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construction of the act any more than the DESTINE.
word "required," and the former is at least
as forcible in its expression of a request as
the latter is in its expression of a command.
Ex parte Kohler, 15 Pac. 436, 437, 74 Cal. 38.
Within a bond providing that it will be
redeemed, if desired, 12 years after date, "de-
sired" is the synonym of "wished for" and of
“requested,” and gives the option of redemp-
tion to the holder of the bond, and not to its
maker. Allentown School Dist. v. Derr. 9
Atl. 55, 56, 115 Pa. 439, 19 Wkly. Notes Cas.

189.

DESIRE TO FAVOR.

"Desire to favor," as used in an instruction that "you are not required to find any fact to be proven because you find the same suggested in a verdict, or in the verdict of the party you desire to favor," means "find to have the merits," and the jury could not have understood that their verdict could be bestowed by favor. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Burton, 37 N. E. 150, 154, 139 Ind. 357.

DESPOIL.

"The word 'despoil' involves in its signification violent or clandestine means by which one is deprived of that which he possesses." Sunol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254, 268.

DESTINATION.

See "Final Destination."

The destination of a vessel, within the meaning of a fire policy insuring it for a voyage to Havana, was construed to mean the inner harbor at Havana, and not the outer harbor or quarantine grounds, which was not a place of safety for vessels. Dickey v. United Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 11 Johns. 358, 363.

A grant of land made by the Governor of Louisiana was in the following words: "Exercising the authority which the King has granted to us, we destine and appropriate, in his royal name, the aforesaid twelve leagues." These words are of strong and decisive import, and, it is believed, show the intent of the grantor as fully as any that could have been adopted. To "destine" is to set, ordain, or appoint to a use, purpose, estate, or place. We are all destined to a future state. To fix unalterably by a divine decree; to appoint unalterably. The word "appropriate,” in the sense used, signifies to set apart for or assign to a particular use in exclusion of all other uses; to claim or use by an exclusive right. No words of a more determinate character to convey a complete title could have been found in any language. The words as used in the original grant mean to grant and deliver as property. United States v. Philadelphia and New Orleans, 52 U. S. (11 How.) 609, 660, 13 L. Ed. 834.

DESTITUTE.

The words "destitute persons," within the meaning of Rev. St. c. 24, § 24, providing that the overseers are to relieve destitute persons found in their towns and having no settlement therein, includes a person found in distress, although he may prove property of his own not available for immediate relief. A person in jail on execution and actually destitute is entitled to relief, although he refuses to make oath that he is unable to support himself in jail and has not sufficient property to furnish security for his support. Inhabitants of Norridgewock v. Inhabitants of Solon, 49 Me. 385.

The words "destitute of property or means of comfortable subsistence" may be used to characterize minor children who have A bill of lading providing against liabil- no property, although they earn their own ity for articles of freight after their arrival living. Woods v. Perkins, 9 South. 48, 43 La. at their "place of destination" and unloading | Ann. 347. at the company's warehouse, and providing that articles arriving at their "place of destination" must be taken away within 24 hours after being unladen, means the place of ultimate destination of the goods, and does not include an intermediate point where the goods were to be delivered from one carrier to a connecting carrier. Ayres v. Western R. Corp. (U. S.) 2 Fed. Cas. 275, 277.

DESTROY-DESTRUCTION.

See "Sunk or Destroyed"; "Total Destruction"; "Wholly Destroyed."

In Rev. St. § 5358 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3639], declaring that every person who plunders or destroys any goods, merchandise, or other effects from or belonging to any ves

stroys" is used in a popular sense, to include every kind of a deprivation of the owner by demolishing, making way with, or other subversion of his property. United States v. Stone (U. S.) 8 Fed. 232, 249.

Rev. St. c. 91, § 34, giving a person who labors at cutting or driving logs a lien there-sel in distress shall be punished, etc., "deon, to continue for 60 days after the logs arrive at the "place of destination," means the place of destination of the logs as a collective whole that is, the boom into which they are rafted—and not the different destinations to which the aggregate logs in different detachments may be sent for manufacture into lumber. Sheridan v. Ireland, 66 Me. 65, 69.

Under Act July 15, 1897, pl. 297, authorizing transfers of licenses from place to place, on partial or complete "destruction" of the

building, a destruction may exist where the buildings are rendered useless for the purpose intended. The word must necessarily be construed as synonymous with "demolition," "breaking up in parts," "pulling down." In re McCabe, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 564.

Rev. St. § 4113, provides that the lessee of any building which shall, without any fault or neglect on his part, be "destroyed" or be so injured by the elements as to be unfit for occupancy, shall not be liable to pay rent after the destruction, but shall surrender possession, etc. Held, that the destruction or

injury, within the purview of the statute, did

otherwise destroy any ship or vessel of which he is owner, in part or in whole, or permit or procure the same to be done, with intent to prejudice any person who has underwritten any policy of insurance thereon, he shall be punished, etc., "destroy" means to unfit a ves

sel for services beyond the hope of recovery ry, is synonymous with 'cast away.' It is a by ordinary means. "This, in extent of injugeneric term. Casting away is a species of act as causes a vessel to perish or be lost so destroying, as burning is; both mean such an as to be irrecoverable by ordinary means." United States v. Johns (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas.

616, 618.

Destruction by fire.

The word "destroyed," in an agreement

not mean the gradual decay which results from the ordinary action of the elements, nor the injury resulting from the ordinary action of human agents, which a lessee is supposed to have in view when he enters into the by a lessee of certain fire extinguishers to contract, but that the statute was designed pay the lessor the value of the property derather to protect the lessee against unexpect-stroyed, was held to include destruction of ed and unusual action of the elements, or of human forces causing a total destruction. The word "destroy" has reference to a sudden and total destruction, acting with unusual power, and the term "injury" meant

something short of total destruction occasioned in the same manner. Hilliard v. New York & Cleveland Gas Coal Co., 41 Ohio St. 662, 669, 52 Am. Rep. 99. In New York, under a similar statute, a like meaning was given to the word "destroy." Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N. Y. 450, 455.

The word "destroy" has on more than one occasion been construed to describe the act which, while rendering useless for the purpose for which it was intended, did not literally demolish or annihilate the thing. In re McCabe, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 564.

The malicious or mischievous destruction or injury of animals, within the meaning of a statute making it an offense to maliciously or mischievously destroy or injure certain animals, is sufficiently described by an indictment charging a defendant who did maliciously and unlawfully injure, maim, and wound such an animal. State v. Merrill (Ind.) 3 Blackf. 346, 347.

As carry away.

Laws 1855, c. 428, providing that persons whose property is destroyed by mobs shall be compensated therefor, does not necessarily mean the actual, immediate destruction of the property; and it would make no real difference whether the rioters actually destroyed the property on the premises, or whether they took it away and then destroyed it, or whether they destroyed the goods taken by using them. Solomon v. City of Kingston (N. Y.) 24 Hun, 562, 564.

As cast away a vessel.

In Act Cong. March 26, 1804, § 2, providing that if any person shall on the high seas willfully and corruptly cast away, burn, or

the property by fire. "The word 'destroyed' is used without limitation, and hence it is difficult to see why destruction by fire should constitute an exception. True, either party might have insured against loss by fire; but when it is considered that it was the business of the plaintiff to hire out fire extinguishers, and in each instance would have to effect separate insurance unless protection against loss by fire could be secured by some special provision in the contract of bailment, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the contract in this case contemplated to cast the burden of loss, in case of destruction by fire, upon the bailee. Rapid Safety Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Hay-Budden Mfg. Co., 75 N. Y. Supp. 1008, 1010, 37 Misc. Rep. 556.

As disable.

2 Rev. St. p. 665, § 27, defines the offense of mayhem to be the cutting off or disabling any limb or member of another. Held, where an indictment for mayhem charged that defendant did with premeditated design cut, bite, and destroy the thumb of another, the word "destroy" was sufficient instead of "disable," inasmuch as it was more comprehensive, and included everything signified by "disable." Tully v. People, 67 N. Y. 15, 20.

Partial destruction.

"Destroyed," within the meaning of a covenant in a lease that, if the premises are destroyed by fire, the payment of rent and relation of landlord and tenant shall cease at the election of either party, does not characterize a partial destruction of a building by fire which renders a part of it uninhabitable until repaired. Wall v. Hinds, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 256, 268, 64 Am. Dec. 64.

A "destruction" of property, within the meaning of the law of fire insurance, is shown by evidence that the insured building was so damaged as to render it useless for the purpose for which it had been used. "If rendered useless for the purpose for which the

property was used, the plaintiff's right to recover insurance for what was so insured was complete. If what remained of the property so insured was of any value, the insurer was entitled to it." Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Feibelman, 23 South. 759, 765, 118 Ala. 308.

The term "destruction," in a covenant in

a lease to repair damages occurring during the occupancy, the usual wear and tear, providential destruction, and the destruction by fire excepted, is to be construed as meaning a total destruction of the premises, such as will require a “rebuilding" as distinguished from a "repair." There must be such a destruction as will permanently unfit the premises for occupancy. Spalding v. Munford, 37 Mo. App. 281, 283.

In an act providing that a person who shall willfully break or destroy or injure the door of any building shall be punished, etc., the words "break or destroy" mean to destroy the completeness of. State v. McBeth, 31 Pac. 145, 49 Kan. 584.

Defendants were indicted and convicted for destroying buildings in the nighttime, under a statute providing that "if any person shall in the nighttime maliciously, unlawfully, and willingly burn or cause to be burned or destroyed any houses or buildings," etc., he shall be punished, etc. In construing the statute, the court said: "If the words 'or destroyed' be stricken out of the statute entirely, it is clear that by no rule of construction can its remaining language be made to embrace any injury to a building other than those in which fire is the element used in the work of destruction. But conceding the construction which was contended for in behalf of the state to be correct, namely, that by the insertion of those words into the statute it was meant to include every kind of injury that might be done to a building, whether by fire or otherwise, it would, however, be a strained construction of the words 'or destroyed,' standing alone as they do, and unsustained by anything in the context, to say nothing of the rule which enjoins a strict construction of penal enactments, to hold that these words were intended to embrace within the provisions of this highly penal statute every possible injury, however slight or trivial, that might be done to a building merely because done in the nighttime such, for example, as the breaking of a door or window, or even to such injuries as those that were done to the building in question by the defendants, by prizing up the end of a smoke house and taking out three logs, whereby the top was pushed back, so that it nearly fellwhen it is manifest, whether we resort to the context as furnishing an index to the scope or design of the authors of the statute, or to the ordinary meaning of the word 'destroy,' that its sole purpose was to include within its provisions such injuries only, whether by fire or otherwise, as would amount either to

a total demolition of a building, or such as would unfit it for the purpose for which it had been erected." State v. De Bruhl (S. C.) 10 Rich. Law. 23, 26.

Poisoning.

Under Pen. Code, § 654, relating to injuries against property, and prescribing the punishment for unlawfully destroying another's property, one who poisons the horses of another may be prosecuted for destroying property. People v. Christy, 20 N. Y. Supp. 278, 279, 65 Hun, 349.

"Destruction or injury of personal property," within the meaning of Gen. St. c. 161, § 85, which provides a punishment for willful and malicious destruction or injury of personal property of another in any manner or by any means not particularly described or mentioned in the chapter, includes poisoning the hens of another, notwithstanding the provisions of section 80 for punishing the poisoning of horses, cattle, or other beasts. Commonwealth v. Falvey, 108 Mass. 304, 306.

As prevention of use

Property is destroyed, although not touched directly, when the result of construction is to prevent its use, as in Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coon, 6 Pa. (6 Barr) 379, 47 Am. Dec. 474. The injury results in these cases from the construction of the works of the corporation; but in the case of a valuable country hotel, the business of which was destroyed by the change of travel from wagons to trains as the result of operation of a railroad, plaintiff was held to be remediless, although the value of his property was destroyed. Jones v. Erie & W. V. R. Co., 25 Atl. 134, 137, 151 Pa. 30, 17 L. R. A. 758, 31 Am. St. Rep. 722.

"Destroyed," as used in Const. art. 16, 8, providing for the payment of damages by corporations for property injured or destroyed in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, was not designed to change, alter, or limit the nature and effect of corporate contracts, but to impose on those having the right of eminent domain a liability for conse quential damages; as, for instance, if, in the exercise of a right, the water of a creek or other stream is cut off from the owner below or backed on the owners above, or if, in the lawful use of a highway, the property of an adjacent owner is injured thereby, damages therefor may be recovered. Edmondson v. Pittsburgh, M. & Y. R. Co. (Md.) 4 Atl. 404, 406.

In relation to instruments.

The cutting of a bank note into two parts, unless done with the intent to destroy the note, is not of itself a destruction of it. While the two parts exist and are retained by the rightful holder, the rights and liabilities of the parties remain precisely the

same as before the division. Allen v. State | death is not caused, shall be punished, does Bank, 21 N. C. 3, 12.

Where, before a marriage, the parties entered into a marriage contract defining the interest the wife should have in the huspand's property, and delivered such contract to a trustee to hold for them, and thereafter they demanded and received such contract from the trustee, each declaring that it should be null and void, such act and words were equivalent to a cancellation or destruction of the paper itself. In determining whether a contract has been destroyed, the intention of the parties alone is to be considered, not the mode adopted to signify that Intent. In re Gangwere's Estate, 14 Pa. (2 Harris) 417, 426, 53 Am. Dec. 554.

In relation to wills.

"Destroy," within an act relating to wills, includes burning, canceling, and tearIng up. A will burned, canceled, or torn animo revocandi is destroyed. Johnson v. Brailsford (S. C.) 2 Nott & McC. 272, 278, 10 Am. Dec. 601.

The term "destroying," in Act April 8, 1833, 13, authorizing the revocation of a will by burning, cancelling, obliterating, or destroying the same, does not include the act of testator in writing the word "obsolete" on the margin of his will without signing the same. Lewis v. Lewis (Pa.) 2 Watts & S. 455, 457.

"Destroying," as used in a statute providing that a will may be revoked in certain specified ways or by otherwise destroying it, does not include a cancellation of the will with a pen. Stephens v. Taprell (U. S.) 2 Curt. 458.

not mean merely such as might, when administered, be hurtful and injurious, but, like a poison, it must be capable of destroying life. It includes substances which act on the system mechanically so as to destroy life, as well as those which are capable of destroying life by their own inherent qualities. Pulverized glass or boiling water are included within "noxious or destructive substance or liquid," for when administered in sufficient quantities they will destroy life; but they are not poisonous. People v. Van Deleer, 53 Cal. 147,

148.

"Destructive matter," as used in St. 1 Vict. c. 85, prescribing the punishment for any person who shall cast or throw on or otherwise apply to any person any corrosive fluid or other destructive matter with intent to burn, disfigure, or disable such person, would include boiling water. Regina v. Crawford, 2 C. & K. 129.

DESUETUDE.

*

It

"The instances are numerous of statutes being repealed in fact—a kind of silent legislation. As to the abrogation of statutes by nonuser, there may rest some doubt; for myself, I own, my opinion is that nonuser may be such as to render them obsolete when their objects vanish or their reason ceases. The long desuetude of any law amounts to its repeal. Mr. Woodeson in his second lecture (volume 1, 63) of civil, positive and institutive laws, observes, that the last consideration is the period of their existence;' they may be repealed either expressly or by implication founded on disuse. certainly requires very strong grounds to preDestruction of a will, as used in a statute sume a law obsolete, yet, as the whole comrelating to the burning, canceling, obliter-munity includes as well the legislative power ating, and destroying a will, is not necessarily annihilation or a change into other forms of matter. Tearing into fragments is unquestionably destruction, though the fragments may be reunited. All the words are used in their popular sense, and thus used they secure the object the Legislature had in view —a complete manifestation of an executed in- DETACHABLE. tention to repeal the will. Appeal of Evans, 58 Pa. (8 P. F. Smith) 238, 244.

DESTRUCTIVE.

The question whether the term "noxious or destructive substance or liquid," in a statute making the administering of such substance criminal, includes the substance or liquid administered, is a question for the jury. Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 516.

Pen. Code, 216, providing that every person who, with intent to kill, administers, or causes or procures to be administered, to another, any poison or other noxious or destructive substance or liquid, but by which

as its subjects, total disuse of any civil institution for ages past may afford just and rational objections against disrespected and superannuated ordinances." James v. Commonwealth (Pa.) 12 Serg. & R. 220, 227.

A patent called for a coffee or similar mill having a detachable hopper and grinding shell formed in a single piece, and suspended within the box by the upper part of the hopper or a flange thereon. Held, that the word "detachable," as so used, did not necessarily imply that the hopper must possess the capacity of being detached from the top of the box; the object contemplated being rather that the hopper might be easily detachable from the box, since by the terms of the claim the hopper and grinding shell, formed in a single piece, are suspended within the box by the upper part of the hopper or a flange thereon. Strobridge v. Lindsay (U. S.) 2 Fed. 692, 693.

in a claim for a patent declaring the same to be the combination of a torpedo, a detachable clip, means for attaching it to the torpedo, and a wire for attaching the clip to the rail, substantially as shown, a removable clip was meant, or one which was not positively attached to, and virtually made a part of, the torpedo shell by riveting or soldering; one which, while it accomplished connection, did not create union. Bennett v. Schooley (U. S.) 75 Fed. 392, 394.

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DETAIL.

See "Facts Detailed"; "Matters of Detail."

A statement that one has not heard the particulars of a transaction is contradicted by showing that he had heard the details. The words "particulars" and "details" are in fact synonymous, and in ordinary parlance convey the same meaning. Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Knee, 34 Atl. 252, 254, 83 Md. 77.

In an agreement of reorganization of a corporation, providing that the bond holders' committee should submit to the certificate holders a detailed plan of reorganization, which should be binding upon all such holders, and requiring the bond holders to dissent "details" are the minor particulars necessary within 30 days to the details of the plan, the to complete the reorganization, but consistent with the original plan, and lawful and honest. In matters of substance nothing might be done under the detailed plan that could not have been done under the original agreement. That was the idea conveyed by the

use of the word "detailed." United Waterworks Co. v. Omaha Water Co., 58 N. E. 58, 62, 164 N. Y. 41.

As selected.

Where, in an insurance policy, the dwelling insured is described as standing detach"Detailed," as used in a resolution of the ed, and the dwelling was 7 feet from any oth-common council of Brooklyn appointing a cerer building, it did stand detached, and an at- tain person as a detailed fireman, means, simtempt to show that the phrase "standing de- ply, selected. People v. City of Brooklyn tached" meant that it was distant 25 feet or Fire Com'rs, 8 N. E. 730, 731, 103 N. Y. 370. thereabouts from any other building was properly rejected. The phrase is not in the slightest degree ambiguous, and extrinsic proof was not admissible to give it a meaning different from its plain import. Hill v. Hibernia Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 10 Hun, 26, 30.

A policy of fire insurance issued to plaintiffs stated that the property insured was contained in their frame storehouse with slate roof, situate detached at least 100 feet, etc., on the east side of Lake Champlain. Held, that the words "detached at least 100 feet" should not be construed as mere words

relating to the description of the building,

but words relating to the character of the risk, and which amounted to a warranty to the effect that no other buildings of such size and character as to constitute an exposure and increase of risk stood within the distance specified. Burleigh v. Gebhard Fire Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 220, 223.

As isolated.

"Detached," as used in St. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, § 1, providing that the detached parts of a county should be considered for all purposes as part of the counties of which they are part for election purposes, must be taken to embrace "isolated." Regina v. Brecon, 15 Q. B. 813, 825.

As set apart to particular service.

With relation to military service a "detail" is one who belongs to the army, but is only detached or set apart for the time to some particular duty or service, and who is liable at any time to be recalled to his place in the ranks. A "detail" is distinguished from an "exempt," who is one free from any charge, burden, or duty—is not liable to any service. In re Strawbridge, 39 Ala. 367, 375.

"The Century Dictionary defines the verb 'detail' to mean 'set apart for a particular service.'" The word is so used in Acts

1898, c. 123, § 95, directing the police commissioners of Baltimore, at the request of the park commissioners, to detail, from time to time, members of the regular police force for the preservation of order in the parks. Upshur v. City of Baltimore, 51 Atl. 953, 955, 94 Md. 743.

DETAILED REPORT.

Rev. St. § 917, requiring the county commissioners annually to make a detailed report in writing of their financial transactions during the preceding year, will be construed to have been complied with if such report states faithfully the several sources of expenditure

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