DIE BY HIS OWN HAND OR ACT, ETC. 2055 DIE IN KNOWN VIOLATION, LAW the suicide is the result of insanity, or in it- DIE BY SUICIDE self an insane act. Streeter v. Western Union Mut. Life & Accident Soc. of the United States, 31 N. W. 779, 780, 65 Mich. 199, 8 Am. St. Rep. 882. The term "death by his own hand or act, sane or insane," in a condition in a life policy that the policy shall be void in case of the death of insured by his own hand or act, sane or insane, includes his death by suicide, though insane at the time of the commission of the act. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Maguire, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 562, 563. In a policy of life insurance providing that in case of the death of the insured "by his own act or intention, whether sane or insane," the company shall only be liable for the net value of the policy at that time, the clause "by his own act or intention," etc., is equivalent to the words "by his own hand." Adkins v. Columbia Life Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27, 28, 35 Am. Rep. 410. Under a policy providing that it should be void if insured "die by his own act, sane or insaue," there can be no recovery if insured took his life when he had mind enough to know that the act by which he did so would probably result in his death, and he committed it with the intention that it should do so, though he may not, from mental derangement, have known that the act was wrong, and may not have had power to resist the impulse. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Beard, 66 S. W. 35, 36, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1747, 1750, 112 Ky. 455. In an action on a life policy providing that if insured should die by his own hand or act, sane or insane, the policy should be void, the court said: "We are to say from these words what the parties must have intended, and we cannot properly say that additional words having no meaning were inserted in the contract, and if they mean anything it is just what the words commonly import, and that is, if death ensues from any physical movement of the hand or body of the assured, proceeding from a partial or total eclipse of the mind, the insurer may go free. We are not altogether unmindful of the force of the proposition that a man does not die by his own hand who has not sufficient mind to will his own death, and it is not, perhaps, entirely easy to see in what precise words in our language the idea may be accurately and artistically expressed that a totally insane man may take his own life. But the question seems to involve more the refinement of language than the application of practical sense, and we are of opinion that, in the common judgment of mankind, it will be considered that, when a totally insane man blows his brains out with a pistol, he will be said to have 'died by his own hand,' within the meaning of a policy such as we have now under consideration." De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 232, 241, 242. See "Suicide." DIE BY SUICIDE, SANE OR INSANE. DIE BY SUICIDE, VOLUNTARY OR IN- See "Suicide Voluntary or Involuntary." DIE IN CONSEQUENCE OF VIOLATION An exception in a policy that the company shall not be liable if insured shall "die in or in consequence of the violation of any criminal law" would not include death of the insured by suicide committed in order to escape arrest for violation of a criminal law. Kerr v. Minnesota Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 39 N. W. 312, 313, 39 Minn. 174, 12 Am. St. Rep. 631. As used in a life policy containing a clause to the effect that the policy should be void if the assured should die in consequence of the violation of any law, the phrase "in consequence of the violation of any law" meant in consequence of the commission of any crime, the character of which directly increased the risk, although the crime might be below the grade of a felony. Wolff v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App. 236, 244. An exception in a policy of life insurance that it should be void if the insured should “die in consequence of the violation of the laws" of any nation, state, or province, should be construed to include the dying from a shot from a pistol in the hands of a person upon whom the insured and his brother had committed a violent assault, even though the pistol might have been accidentally discharged. Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614, 616, 48 Am. Rep. 658. DIE IN KNOWN VIOLATION OF LAW. The term "known violation of any law," in a life policy containing a clause that the policy shall be void in case insured shall die in a known violation of any law of the state, or of the United States, or any foreign country, means while engaged in a criminal act, known by him at the time to be a crime against the laws of such state or country. Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 308, 317. Where a life policy provides that the same shall be void if the insured "die in the known violation of any law," such phrase means that the policy is to be void if death occur by reason of the violation of law. It cannot be construed to mean that the policy is to be avoided by the mere fact that at the time of the death the insured was vio lating the law, if the death occurred from one's property by will. A life policy which provided it should be void if the assured should die in a duel, or by the hand of justice, in the commission of a felony, or in the "known violation of the law" of a state, meant a death in the commission of the felony. Harper's Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506, 511. "Die in known violation of law," as used in a life insurance policy conditioned that it was avoided if the assured died in the known violation of a law of the state, did not include the death of insured which resulted from a quarrel, unless his slayer was excusable. Harper's Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 109, 110. Where insured came to his death by a wound received by him in an encounter between himself and another in which pistols loaded with powder and balls were fired by each party at the other, if insured's firing off his pistol was done in lawful defense of his person, when there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend design on the part of the other to do him a great personal injury, and also to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished, then insured did not come to his death in "known violation of the law of the land," within the meaning of a clause in the policy "that in case he should die in the known violation of any law of this state, or of the United States, or of any government where he may be, this policy shall be void and of no effect." A killing under such circumstances, under the statutes of Missouri, would be justifiable homicide, and not a "violation of the law" within the meaning of the policy. Overton v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 Mo. 122, 124, 90 Am. Dec. 455. DIE LEAVING ISSUE. Newton v. Griffith The words "leaving issue" in a will, when used in reference to realty, mean leaving issue at the time of death. Downing v. Wherrin, 19 N. H. 2, 86, 49 Am. Dec. 139. The phrase "if he shall leave issue" is uniformly construed to mean an indefinite failure of issue, unless there be something in the context to qualify the expression. George v. Morgan, 16 Pa. (4 Harris) 95, 107. The words "die leaving issue," as used in a will making a gift to certain daughters for life, and providing that if such daughters, the share of such daughter so dying should or either of them, should die leaving issue, go to and be equally divided among such issue, and the lawful issue of such as may be dead, naturally and necessarily means issue surviving at the time of the daughter's death. Appeal of Woelpper, 17 Atl. 870, 872, 126 Pa. 562. A provision in a will that, if any of testator's children should die leaving issue or lawful heirs, such issue or heirs should receive their parents' portion, refers to a death in the testator's lifetime, and not afterwards. Livingston v. Greene, 52 N. Y. 118, 124; Phelps v. Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, 251. DIE LEAVING NO DESCENDANTS. A will provided finally that, should either of testator's sons die leaving no legal descendants, then and in that event all the property which should have been his, if living, should go to and become the property of the survivor and his legal descendants, and the property of the survivors of the trustees mentioned. Held, that the words "die leaving no legal descendants" are not used in their technical sense, in which they are held to import an indefinite failure of issue; but, when construed with the whole clause, mean a dying of one son without legal descendants during the life of the other, so that the estate devised will take effect on the death of one and during the lifetime of the other. Armstrong v. Douglass, 14 S. W. 604, 605, 89 Tenn. (5 Pickle) 219, 10 L. R. A. 85. Under a policy providing that it shall be forfeited in case the assured shall die while engaged in a known "violation of law," a known violation of a positive law, whether a civil or a criminal one, avoids the policy if the natural and reasonable consequences of the violation increase the risk. A violation of law, whether the law is a civil or a criminal one, does not avoid the policy if the natural and reasonable consequences of the DIE SEISED. act do not increase the risk. An assault and battery upon the person of the wife of another, violently beating, bruising, or choking her, is a known violation of law. Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 484, 49 Am. Rep. 469. DIE INTESTATE. "Dying intestate" means dying without making a valid and operative disposition of A will giving to one person certain property, "and all other property of which I shall die seised," passes a life insurance under a certificate payable "to the devisees, or, if no will, to the heirs," though nearly if not all of the property of the insured, except the insurance, is specifically named in the bequest. Aveling v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 40 N. W. 28, 29, 72 Mich. 9, 1 L. R. A. 528. DIE UNMARRIED OR WITHOUT IS-DIE WITHOUT HAVING CHILDREN. SUE. "Having" as used in a will reciting, aft It has long been regarded as an estab- er giving and bequeathing a certain house lished law in Pennsylvania that such words as "in case of his death, unmarried or without issue," as used in a will, are equivalent to simply dying without issue, unless there is something else in the case to warrant a different construction of the will. Barber v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 166 U. S. 83, 106, 17 Sup. Ct. 488, 41 L. Ed. 925. DIE WITHOUT CHILDREN. A devise to one, but, in case he should "die without children," then over, means "die without children living at the time of his death." Morgan v. Morgan (Conn.) 5 Day, 517, 523; Barney v. Arnold, 23 Atl. 45, 15 R. I. 78; Fairchild v. Crane, 13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beasl.) 105, 107; Parish's Heirs v. Ferris, 6 Ohio St. 563, 574, 575. and money to a daughter, that in the event of her dying without "having" any lawful issue such house and money should go to certain others, is capable of two meanings: When applied to realty, it means a general, indefinite failure of issue; when applied to personalty, it means leaving at the time of the death. Cole v. Goble, 13 C. B. 444, 455, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 234, 237; Downing v. Wherrin, 19 N. H. 2, 86, 49 Am. Dec. 139; Harris v. Smith, 16 Ga. 515, 548. As used in a will leaving a leasehold estate to a certain daughter, but, if she died without having children, that it should then go to another, etc., "having" does not mean leaving, so that such other person is not entitled to such leasehold in the event of such daughter's ever having had any child, though it dies before her decease. Weakley v. Rugg, 7 Term R. 322, 326. DIE WITHOUT HAVING ISSUE. Where a will bequeathed certain property to the testator's son, to be put on interest for his benefit until he should arrive at the age of 21 years, and that, in case he should "die having no children," then the The text-books lay down the general rule property should go to certain beneficiaries, that where a devise is to one and his heirs, the devise over was on the condition of the with a devise over "if he die without issue" son's dying under 21 years of age and withor "without having issue," and with no exout issue. Van Houten's Ex'rs v. Penning-planatory words defining the time to which ton, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Halst. Ch.) 745, 746. The term "die without children," in a will devising property to testator's son, but directing that if he die without children or their legal representatives the property shall be divided, etc., is to be construed to mean living children. Bullock v. Seymour, 33 Conn. 289, 293. The words "die without children," as used in a will, mean die in the lifetime of the testator without children. McCormick v. McElligot, 17 Atl. 896, 898, 127 Pa. 230, 14 Am. St. Rep. 837. Unless a different purpose be plainly expressed in the instrument, every limitation in a deed or will contingent upon a person dying "without heirs," or "without children" or "issue," or other words of like import, shall be construed as a limitation to take effect when such person shall die, unless the object on which the contingency is made to depend is then living, or, if a child of his body, such child be born within 10 months next thereafter. Ky. St. 1903, § 2344. An absolute devise, followed by a proviso that, if the devisee "die without children, grandchildren, or wife living," the estate shall go over, carries the fee to the devisee if he survive the testator, inasmuch as the limiting words will be taken to refer to the devisee's death in the lifetime of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears. King v. Frick, 135 Pa. 575, 19 Atl. 951, 952, 20 Am. St. Rep. 889. this contingency is to apply, it will be construed to be a general failure of issue at any time, however indefinite or remote, and which may not, therefore, happen for many generations. But the decisions upon this subject are exceedingly arbitrary, and without much reason or common sense. foundation in Hence courts will seize hold of slight circumstances to give to executory devises a construction which regards the failure of issue as relating to a definite period of time. The construction of the words as importing an indefinite failure of issue will give way to any explanatory words in the context which can be interpreted as fixing the time of the failure at the death.of the first taker. Strain v. Sweeny, 45 N. E. 201, 202, 163 Ill. 603. occurring in a will referring to the death of It has been long settled that the words "if he die without issue," or "if he have no a person without issue, whether the terms be issue," or "if he die before he has issue," or "for want of or in default of issue," unexplained by the context, and whether applied to real or personal estate, are construed to import a general indefinite failure of issue. The rule, in the language of Lord Redesdale, is that technical words shall have their legal effect, unless from subsequent inconsistent words it is very clear that the testator meant otherwise, or unless, in the language of Lord Alvaney, in Coole v. Coole, 3 Bos. & P. 620, the intent appears so plainly to the contrary that no one can misunderstand it. As to personalty, it seems the word "issue" yields more readily to expressions and cir cumstances in a will tending to confine it to the restricted sense, than when applied to real estate. Tinsley v. Jones (Va.) 13 Grat. 289, 292. DIE WITHOUT HEIRS. The terms "die without issue," "die without leaving issue," and "die without heirs lawfully begotten," are synonymous. Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147, 198. A will providing that, in case the daughter of the testatrix should "die without heirs," the estate devised to her should vest in others named, should be construed to mean without issue. Kent v. Armstrong, 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Halst. Ch.) 637, 640 (citing Cro. Jac. 415; 3 Lev. 17; 1 P. Wms. 23; 2 Saund. 288, a, b); Niles v. Gray, 12 Ohio St. 320, 328. As indefinite failure of issue. The words "die without heirs" import an indefinite failure of heirs, in contradistinction to a failure or extinction within some specified period, which is called a "definite failure of heirs." Gambrill v. Forest Grove Lodge, 5 Atl. 548, 549, 66 Md. 17; Watkins v. Quarles, 23 Ark. 179, 192; Seaman v. Harvey (N. Y.) 16 Hun, 71, 75. A will providing that, if a beneficiary should "die without an heir before he shall arrive to the age of 21 years," what was bequeathed to him should be divided among his brothers and sisters, should be construed to mean a definite failure of issue, and vests the first taker with a fee simple. Lippett v. Hopkins (U. S.) 15 Fed. Cas. 567, 568. "A devise, 'If either of my sons John and Jacob should happen to die without any lawful heirs of their own, then the share of him who may first decease shall accrue to the other survivor and his heirs,' should be construed to provide for a definite failure of issue, and that each son took an estate in fee simple conditional, and not an estate tail. It seems to me that the natural construction is, and the real meaning of this testator was, that, if one of these sons should die without issue in the lifetime of the other, the other was to have the whole. If this contingency should not happen, the testator desired to make no further provision on the subject. The best opinion I have been able to form is that, by way of executory devise, the share of the son first dying without issue in the lifetime of the other was to go over to that survivor, and that, subject to this contingency, each took a fee simple." Abbott v. Essex Co. (U. S.) 1 Fed. Cas. 16, 20. A testator devised certain land to his children in fee, and then added the following clause: "That if any of my said sons [naming them] or my daughter M. shall happen to die without heirs male of their own bodies, that then the land shall return to the survivors, to be equally divided between them." Held, that the devise over to the survivors showed that an indefinite failure of issue was not meant, and that the will should Unless a different purpose be plainly expressed in the instrument, every limitation in a deed or will contingent upon a person dying "without heirs," or "without children” or "issue," or other words of like import, shall be construed as a limitation to take effect when such person shall die, unless the object on which the contingency is made to depend is then living, or, if a child of his body, such child be born within 10 months next there-be construed to mean that, if any of the deviafter. Ky. St. 1903, § 2344. In a limitation of real or personal property by deed, will, or other instrument in writing, the words "die without issue," or "die without leaving issue," or "have no issue," or "die without heirs of the body," or other words importing either a want or failure of issue of any person in his lifetime or at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his issue, shall, unless a contrary intention clearly appears by the instrument creating such limitation, mean a want or failure of issue in the lifetime or at the time of the death of such person, and not an indefinite failure of his issue. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 1268, c. 134, § 5. A devise to a daughter, but in case she should "die without any legitimate heirs," then over, means a definite, and not an indefinite, failure of issue, and is to be construed as if the words "living at the time of her death" had been added after the words "legitimate heirs." Niles v. Gray. 12 Ohio St. 329, 328. sees named should die without leaving male issue at the time of his death, his portion should be divided among the survivors. Fosdick v. Cornell (N. Y.) 1 Johns. 440, 448, 452, 3 Am. Dec. 340. As within lifetime of testator. Where a future interest is limited by a grant to take effect on the death of any person "without heirs" or "heirs of his body," or "without issue," or in equivalent words, such words must be taken to mean successors, or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor. Civ. Code Idaho 1901, § 2397. A will providing for the division of property among testator's children, and, in case any of such children should "die without an heir of their body begotten," their part should be equally divided among the survivors or their heirs, should be construed as meaning the death of the legatee after that of the testator, and before the time for distribution, or when the legacy may be re duced to possession. Pool v. Benning, 48 Ky. the body. Moore v. Gary, 48 N. E. 630, 632, (9 B. Mon.) 623. 149 Ind. 51. Testator devised certain land to his wife for life, then to his son W. and his heirs forever. Another clause provided that, if any of his sons to whom he bequeathed property should die without "heirs of his body," the real estate so bequeathed should go to the surviving brother or brothers, and personalty to all the other heirs equally. Other provisions tended slightly to show that testator contemplated that his son should survive him. It was held that, construing all the clauses together, the word "die without heirs of his body" referred to death at any time before or after testator's death, and passed a conditional fee to W., determinable upon his death without lineal heirs. Summers v. Smith, 21 N. E. 191, 192, 127 Ill. 645. As indefinite failure of issue. shall cease. The term "die without issue," standing uninfluenced by other parts of the will, imports an indefinite failure of issue; that is, a failure not on the death of the first taker, but a failure when all his issue or descendants Kent v. Armstrong, 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Halst.) 637, 638; Wardell v. Allaire, 20 N. J. Law (Spencer) 6, 9, 21; Condict's Ex'rs v. King, 13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beasl.) 375, 376; Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. Law (2 Zab.) 117, 154; Davies' Adm'r v. Steele's Adm'r, 38 N. J. Eq. (11 Stew.) 168, 171; Hugg v. Hugg, 5 N. J. Law (2 Southard) 427, 431; Morehouse v. Cotheal, 21 N. J. Law (1 Zab.) 480, 490 (citing 4 Kent, Comm. 274 [5th Ed.]; 2 Jarm. Wills, 417, 427); Morehouse v. Cotheal, 22 N. J. Law (2 Zab.) 430, 435; Wilson v. Small, 20 DIE WITHOUT HEIRS AND INTES- N. J. Law (Spencer) 151, 152; Chetwood v. TATE. Where a will devised property to a person to be possessed, enjoyed, and occupied by her and her heirs forever, but, if she should die without heirs and intestate, then that all the estate should vest in her brother, the words "without heirs and intestate" implied a power of control and disposition, so as to be inconsistent with and avoid the limitation over, and the devisee took an estate in fee. Armstrong v. Kent, 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Halst. Ch.) 559, 574. DIE WITHOUT HEIRS LIVING. "Dying without heirs living or surviving" is always held to import a definite failure of issue. Granger v. Granger, 46 N. E. 80, 84, 147 Ind. 95, 36 L. R. A. 190. DIE WITHOUT ISSUE. The terms "die without issue," "die without leaving issue," and "die without heirs lawfully begotten," are synonymous. Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. (3 Pike) 147, 198. A will which devised all the testator's es tate to G. and his heirs forever, and afterwards provided that, if G. should die without issue who could inherit, the estate given to him in the will should be otherwise disposed of, is of the same effect as though the testator had said without "heirs of his body lawfully begotten," and the word "heirs," in the first devise, will be construed as intended for heirs of the body, G. taking an estate tail. Turrill v. Northrop, 51 Conn. 33, 36. The words "without issue, that is, without heirs, being his own children lawfully begotten," have the same meaning as if only the words "without issue or without heirs of his body" had been used. The only effect of the use of the words "children lawfully begotten" was to qualify and restrict the meaning of the word "heirs" to the heirs of Winston, 40 N. J. Law (11 Vroom) 337, 338; Harris v. Taylor, 5 N. J. Law (2 Southard) 413, 416; Wilson v. Wilson, 19 Atl. 132, 133, 46 N. J. Eq. (1 Dick.) 321; Harris v. Smith, 16 Ga. 545, 548; Paterson v. Ellis' Ex'rs (N. Y.) 11 Wend. 259, 282; Jackson v. Bull (N. Y.) 10 Johns. 19; Wilson v. Wilson (N. Y.) 20 How. Prac. 41, 44; Whitford v. Armstrong, 9 R. I. 394, 395; Arnold v. Brown, 7 R. I. 188, 196; Vaughn v. Guy, 17 Mo. 429, 431; Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. (3 Pike) 147, 198; Hollett's Lessee v. Pope (Del.) 3 Har. 542 Fisk v. Keene, 35 Me. 349, 355; Mendenhall v. Mower, 16 S. C. 303, 312; Mangum v. Piester, 16 S. C. 316, 327; Eichelberger v. Barnitz (Pa.) 9 Watts, 447, 450; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Pa. 335, 339; Stouch v. Zeigler, 46 Atl. 486, 488, 196 Pa. 489; Wynn v. Story, 38 Pa. (2 Wright) 166, 169; Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. (1 Wright) 31, 33, 78 Am. Dec. 399; In re Miller's Estate, 22 Atl. 1044, 145 Pa. 561; In re Hoff's Estate, 23 Atl. 890, 892, 147 Pa. 636; Reinoehl v. Shirk, 12 Atl. 806, 808, 119 Pa. 108; Hackney v. Tracy, 20 Atl. 560, 561, 137 Pa. 53; In re Robinson's Estate, 24 Atl. 297, 299, 149 Pa. 418; Tongue's Lessee v. Nutwell, 13 Md. 415, 425; Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee (Md.) 7 Har. & J. 220, 236 Newton v. Griffith (Md.) 1 Har. & G. 111, 116 Comegys v. Jones, 4 Atl. 567, 568, 65 Md. 317; Barlow v. Salter, 17 Ves. 479, 482; Cole V. Goble, 13 C. B. 444, 455, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 234, 237; Allen v. Trustees of Ashley School Fund, 102 Mass. 262, 264; Hall v. Priest, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 18, 19; Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, 502; Hawley v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 8 Mass. 3, 12, 5 Am. Dec. 66; Hayward v. Howe, 78 Mass (12 Gray) 49, 50, 71 Am. Dec. 734; Downing v. Wherrin, 19 N. H. 9, 86, 49 Am. Dec. 139; McGraw v. Davenport (Ala.) 6 Port. 319, 327, 329. But where, from its context, and the will as a whole, it appears that testator intended the term to mean a definite failure of issue, it will be so construed. Cain v. Robertson, 61 N. E. 26, 27, 27 Ind. App. 198; Hall v. Chaf |