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DERELICT.

Hiett

early date. The general criterion by which | ness, except the natural born idiot. to test his authority is declared in the case v. Shull, 15 S. E. 146, 147, 36 W. Va. 563. of Levett v. Farrar, Cro. Eliz. 294, in which the court said that if a writ be directed to the sheriff by the name of his office, and not by a particular name, and doth not expressly command him to execute it in person, the undersheriff may execute it. Tillotson V. Cheetham (N. Y.) 2 Johns. 63, 70.

DEPUTY STATE CONSTABLE.

The phrase "deputy state constable" is equivalent to the phrase "deputy consul of the commonwealth," which is the designation used in the statutes. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors, 97 Mass. 63, 66.

DEPUTY TO CONGRESS.

Baldwin, J., in his opinion in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, considers that the words "deputy to Congress," occurring in the twelfth article of the Hopewell treaty with the Indians, providing that the Indians should have a right to send a "deputy of their choice to Congress," might mean either a person having a right to sit in that body, since at that time it was composed of delegates or deputies from the states, or it might mean an agent or minister. In either event, he could not represent an independent or foreign nation; for if he sat in Congress as the deputy from any state it must be one having a political connection with the confederacy; if as a diplomatic agent, it could not be as an agent of an independent nation, for all such have an unquestioned right to send such agents when and where they please. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 1, 38, 8 L. Ed. 25.

DEPUTY TREASURER.

Money was deposited in a bank in the name of "A., deputy treasurer." Held, that the words "deputy treasurer," in such connection, had the same import as the word "agent," and was merely an acknowledgment by A. that he held the money for some one else, and the person for whom he held the money not being divulged, as between the bank and A., the money belonged to A., and it was not entitled to justify a refusal to pay A.'s checks on that ground alone. Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Alexander, 14 Atl. 402, 404, 120 Pa. 476. See, also, Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank, 18 Atl. 632, 130 Pa. 419, 17 Am. St. Rep. 778.

See "Quasi Derelict."

A "derelict" is defined by Judge Story to be a "boat or vessel found deserted or aban doned on the seas, whether it arose from accident or necessity or voluntary dereliction." The Hyderabad (U. S.) 11 Fed. 749, 754; Rowe v. The Brig (U. S.) 20 Fed. Cas. 1281, 1282; Montgomery v. The T. P. Leathers (U. S.) 17 Fed. Cas. 641, 643.

The term "derelict" is used in the maritime law to designate a vessel found entirely deserted or abandoned at sea. Evans v. The Charles (U. S.) 8 Fed. Cas. 838.

Derelicts are boats or other vessels for

saken or found on the seas, without any person in them. The Fairfield (U. S.) 30 Fed. 700, 701; Montgomery v. The T. P. Leathers (U. S.) 17 Fed. Cas. 641, 642; Flinn v. The Leander (U. S.) 9 Fed. Cas. 275; Baker v. Hoag, 7 N. Y. (3 Seld.) 555, 559, 59 Am. Dec. 431.

A derelict is a ship wrecked at sea which has been abandoned by the crew, without hope of recovery or intention on their part to return. Cromwell v. The Island City, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 121, 128, 17 L. Ed. 70; Rowe v. The Brig (U. S.) 20 Fed. Cas. 1281, 1282; Cromwell v. The Island City (U. S.) 6 Fed. Cas. 859, 860; Tyson v. Prior (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 489; The Aquila, 1 C. Rob. 37, 41; The Ann L. Lockwood (U. S.) 37 Fed. 233, 237; The B. C. Terry (U. S.) 9 Fed. 920; The Emulous (U. S.) 8 Fed. Cas. 705, 707. A temporary abandonment for the purpose of providing more effectual means of saving For this it does not constitute a derelict. purpose the abandonment must be final, without the intention of returning and resuming Lewis v. The Elizabeth and possession. Jane (U. S.) 15 Fed. Cas. 478, 479. If the boat is simply abandoned by the crew temporarily for the purpose of obtaining assistance and returning, it is no derelict. Cromwell v. The Island City, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 121, 128, 17 L. Ed. 70; Rowe v. The Brig (U. S.) 20 Fed. Cas. 1281, 1282.

In maritime law the abandonment of a steamboat by the master to the care and protection of the master and crew of another steamboat, for the purpose of procuring assistance and safety, is not a case of derelict.

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MAR- Montgomery v. The T. P. Leathers (U. S.) 17

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er.

The owner does not renounce his right to the property, and this is not presumed to be his intention, and the finder does not acquire the property, but the owner does abandon temporarily his right of possession, which is transferred to the finder, who becomes bound to preserve the property in good faith, and to bring it to a place of safety for the owner's use, and he acquires the right to be paid for his services a reasonable and proper compensation out of the property itself. The Bee (U. S.) 3 Fed. Cas. 41, 44.

A derelict is a wreck which has been abandoned by all parties; generally applied to shipping. Goods cannot be taken and title therein acquired by finding as derelict, while they are floating in the water, having escaped from the custody of the crew of the wrecked steamer, with full knowledge on their part, unless they have been absolutely abandoned, such goods being still in the constructive possession of the owner of the vessel, in the same manner as goods in a house which is on fire, and which has not been abandoned because of the peril. United States v. Stone (U. S.) 8 Fed. 232, 243.

A vessel loaded with a cargo of slaves, who revolt and throw the crew overboard, is a derelict. Flinn v. The Leander (U. S.) 9 Fed. Cas. 275.

As land gained from sea.

Dereliction is land gained from the sea when the sea shrinks back below the usual high-water mark. Linthicum v. Coan, 2 Atl. 826, 827, 828, 64 Md. 439, 54 Am. Rep. 775.

Dereliction is a rescission of the waters of the sea, a navigable river, or other stream, by which land that was before covered with water is left dry. In such case, if the alteration takes place suddenly and insensibly, the ownership remains according to former bounds, or, if it is gradual and imperceptible, the dereliction or dry land belongs to the riparian owner through whose shore or bank the water has receded. Warren v. Chambers, 25 Ark. 120, 121, 91 Am. Dec. 538, 4 Am. Rep. 23.

Dereliction or reliction is land added to

a front tract by the permanent uncovering of the waters; the laying bare of the bottom, by the retirement of the waters, as contradistinguished from a filling up of the bottom by deposits causing the waters to recede. Dereliction, as used in the English law, meant when the sea shrank back below the usual water mark, and remained there. In those cases the law is held to be that, if this be by little and little, it should go to the owner of the land adjoining. It is recognized by the Louisiana law as a mode of acquiring prop

the waters occasioned by the seasons, coming in the winter and staying to the spring, going in the summer and gone in the autumn,

A bark which has broken from her anch-erty, but the mere temporary subsidence of orage in the arm of the sea, drifted on a rock beach in a heavy storm, made fast to trees by the captain and crew, filling with water during the night, deserted the next day by all hands, who took with them the ship's papers, compasses, side lights, and their per

sonal effects, and then goes adrift again some days later, and is found drifting 14 miles from her anchorage, with no one on board, is a derelict. The Canada (U. S.) 92 Fed. 196, 198.

DERELICTION.

See "Presumed Dereliction."

As abandonment of goods.

Dereliction by the civil law is the voluntary abandonment of goods by the owner, without the hope or purpose of returning to the possession. Jones' Adm'rs v. Munn, 12 Ga. 469, 473 (citing 1 Bro. Civ. Law, 239; Wood's Civ. Law, 156).

Dereliction or renunciation of property requires both the intention to abandon and external action. Thus the casting overboard of articles in a tempest to lighten the ship is not dereliction, as there is no intention of abandoning the property in case of salvage, nor does the mere intention of abandonment constitute dereliction without a throwing away or some external act. Livermore v. White, 74 Me. 452, 456, 43 Am. Rep. 600.

does not constitute dereliction in the sense

of an addition to the contiguous land, susceptible of private rights as riparian rights. Sapp v. Frazier, 26 South. 378, 380, 51 La. Ann. 1718, 72 Am. St. Rep. 493.

DERIVE.

In the compact between Virginia and Kentucky in reference to lands ceded to Kentucky, providing that all private rights and interests of land within the said district, "derived from the laws of Virginia prior to such separation," shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this state, such phrase "appears to have been employed to express the direct and immediate concessions and sales by the state." Beard v. Smith, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Mon.) 430, 437.

In Rev. St. § 2364, providing that on judgment for divorce the court may divide the estate, both real and personal, of the husband, and so much of the estate of the wife as shall have been "derived from the husband," the words "property derived from the husband" refer not only to property directly transferred from him to her, but also such as was substantially derived, mediately or im

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The words "descend," inherit," and "inheritance," in the statutes of the state in reference to the estates of decedents, ordinarily relate to real estate; but while this is true, it is in the power of the Legislature to give them a different inflection and expand their meaning. The words "descend," "inherit," and "inheritance," in their broad meaning, are frequently applied to personal property. Rountree v. Pursell, 39 N. E. 747, 749, 11 Ind. App. 522.

As ascend.

The word "descend" means ordinarily to go down, but in the law relating to the devolution of property rights "descend" may mean "ascend," as "descending in the ascending line." Rountree v. Pursell, 39 N. E. 747, 749, 11 Ind. App. 522.

As go to.

The word "descend," in a will devising testator's property to certain persons, but, if he left no child or children, then directing that the property was to descend to others, was construed to have been used in the sense of the words "go to." Brooks v. Kip, 35 Atl. 658, 660, 54 N. J. Eq. 462; Stratton v. McKinne (Tenn.) 62 S. W. 636, 640; Borgner v. Brown, 33 N. E. 92, 94, 133 Ind. 391.

in this statute, the court observes that it is a canon of construction that every word of the statute must be given effect, if possible, and that if words, taken in their technical sense, would make a statute inoperative in whole or in part, they will be taken in their popular sense. In view of this rule, it is held ute includes estates for life which pass by that the word "descends" as used in the statdevise, and is not limited to those passing by operation of law on the death of the ancestor intestate. Mitchell v. Blanchard, 47 Atl. 98, 99, 72 Vt. 85.

"Descend," as used in a will providing that, after the death of testator's children, the trust created by the will should cease and determine, and the several tracts or parcels of land and premises should go and descend, freed and discharged from all trusts, to the respective right heirs of his children in fee simple, does not express descent in the legal sense, but devolution by force of the devise. It is the same as if testator had said "go down to the children." Ballentine v. Wood, 9 Atl. 582, 585, 42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 552.

Testator's will provided "the share of my property received by J., he may have and use the profits from during his natural life, and at his death descend to his children."

Held, that the word "descend" was used in the sense of "go" or "belong" to, and at the death of J. such children took the estate by virtue of the will. Tate v. Townsend, 61 Miss. 316, 319.

Testator bequeathed a sum of money, a slave, and other chattels to his wife, to hold during her natural life, and at her death to descend to her granddaughter. Held, that the term "descend" thus used in the will was legatory, and meant that the granddaughter took a vested remainder, and not a contingent interest as successor to the wife. Timberlake v. Parish's Ex'r, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 345. 347.

As pass by operation of law.

The word "descend" ordinarily defines the vesting of the estate by operation of law the ancestor. Potts v. Kline, 34 Atl. 191, 192. in the heirs immediately upon the death of

174 Pa. 513.

"Descend," as used in an antenuptial contract providing that certain property shall remain in the wife, but if there be issue of the marriage then said property shall descend to such child or children, share and share alike, according to the law of the state of Tennessee. is not used in its technical sense, but means shall "go to" or "be vested" in such child or children, share and share alike, or equally, as is provided in the laws of Tennessee in cases of descent or distri-riage or death of my surviving daughters, the bution. Aydlett v. Swope (Tenn.) 17 S. W. 208, 209.

As pass by devise.

Testator's will, after devising the residue of his real estate to his daughters, and the survivors of them, until death or marriage, provided as follows: "After the mar

estate herein devised shall descend to those persons who will then be entitled to take the same as my heirs." Held, that the word "descend" denoted the vesting of the estate by V. S. 2613, provides that the probate operation of law in the heirs immediately on court may appoint trustees in cases not oth- the death of the ancestor, and manifested erwise provided for, when the use of prop- the intention of the testator to have been erty, real or personal, descends to a person that, after the particular estates which he for life. In construing the word "descends" had given should have failed, the law should

take its course, and his estate go to his heirs as if he had made no further disposition. Dove v. Torr, 128 Mass. 38, 40 (citing Bullock v. Downes, 9 H. L. Cas. 1; Mortimer v. Slater, 7 Ch. Div. 322; Mortimore v. Mortimore, 4 App. Cas. 448).

mere operation of law, from purchase, which may be either devise or grant. In the former case the person is said to take by descent or as heir, while a grantee or devisee is said to take by purchase or as a purchaser." Abbott, Law Dict. The above definitions of the word "descent" clearly estab

case the adopted child dies without issue the property shall descend, not to his next of kin, but to that of the adopting parent, it intestate it should so descend, for otherwise means that in case the adopted child dies scend. Spangenberg v. Guiney, 3 Ohio Dec. it would pass by devise, and could not de163, 165, 2 Ohio N. P. 39.

"Descend," as used in a will giving property to a certain person to descend to his felish that when the statute declares that in male children and grandchildren and to their heirs forever, does not operate to work a "de scent" in the legal strict sense of the term, as inheritance is through operation of law. Its employment, therefore, no other meaning being apparent, is to be taken as indicating the desire of testator that his property shall follow the same channel into which the law would direct it. The devise can only mean that the grandchildren only whose parents are dead shall take with the living children, for only in case of the death of its parent can the grandchild become the heir at law of its grandfather, and take from him by descent. Property cannot descend from grandparent to a grandchild whose parents are living. Halstead v. Hall, 60 Md. 209, 211.

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A will directing that, after a certain time fixed, the estate devised should "de scend" to those persons who may then be entitled to take the same as the testator's heirs, meant that at that stage the law should take its course and the estate go to the testator's heirs as if he had made no further disposition, since the word "descend" ordinarily denotes the vesting of the estate of the deceased person, by operation of law, immediately on the death of the ancestor. Wood v. Bullard, 25 N. E. 67, 71, 151 Mass. 324, 7 L. R. A. 304.

"Descend," as used in a will devising testator's real estate, and bequeathing his personal property in trust for his wife for life, and directing a division among his heirs on her death, except the share which would by law descend to his daughter, is to be construed to mean to pass or to be transferred. Childs v. Russell, 52 Mass. (11

Metc.) 16, 21.

"Descend," as used in the expression in a will providing that at "her death the same to descend to such of her children as were then living," refers to the course the property would take by descent. Harrington v. Gibson, 60 S. W. 915, 916, 109 Ky. 752. The word "descend" has a well-defined meaning in law, as the following definitions of the word "descent" will show: "Descent is what takes place when land, or some interest in land or other realty, belonging to a person, passes on his death, intestate, to some one related to him. Descent is opposed to what takes place when land, on the death of a person, passes to some one else by virtue of a gift or limitation to him as persona designata." Rap. & L. Law Dict. Again: "Descent is frequently used to distinguish the vesting of title in any one, by

As a word of inheritance.

"Descend," as used in a clause of the will declaring that one-half of the estate shall descend to E.'s heirs and assigns, and the other half to descend to G.'s heirs and assigns, must be construed as a word of inheritance, vesting in the first taker as a fee, since, if it be construed that E. and G. were simply to take life estates, there would be nothing to descend to their heirs. Also the use of the word "assigns" in this connection lends force to this construction, for it contemplates that E. and G. might have the right to transfer the property. In re Browning, 16 Atl. 717, 718, 16 R. I. 441, 3 L. R. A. 209.

A will directed that deceased's executor invest a sum of money in real estate for M. W., and that the title to the same be made to her, with the restriction that she should not have power to sell or incumber the same in any way, but might rent, use, or occupy the same, and on her death it

was to "descend to her heirs"; and further provided that an annuity should be given to one of the brothers of the testator until July 1, 1882, or to his wife in the event of his death, and directed that at the time named $5,000 should be invested for their benefit, and after their death "the said $5,000 is to be paid to the children of my said brother Henry, share and share alike. If my said brother H. and his wife both die before the 1st day of July, 1882, the said $5,000 is not to be paid until the said 1st day of July. 1882, at which time, if they are both dead, the said children shall be en

titled to the same." Held that, construing both clauses of the will together, "descend to her heirs," used in the clause first quoted. is not employed by way of words of purchase, or to express a devise, but merely to express the idea that the testator expected w's death, pass by descent to her heirs. and intended his bounty would, upon M. Wedekind v. Hallenberg, 10 S. W. 368, 371, 88 Ky. 114.

The word "descend" is inapplicable to any estate less than a fee. Johnson v. Morton, 10 Pa. (10 Barr) 245, 248.

As a word of purchase.

if any, means all legitimate children, whether The word "descend," as used in a deed they were born in wedlock, or were made conveying property to another for and dur-legitimate by subsequent marriage by their ing her natural life, and to descend to her parents and recognition according to statute. heirs in equal portions, means to pass from Jackson's Adm'rs v. Moore, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) the grantee to her heirs, and is of the same 170, 173. effect as if the deed read "to her during her natural life, and to her heirs." Taney V. Fahnley, 25 N. E. 882, 126 Ind. 88.

"Descend" has been held to mean the same as "to go to," and, as used in the habendum clause of a deed providing that the land shall descend to W. on the death of the first takers, is a word of purchase and not of limitation, and does not show that it was the intention to vest the first takers with the fee, in the face of the express statement that they are to take only a life estate. Doren v. Gillum, 35 N. E. 1101, 1102, 136 Ind. 134.

Land was devised to the testatrix's two nephews in common during life, with the provision that immediately after their decease the same should descend to their children in equal shares, or their heirs, yet so that the children of each only divide the share that belonged to their father. Held, that the use of the term "descend" in such devise did not indicate an intention on the part of the testatrix that the children should take as heirs of their parents, and not by way of remainder, especially when taken in connection with the preceding clause, by which a life estate was given to two other nephews, it being provided therein that on the death of either life tenant the undivided half belonging to the one so dying should go to and be enjoyed in equal shares by his children, or to their heirs. Appeal of Keim, 17 Atl. 463, 464, 125 Pa. 480.

In a clause of a will providing that the property herein devised to my several children is to remain their own during their natural lives, and to descend to their bodily heirs, if any, the word "descend" is used in the sense of "going to," and will not be understood to vest the fee in the children, as rendering the words "bodily heirs" words of limitation. Stratton v. McKinnie (Tenn.) 62 S. W. 636, 640.

"Descend," as used in the provisions of a will as follows: "The above named real estate, one-third to descend to his wife if living, the remainder to go to my children" means "go," and is not a limitation on the fee devised. Borgner v. Brown, 33 N. E. 92, 94, 133 Ind. 391.

DESCENDANT.

Within the provision of the Code that the estate of an illegitimate dying intestate without children, husband or wife, or mother, shall go equally to his brothers and sisters by his mother, or descendants of such brothers and sisters, the words "descendants of such brothers and sisters" mean legitimate descendants only, and will not include illeGiles v. Wilhoit (Tenn.) 48 gitimate ones.

S. W. 268, 270.

The word "descendants," in a will providing that, if a certain one of testator's sons should leave no other issue or descendants than one son then living, the former's power of disposition should be limited to a certain sum, is not used as a word of purchase, the testator evidently having imagined that the word "issue" might be mistakenly read for "children," and he therefore followed it in the disjunctive "or descendants." Appeal of Barry (Pa.) 10 Atl. 126, 127.

The use in the Penal Code of any word expressive of relationship, state, condition, office, or trust of any person, as the "parent," "child," "ascendant," "descendant," "minor," "infant," "ward," "guardian," or the like, or of the relative pronouns "he" or "they," in reference thereto, includes both males and females. Pen. Code Tex. 1895, art. 22.

As children.

reference to persons taking the estate of a

The word "descendant," as used with

deceased person, has not the same precise technical signification as the words "heirs of the body," and may be and is often used by testators as synonymous with "children." Schmaunz v. Goss,, 132 Mass. 141, 144.

As grandchildren.

At the

By a will testator's property was devised to his brothers and sisters surviving at his death, and the descendants of such as should then be dead, such descendants to take the share or portion which would have otherwise belonged to such deceased parent. time of his death six of his brothers and sisters were dead, and had left children and grandchildren. The broad import of the term "descendants" is sometimes narrowed where there is ground for judging that it was intended in a restricted sense. Thus, the word "issue," which is coextensive with "descendants," and includes every degree,

See "Immediate Descendants or Issue"; has been restricted to the sense of "children." "Lineal Descendants."

"Descendants," as used in the act of 1765 directing that an intestate's estate shall descend to his children or their descendants,

In this case we may reasonably conclude the testator intended to regard each deceased sister and brother as a stock of descent, and, while using the word "descendants" in the sense of children and the descendants of chil

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