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to load on this charter," meant that the vessel is to take a direct course to the port or ports at which she must load under the charter party, without deviation or unreasonable lelay, but did not mean that the vessel should depart from T. instantly or immediately, but that she should at that place enter on the voyage provided for in the charter and proceed in a direct course to the place of loading. The Onrust (U. S.) 18 Fed. Cas. 734, 735.

Natural and proximate synonymous.

the payment of such money, and in this connection the two words may be used interchangeably. Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Cely, 18 S. E 790, 791, 40 S. C. 430.

As wish.

The term "direct," as used in a will creating a trust, is used in the same sense as "wish" or "will." Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469, 476.

DIRECT ATTACK.

In the statement of the rule that one is not liable for the results of an act, unless the "A direct attack upon a judgment," says act was the natural and proximate cause of Mr. Justice Cooke in Pope v. Harrison, 84 the injury, the word "direct" is often used, Tenn. (16 Lea) 82, "is by appropriate proas synonymous with "natural" and with ceedings between the parties to it, seeking, "proximate." Lovett v. City of Chicago, 35 for sufficient cause alleged, to have it anIll. App. 570, 571. nulled, reversed, vacated, or declared void." Meinert v. Harder, 65 Pac. 1056, 1058, 39 Or. 609.

As point out.

"Direct," as used in Act 1863, providing that the court to which the record is remitted is to pass such sentence as the appellate court shall direct, means to point out a law providing for the punishment, and direct the court below to sentence thereunder. People v. Bork, 96 N. Y. 188, 202.

Code Civ. Proc. § 1022, provides that the report of a referee must direct the judgment to be entered thereon. Held, that the word "direct," as used in this connection, is synonymous with the words "to point out; to guide; to show; to regulate." Webst. Internat. Dict. And hence it cannot be held that the

Legislature thereby intended that the referee should formulate the judgment, and that the only requirement was that the report should be sufficiently full to show the particular form and terms of the judgment to which the successful party was entitled thereunder. Hinds v. Kellogg, 13 N. Y. Supp. 922, 923.

The verb "direct" ordinarily implies a pointing out with authority, or directing as a superior, and as used in a contract by an attorney with a client for a percentage of the recovery as compensation for his services, providing that no settlement shall be made unless he is present and directs it, is used in such sense, thus limiting the client's control over the action, and does not mean to guide or advise. Davis v. Chase, 64 N. E. 88, 89, 159 Ind. 242, 95 Am. St. Rep. 294.

As require.

The word "directing," in Code, § 346, providing that "a notice of appeal from a judgment directing the payment of money shall not stay the execution of the judgment unless a stay of execution is granted," amounts to neither more nor less than the word "require." When a tribunal invested with the power to enforce its mandates directs by its judgment a payment of money, it is equivalent to saying that it required

A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to amend, correct, reform, vacate, or enjoin the execution of same in a proceeding instituted for that purpose, such as a motion for a rehearing, an appeal, some form of writ of error, a bill of review, an injunction to restrain its execution, etc. An attack in trespass to try title by devisees against a purchaser at a sale by the executor, or the judgment of a probate court having jurisdiction over plaintiff which confirmed the sale, is not a direct, but a collateral, attack. Crawford v. McDonald, 33 S. W. 325, 327, 88 Tex. 626.

The phrase "direct attack," in a statement that upon a direct attack on a judgment there is no presumption in favor of the existence of a fact essential to the jurisdiction of the court, refers to appeals from the judgment. Eichhoff v. Eichhoff, 40 Pac. 24, 25, 107 Cal. 42, 48 Am. St. Rep. 110.

Where a statutory method is pursued for

avoiding a judgment, the attack on the judg1018, 1020, 31 Ind. App. 321. ment is direct. Spencer v. Spencer, 67 N. E.

Collateral distinguished.

When the validity of a record attacked is directly put in issue by the pleadings of the party attacking it by proper averment, the attack is direct, and not collateral; but when there are no proper averments attacking the record, although its validity is drawn in the issue of the case, the attack is collateral. Walker v. Goldsmith, 12 Pac. 537, 553, 14 Or. 125.

A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law. In Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Or. 96, 25 Pac. 362, 11 L. R. A. 155, 23 Am. St. Rep. 95, a collateral attack is aptly defined to be "an attempt to impeach a decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying the decree, or enjoining its execu

tion." It follows, therefore, that if the pro- | Ashland Light, Power & Street Ry. Co., 84 N. ceeding was instituted for any one of these W. 998, 1000, 108 Wis. 255. express purposes it would be a direct attack. Smith v. Morrill, 55 Pac. 824, 826, 12 Colo. App. 233.

The direct cause of an injury is one without which the injury would not have happened. Such was the sense in which the word “directly” was used in an instruction in an action for damages for an injury occasioned by collision between two vessels, stating that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover if by his negligence he had directly contributed to the accident. Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573, 586.

DIRECT CONSANGUINITY.

The series of degrees between persons who descend from one another is called direct, or lineal, consanguinity. Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 1856; Civ. Code Cal. 1903, § 1390; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 3747.

A direct attack upon a judgment is an attempt to amend, correct, reform, vacate, or enjoin the execution of the same, in a proceeding instituted for that purpose, such as a motion for a rehearing, an appeal, some form of writ of error, a bill of review, an injunction to restrain its execution, etc., while a collateral attack is an attempt to avoid its binding force in a proceeding not instituted for one of the purposes aforesaid, as where, in an action of debt on a judgment, defendant attempts to deny the fact of indebtedness, or where, in a suit to try title to property, a judgment is offered as a link in the chain of title, and the adverse party attempts to avoid its effects, etc. Thus, where a plaintiff in an action to recover land sought to set aside on the ground of fraud judgments in partition affecting their title, all parties to the judgments were made parties to the action, the tribunal in which the pending action was brought had rendered the judgments, and had jurisdiction to set them aside. The attack on the judgments was not collateral, but direct, though third parties, defendants to the action, claiming under the judgments, had become possessed of the land. Schneider v. Sellers, 61 S. W. 541, 543, the face of the court, in the presence of the

25 Tex. Civ. App. 226.

DIRECT CAUSE.

By the words "direct and proximate cause" are meant the cause which naturally led to and might have been expected to be directly instrumental in producing the result complained of. McKeon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 69 N. W. 175, 177, 94 Wis. 477, 35 L. R. A. 252, 59 Am. St. Rep. 910.

DIRECT CONTEMPT.

Direct contempts are contempts offered to a court while sitting as such and in its presence. Stuart v. People, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 395, 404; Cooper v. People, 22 Pac. 790, 796, 13 Colo. 337, 6 L. R. A. 430; Territory v. Murray, 15 Pac. 145, 148, 7 Mont. 251; Stewart v. State, 39 N. E. 508, 140 Ind. 7; State v. Anders, 68 Pac. 668, 669, 64 Kan. 742.

"A direct contempt is an open insult in

judges while presiding, or a resistance to its powers in their presence." Ex parte Wright, 65 Ind. 504, 508. See, also, Holman v. State, 5 N. E. 556, 557, 105 Ind. 513; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196, 198.

ted in the presence, or such as obstruct or inDirect contempts are such as are committerrupt the proceedings, of the court. State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 253, 10 S. E.

407, 408.

Direct contempts are those which are committed in the presence of the court while in session, or so near as to interrupt its proceedings. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 76

By "direct and proximate cause" is not meant the cause or agency which is nearest in time or place to the result, necessarily. "The active efficient cause, that sets in motion a train of events which brings to a re-s. W. 79, 177 Mo. 205. sult, without the intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and independent source, is the direct and proximate cause." Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. E. 690, 691, 158 Mass. 570, 20 L. R. A. 297, 35 Am. St. Rep.

540.

The direct cause may not be the proximate cause, and the proximate cause may not be the direct cause. Neither time nor distance is essentially a controlling element in determining whether a certain cause of an injury is the proximate cause of such injury; so that an instruction that the words "direct" and "proximate" mean about the same thing, mean the cause which naturally produced the accident, is erroneous. Wills v.

A direct contempt is an act committed in the presence of the court, while sitting judicially, or so near to the court as to interfere with or stop its ordinary way of procedure. Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co. (U. S.) 75 Fed. 972, 975; Snyder v. State, 52 N. E. 152, 151 Ind. 553.

Where attorneys during a court day, but while it was not in session, held a meeting at which one of their number presided in a room in the courthouse adjoining the courtroom, and occasionally used as a courtroom, which meeting was attended by the judge at their request, their acts in his presence are not committed in the presence of the court, and hence cannot constitute direct

To constitute a direct contempt of court there must be some disobedience to its powers, judgment, or process, or some open and

intended disrespect to the court or its officers in the presence of the court, or such conduct in or near the court as to interrupt or interfere with its proceedings or with the administration of justice. In re Dill, 5 Pac. 39, 47, 32 Kan. 668, 49 Am. Rep. 505.

Thus

contempt. Snyder v. State, 52 N. E. 152, 151 | ment, the evidence of a witness who was Ind. 553. present and witnessed the making of it is direct. Ann. Codes & St. Or. 1901, § 684. Code Civ. Proc. Cal. 1903, § 1831; where, on a trial for murder, the identity of the person alleged to have been guilty was proved by the direct evidence of an accomThe death of a human being was proved by plice, corroborated by circumstantial evidence. the identification of certain teeth and charred bones found in a river near the point where the body was burned, and there was circumstantial evidence to prove the identity of the deceased. The evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Pen. Code, § 358, that the death of a person alleged to have been killed must be established by direct proof as an independent fact. State v. Calder, 59 Pac. 903, 904, 23 Mont. 504.

Contempts are either direct, which openly insult and resist the powers of the court or the persons of the judges who preside there, or else are consequential, which without such gross insolence or direct opposition plainly tend to create a universal disregard of other authority. A direct contempt is one offered in the presence of a court while sitting judicially. A constructive contempt is one which tends to obstruct or embarrass a

court, though the act be not done in its presence. State v. Hansford, 28 S. E. 791, 792, 43 W. Va. 773; State v. Henthorn, 26 Pac. 937,

938, 46 Kan. 613; Androscoggin & K. R. Co. v. Androscoggin R. Co., 49 Me. 392, 400.

DIRECT DAMAGES.

1 Greenl. Ev. § 13, defines direct evidence as being given when the thing to be proved their own actual and personal knowledge of is directly attested by those who speak from its existence; circumstantial, when the thing

to be proved is to be inferred from other facts satisfactorily proved. See, also, Wills, on Cir. Ev. c. 2, § 1. And in a case of homicide direct proof of death would have been testimony of a witness who knew the person

Direct damages are such as flow imme- killed in his lifetime, and who would testify that the body found was the body of such diately upon the act done. Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 3911. person. People v. Palmer, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 817, 820.

DIRECT EVIDENCE.

Direct evidence is given where a witness testifies directly of his own knowledge of the main fact or facts to be proven. State v. Avery, 21 S. W. 193, 197, 113 Mo. 475; State v. Tate, 56 S. W. 1099, 1100, 156 Mo. 119; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438, 441.

"Direct or positive evidence is given when a witness can be called to testify to the precise fact which is the subject of an issue on trial." Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 310, 52 Am. Dec. 711; People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142, 144.

Evidence is direct and positive where the particular facts in dispute are communicated by those who have actual knowledge of them Pease v. Smith, by means of their senses. 61 N. Y. 477, 484.

Direct evidence is that which in the first instance applies directly to the factum probandum. Beason v. State, 67 S. W. 96, 98, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 442.

Direct evidence is that which immediately points to the question at issue. Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 5143; Pen. Code Ga. 1895, § 983.

Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute directly, without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact; for example, if the fact in dispute be an agree

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The phrases "direct injury" and "consequential injury" are not of the same meaning as "direct damages" and "consequential damages." The latter phrases are of the terminology of damages and the measure of damages, while the former are not, but are of the terminology of injuries. To illustrate, a direct injury may, in addition to direct damages, do indirect, or, as it is often more loosely phrased, consequential, damages; and the latter are recoverable as well as the for

steam boilers; the destruction of buildings to prevent the spread of fire; or their destruction through the falling of burning walls, etc. California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 10 Sup. Ct. 365, 372, 133 U. S. 387, 33 L. Ed. 730.

mer, unless they be not "proximate," but or chemicals caused by fire; explosion of "remote," to use two other words which belong to the terminology of damages. In the case of a direct injury the measure of damages includes both direct and indirect or consequential damages, but in the case of consequential injuries, there are no recoverable damages at all. Consequential damages can only result from a direct injury, while no actionable damages of any kind result from a consequential injury. Sadlier v. City of New York, 81 N. Y. Supp. 308, 312, 40 Misc. Rep. 78.

DIRECT INTEREST.

A direct interest, as relating to the competency of a witness in a suit against an executor, is the opposite of an indirect interest, and excludes the idea of contingency. A direct interest is defined in Winfield, Words & Phrases, p. 195, as "one which is certain, and not contingent or doubtful." In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined: "A direct interest, such as would render the interested party incompetent to testify in regard to the matter, is an interest which is certain, and not contingent or doubtful." In re Van Alstine's Estate, 72 Pac. 942, 943, 26 Utah, 193.

DIRECT LINE.

See "By Direct Line."

The direct line is divided into a direct line descending and a direct line ascending. The first is that which connects the ancestor with those who descend from him. The second is that which connects a person with those from whom he descends. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 3748.

DIRECT LOSS.

In an insurance policy, providing that the insurer would be liable if the falling of the insured building was caused by a direct loss or damage by fire, the word "direct" means merely immediate or approximate, as distinguished from remote; and where a building fell because a portion of the building was burned and fell, thereby causing the partition wall to fall, the loss was direct. Ermentrout v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 65 N. W. 635, 636, 63 Minn. 305, 30 L. R. A. 346, 56 Am. St. Rep. 481.

"Direct loss or damage by fire," as used in a fire policy against direct loss or damage by fire, applies to all losses of which fire is the immediate cause. California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 10 Sup. Ct. 365, 133 U. S. 387, 33 L. Ed. 730.

In a policy of insurance, direct loss or damage by fire meant the loss or damage occurring directly from the fire as the destroying agency, in contradistinction to the remoteness of fire as such agency. Remoteness of agency is the explosion of gunpowder, gases,

DIRECT PAYMENT.

The term "direct," as defined by Webster, means "immediate, express, unambiguous, confessed, absolute." The word "direct," in the English language, is one of wide acceptation, and has been adopted into the law in many relations. Thus, we have "direct descent," "direct taxes," "direct interest," "direct route," and "direct payment"; and as used in the latter term it means one which is absolute and unconditional as to time, amount, and the persons by whom and to whom it is to be made. People v. Boylan (U. S.) 25 Fed. 594, 595.

The phrase "direct payment of money," as used in Code, § 92, which provides that in all actions brought on overdue promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other written instruments for the direct payment of money, and upon book accounts, the creditor may have a right of attachment entered, means such instruments as provide for the immediate payment of money, such as overdue bills of exchange and promissory notes. Hurd v. McClellan, 23 Pac. 792, 793, 14 Colo. 213.

DIRECT RESULT.

By direct result, as relating to the cause of an injury, is meant the first result or ef fect. Story v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 44 N. W. 690, 692, 79 Iowa, 402.

In an instruction, in an action for personal injuries, that the jury should assess such damages as were the direct result of defendant's negligence, "direct" is synonymous with “natural” and "proximate." Lovett v. City of Chicago, 35 Ill. App. 570, 571.

"Direct result," as used in the statement that the diseased mental condition of accused in a prosecution for murder was the direct and immediate result of voluntary drunkenness, means that such mental condition arose during a condition of drunkenness, and pending a single, continuous, voluntary, drunken debauch, which at its origin started with the accused in a condition of sanity. State v. Haab, 29 South. 725, 728, 105 La. 230.

DIRECT ROUTE.

Code, § 3788, provides that a sheriff shall be entitled to mileage for conveying convicts to the penitentiary at the rate of 16 cents for each mile traveled from the county seat to the penitentiary by the most direct route of travel. Held, that the term "most direct route of travel," as so used, meant the route

A tax on real estate is a direct tax on

which was most generally used in journeying a tax on personal property or the income between the two places. Thus, where the thereof. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust route most generally used was a railway, Co., 15 Sup. Ct. 912, 916, 158 U. S. 601, 39 L which was much longer than an old wagon Ed. 1108. road, which was but seldom used, and then only by private conveyances, the sheriff was entitled to convey his prisoners by the railroad, and was entitled to compensation computed by that route, instead of by the shorter wagon road. Maynard v. Cedar County, 1 N. W. 701, 702, 51 Iowa, 430.

DIRECT TAX.

A direct tax, within Const. art. 1, § 8, providing that no capitation or other direct

tax shall be levied, unless in proportion to

the census of the inhabitants of the United States, means a capitation or poll tax simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance, and a tax on land. Hylton v. United States, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174, 1 L. Ed. 556; Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 433, 445, 19 L. Ed. 95; Scholey v. Rew, 90 U. S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347, 23 L. Ed. 99; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 602, 26 L. Ed. 253.

The tax imposed by Act Cong. July 13, 1866, on notes of state banks, is therefore not a direct tax. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 542, 19 L. Ed. 482.

Historical evidence shows that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like have never been regarded as the subjects of direct taxation. The phrase is understood to be limited to taxes on land and its appurtenances, and on polls. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482.

A direct tax is a tax demanded from the very person who it is intended or desired should pay it. A tax assessed as a direct tax in this sense may nevertheless fall ultimately upon one other than the one desired to pay it. It is generally agreed that the greater part of a tax assessed against the landlord falls finally upon his tenant. So a tax upon mortgages upon land in the end proves to be a tax upon the borrower. In 'neither of these cases was it intended or desired that the burden of the tax should fall upon either the renter or borrower. Yet, though it may happen that the renter and borrower have in other forms fully paid their due proportion of tax, the unintended duplication of their burden will not make the tax which they have been indirectly compelled to pay double taxation. South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 11 S. W. 348, 850, 87 Tenn. (3 Pickle) 406, 2 L. R. A. 853.

A tax upon rents and income of real estate is equivalent to a tax on the real estate Itself, and is therefore a direct tax, within the constitutional prohibition. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 689, 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759. Likewise

real property. People v. Knight, 67 N. E. 65, 66, 174 N. Y. 475, 63 L. R. A. 87.

DIRECT TESTIMONY.

The term "direct testimony," or "positive testimony," is used to designate the testimony of those who speak of their own in controversy. The proof in such case actual and personal knowledge of the fact rests upon faith in the veracity, impartial

ity, opportunity for observation, accuracy

of memory, etc., of the witnesses. The proof applies immediately to the factum probandum, without any intervening process. State v. Miller (Del.) 32 Atl. 137, 141, 9 Houst. 564.

DIRECT TRUST.

A direct or express trust is one springing from the agreement of the parties, creevincing the intention to create a trust. It ated by words, either expressly or impliedly

is distinguished from a constructive or implied trust, which is a trust created by equity law; a trust not created by any words either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. Currence v. Ward, 27 S. E. 329, 330, 43 W. Va. 367.

DIRECTION.

See "Express Direction"; "Under the Direction of."

In a plea alleging that plaintiff had the "direction, care, and management" of a ship, which defendant was charged with having neglected to load according to contract, was construed to mean the actual direction, care, and management, and not merely the legal direction, care, and management. It is equivalent to a charge of actual bad direction, care, and management, which included such conduct on the part of the mas ter and crew. Taylor v. Clay, 9 Q. B. 713, 723.

The word "direction," as used in a contract by which a contractor agreed to build a sewer under the immediate direction and superintendence of the commissioner of public works, related to the results, and not to the methods to be employed, and did not, therefore, make the contractor a servant of the city, as being one who, though he is to have a stipulated price for a thing, executes it under the direction and superintendence of the employer. Foster v. City of Chicago, 64 N. E 322, 323, 197 Ill. 264.

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