account with the probate court and the court has ordered him to pay over to the ward the money in his hands. Probate Court for Orleans Dist. v. Child, 51 Vt. 82, 85.

A guardian is discharged, within the meaning of the statute relating to the liability of his sureties, when he has settled his guardianship account with the court and has been ordered to pay over to the ward money in his hands. Probate Court v. Child, 51 Vt. 82, 85.

To say that the term "discharged" is synonymous with settlement of guardian's account would seem to do violence to the language used. With due deference to courts that have otherwise held, this appears to be quite clear. We are unable to see where a mere settlement of a guardian's account, without the actual compliance with the order of the court, operates as a discharge in any sense. The term "discharged" is synonymous with the termination of the guardianship, not of the relation of the trustee and beneficiary, but of the office or the right to be guardian; and such termination occurs in the event of the death of the guardian, the arrival of the ward at the age of 21, or any other event by which the office of guardian, strictly so called, is brought to a close, though the trust relation in respect to the property may still continue up to the time of the settlement and discharge in respect to such relation. Paine v. Jones, 67 N. W. 31, 93 Wis. 70. |

Within a statute limiting the liability of sureties of a guardian, the discharge is practically, in the majority of cases, when he makes a final settlement of his accounts. For instance, when the ward becomes of age, it is the duty of the guardian to settle his accounts and turn over all property in his hands belonging to the ward. The fact that the ward comes of age does not ipso facto change the relation in which the guardian holds the property from that of a statutory trustee to that of a debtor. The death of the guardian ends, of course, all personal control over the property, and death is a discharge of the guardian. Hudson v. Bishop (U. S.) 32 Fed. 519, 521; Id., 35 Fed. 820, 822; Marlow v. Lacy, 2 S. W. 52, 53, 68 Tex. 154.

Of mortgage.

The word "discharge," in an indorsement by a mortgagee, on the record of the mortgage, that in consideration of the full payment of all moneys secured to be paid I hereby discharge the same of record," imports an absolute discharge, and not an assignment of the mortgage, and therefore a bona fide purchaser, relying on the record as showing the discharge of the mortgage, will be protected, though the mortgage was only assigned. Lowry v. Bennett, 77 N. W. 935, 936, 119 Mich. 301.

Within an agreement to return certain money on the discharge of two certain mortgages, "discharge" is not synonymous with "payment." By the discharge of a mortgage, as the term is commonly understood, a discharge of record, something that relieves the land from the apparent liens, is intended, not a mere payment, that may rest for proof upon parol, and perhaps disputed, testimony. Blackwood v. Brown, 29 Mich. 483, 484.

The word "discharge," as used in a quitclaim deed, reciting that this release is made at the request of the mortgagors, and is intended to discharge all title acquired by the mortgagee, when taken in connection with the word "release," can mean nothing more than that the mortgagee had no remaining claim upon the property, and whatever title it had acquired was released. Rangely v. Spring, 28 Me. (15 Shep.) 127, 151.

Of prisoner.

See "Lawfully Discharged."

A declaration in an action for malicious prosecution, alleging that the plaintiff was discharged from his imprisonment, is not sufficient to show that he was acquitted, which has a definite meaning. Where the word "acquitted" is used, it must be understood in a legal sense, namely, by a jury on the trial; but there are various ways in which a man may be discharged from his imprisonment without putting an end to the prosecution. Morgan v. Hughes, 2 Term. R. 225, 231; Law v. Franks (S. C.) Cheves, Law, 9, 10; Hester v. Hagood (S. C.) 3 Hill, 195; Bacon v. Townsend (N. Y.) 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 120, 122.

"Discharge," as used in a statute (Rev. St. § 292) providing that every indictment shall be tried at the term or session in which the issue is joined, or the term after, unless the court, having just cause, shall allow further time for the trial thereof, and that if such indictment be not tried as aforesaid the defendant shall be discharged, means merely a release from imprisonment and bail, and not also a release from further prosecution or indictment, or from the penalty of the crime itself. State v. Garthwaite, 23 N. J. Law (3 Zab.) 143, 145.

"Discharge," as used in a statute providing for the payment of fees to United States marshals in case of the discharge of a person, means an order of discharge which releases the person entirely from custody. It does not apply to the removal of a person from one place to another, or merely bringing the person up to testify or be tried. It means discharge from the custody of the law. Ex parte Paris (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 1104, 1105.

A statute authorized the sheriff to charge for every person committed to jail 35 cents

and for every person discharged from jail word 'discharge,' with reference to a cargo, 35 cents. Held, that the words "committed" is to unload it from the ship." As used in and "discharged" should be construed to a charter party, providing that the freight mean a technical committal and discharge, shall be paid in five days after the vessel's and could not be so liberally construed as to return to and discharge in B., it will be conauthorize the sheriff to charge 35 cents for strued to have been used in its ordinary taking out and 35 cents for returning a pris- meaning, when the circumstances fail to oner to jail in the course of the proceedings show that it was used in a different sense; against them. Lee v. Ionia County Sup'rs, and hence it refers merely to the unlading, 36 N. W. 83, 84, 68 Mich. 330. and not to the delivery, of the cargo. Certain Logs of Mahogany (U. S.) 5 Fed. Cas. 374, 378; Kimball v. Kimball (U. S.) 14 Fed. Cas. 481, 486; The Bird of Paradise v. Heyneman, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 545, 557, 18 L. Ed. 662; Sears v. 4,885 Bags of Linseed (U. S.)

Of seamen.

21 Fed. Cas. 934.

A discharge imports, in the natural and ordinary meaning of the word, and as used in Act Cong. Feb., 1803, c. 62, 2 Stat. 203, allowing two months' extra wages to a crew of a vessel upon its sale and their discharge in a foreign country, a voluntary act on the DISCHARGE FOR MONEY. part of the master, not a mere separation from the vessel by the unavoidable breaking up of the voyage by misfortune. Indeed, a seaman cannot in propriety of language be said to be discharged by the master, when the master himself is dispossessed of the vessel, and the whole enterprise is brought to a violent end by an accident of major force. The Dawn (U. S.) 7 Fed. Cas. 200,

202.

Of soldier.

The term "discharge" was used during the period of the Revolution to designate the dismissal from the continental service of troops, either individually or as organizations. Williams v. United States, 11 Sup. Ct. 43, 48, 137 U. S. 113, 34 L. Ed. 590.

In the military service the word "discharge" is the word applied to an order ending the service of the officer at his own request; but in other connections it conveys the notion of a movement beginning with a superior, and more or less adverse to the

object, as, for instance, we speak of the discharge of a servant. Usually it is a slightly discrediting verb. United States v. Sweet, 23 Sup. Ct. 638, 639, 189 U. S. 471, 47 L. Ed. 907.

Of tax.

The term "discharge," as used in St. 1867, p. 111, authorizing the board of supervisors of a county to equalize, modify, or discharge a tax, is not synonymous with the other words, "equalize" or "modify," as used in the act, so that, when the board had acted on a petition to equalize, it had not exhausted its powers to subsequently act on a petition to discharge. State v. Ormsby County Com'rs, 7 Nev. 392, 397.

Of vessel.

See "Customary Discharge."

"In a general sense, as well as in a nautical sense, the proper meaning of the

Instruments in the form of ordinary receipted statements of account, by various persons, against the town or county, presented by defendant, who was the clerk of the town and county, to the treasurer, and paid and acted upon as vouchers for money expended by defendant in behalf of the town dictment as "discharges for money," under and county, are properly described in the inPub. St. c. 204, § 1, declaring the punishment for forgery of a discharge for money, and chapter 214, § 26, providing that variances are immaterial if the identity of the instrument is evident and its purport is sufficiently described to prevent prejudice to defendant. Commonwealth v. Brown, 18 N. E. 587, 592, 147 Mass. 585, 1 L. R. A. 620, 9 Am. St. Rep. 736.

DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.

act, shall mean the release of a bankrupt "Discharge," as used in the bankruptcy from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419.

A discharge in bankruptcy is in the nature of a personal privilege granted to a debtor in consideration of his yielding up all of his property for distribution among his creditors, so that a discharge of a bankrupt in bankruptcy proceedings, by which the exclusion of others, is not such a discharge bankrupt preferred certain creditors to the as will relieve the bankrupt. Southern Loan & Trust Co. v. Benbow (U. S.) 96 Fed. 514, 528.

A discharge in bankruptcy, unlike the bar of statutes of limitations, is a positive extinguishing of the debt, liability, or demand to which it applies. Nothing less than his express promise to pay can remove or revise the bankrupt's liability; and by statute the promise must be put in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. Colton v. Depew, 44 Atl. 662, 663, 59 N. J. Eq. 126.

DISCIPLES OF CHRIST.

Rev. St. 5116, declaring that no per- Lehigh Valley R. Co., 26 A. 310, 311, 154 son who has been discharged, and after- Pa. 364. wards becomes bankrupt on his own petition, shall be again entitled to a discharge if his estate is insufficient to pay 70 per cent. of the debts proved against it, unless the assent in writing of three-fourths in value of his creditors, who have proved their claims as filed, etc., is not to be construed in a technical legal sense as meaning a discharge by order of court, but it includes as well a discharge effected by composition proceedings, by which the bankrupt was released from his debts. In re Bjornstad (U. S.) 5

Fed. 791.

A debt discharged is a debt extinguished, and therefore the discharge of a debt by discharge in bankruptcy destroys all legal obligation to pay; but as it has been discharged, not by payment or the act of the creditor, but by operation of law, there remains a moral obligation to pay, which is a sufficient consideration to support a new promise, agreement, or contract to pay. Steward v. Reckless, 24 N. J. Law (4 Zab.) 427, 430.

"Disciples of Christ" is the name given to a certain religious sect. The movement resulting in the foundation of the brotherhood was a decided revolt from the ecclesiasticism into which it was conceived Protestant religion had fallen, and in all organic and fundamental polity authority was alone sought in the doctrines of the New Testament and the authentic practice of the Apostles themselves. In a corporate sense, the Church of the Disciples is essentially congregational. The congregation is the unit of organization, and generally the source of corporate authority. In its government the church has discarded all councils, synods, and presbyteries. It recognizes no court of appeal or of last resort, representing and standing for the entire brotherhood of believers. In re Reinhart, 9 Ohio Dec. 441, 447.

DISCLAIMER.

A disclaimer consists in a denial of the insistence upon any claim or right in the thing demanded, and a renunciation of all claim thereto. Moores v. Clackamas County, 67 Pac. 662, 663, 40 Or. 536.

A disclaimer is an admission upon the record of the plaintiff's right, and a denial of assertion of title on the part of the defendant. Snyder v. Compton (Tex.) 29 S. W. 73.

A disclaimer is a renunciation of the ti

The word "discharge" has no technical, common, or appropriate meaning in the law of common or voluntary composition; nor would it have in an ordinary statute, authorizing creditors to get together and adopt a composition on such terms as the statute might prescribe, voluntary or compulsory. The word "release" would exactly describe the transaction; or, with equal common significance, the word "satisfy" or "acquit" would define that which was done, so that, in such sense, the word "discharge" would somewhat synonymously express the transaction. Yet, when the word is used in the tle and right to possession. If not falsified, statute authorizing a debtor to compound his debts with his creditors, which statute at the it defeats an action of ejectment. Webster same time establishes a system of bankrupt- V. Pierce, 83 N. W. 938, 940, 108 Wis. 407. cy, it borrows not unnaturally a reflected It imports only the disavowal of title or light by association with a technical term Oakham v. Hall, 112 Mass. 535, 539. of similar import and identical form familiar to all bankruptcy statutes. But this reflected light might be discarded for a proper understanding of the use of the word in the composition sections of the statute. So that, under the bankrupt act, allowing appeals from a judgment granting or denying a discharge, no appeal lies from a refusal of the court of bankruptcy to confirm a composition by a bankrupt. In re Adler (U. S.) 103 Fed. 444, 445.

DISCHARGED PASSENGER.

A discharged passenger is a passenger over whom the care of a common carrier has

entirely ceased. One who has left the car, but is using means provided by the carrier for the alighting, and is being assisted by the agent of the company, does not come within the meaning of the term. Hartzig v.

right in the supposed tenant. Inhabitants of

Disclaimer is a formal mode of expressing a grantee's dissent to the conveyance of property before the title has become vested in him. The object of a disclaimer is to prevent an estate passing from the grantor to the grantee, and an estate, having once vested, cannot be divested by a disclaimer, though made under seal, duly witnessed, acknowledged, and recorded. Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83, 85 (citing Jackson v. Richards [N. Y.] 6 Cow. 617; Jackson v. French, [N. Y.] 3 Wend. 337, 20 Am. Dec. 699; Jackson v. Wheeler [N. Y.] 6 Johns. 272; Bush v. Bradley [Conn.] 4 Day, 298; Kinne v. Beebe, Conn. 494; Wheeler v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn.

225).

The word "disclaimer," in St. c. 7, p. 89. providing that the writ in ejectment shall not be abated because all the tenants are not

A discontinuance is a gap or chasm in

pending. Hayes v. Dunn, 34 South. 944, 945, 136 Ala. 528. "A criminal as well as a civil suit may be discontinued." Ex parte Hall, 47 Ala. 675, 680.

sued, but those on whom service is made shall answer for such part of the premises the proceedings, occurring while the suit is only as he or they shall distinguish and set forth in his or their plea, and disclaim the remainder, and if any shall disclaim the whole, unless plaintiff shall prove such disclaimer's possession of all or part of the premises demanded, such "disclaimer" shall recover costs against plaintiff, is used for the word "defendant." Marshall v. Wood, 5 Vt. 250, 254, 255.

As a plea.

In real actions in trespass, by force of the statute and in a quare impedit, disclaimer is a plea, and, like pleas in error or in abatement, concludes with a verification, and calls for a replication and issue. But in ejectment, notwithstanding the defendant disclaims title to the land, it is still necessary to try the fact whether defendant was in possession when the writ was served. And consequently, where ejectment was brought against two, and one entered a disclaimer, the court should have compelled him to give judgment which would secure the costs and damages, or to plead instanter the general issue. Bratton v. Mitchell (Pa.) 5 Watts, 69, 71.

A disclaimer, instead of being a plea to an action, resembles so far a release or conveyance of the land that in general no person could disclaim who was incapable of conveying the land. Kentucky Union Co. v. Cornett, 66 S. W. 728, 729, 112 Ky. 677.

DISCONTINUANCE.

A "discontinuance" means no more than a declaration of the plaintiff's willingness to stop the pending action. It is neither an adjudication of his cause by the proper tribunal, nor an acknowledgment by himself that his claim is not well founded. T. & H. Prac. 564. This, of course, does not apply where actions are groundless, and brought with a vexatious or corrupt purpose. Engle v. Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Pa. Dist. R. 172.

A discontinuance is the result of some act done or omitted by the plaintiff, which legally withdraws his case from the power and jurisdiction of the court. Where the plaintiff did, or omitted to do, nothing to produce such a result, but what was done was done by the court, and which plaintiff could not prevent, his cause was not discontinued. McGuire v. Hay, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 419, 421.

A discontinuance is a break or chasm in a suit, arising from the failure of the plaintiff to carry the proceedings forward in due course of law, and cannot, therefore, ex vi the suit termini, occur after has been brought to an end. This is not only true technically, but in point of essential justice. A discontinuance does not, like a retraxit, operate as an extinguishment of the cause of action, but leaves the plaintiff free to bring another suit. It will not, therefore, be

See "Involuntary Discontinuance"; "Vol- allowed when the effect is to deprive the deuntary Discontinuance."

Of action.

"The term 'discontinuance' is the name applied to the voluntary withdrawal of a suit by a plaintiff, or where he is regarded as out of court by some technical omission or mispleading, and the like." Hadwin v. Southern Ry. Co., 45 S. E. 1019, 1020, 67 S. C. 463.

A discontinuance is a chasm or gap left by neglecting to enter a continuance. Taft v. Northern Transp. Co., 56 N. H. 414, 416.

A discontinuance is, in substance and effect, an abandonment of the moving party of his pending cause. Hence the failure of a clerk to note a continuance on his docket does not amount to a discontinuance. Ex parte Humes (Ala.) 30 South. 732, 733.

A discontinuance is the interruption of a proceeding, occasioned by the failure of the plaintiff to continue the suit regularly from time to time as he ought. Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 85, 86, 29 Am. Rep. 445.

fendant of an advantage which he is entitled to retain. Kennedy v. McNickle (Pa.) 7 Phila. 217 (citing Mechanics' Bank v. Fisher [Pa.] 1 Rawle, 341, 347).

A discontinuance, in practice, is the same as a dismissal, and means that the cause is sent out of court. Thurman v. James, 48 Mo. 235, 236.

Where an order had been rendered which had the effect of discontinuing an action, it was contended that the courts had no authority to order a discontinuance of the cause, such a thing as a discontinuance being unknown to our practice, but it was held that "discontinuance" and "dismissal" are synonymous terms. English v. Dickey, 27 N. E. 495, 497, 128 Ind. 174, 13 L. R. A. 40.

"Discontinuance,' at common law, was a failure to continue the cause regularly from day to day, or term to term, between the commencement of the suit and final judg ment, and if there was any lapse or want of

those the enjoyment of which can be had only by the interference of man, as rights of way. Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505, 515; Outerbridge v. Phelps, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. (13 Jones & S.) 555, 570.

"Discontinuous servitudes" are such as

need the act of man to be exercised. Such are the rights of passage, drawing water, pasturage, and the like. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 727.

continuance the parties were out of court, and "discontinuous." "Discontinuous" are and the plaintiff had to begin anew. The plaintiff having left a chasm in the proceedings of his cause, the defendant was no longer bound to attend. Discontinuance resulted from the necessity of continuances to be formerly entered. As our statutes dispense with the necessity for the entry of formal continuances in order to keep a case in court, and require the attendance of the defendant, it is not perceived that there can be in this state such a thing as a technical discontinuance." Code 1871, § 679, declaring that an action shall be discontinued if the represen- DISCOUNT. tatives of a deceased person shall not appear and become a party by the second term after the death of the plaintiff, means a nonsuit or dismissal for want of prosecution. Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Francis, 52 Miss. 457, 467, 24 Am. Rep. 674.

A discontinuance is somewhat similar to a nonsuit, for when a plaintiff leaves a chasm in the proceedings of his case, as by not continuing the process regularly from day to day, and from time to time, as he ought to do, the suit is discontinued. Hunt v. Griffin, 49 Miss. 742, 748. Thus, there is a "discontinuance" of a case by the plaintiff, within the meaning of the statute allowing him to renew the action within six months after his discontinuance, where the case is dismissed by the court for want of prosecution by the plaintiff. Rountree v. Key, 71

Under the act of February 28, 1861, which authorizes the postmaster general to discontinue, under certain circumstances specified, the postal service on any route, a suspension during the late Rebellion, at the postmaster general's discretion, of the route in certain rebel states, with notice to the contractor that he would be held responsible for a renewal when the postmaster general should deem it safe to renew the service there, was held to be a discontinuance. Reeside v. United States, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 38, 43, 19 L. Ed. 318.

DISCONTINUOUS EASEMENT.

"The word 'discount' denotes the act of giving money for a bill of exchange or promissory note, deducting the interest." Newell v. First National Bank of Somerset, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 775, 777; State v. Boatmen's Sav. Inst., 48 Mo. 189, 191.

By "discount," in the Constitution, is understood to be meant "bank discount," and a bank discount is the purchase of a promissory note, bill of exchange, or other negotiable paper at less than its face. Building Ass'n v. Seemiller (Pa.) 3 Phila. 115, 119.

"Discount" is used in different senses, some judges employing the term to designate the reception of paper in payment of a loan or debt, while others use it to designate the reception of paper on a sale as a piece of property. Baxter v. Duren (16 Shep.) 29 Me. 434, 441, 1 Am. Rep. 602.

"Discounting." as used in Banking Act 1838, 18, providing that such association shall have power to carry on the business of the taking of uncurrent bank bills, due on banking by discounting bills, etc., includes their face and payable at a distant place, for an amount less than their face value, as well as the taking of paper not yet due for an amount less than its face value. Metropolitan Bank (N. Y.) 7 How. Prac. 144, People v.

148.

Buy distinguished.
See "Buy."

An authority to a bank to discount evidences of debt includes authority to buy; for "discounting," at most, is but another term for "buying at a discount." Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 82 N. Y. 291, 302; Tracy v. Talmadge (N. Y.) 9 How. Prac. 530, 536; Saltmarsh v. Planters' & Merchants' Bank, 14 Ala. 668, 677; Tracy v. Talmage, 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 302, 306.

Commission distinguished.

The word "discount" is not synonymous with the word "commission." "Discount" is a percentage taken from the face value of Easements or servitudes are divided by the security or property negotiated, while the Civil Code of France into "continuous" "commission," in its technical as well as its