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right to the establishment of a road to a Same-Surrounding grounds. point on the railroad at which there is no
Depot “does not necessarily mean a sin. established depot. Karnes v. Drake, 44 S. gle building, but means the entire grounds W. 444, 445, 103 Ky. 134.
used by a railroad company for its business The term “depot” may mean a house for purposes with the public at that station.” the storage of freight and the accommoda- Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. V. Rose, 24
Ohio St. 219, 229. tion of passengers, or it may mean a place where railroad trains regularly come to a The term “depot" means a railroad stastop for the convenience of passengers and tion. "It is sufficiently broad to embrace for the purpose of receiving and discharging within its meaning a passageway used for freight, or it may include all of these things. the convenient and safe egress and ingress The term “depot" usually includes not only of passengers. It is not restricted in its sig. the idea of a stopping place, but also that nification to the house or structure used also of a building, or something of that kind, for their convenience in this respect, but infor the convenience of passengers and cludes a walk leading from the building or freight. Arkansas Cent. R. Co. v. Smith house, affording shelter to the passengers, to (Ark.) 71 S. W. 947, 948.
the car, and other approaches thereto.” An
allegation in an action that the railroad comIn a mortgage given by a railroad company of its franchises, real estate, right of pany had failed to properly light its "depot
held to be supported by evidence that it way, and depots, the term “depots” is not failed to properly light a passway. Galvesnecessarily limited to a place provided for ton, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Thornsberry (Tex.) the convenience of passengers while wait
17 S. W. 521, 523. ing the arrival or departure of trains. It applies also to the buildings used for receipt In Act March 9, 1889, § 1, providing that and storage of freight, which when received every corporation, company, or person oper: is to be safely kept until forwarded by the ating a railroad within the state shall place cars of the company, or delivered to the own- in each passenger depot of such company, er or consignee. Humphreys v. McKissock, located at any station in this state at which 11 Sup. Ct. 779, 781, 140 U. S. 304, 35 L. Ed. there is a telegraph office, a blackboard on 473.
which such company or person shall post
the fact whether each scheduled passenger A station at a coal bank where trains train is on time or not, by the words “pasmerely stop to take or leave cars for pur- senger depot” was not meant merely a staposes connected with its trade is not a “de tion house built for the accommodation of pot” within a contract that defendant was passengers, but the grounds prepared and to build but one other depot between two used as depot grounds for the benefit of percertain fixed points. Mabaska County R. Co.
sons traveling on the particular railroad, and v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 28 Iowa, 437, used by the company at such point in oper 449.
ating it as a common carrier of passengers A building used by passengers on a rail-State v. Indiana & I. S. R. Co., 32 N. E. 817, road may properly be designated by the 818, 133 Ind. 69, 18 L. R. A. 502. word “depot” as well as by the word “passenger station.” Either is certain to a com- As place for military stores. mon intent. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com- "Depot,” as used in a contract with the monwealth (Ky.) 33 S. W. 939.
government to transport supplies from cer
tain posts, depots, and stations, is to be conWhere a covenant in a deed of a right strued as meaning “a place where military of way to a railroad required the railroad stores or supplies are kept, or troops assemto establish and maintain a depot for freight
bled." United States v. Caldwell, 86 U. S. and passengers, evidence is admissible to ex- (19 Wall.) 264, 268, 22 L Ed. 114. plain what was intended by the term "freight and passenger depot,” as there are freight and passenger depots all the way from mere
DEPOT GROUNDS. flag stations, where there are no buildings
“Depot grounds” are where passengers at all, to the most modern depot with all its get on and off trains, and where goods are equipments and conveniences. But it was loaded and unloaded, and all grounds necesheld that an umbrella shed cannot be called sary and convenient and actually used for a “depot" for passengers. Murray v. North- such purpose by the public and by the railwestern Ry. Co., 42 S. E. 617, 622, 64 S. C. road company. This includes the switching 520.
and making up of trains and the use of the
side tracks for the storing of cars, and the Same-Flag station.
place where the public require open and A mere flag station is not a depot. Hurt | free access to the road for the purposes of v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 40 N. W. 613, such business. Grosse v. Chicago & N. W. 614, 39 Minn. 485; Anderson v. Stewart, 76 Ry. Co., 65 N. W. 185, 91 Wis. 482; Fowler Wis. 43, 44 N. W. 1091, 1092.
V. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wis. 77,
78 (citing Dinwoodie v. Chicago, M. & St. P. , statute. The evidence showed that there R. Co., 70 Wis. 160, 35 N. W. 296; Plunkett had been at one time a station house near v. Minneapolis, S. S. M. & A. Ry. Co., 79 the point in question, but for several years Wis. 222, 48 N. W. 519).
the company had kept no agent there, that the
station building had been closed up and had “Depot grounds" and "yard limits" are
gone to decay, that there were no grounds synonymous terms. It is well known that in for a depot outside the usual right of way, large cities these grounds extend for sev- and that the company had put in cattle eral miles. The question of frequent or in- guards 350 feet south of the station building frequent use for switching purposes does not and 721 feet north of it, and beyond this control. The question is, are they reason- point the road was fenced. It was held that ably necessary to that purpose, or liable to the court properly refused to hold as a ques. become so? In McGrath v. Detroit, M. & tion of law that such ground was “depot M. R. Co., 57 Mich. 555, 24 N. W. 854, the grounds," and that the jury were warranted court said: “The existence or extent of in finding that a place near the north cattle these grounds is not to be determined by the guard was not a part of the company's de continued actual use thereof. When station pot grounds. McDonough v. Milwaukee & grounds are laid out, their contemplated fu. N. R. Co., 40 N. W. 806, 807, 73 Wis. 223. ture use is not infrequently of more consideration than it actually demands at the time Where a railroad company, at a place in determining their shape or extent; and, where it had maintained a flag station and when these grounds are appropriated and side track, took up its fence and put in cattle set apart by the company, it would neither guards after the laying out of the town plat, be safe nor wise to allow their limits to but did not keep any depot master or clerk, be curtailed or extended by a jury in a nor sell any tickets to the town, which conproceeding where they collaterally come in sisted of two houses and a store, but mere question.” Rabidon v. Chicago & W. M. ly took up freight there when flagged, as it Ry. Co., 73 N. W. 386, 387, 115 Mich. 390, 39 did at any point on that portion of the road, L. R. A. 405.
it could not escape the liability for horses
killed there for want of a fence, on the A part of the main line of road, where ground that such place constituted depot there was but a single track in the neighbor- grounds. Anderson v. Stewart, 44 N. W. hood of the depot more than a hundred yards 1091, 1092, 76 Wis. 43. beyond the switch, and beyond where a cattle guard was subsequently placed, was no Depot grounds on the right of way of part of the “depot grounds," within a stat- a railroad 242 miles from any town, and not ute exempting a railroad from a duty to located on any highway, there being neither fence such grounds, though long trains, in station, station agent, depot building, nor switching, ran out to the place. Blair v. platform for receiving or discharging freight Milwaukee & P. du C. R. Co., 20 Wis. 254, or passengers, but only a side track used for 260.
the convenience of loading and unloading a “Depot grounds,” as used in Rev. St. within the meaning of a statute exempting
single commodity, are not "depot grounds" 1810, as amended by Laws 1881, c. 193, re- railroad companies from liability for failure quiring railroads to be fenced except depot to fence such property. Jaeger v. Chicago, grounds, should be construed to include the M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 43 N. W. 732, 733, 75 Wis. railroad grounds used in connection with a
130. building in which there was a telegraph office, with telegraphic instruments, a ticket “Depot grounds," within the meaning of office, and a place for eating and sleeping, a statute excepting depot grounds from the and which building was occupied by the requirement that a railroad shall fence its company's station men and agent, who op- right of way, includes flag stations at which erated the telegraph, sold tickets for the trains are regularly stopped whenever there company to passengers, operated the switch is freight, passengers, or express to be taken, and water tank, and handled the baggage though there is no depot erected thereon. and freight, there being a platform between Schneekloth v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 65 the building and the track at which trains N. W. 663, 664, 108 Mich. 1. stopped and received and discharged passengers and freight. Peters V. Stewart, 39 N. W, 380, 381, 72 Wis. 133.
DEPRAVITY OF HEART. In an action to recover the value of a An instruction that if defendant pur. span of horses killed upon a railroad track, posely killed deceased after reflection, witb on the ground that the railroad company a wickedness and deprav of heart toward had neglected to fence its line of road at the deceased, etc., the defendant was guilty the point where the horses got upon the track, of murder in the first degree, is gufficient as defendant contended that the place of the a statement of the highest degree of malice. accident was part of its depot grounds, and Lang v. State, 4 South. 193. 195, 84 Ala, 1, 5 as such not bound to be fenced under the Am. St. Rep. 324,
The constitutional provision is that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or “Depreciating,” as used in a power au- property without process of law. This clause thorizing a sale of securities upon their de- nowhere declares that in the exercise of the preciation in value, is the present participle admitted functions of government private of the verb "depreciate,” used intransitively, property may not receive remote and consewhich verb, as defined by Webster, means quent injury. No person can claim that in "to fall in value; to become of less worth; the exercise of the proper functions of govto sink in estimation.” As used in the power, ernment his property shall not be diminished it applied only to what might happen in the in value. The point is the owner shall not then future. National Bank of Illinois v. be deprived of his property without due proBaker, 27 Ill. App. 356, 359.
cess of law. If, in the exercise of any one of the admitted functions of government, a
person's property is rendered less valuable, DEPRIVE.
it cannot be seriously claimed this provision "Deprive" conveys the idea of taking
in the Bill of Rights has been infringed. So away that which one has, or withholding
the act regulating warehouses, and fixing the
rates of charges thereof, though it may dithat which one may have. To take something from; to keep from acquiring, using, minish the value of such property, in that it or enjoying something; to take away, end, deprives the owner of so much of the income injure, or destroy. State ex rel. Star Pub. therefrom as he has been in the habit of Co. v. Associated Press, 60 S. W. 91, 100, 159
deriving from extortionate and unreasonable Mo. 410, 51 L. R. A. 151, 81 Am. St.'Rep. 368. charges, is not a deprivation of his property,
and does not infringe the Constitution. A deprivation or taking of property, Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80, 88. which is prohibited by the Constitution unless due compensation is made, includes any teenth amendment of the Constitution of the
The term "deprive," as used in the fourthing that affects or limits the free use and United States, does not prevent the regulatenjoyment of one's property, or of the ease-ing by statute of the use, or even the price ments or appurtenances thereto. Myer v. Adam, 71 N. Y. Supp. 707, 710, 63 App. Div. of the use, of private property under all cir
cumstances. Property does become clothed 540.
with a public interest when used in a manIn Const. art. 1, 6, the word “deprive” ner to make it a public consequence and afis used in its ordinary and popular sense, fect the community at large. When, thereand relates simply to divesting or forfeiting, fore, one devotes his property to a use in alienating, and taking away property. It ap which the public has an interest, he, in efplies to property in the same sense that it fect, grants to the public an interest in that does to life and liberty, and no other. Pro- use, and must submit to be controlled by the bibiting the sale of property, except in pur- public for the common good, to the extent suance of a license, is in no sense depriving
of the interest he has thus created. Munn v. the person of it. Wynehamer v. People, 13 Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 123, 24 L. Ed. 77. N. Y. (3 Kern.) 378, 467 (per Johnson, J., dis
An indictment for the theft of cattle unsenting).
der Pen. Code, art. 749, declaring that if any In Const. art. 1, § 6, providing that a per
person shall willfully take into possession, son shall not be deprived of his property, and drive, use, or remove from its accusand that it shall not be taken for public use, tomed range, any live stock without the conwithout due process of law, the meaning of sent of the owner, and with intent to defraud the word "deprive" is the same as the word the owner, he shall be deemed guilty of theft, "taken,” and when property is not seized and is not defective for using the word “deprive" directly appropriated to public use, though it instead of “defraud,” where it was alleged be subjected, in the bands of the owner, to that the animals were fraudulently taken. greater burdens than before, it is not taken Shubert v. State, 20 Tex. App. 320, 330. within the meaning of the prohibition. Grant v. Courter (N. Y.) 24 Barb. 232, 238.
Pre-existing right implied.
In Gen. St. 1875, $ 28, providing that the In the Constitution, declaring that a cit- husband of any decedent “shall not be deizen cannot be "deprived" of his life, liberty, prived” of his right as tenant by the curtesy or property, unless by the judgment of his nor of the possession or control of the espeers or the law of the land, "deprive" tate of his deceased wife, nor of the income means take. It cannot be said that a citizen thereof, during the settlement of her estate, is deprived of his property when he is left the words “shall not be deprived” imply a in the undisturbed possession of it, whatever pre-existing right, and apply as well to postaxation may be imposed on it. Sharpless v. session, control, and income as to the words City of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167, 59 Am. "his right as tenant by the curtesy." Appeal Dec. 759.
of Staples, 52 Conn. 421, 423.
DEPRIVE OF LIFE.
inheritance for years, and those which re“Deprive of life,” as used in an indict- quire a superintendency, and no particular ment for murder charging that the defendant skill
, may regularly be exercised by deputies. did deprive deceased of his life, was equiva- Thus, a sheriff, though he is an officer, made lent to the word “kill.” Walker v. State, 14 by the King's letters patent, and though it Tex. App. 609, 627.
be not said that he may execute his office per se vel sufficientum deputatum suum, yet
he may make a deputy, which is an underDEPUTY.
sheriff, against whom action may be brought
by the parties aggrieved." A judicial officer See “Special Deputy."
cannot make a deputy unless he hath a
clause in his patent to enable him, beca use The term “deputy” means “one who is bis judgment is relied on in matters relatappointed, designated, or deputed to act for ; ing to his office which might be the reason another.” Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62, 63.
of the making of the grant to him; neither
can a municipal officer depute one in his A deputy is one who by appointment exercises an office in another's right, having no him in person, but when nothing is required
stead if the office be to be performed by interest therein, but doing all things in his but the superintendency in the office he may principal's name, and for whose misconduct make a deputy. Bouvier says that in genthe principal is answerable. Carter v. Horn- eral “municipal officers cannot appoint depback, 40 S. W. 893, 139 Mo. 238; Willis v.
uties unless the office is to be exercised by Melvin, 53 N. C. 62, 63; People v. Barker, 35 the municipal officer in person.” WillingN. Y. Supp. 727, 729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360; Pi- ham v. State, 21 Fla. 761, 776. land v. Taylor, 18 S. E. 70, 113 N. O. 1; In re Tilyou, 57 App. Div. 101, 110, 67 N. Y. Supp. A deputy is an assistant to an officer, 1097, 1104.
and he must be one whose acts are of equal
force with that of the officer himself. The Webster defines a deputy to be one ap deputy must act in pursuance of law, perpointed as a substitute of another, and em
form official functions, and take oaths bepowered to act for him, in his name and on his behalf. An agent can only bind bis prin- fore acting. Opinion of Justices, 12 Fla. 651,
652; People v. Barker, 35 N. Y. Supp. 727, cipal when he does the act in the name of his
729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360. principal, but a deputy may do the act and sign his own name, and it binds the principal. A deputy is a clerk with all the powers A deputy, however, is in law deemed an of the principal. An assistant does not mean agent. When the officer or principal is dead, a deputy. Clerks and other public officers and that fact is known, or he is otherwise have assistants who are not deputies. (Per disqualified to act for himself, he cannot act Bibb, J.) A deputy is an assistant, and by a deputy or agent. Herring v. Lee, 22 W. there may be other assistants who are not Va. 661, 667.
deputies. “Assistant" is a more compre
bensive word than “deputy, and includes A deputy has power to do every act those who aid the principal, whether sworn which his principal might do, and he cannot
or not, while "deputy" embraces only the be restrained to some particulars of his
sworn class. (Per Mills, J., dissenting.) office, for that would be repugnant to his Ellison v. Stevenson, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Mon.) being deputy. Steinke v. Graves, 52 Pac. 271, 276, 279. 386, 387, 16 Utah, 293.
The word “deputy," in Const. art. 11, $ "A deputy is said to be one who occu- ; 842, relating to officers, includes employés pieth in right of another, and for whom, reg. and all the subordinates of the county offiularly, his superior shall answer."
Thus the copyist in & recorder's office uty has not any estate or interest in the is a deputy, and may be appointed without office, but is as servant to the officer.” “A examination by the civil service commission deputy cannot regularly have less power than of the city and county of San Francisco. his principal.” Erwin v. United States (U. Garnett v. Brooks, 69 Pac. 298, 299, 136 S.) 37 Fed. 470, 475, 2 L. R. A. 229 (citing 7 Cal. 585. Bac. Abr. 316 [L]).
By the public officers' law it is provided A "deputy," as defined by Bouvier, is one that every deputy shall be appointed by his authorized by an officer to exercise the office principal, etc. If there is but one deputy, or right which the officer possesses for and he shall, unless otherwise prescribed by law, in the place of the latter. Comyn's Dig. possess the powers and perform the duties tit. “Officer" (D, 3), says: "It is said that of his principal during the absence or ina deputy has power to do every act which ability to act of his principal, or during a bis principal might do, but that a deputy vacancy in his principal's office. The funccannot make a deputy, as this imports an tion of a deputy possessing the powers, as assignment of all his authority, which is he does, to act as if he were the actual in. not assignable.” In Bacon's Abridgment, “Of- cumbent of his principal's office implies a ficer" (L), it is laid down "that offices of correlative duty and right on the part of
“A dep-, cers.
the principal to exercise an unfettered per- bis name. Simpson v. Morris (Pa.) 3 Yeates, sonal selection in the appointment of such 104, 107. subordinate, and also a corresponding free dom in exercising the power of removal, DEPUTY CONSUL. and such is its meaning when used in statute providing that the act relating to re
“Deputy consul" and "consular agent," moval of honorably discharged veterans from when used in the title relating to diplomatic office shall not apply to any private secre- and consular officers, shall be deemed to detary, chief clerk, or deputy. Within this note consular officers subordinate to such meaning, a deputy tax commissioner, whose principals, exercising the powers and perduties are prescribed by the statute, and for forming the duties within the limits of their the performance of wbich he is responsible to consulates or commercial agencies respectivethe public, and which, while performed under 15, the former at the same ports or places, the direction of the commissioners, do in any and the latter at ports or places different way interfere with the duties of the commis- from those at which such principals are locatsioners themselves, is not a deputy. People ed respectively. U. s. Comp. St. 1901, p.
1150. v. Barker, 35 N. Y. Supp. 727, 729, 14 Misc. Rep. 360.
DEPUTY POSTMASTER. Civil Service Law (Laws 1902, p. 803, c. 270, § 21) provides that no person holding a
The term "deputy postmaster" in Const. position by appointment in the state or city, art. 2, § 9, providing that no person shall hold who shall have served the term required by more than one lucrative office at the same law in the voluntary fire department of a time, but the office of deputy postmaster, city, shall be removed except for incompeten- when the compensation shall not exceed ninecy or misconduct shown after a hearing on ty dollars per annum, shall not be deemed ludue notice, and that nothing in the section crative, applies to the office of postmaster shall apply to the position of "deputy" of any as not designated. Bishop v. State, 48 N. E. official or department. Held, that the word 1038, 1039, 149 Ind. 223, 39 L. R. A. 278, 63 "deputy," as used in the exception of the Am. St. Rep. 270. statute, referred to persons holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing power, DEPUTY SHERIFF. and did not apply to or include a deputy tax commissioner in the department of taxes or
A deputy sheriff is an officer within the assessments in the city of New York, who meaning of the law punishing the embezzlewas a veteran fireman, so as to authorize his ment of public money. State v. Brooks, 42 removal without a compliance with such sec
Tex. 62, 66. tion. People v. Wells, 83 N. Y. Supp. 789, A deputy sheriff is one appointed to act 790, 86 App. Div. 270.
for the sheriff, and not in his own name, perThe office of assistant clerk of the city son, or right. He cannot legally act, as in is provided for in the charter, and he is er- serving an execution, in his own name, but pressly given all the powers, duties, and re- authority of the sheriff, in whose stead be
such acts must be in the name and by the sponsibilities of his principal, except that by acts. He is the deputy of the sheriff, and not implication, at least, he cannot certify to or of the office of sheriff, as distinct from the affix the corporate seal to copies of the files
Wilson V. Rusand transcripts of records. His appointment person holding the office. by the clerk must be confirmed by the coun- sell, 31 N. W. 645, 4 Dak. 376. cil, which also determines bis salary, and he Deputy sheriff's are of two kinds: (a) may be required to give a bond for the faith- A general deputy, or undersheriff, who, by ful performance of his duties, and is respon- virtue of his appointment, bas authority to sible to the municipality for their proper per- execute all the ordinary duties of the office formance. He is in fact a deputy, although of sheriff (Com. Dig. tit. “Viscount,” 542, B. officially styled “assistant clerk.” Kelly v. 1); one who executes process without special City of Minneapolis, 79 N. W. 653, 654, 77 authority from the sheriff, and may even Minn. 76.
delegate authority in the name of the sheriff
or its execution to a special deputy. (b) A As officers.
special deputy, who is an officer pro hac vice, See "Officer.”
to execute a particular writ on some certain occasion, but acts under a specific and not a
general appointment and authority. Allen v. DEPUTY CLERK.
Smith, 12 N. J. Law (7 Halst.) 159, 162. As clerk, see "Clerk."
The deputy is an officer coeval in point of
antiquity with the sheriff. The creation of DEPUTY CONSTABLE.
deputies arise from an impossibility of the
sheriff's performing all the duties of his ofA "deputy constable” possesses the whole fice in person. The powers of the deputy power of his principal, and of right acts in have consequently been ascertained at an