was no just setoff against the claim, was insufficient under the statute providing that the claimant shall state that there is no discount against his demand, since the word "set-off" is not sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the word "discount" as used in the statute. A "setoff" is an independent debt or demand which the debtor has against his creditor, while a "discount" is a right which the debtor has to an abatement of the demand against him in consequence of a partial failure of the consideration, or on account of some equity arising out of the transaction on which the demand is founded. Trabue's Ex'r v. Harris, 58 Ky. (1 Metc.) 597, 598. DISCOVERY. In St. 1868, c. 320, providing for an additional assessment on personal property on a discovery by the assessors that the taxable personal estate of any person has been omitted from the last annual assessments, "diszovery" means becoming satisfied as a board that there has been such omission. The stat ute contemplates joint action on their part, and private information obtained by one or more individual assessors may prove unsatisfactory to the board. Noyes v. Hale, 137 Mass. 266, 271. Of fraud. "Discovery," as used in a statute of limitation requiring an action for relief on the ground of fraud to be brought within a certain time after the discovery of fraud, means when the fraudulent act is revealed--made known-to the party aggrieved. Notice or knowledge of the act is a "discovery" of the fraud. Francis v. Wallace, 42 N. W. 323, 324, 77 Iowa, 373. The word "discovery," when used in reference to past transactions or omissions, cannot have the same literal meaning as when applied to the discovery of a new continent, or a principle in physics. Fraud in a past and consummated transaction cannot be the subject of direct "discovery" or knowledge. The "discovery," then, of which the statute speaks, is of evidence or evidential facts leading to a belief in the fraud, and by which lished, and not of the fraud itself as an exits existence or perpetration may be estabisting entity. Parker v. Kuhn, 32 N. W. 74, 80, 21 Neb. 413, 59 Am. Rep. 838. Within the meaning of the statute providing that a cause of action for fraud shall be deemed to have occurred at the time of the "discovery" of the fraud, the time of discovery means notice of the fraud, and as to what constitutes notice the court quotes with approval the statement of the federal Supreme Court to the effect that "whatever is the party on his guard, and call for inquiry, notice enough to excite attention, and put is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led." Irwin v. Holbrook (Wash.) 73 Pac. 360, 362. As used in Code, § 2530, providing that actions for relief on the grounds of fraud, in cases formerly solely cognizable in a court of chancery, shall not be deemed to have occurred until the fraud shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved, means "when the fraudulent act is revealed or made known to the party aggrieved. Notice or knowledge of the acts is a discovery of the fraud." The execution of a fraudulent conveyance being the act which constitutes the fraud on creditors, such creditor is chargeable with notice thereof by the record of the deed. Laird v. Kilbourne, 30 N. W. 9, 11, 70 Iowa, 83. Same-Knowledge distinguished. "Discovery," as applied to discovery of facts constituting fraud as affecting the statute of limitations, is not convertible with "knowledge." It must appear that there was no notice of facts or information which would put one on inquiry which would lead to knowledge. Lady Washington Consol. Co. v. Wood, 45 Pac. 809, 810, 113 Cal. 482. The knowledge which comes to an unsuccessful litigant that he is unable to convince the court of the righteousness of his cause may be a disappointment or even a surprise, but can hardly be called a "discovery" within the meaning of Code, § 3448, providing that in actions for mistake or trespass the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until such mistake or trespass has been "discovered" by the party aggrieved. Sioux City & St. P. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien County, 92 N. W. 857, 858, 118 Iowa, 582. Same-Recollection distinguished. "Discovery," as used with relation to evidence as ground for new trial, does not mean the same as "recollection." "Newly discovered" evidence is not the same as evidence which is "newly recollected." In the latter case no new trial can be given because evidence the existence of which was formerly known has been "recollected." "Discovery" refers only to the ascertainment of the existence of that which was previously unknown; "recollection" deals with the known. Howton v. Roberts (Ky.) 49 S. W. 340, 341. Same-Suspicion distinguished. in place containing mineral, regardless of whether the earth or rock is rich or poor, or whether it assays high or low. It is the finding of the mineral in the rock in place, as distinguished from float rock, that constitutes the discovery and warrants the prospector in locating the mining camp. Book v. Justice Min. Co. (U. S.) 58 Fed. 106, 120; McShane v. Kenkle, 44 Pac. 979, 981, 18 Mont. 208, 33 L. R. A. 851, 56 Am. St. Rep. 579. So in respect to placer claims, if a competent locator actually finds upon unappropriated public land petroleum or other mineral in or upon the ground, and so situated as to constitute a part of it, it is a sufficient "discovery," within the meaning of the statute, to justify a location under the law, without waiting to ascertain by exploration whether the ground contains mineral in sufficient quantities to pay; but where a person found only such rock as indicated the presence of oil, without finding the oil itself, there is no "discovery," though oil exists on adjoining ground. Nevada Sierre Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co. (U. S.) 98 Fed. 673, 676. The finding of ore or metalliferous rock in place in a defined vein is sufficient to constitute a "discovery," within the provisions of Rev. St. U. S. § 2320 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1424], that no right can be acquired to quartz claim before a discovery of a vein or lode within its limits, though "Discovery" of the fraud, within the lan- it does not contain ore in paying quantities. guage of the statute of limitations, implies If the rock in place is sufficiently encourknowledge, and is not satisfied by the mere aging to warrant an ordinarily prudent man "suspicion" of wrong. The suspicion may be in spending his time or money upon it, it such as to call for future investigation, but is sufficient as against a subsequent locator is not of itself a discovery. A party, even for mining purposes. Muldrick v. Brown, though his suspicions have been aroused, may 61 Pac. 428, 429, 37 Or. 185. be lulled into confidence, and take no action, by such representations as are made. Marbourg v. McCormick, 23 Kan. 38, 43; Parker v. Ruhn, 32 N. W. 74, 80, 21 Neb. 413, 59 Am. Rep. 838. In mining law. When a locator of a mining claim finds rock in place, containing mineral in sufficient quantity to justify him in expending his time and money in developing the claim, he has made a "discovery" of a vein or lode, whether the rock or earth is rich or poor, whether it assays high or low, with this qualification: that the definition of a "lode" must always have special reference to the formation and peculiar characteristics of the particular district in which the lode or vein is found. Migeon v. Montana Cent. R. Co. (U. S.) 77 Fed. 249, 23 C. C. A. 156; Bonner v. Meikle (U. S.) 82 Fed. 697, 703. Where, in running a tunnel, small veins of iron oxide, quartz, and small quantities of carbonate of lead were found two or three inches wide, and these indications were of such a character as miners in that district would follow in the expectation of finding ore, and which would justify miners in working the claim for such purpose, and the rock in these seams was different from the country rock, and was of such character as designated by the witnesses who were practical miners as a vein containing "rock in place," bearing minerals, there was a "discovery" of a mineral lode or vein within Co. v. Rutter (U. S.) 87 Fed. 801, 806, 31 the meaning of the statute. C. C. A. 223. Shoshone Min. In mining parlance, "discovery" has a technical meaning. When applied to the finding of a vein or lode, it means a finding of the top or apex of such vein or lode. Upton v. Larkin, 17 Pac. 728, 733, 7 Mont. 449. "Discovery," within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 2320 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1425], providing that no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of a To constitute a "discovery" of a well, vein or lode within the limits of the claim the law requires something more than conlocated, means when the locator finds rock jecture, hope, or even indications. The |