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right to the establishment of a road to a point on the railroad at which there is no established depot. Karnes v. Drake, 44 S. W. 444, 445, 103 Ky. 134.

The term "depot" may mean a house for the storage of freight and the accommodation of passengers, or it may mean a place where railroad trains regularly come to a stop for the convenience of passengers and for the purpose of receiving and discharging freight, or it may include all of these things. The term "depot" usually includes not only the idea of a stopping place, but also that of a building, or something of that kind, the convenience of passengers and freight. Arkansas Cent. R. Co. v. Smith (Ark.) 71 S. W. 947, 948.

for

In a mortgage given by a railroad company of its franchises, real estate, right of way, and depots, the term "depots" is not necessarily limited to a place provided for the convenience of passengers while waiting the arrival or departure of trains. It applies also to the buildings used for receipt and storage of freight, which when received is to be safely kept until forwarded by the cars of the company, or delivered to the owner or consignee. Humphreys v. McKissock, 11 Sup. Ct. 779, 781, 140 U. S. 304, 35 L. Ed. 473.

A station at a coal bank where trains merely stop to take or leave cars for purposes connected with its trade is not a "depot" within a contract that defendant was to build but one other depot between two certain fixed points. Mahaska County R. Co. v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 28 Iowa, 437,

449.

A building used by passengers on a railroad may properly be designated by the word "depot" as well as by the word "passenger station." Either is certain to a common intent. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 33 S. W. 939.

Where a covenant in a deed of a right of way to a railroad required the railroad to establish and maintain a depot for freight and passengers, evidence is admissible to explain what was intended by the term "freight and passenger depot," as there are freight and passenger depots all the way from mere flag stations, where there are no buildings at all, to the most modern depot with all its equipments and conveniences. But it was held that an umbrella shed cannot be called a "depot" for passengers. Murray v. Northwestern Ry. Co., 42 S. E. 617, 622, 64 S. C.

520.

Same-Flag station.

A mere flag station is not a depot. Hurt v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 40 N. W. 613, 614, 39 Minn. 485; Anderson v. Stewart. 76 Wis. 43, 44 N. W. 1091, 1092.

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The term "depot" means a railroad station. "It is sufficiently broad to embrace within its meaning a passageway used for the convenient and safe egress and ingress of passengers. It is not restricted in its signification to the house or structure used also for their convenience in this respect, but includes a walk leading from the building or house, affording shelter to the passengers, to the car, and other approaches thereto." An allegation in an action that the railroad com

pany had failed to properly light its "depot" held to be supported by evidence that it failed to properly light a passway. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Thornsberry (Tex.) 17 S. W. 521, 523.

In Act March 9, 1889, § 1, providing that every corporation, company, or person oper ating a railroad within the state shall place in each passenger depot of such company, located at any station in this state at which there is a telegraph office, a blackboard on which such company or person shall post the fact whether each scheduled passenger train is on time or not, by the words "passenger depot" was not meant merely a station house built for the accommodation of passengers, but the grounds prepared and used as depot grounds for the benefit of persons traveling on the particular railroad, and used by the company at such point in oper ating it as a common carrier of passengers State v. Indiana & I. S. R. Co., 32 N. E. 817, 818, 133 Ind. 69, 18 L. R. A. 502.

As place for military stores.

"Depot," as used in a contract with the government to transport supplies from certain posts, depots, and stations, is to be construed as meaning "a place where military stores or supplies are kept, or troops assembled." United States v. Caldwell, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 264, 268, 22 L. Ed. 114.

DEPOT GROUNDS.

"Depot grounds" are where passengers get on and off trains, and where goods are loaded and unloaded, and all grounds necessary and convenient and actually used for such purpose by the public and by the railroad company. This includes the switching and making up of trains and the use of the side tracks for the storing of cars, and the place where the public require open and free access to the road for the purposes of such business. Grosse v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 65 N. W. 185, 91 Wis. 482; Fowler v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wis. 77,

78 (citing Dinwoodie v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 70 Wis. 160, 35 N. W. 296; Plunkett v. Minneapolis, S. S. M. & A. Ry. Co., 79 Wis. 222, 48 N. W. 519).

"Depot grounds" and "yard limits" are synonymous terms. It is well known that in large cities these grounds extend for several miles. The question of frequent or infrequent use for switching purposes does not control. The question is, are they reasonably necessary to that purpose, or liable to become so? In McGrath v. Detroit, M. & M. R. Co., 57 Mich. 555, 24 N. W. 854, the court said: "The existence or extent of these grounds is not to be determined by the

continued actual use thereof. When station

grounds are laid out, their contemplated future use is not infrequently of more consideration than it actually demands at the time in determining their shape or extent; and, when these grounds are appropriated and set apart by the company, it would neither be safe nor wise to allow their limits to be curtailed or extended by a jury in a proceeding where they collaterally come in question." Rabidon v. Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 73 N. W. 386, 387, 115 Mich. 390, 39 L. R. A. 405.

A part of the main line of road, where there was but a single track in the neighborhood of the depot more than a hundred yards beyond the switch, and beyond where a cattle guard was subsequently placed, was no part of the "depot grounds," within a statute exempting a railroad from a duty to fence such grounds, though long trains, in switching, ran out to the place. Blair v. Milwaukee & P. du C. R. Co., 20 Wis. 254, 260.

"Depot grounds," as used in Rev. St. 1810, as amended by Laws 1881, c. 193, requiring railroads to be fenced except depot

grounds, should be construed to include the

railroad grounds used in connection with a building in which there was a telegraph office, with telegraphic instruments, a ticket office, and a place for eating and sleeping, and which building was occupied by the company's station men and agent, who operated the telegraph, sold tickets for the company to passengers, operated the switch and water tank, and handled the baggage and freight, there being a platform between the building and the track at which trains stopped and received and discharged passengers and freight. Peters v. Stewart, 39 N. W. 380, 381, 72 Wis. 133.

In an action to recover the value of a span of horses killed upon a railroad track, on the ground that the railroad company had neglected to fence its line of road at the point where the horses got upon the track, defendant contended that the place of the accident was part of its depot grounds, and as such not bound to be fenced under the

statute. The evidence showed that there had been at one time a station house near the point in question, but for several years the company had kept no agent there, that the station building had been closed up and had gone to decay, that there were no grounds for a depot outside the usual right of way, and that the company had put in cattle guards 350 feet south of the station building and 721 feet north of it, and beyond this point the road was fenced. It was held that the court properly refused to hold as a question of law that such ground was "depot grounds," and that the jury were warranted in finding that a place near the north cattle guard was not a part of the company's de pot grounds. McDonough v. Milwaukee & N. R. Co., 40 N. W. 806, 807, 73 Wis. 223.

Where a railroad company, at a place where it had maintained a flag station and side track, took up its fence and put in cattle guards after the laying out of the town plat, but did not keep any depot master or clerk, nor sell any tickets to the town, which consisted of two houses and a store, but merely took up freight there when flagged, as it did at any point on that portion of the road, it could not escape the liability for horses killed there for want of a fence, on the grounds. Anderson v. Stewart, 44 N. W. ground that such place constituted depot 1091, 1092, 76 Wis. 43.

Depot grounds on the right of way of a railroad 21⁄2 miles from any town, and not located on any highway, there being neither station, station agent, depot building, nor platform for receiving or discharging freight or passengers, but only a side track used for the convenience of loading and unloading a within the meaning of a statute exempting single commodity, are not "depot grounds" railroad companies from liability for failure M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 43 N. W. 732, 733, 75 Wis. to fence such property. Jaeger v. Chicago,

130.

"Depot grounds," within the meaning of a statute excepting depot grounds from the requirement that a railroad shall fence its right of way, includes flag stations at which trains are regularly stopped whenever there is freight, passengers, or express to be taken, though there is no depot erected thereon. Schneekloth v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 65 N. W. 663, 664, 108 Mich. 1.

DEPRAVITY OF HEART.

An instruction that if defendant purposely killed deceased after reflection, with a wickedness and depravity of heart toward the deceased, etc., the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, is sufficient as a statement of the highest degree of malice. Lang v. State, 4 South. 193. 195. 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. Rep. 324.

DEPRECIATE.

"Depreciating," as used in a power authorizing a sale of securities upon their depreciation in value, is the present participle of the verb "depreciate," used intransitively, which verb, as defined by Webster, means "to fall in value; to become of less worth; to sink in estimation." As used in the power, it applied only to what might happen in the then future. National Bank of Illinois v. Baker, 27 Ill. App. 356, 359.

DEPRIVE.

"Deprive" conveys the idea of taking away that which one has, or withholding: that which one may have. To take something from; to keep from acquiring, using, or enjoying something; to take away, end, injure, or destroy. State ex rel. Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 60 S. W. 91, 100, 159 Mo. 410, 51 L. R. A. 151, 81 Am. St. Rep. 368.

The constitutional provision is that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without process of law. This clause nowhere declares that in the exercise of the admitted functions of government private property may not receive remote and consequent injury. No person can claim that in the exercise of the proper functions of government his property shall not be diminished in value. The point is the owner shall not be deprived of his property without due process of law. If, in the exercise of any one of the admitted functions of government, a person's property is rendered less valuable, it cannot be seriously claimed this provision in the Bill of Rights has been infringed. So the act regulating warehouses, and fixing the rates of charges thereof, though it may diminish the value of such property, in that it

deprives the owner of so much of the income therefrom as he has been in the habit of deriving from extortionate and unreasonable charges, is not a deprivation of his property, and does not infringe the Constitution. Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80, 88.

A deprivation or taking of property, which is prohibited by the Constitution unThe term "deprive," as used in the fourless due compensation is made, includes any teenth amendment of the Constitution of the thing that affects or limits the free use and United States, does not prevent the regulatenjoyment of one's property, or of the ease-ing by statute of the use, or even the price ments or appurtenances thereto. Myer v. Adam, 71 N. Y. Supp. 707, 710, 63 App. Div.

540.

In Const. art. 1, § 6, the word "deprive" is used in its ordinary and popular sense, and relates simply to divesting or forfeiting, alienating, and taking away property. It ap plies to property in the same sense that it does to life and liberty, and no other. Prohibiting the sale of property, except in pursuance of a license, is in no sense depriving the person of it. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.) 378, 467 (per Johnson, J., dissenting).

In Const. art. 1, § 6, providing that a person shall not be deprived of his property, and that it shall not be taken for public use, without due process of law, the meaning of the word "deprive" is the same as the word "taken," and when property is not seized and directly appropriated to public use, though it be subjected, in the hands of the owner, to greater burdens than before, it is not taken within the meaning of the prohibition. Grant v. Courter (N. Y.) 24 Barb. 232, 238.

In the Constitution, declaring that a citizen cannot be "deprived" of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land, "deprive" means take. It cannot be said that a citizen is deprived of his property when he is left in the undisturbed possession of it, whatever taxation may be imposed on it. Sharpless v. City of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167, 59 Am. Dec. 759.

of the use, of private property under all circumstances. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it a public consequence and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 123, 24 L. Ed. 77.

An indictment for the theft of cattle under Pen. Code, art. 749, declaring that if any person shall willfully take into possession, and drive, use, or remove from its accustomed range, any live stock without the consent of the owner, and with intent to defraud the owner, he shall be deemed guilty of theft, is not defective for using the word "deprive" instead of "defraud," where it was alleged

that the animals were fraudulently taken. Shubert v. State, 20 Tex. App. 320, 330.

Pre-existing right implied.

In Gen. St. 1875, § 28, providing that the husband of any decedent "shall not be deprived" of his right as tenant by the curtesy nor of the possession or control of the estate of his deceased wife, nor of the income thereof, during the settlement of her estate, the words "shall not be deprived" imply a pre-existing right, and apply as well to possession, control, and income as to the words “his right as tenant by the curtesy." Appeal of Staples, 52 Conn. 421, 423.

DEPRIVE OF LIFE.

"Deprive of life," as used in an indictment for murder charging that the defendant did deprive deceased of his life, was equivalent to the word "kill." Walker v. State, 14

Tex. App. 609, 627.

DEPUTY.

See "Special Deputy."

The term "deputy" means "one who is appointed, designated, or deputed to act for another." Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62, 63.

A deputy is one who by appointment exercises an office in another's right, having no interest therein, but doing all things in his ́principal's name, and for whose misconduct the principal is answerable. Carter v. Horn

back, 40 S. W. 893, 139 Mo. 238; Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62, 63; People v. Barker, 35 N. Y. Supp. 727, 729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360; Pi

land v. Taylor, 18 S. E. 70, 113 N. C. 1; In re Tilyou, 57 App. Div. 101, 110, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1097, 1104.

Webster defines a deputy to be one ap pointed as a substitute of another, and empowered to act for him, in his name and on his behalf. An agent can only bind his principal when he does the act in the name of his principal, but a deputy may do the act and sign his own name, and it binds the principal. A deputy, however, is in law deemed an agent. When the officer or principal is dead, and that fact is known, or he is otherwise disqualified to act for himself, he cannot act by a deputy or agent. Herring v. Lee, 22 W. Va. 661, 667.

A deputy has power to do every act which his principal might do, and he cannot be restrained to some particulars of his office, for that would be repugnant to his being deputy. Steinke v. Graves, 52 Pac. 386, 387, 16 Utah, 293.

inheritance for years, and those which require a superintendency, and no particular skill, may regularly be exercised by deputies. Thus, a sheriff, though he is an officer, made by the King's letters patent, and though it be not said that he may execute his office per se vel sufficientum deputatum suum, yet he may make a deputy, which is an undersheriff, against whom action may be brought by the parties aggrieved." A judicial officer cannot make a deputy unless he hath a clause in his patent to enable him, because his judgment is relied on in matters relating to his office which might be the reason of the making of the grant to him; neither stead if the office be to be performed by can a municipal officer depute one in his him in person, but when nothing is required but the superintendency in the office he may make a deputy. Bouvier says that in general "municipal officers cannot appoint dep

uties unless the office is to be exercised by the municipal officer in person." Willingham v. State, 21 Fla. 761, 776.

A deputy is an assistant to an officer, and he must be one whose acts are of equal force with that of the officer himself. The

deputy must act in pursuance of law, perform official functions, and take oaths before acting. Opinion of Justices, 12 Fla. 651, 652; People v. Barker, 35 N. Y. Supp. 727,

729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360.

A deputy is a clerk with all the powers of the principal. An assistant does not mean a deputy. Clerks and other public officers have assistants who are not deputies. (Per Bibb, J.) A deputy is an assistant, and there may be other assistants who are not deputies. "Assistant" is a more comprehensive word than "deputy," and includes those who aid the principal, whether sworn or not, while "deputy" embraces only the sworn class. (Per Mills, J., dissenting.) Ellison v. Stevenson, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Mon.) 271, 276, 279.

The word "deputy," in Const. art. 11, § 82, relating to officers, includes employés and all the subordinates of the county officers. Thus the copyist in a recorder's office is a deputy, and may be appointed without "A examination by the civil service commission of the city and county of San Francisco. Garnett v. Brooks, 69 Pac. 298, 299, 136 Cal. 585.

"A deputy is said to be one who occupieth in right of another, and for whom, regularly, his superior shall answer." "A deputy has not any estate or interest in the office, but is as servant to the officer." deputy cannot regularly have less power than his principal." Erwin v. United States (U. S.) 37 Fed. 470, 475, 2 L. R. A. 229 (citing 7 Bac. Abr. 316 [L]).

A "deputy," as defined by Bouvier, is one authorized by an officer to exercise the office or right which the officer possesses for and in the place of the latter. Comyn's Dig. tit. "Officer" (D, 3), says: "It is said that a deputy has power to do every act which his principal might do, but that a deputy cannot make a deputy, as this imports an assignment of all his authority, which is not assignable." In Bacon's Abridgment, "Officer" (L), it is laid down "that offices of

By the public officers' law it is provided that every deputy shall be appointed by his principal, etc. If there is but one deputy, he shall, unless otherwise prescribed by law, possess the powers and perform the duties of his principal during the absence or inability to act of his principal, or during a vacancy in his principal's office. The function of a deputy possessing the powers, as he does, to act as if he were the actual incumbent of his principal's office implies a correlative duty and right on the part of

DEPUTY CONSUL.

the principal to exercise an unfettered per- his name. Simpson v. Morris (Pa.) 3 Yeates, sonal selection in the appointment of such 104, 107. subordinate, and also a corresponding freedom in exercising the power of removal, and such is its meaning when used in statute providing that the act relating to removal of honorably discharged veterans from office shall not apply to any private secretary, chief clerk, or deputy. Within this meaning, a deputy tax commissioner, whose duties are prescribed by the statute, and for the performance of which he is responsible to the public, and which, while performed under the direction of the commissioners, do in any way interfere with the duties of the commissioners themselves, is not a deputy. People v. Barker, 35 N. Y. Supp. 727, 729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360.

Civil Service Law (Laws 1902, p. 805, c. 270, § 21) provides that no person holding a position by appointment in the state or city, who shall have served the term required by law in the voluntary fire department of a city, shall be removed except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing on due notice, and that nothing in the section shall apply to the position of “deputy" of any official or department. Held, that the word "deputy," as used in the exception of the statute, referred to persons holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing power, and did not apply to or include a deputy tax commissioner in the department of taxes or assessments in the city of New York, who was a veteran fireman, so as to authorize his removal without a compliance with such section. People v. Wells, 83 N. Y. Supp. 789, 790, 86 App. Div. 270.

"Deputy consul" and "consular agent," when used in the title relating to diplomatic and consular officers, shall be deemed to denote consular officers subordinate to such principals, exercising the powers and performing the duties within the limits of their consulates or commercial agencies respectively, the former at the same ports or places, and the latter at ports or places different from those at which such principals are located respectively. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.

1150.

DEPUTY POSTMASTER.

The term "deputy postmaster" in Const. art. 2, § 9, providing that no person shall hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, but the office of deputy postmaster, when the compensation shall not exceed ninety dollars per annum, shall not be deemed lucrative, applies to the office of postmaster as not designated. Bishop v. State, 48 N. E. 1038, 1039, 149 Ind. 223, 39 L. R. A. 278, 63 Am. St. Rep. 270.

DEPUTY SHERIFF.

A deputy sheriff is an officer within the meaning of the law punishing the embezzlement of public money. State v. Brooks, 42 Tex. 62, 66.

A deputy sheriff is one appointed to act for the sheriff, and not in his own name, per

Wilson v. Rus

The office of assistant clerk of the city son, or right. He cannot legally act, as in is provided for in the charter, and he is ex-serving an execution, in his own name, but such acts must be in the name and by the pressly given all the powers, duties, and re-authority of the sheriff, in whose stead he sponsibilities of his principal, except that by acts. He is the deputy of the sheriff, and not implication, at least, he cannot certify to or affix the corporate seal to copies of the files of the office of sheriff, as distinct from the and transcripts of records. His appointment sell, 31 N. W. 645, 4 Dak. 376. person holding the office. by the clerk must be confirmed by the council, which also determines his salary, and he may be required to give a bond for the faithful performance of his duties, and is responsible to the municipality for their proper performance. He is in fact a deputy, although officially styled "assistant clerk." Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 79 N. W. 653, 654, 77 Minn. 76.

As officers.

See "Officer."

DEPUTY CLERK.

As clerk, see "Clerk."

DEPUTY CONSTABLE.

A "deputy constable" possesses the whole power of his principal, and of right acts in

Deputy sheriffs are of two kinds: (a) A general deputy, or undersheriff, who, by virtue of his appointment, has authority to execute all the ordinary duties of the office of sheriff (Com. Dig. tit. "Viscount," 542, B. 1); one who executes process without special authority from the sheriff, and may even delegate authority in the name of the sheriff or its execution to a special deputy. (b) A special deputy, who is an officer pro hac vice, to execute a particular writ on some certain occasion, but acts under a specific and not a general appointment and authority. Allen v. Smith, 12 N. J. Law (7 Halst.) 159, 162.

The deputy is an officer coeval in point of antiquity with the sheriff. The creation of deputies arise from an impossibility of the sheriff's performing all the duties of his office in person. The powers of the deputy have consequently been ascertained at an

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