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96 Ga. 413, where it is said death evidently p is not the kind of disability to which the policy refers). See, also, Rosenberry v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 43 N. E. 317, 318, 14 Ind. App. 625; Brown v. United States Casualty Co. (U. S.) 95 Fed. 935, 937.

As physically disabled.

A "disability," as the term is used in an accident or life insurance policy, is a deprivation of ability; the state of being disabled or incapacitated. Any bodily infirmity by which a person is incapacitated from pursuing his usual vocation is a disability, within the policy. Miller v. American Mut. Acc. Ins. Co., 21 S. W. 39, 40, 92 Tenn. (8 Pickle) 167, 20 L. R. A. 765.

"Disability of any kind," as used in an accident certificate, reciting that such certificate would not entitle the holder or any person in interest to indemnity for disability of any kind, unless the disability accrued within 30 days from the date of the accident causing such disability, etc., meant personal hurts, to wit, the loss of a hand or foot, or both hands or both feet, or a hand and foot, or both eyes. Such words do not refer to the incapacity for business specified as one of the losses insured against. Odd Fellows Fraternal Acc. Ass'n v. Earl (U. S.) 70 Fed. 16, 20,

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Failure to elect.

In Const. art. 5, § 16, providing that in case of a death, impeachment and notice thereof to the accused, failure to qualify, resignation, absence from the state or "other disability" of the Governor, the powers, duties, and emoluments of the office for the residue of the term or until the disab. ty shall be removed shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor, "disability" does not mean the ineligibility of the person to be elected to the office, but means any disability of the Governor, not specifically enumerated, occurring after the commencement of his term of office. Failure to elect a Governor, on account of the ineligibility of the person receiving the highest number of votes for the office, is not a disability of the Governor, so that the Lieutenant Governor could take the office.

State v. Boyd, 48 N. W. 739, 753, 31 Neb. 682.

In the Constitution, providing that, on disability of the Governor, the President of the Senate shall act as Governor, "disability" means something attaching to the person of the Governor and disabling him; and the nonconsideration of the result of the election, so that no one has been appointed as a successor to the Governor, is not a disability of the Governor such as is meant by the Constitution. It is simply nonaction or incomplete action by the agencies assigned to vest the title in the candidate. It is not like insanity, conviction of the officer for crime, continued absence, or other disability connected with the person of the Governor. Wilson, 9 S. E. 31, 33, 32 W. Va. 429, 3 L. R. A. 64.

Insolvency.

Carr v.

Within a contract authorizing certain parties to take immediate possession of cattle, if others were prevented by disability from carrying on the business, insolvency of such parties is a disability. Montgomery v. McGuire, 25 Ill. App. 31, 38.

Refusal to act.

not want of inclination. It refers to incapacDisability implies want of power, and

"Disability," as used in an accident insurance policy, is defined to be a deprivation of ability; state of being disabled; incapacity. Thus a person who loses a leg or arm or eye, or is otherwise disabled, whether temporarily or permanently, by external and vio-ity, lent means, is one suffering from an imperfection, and is to that extent disabled by a bodily infirmity. Miller v. American Mut. Acc. Ins. Co., 21 S. W. 39, 40, 92 Tenn. (8 Pickle) 167, 20 L. R. A. 765.

Impossibility distinguished.

There is a marked distinction between a disability or inability of a party to perform a contract and the absolute and inherent impossibility of performance in the true sense. To excuse performance of a contract on the ground of impossibility of performance, the impossibility must be more than merely a great inconvenience or hardship, or mere impracticability. Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 73 Pac. 337, 339, 43 Or. 429.

and not to disinclination. It is founded on want of authority, arising out of some circumstances or other, notwithstanding the amount or degree of willingness or disposition to act. It is so used in 3 Rev. St. p. 475 (5th Ed.) § 29, authorizing a special proceeding to be continued before another officer in case of death, sickness, etc., or other disability of the one before whom it was commenced; and hence the mere refusal of such latter officer to act does not authorize another officer to act in his place. People v. Ulster County Sup'rs (N. Y.) 32 Barb. 473. 480.

Resignation.

Acts 1849. p. 206. provides that, in case of death or disability of one or more of the

transportation commissioners provided for by | of weekly relief, whether "totally or partially that act, it should be lawful to supply the disabling," for the number of days fixed in place so vacated. Held, that the word "disa- the schedule on the back of the certificate, bility," as there used, was sufficiently exten- should be in full satisfaction of all claims sive to cover, and was designed to cover, any for such injuries, "disabling" relates to the cause which prevented the commissioners same kind of total disablement provided for from acting, and thus the resignation of one in the certificate; that is, permanent injuof the commissioners was necessarily a dis- ries, which are either totally or partially of ability authorizing an appointment of his that character. Hollobaugh v. People's Ins. successor, since no power could compel him to Ass'n, 22 Atl. 29, 30, 138 Pa. 595. continue to act if he thought proper to decline; the right of resigning an office or employment being universally recognized. State v. City of Newark, 27 N. J. Law (3 Dutch.) 185, 197.

DISABLE.

See "Wholly Disabled."
Otherwise disabled, see "Otherwise."

DISABLED FROM HOLDING OFFICE.

Within the provision that, by the making of a contract letting out the duties of an office, the parties shall be thereby disabled from holding said office, the language, "shall thereby be disabled from holding said office," was construed, in the case of Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89, to mean that they should be disabled only from holding the particular term of the office in respect to which the illegal contract was made. White v. Cook, 41 S. E. 410, 415, 51 W. Va. 201, 57 L. R. A. 417, 90 Am. St. Rep. 775.

Under a statute (Act Va. Dec. 17, 1792) making it a felony to disable any limb or member of any person, with intent to disfigure, etc., it was held that an ear could not be disabled, within the meaning of the statute, and hence that the biting off of an ear DISADVANTAGES. was not within the statute. United States v. Askins (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 875.

Mental distress.

Const. art. 5, § 13, Rev. Civ. St. art. 3101, providing that where, pending a trial, any number of jurors not exceeding three shall die or be "disabled from sitting," the remainder of the jury shall have power to render a verdict, cannot be construed to include mere distress of mind, caused by information of sickness in the juror's family

Under Sess. Acts 1849, p. 219, authorizing an assessment of damages to land for the disadvantages or injuries resulting from the construction of a road, only such injuries which result to the landowner in respect to the residue of the tract unappropriated from the particular mode in which the part thereof is taken, or the use to which it is applied, are included. Pacific R. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544, 546.

calling for his presence at home. If a juror DISAGREE-DISAGREEMENT.

became sick, so as to be unable to sit longer, he is plainly disabled from sitting, and if, "Disagree," as used in a statute providing by reason of some casualty or otherwise, phys-that the Supreme Court might review the deically prostrated, so as to be wholly incapable of sitting as a juror, or losing his mental powers, so as to become insane or idiotic, he is disabled. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Waller, 56 Tex. 331, 336.

Permanent injury.

Aik. Dig. 102, declares that if any person or persons, on purpose and of malice aforethought, shall unlawfully cut off the ear or ears, or cut off or disable the tongue, put out an eye, etc., while fighting or otherwise, etc., such person shall be deemed guilty of mayhem. Held, that the word "disable," as used in such statute, meant a permanent injury, and did not include merely a temporary "disabling" of a finger, arm, or eye. State v. Briley (Ala.) 8 Port. 472, 474.

In an indorsement on the back of a certificate of membership in an accident insurance association, reciting that, if the member should sustain bodily injuries by means as provided in such certificate, the payment

cision of the Court of Civil Appeals in cases where the judges disagree, means nothing more than a want of unanimity among the judges, which is usually evidenced by dis sent; for the law contemplates that there shall have been a judgment rendered, by which the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded, and which could not occur if the disagreement contemplated was such that no two of the judges could agree upon a judgment. Darnell v. Lyon, 22 S. W. 304, 309, 85 Tex. 466.

In an agreement between a fire insurance company and an insurer that two persons should act as appraisers, together with a third, who should act as umpire in case of disagreement between such two appraisers, on matters of difference, "disagreement" means the forming or expressing to each other of different opinions concerning the matters submitted to the appraisers. If, after the appraisers had examined and conferred about the damage done, they had reached

and expressed to each other different esti- 631, 67 N. W. 971: "This is not a proceedmates of the amount, and thereafter one ing by way of punishment, though the depri of the appraisers in bad faith endeavored vation of the privileges of an attorney may to prevent further conference or to postpone be a matter of serious importance to a pracsuch conference for some ulterior purpose, titioner. It is in a measure necessary to the then the other appraiser, acting in good faith, protection of the public, who have a right would have a right to regard their difference to expect that courts will be vigilant in withas a final disagreement, and thereupon call holding, and, if already given, withdrawing, in the umpire. Broadway Ins. Co. v. Doy- their certificates of qualification and charing, 27 Atl. 927, 928, 55 N. J. Law (26 Vroom) acter, upon which the public rely." In re 569. Mains, 80 N. W. 714, 716, 121 Mich. 603.

DISALLOW-DISALLOWANCE.

As rejected, see "Reject."

A disbarment proceeding is not primarily in the interest of members of the legal profession, but in the interest of those who, desiring to have the services of an attorney, may be misled to their injury or defrauded in employing a disqualified or dishonest attorney by reason of the action of the state in admitting him to practice. Hyatt v. Hamilton County, 96 N. W. 855, 856, 121 Iowa, 292, 63 L. R. A. 614.

"Disallowed," in Rev. Code, p. 754, c. 99, § 24, providing that an appeal from judgments given by justices of the peace to the superior court may be allowed in case any part of the plaintiff's demand or of the defendant's counterclaim or set-off is disallowed by the justice, should be construed to include a case where the plaintiff has failed DISBURSEMENTS. to prove any sum whatever. It is broad enough to include a case where the justice of the peace has arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff has not proven anything at all, nor established and maintained his

suit. Pepper v. Warren (Del.) 43 Atl. 91, 92,

2 Marv. 225.

See "Legal Disbursements"; "Necessary
Disbursements."

Receipts and disbursements, within the

rule that executors are to receive compensation based upon receipts and disbursements, means receipts and disbursements having an actual, and not merely constructive, existence. Hill v. Nelson (N. Y.) 1 Dem. Sur. 357, 361.

Rev. St. c. 13, § 40, relating to proceedings after the disallowance of a claim against a county by its board, should be construed to include the adoption by the board of supervisWhere a law requires surveyors to give ors of the report of a committee advising the bond for the faithful disbursement of public rejection of an account or claim for moneys money, it is evident that it contemplates paid at tax sales for tax certificates. Warner v. Outagamie County Sup'rs, 19 Wis. 611, theless, where the statute requires that bond such surveyors as disbursing officers. Never

613.

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be given both for the disbursement of money and also for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office, and in fact the bond is conditioned only on the latter, a serious question arises as to whether it was open to proof that the disbursement of money was known as one of the duties of the office and included in the general words. Farrar v. United States, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 373, 388, 8 L. Ed. 159.

As costs in actions.

Cost distinguished, see "Cost."

"Disbursements" is a term properly used to designate the costs which a party to an action has advanced. Dauntless Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 24 S. C. 536, 540.

Money paid by an attorney for costs which his client was adjudged to pay was a "disbursement" within 2 Geo. II, c. 23, providing that no attorney can commence an action until the expiration of one month after delivering to the parties to be charged a bill of his fees, charges and "disburse

ments," signed with his proper hand. Crowder v. Shee, 1 Camp. 437, 438.

As expenditure.

"Disbursements," as used in an order al

As used in an agreement by which an lowing an administrator a certain per cent. on attorney stipulated to give his legal serv-receipts and disbursements of the estate, did ices to the administrators until the estate not include the delivery of bonds which were was settled, and by which the administra- in the hands of the intestate as a trustee, tors agreed that he should be repaid for any and all disbursements necessary on the settlement, the word "disbursements" was employed in its technical meaning, and was confined to such disbursements as were set forth in the Code. Hanover v. Reynolds (N. Y.) 4 Dem. Sur. 385, 386.

Disbursements by an attorney are expenditures or outlays of money which he is authorized by law to make, and which he does make, in the conduct of a cause. Durham Fertilizer Co. v. Glenn, 26 S. E. 796, 797, 48 S. C. 494.

Disbursements are the fees of officers and all other expenses necessarily incurred in the preparation for a trial and costs. Mitchell & Lewis Co. v. Downing, 32 Pac. 394, 395,

23 Or. 448.

"Disbursements," as used in an agreement with an attorney whereby he was to be paid a certain sum out of the proceeds recovered in the suit after the payment of all proper disbursements, is not confined within the narrow and technical meaning it has acquired in the offices of court clerks, as something distinct from costs, counsel fees, and allowances. De Chambrun v. Cox (U. S.) 60 Fed. 471, 479, 9 C. C. A. 86.

"Disbursements," as defined by Gen. St. 1894, c. 67, § 5500, are the expenses necessarily paid or incurred by the prevailing party,

and are included in the term "costs," used in section 7314, providing that, on change of venue, the costs accruing from the change shall be paid by the county in which the offense was committed. Hennepin County Com'rs v. Wright County Com'rs, 87 N. W. 846, 847, 84 Minn. 267.

As used in Code, c. 13, § 2182, which provides that an undertaking for stay of proceedings on appeal to the circuit court from a justice's court must be in such an amount as may be deemed sufficient to compensate plaintiff for the use or profits of the claim during the pendency of the appeal, and for costs and disbursements of the action, must be construed to mean that the undertaking includes all costs and disbursements that

and were delivered by the administrator to the true owner. Such delivery was not an expenditure for the estate. Walton v. Avery. 22 N. C. 405, 411.

A decree allowed a trustee commissions at the rate of 5 per cent. on all collections which he might make, and also a further commission of 5 per cent. on the amount of all disbursements and investments which he had made or might thereafter make. that the word "disbursements," as so used, meant merely expenditures during the existence of the trust, as contradistinguished from payments to the cestui que trust. Whyte v. Dimmock, 55 Md. 452.

Held

Battle's Revisal, c. 68, § 35, provides that all orders on the county treasurer for school money shall be signed by the school committee of the township, which orders, duly indorsed by the persons to whom the same are payable, shall be the only vouchers in the hands of the county treasurer for disbursements of school moneys. Held, that the "disbursements" mentioned in the section, and of which the orders taken up are declared to be the only valid voucher for moneys paid out, have reference to the administration of the fund, and contemplate a settlement of the treasurer's account. Wake County Com'rs v. Magnin, 86 N. C. 285, 288.

DISCHARGE.

See "Plea in Discharge."

Webster

defines "discharged" to be "paid; released; acquitted; freed from debt; performed; executed." Union Bank of Florida v. Powell's Heirs, 3 Fla. 175, 193, 52 Am. Dec. 367.

"Discharged," as used in a declaration on a contract, alleging that plaintiff was prevented and discharged from delivering goods thereunder, did not mean a release under seal, but only that the act of the defendants was the cause of the nondelivery; and the

145.

expression was satisned by proof of a notice from the defendant that he would not accept goods under the contract. Cort v. Ambermay be awarded against the appellant on the gate, N. & B. & E. J. Ry. Co., 17 Q. B. 127, appeal, and is not limited to include only the costs and disbursements of the trial in the justice's court. "Costs and disbursements of the action" must certainly mean the costs and disbursements which will accrue in the trial of the action, as well as those which have already accrued. Bilyeu v. Smith, 22 Pac. 1073, 1074, 18 Or. 335.

3 WDS. & P.-6

Gen. St. c. 162, § 1, providing the punishment for the forgery of any order, acquittance, or discharge for money, means any paper that sufficiently demonstrates that it is a discharge, whether it contain the word "discharge" or not. Commonwealth v. Talbot, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 161, 162.

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The mere fact that a bankrupt has been A discharge under the prison bounds act refused a discharge on a specification of ob- is only a discharge from confinement at the jection is not an absolute bar to a composi- suit of the suing creditor for a year and a tion; a composition not being a "discharge." | day. It cannot, therefore, be a discharge to In re Odell (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 575.

As release.

A discharge by statute must of necessity be a legal defense, and, of course, proper matter to be pleaded at law. It is equivaient, when it proceeds from the act of the creditor, to a release, and may therefore be pleaded. Steptoe's Adm'rs v. Harvey's Ex'rs (Va.) 7 Leigh, 501, 535.

Of attachment.

The word "discharge," as used in an opinion, stating that the effect and design of an instrument given under Code, § 112, providing for the release of property from an attachment upon the giving of a bond, is to release the property attached, but not to discharge the attachment, was used as synonymous with "dissolve,” and not in the sense of "release." Nichols v. Chittenden, 59 Pac. 954, 957, 14 Colo. App. 49.

Of debt.

Compromise as, see "Compromise."

"Discharge" means "to send away, as a creditor, by payment; to set free, release, absolve, or acquit, as of an obligation, claim, accusation, or service due; to exonerate; to relieve." The manner in which a release is accomplished or the obligation satisfied seems to be material, so that evidence that a claim was compromised was sufficient foundation for a finding that the obligations of the parties were discharged. Rivers v. Blom, 63 S. W. 812, 813, 163 Mo. 442.

A debt is discharged, and the debtor is released, when the creditor has received something from the debtor which satisfies him. It may be in money or its equivalents, and it may consist in setting off mutual demands or wiping out mutual disputed claims by mutual concessions, in which event no money is required to pass from one to another. When a referee held the termination of cross-actions between two parties a discharge of one of them, it meant that the other was satisfied, and had no further cause of complaint against the one discharged. Rivers v. Blom, 163 Mo. 442, 446, 63 S. W. 812.

In a plea in an action on assumpsit on a bill of exchange, alleging an agreement to accept payment of the bill on certain conditions and to discharge defendant from performing his promise, the word "discharge" does not import payment or satisfaction of the debt, but only that the bill was given for and on account of it. Kemp v. Watt. 15 Mees. & W. 672, 680.

the sheriff himself from the debt, much less to his sureties. Treasurers of State v. Bates (S. C.) 2 Bailey Law, 362, 384.

Of employé.

In a suit by a workman, who has agreed to do the work to the satisfaction of his employer, there is a distinction between being dissatisfied with his work and discharging him because of dissatisfaction. An employer may be dissatisfied with the work of one of his men, and yet retain the workman in his employment, or he may be dissatisfied, and may discharge the workman, not because of dissatisfaction, but because of some other reason; and in the action by the workmen they are complaining, not of dissatisfaction, but of discharge, and hence the question whether the employer ought to have been satisfied does not arise under the contract, so that it would not be legitimate for either workman to prove that in his opinion or the opinion of the other he had done good work. But proof may be directed to the question whether the employer was dissatisfied, and whether he discharged because of dissatisfaction. Gwynn v. Hitchner, 52 Atl. 997, 998, 67 N. J. Law, 654.

Of guardian.

As used in a statute providing that no action shall be maintained against the sureties on any bond, given by a guardian, unless time when the guardian shall be discharged, it be commenced within four years from the the term "discharged" means any mode by which the guardianship is effectually determined and brought to a close. Loring v. Alline, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 68, 70. This may be either by the resignation or death of the guardian, by the marriage of the female ward, by the arrival of the minor ward at the age of 21 years, or otherwise. Perkins v. Cheney, 72 N. W. 595, 596, 114 Mich. 567, 68 Am. St. Rep. 495; Berkin v. Marsh, 44 Pac. 528, 529, 18 Mont. 152, 56 Am. St. Rep. 565; Goble v. Simeral (Neb.) 93 N. W. 235, 236. It means any termination, such as termination by the death of the guardian, and not necessarily a discharge by the court. Paine v. Jones, 67 N. W. 31, 93 Wis. 70. It means the end of the guardianship office, and not his discharge from liability. Probate Judge v. Stevenson, 21 N. W. 348, 55 Mich. 320.

The guardian of a minor ward is "discharged," within the meaning of Gen. St. c. 72, § 20, if not when the ward attains the age of majority, which may be questioned, at latest when he has settled his guardianship

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