applicant's name appended thereto, is in- | tioned to be void, if the insured should die sufficient, under Rev. St. Wis. § 1945a, precluding an insurance company from proving the contents of an application, unless a copy thereof is attached to and made a part of the policy.-Dunbar v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (Wis.) 386. 6. An applicant is not concluded by an answer inserted in the application by an insurance agent on his own motion, without inquiry of, or authority from, the applicant; and, if false, its falsity is the mistake of the company, and the answer must be considered as stricken from the application, and the question as unanswered, or the answer must be treated as true for determining the rights of the parties.-Id.* 7. The neglect of an applicant to answer, in the application, the question as to incumbrances, does not, in the absence of fraud, avoid a policy on incumbered property, though by its terms its validity is dependent on a full disclosure of all incumbrances, but its issuance on the defective application is a waiver of a fuller disclosure.-Id. intoxicated, the evidence being that insured, who, while a confirmed drunkard, was not always drunk, left home sober, by rail, and became very drunk on the way, reaching his destination at 1 o'clock in the morning, and that he was supposed to have been seen the evening after, by a witness whose account was not entirely clear or consistent, apparently drunk, near a ditch in a large city, where he was found next morning drowned, the finding for plaintiff will not be disturbed.-Id. 13. A condition in a policy of fire insurance on a shingle-mill that, "if the premises shall become vacant or unoccupied, or if a mill or manufactory shall cease to be operated" without notice to and consent of the company, the policy shall be void, is not broken by a temporary suspension, caused by failure of logs, a new supply being daily expected, but being delayed by reason of low water, though such suspension continues for 42 days.-City Planing & Shingle Mill Co. v. Merchants', M. & C. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (Mich.) 777. 14. The president of the insurance com 8. Where an agent, on his own responsibility, fills out an application, merely pre-pany having been informed of the suspensenting it to the applicant for his signature, without acquainting him with its contents, the representations therein made are conclusive against the company.--Id.* 9. Where a life insurance agent assumes the responsibility of filling out a blank application, and the applicant, presuming that he has acted honestly, signs it without any knowledge of its contents, a recovery may be had on the policy, though certain representations be materially false. Temmink v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mich.) 469.* 10. An insurance company which, with knowledge of prior insurance, does not disclaim liability on a policy until after suit brought, and orders an assessment for payment of the loss, and promises to pay, waives an alleged breach of warranty by reason of such other insurance.-Eddy v. Merchants' M. & C. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (Mich.) 775. Conditions of policy. sion soon after the loss, and a member of 15. A general district agent of an insurance company for a stated territory, whose duties are to solicit and forward applications for insurance at a stated compensation, has no authority to bind the company for furniture purchased for his office. Beebe v. Equitable Mut. L. & E. Ass'n, (Iowa,) 122. Actions on policies-Pleading. 16. It is sufficient to allege the destruction by fire of the property insured, without alleging that the fire resulted from accident or misfortune, and not through any fraud or evil practice on the part of the assured. - Bank of River Falls v. German Amer. Ins. Co., (Wis.) 506. 11. An association issuing a certificate conditioned to be void if the insured should use intoxicants so as to injure his health; 17. A complaint reciting the stipulation and that, if the insured should use alcoholic in the policy for the receipt of proof of loss stimulants to the injury of his health, or by the company, and alleging that the inbecome a confirmed user thereof, the asso-sured performed all the conditions of the ciation might, in his life-time, cancel the certificate; and that the insured would forfeit all his rights thereunder,-to a person known to its agent to be a confirmed drunkard, waives the conditions.-Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Ass'n, (Iowa,) 87. 12. In an action on a certificate condi contract, and rendered to the company a particular account and proof of the loss, as required by the contract, sufficiently alleges the receipt of the proof of loss by the company.-Id. 18. The allegation that the claim accruing by virtue of a contract of insurance was duly sold, assigned, and transferred to plaintiff, who ever since has been the owner business in more than three counties, reof it, is an allegation that on the day named mains in force, and a policy issued by such the contract and the right to the amount a company, outside the three counties due on it was delivered to plaintiff as buyer, named in its charter, is void.-Eddy v. Merand accepted by him as required by stat- chants', M. & C. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (Mich.) ute of frauds. Rev. St. Wis. § 2308.-Id. 775. 19. An allegation that a claim for insurance was assigned to plaintiff will, on demurrer, be held to imply that an assignment valid under the statutes was made. -Id. Mutual benefit societies. 25. The constitution and regulations of a corporation formed for the purpose of creating a fund for the benefit of the widows and orphans of the members, to be paid on their death, provided that upon ex 20. A complaint alleging that defendant, for a valuable consideration, entered into a contract of insurance, is sufficient, on de-amination of an applicant, and approval murrer, without any allegation that any premium was ever paid or agreed to be paid.―ld. Evidence. 21. In an action on a policy covering a shingle-mill, where defendants set up a violation of the conditions of the policy by a suspension of business caused by a temporary insufficiency of logs, evidence of the location and connection of a planing-mill from which the shingle-mill received its power, and which was owned and operated by the assured, and that the planing-mill was in operation, is admissible.-City Planing & Shingle Mill Co. v. Merchants', M. & C. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (Mich.) 777. 22. It was proper to prove the fact of the temporary suspension of other mills for the same reason, as showing that such stoppages were incident to that locality.-Id. Accident insurance. 23. An accident policy contained the express condition that it should not cover accidents, injuries, or death from trying to enter a moving steam-vehicle, this provision not being applicable to railway employes. The assured, a banker, was killed while attempting to get on a moving railway train. Held, that a provision of the policy limiting the liability of the company to a less sum than that named in the policy, if the assured should be injured in any Occupation or exposure classed as more hazardous than that specified in the policy, did not apply, the assured being classed as one of the least hazardous, or "select," risks, and not having changed his occupation to that of a railroad employe at the time of the accident. The company, therefore, was not liable.-Miller v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (Minn.) 839. Mutual fire companies. 24. Acts Mich. 1883, No. 175, permitting mutual fire insurance companies, confining their business to risks therein mentioned, to do business throughout the state, having been declared unconstitutional, (Skinner v. Wilhelm, 30 N. W. Rep. 311,) the provision of How. St. § 4249, prohibiting mutual fire insurance companies from doing of the application by the supreme lodge, and the signing of the certificate of membership, and the forwarding of it to the subordinate lodge, the contract should be been forwarded to the subordinate lodge, complete. Held, that the certificate having and retained on the ground of fraud in the application, the beneficiary might recover without producing it, no evidence of the fraud being given by the corporation. Honor, (Mich.) 545. -Lorcher v. Supreme Lodge Knights of 26. Where it is the duty of the subordinate lodge to report the death of the member to the supreme lodge, it will be presumed that the requisite proofs of the death ant refuses to pay on the ground of the were furnished; especially where defendfraud in the application.-Id. 27. Under Code Iowa, SS 2514, 2689, providing that an error of plaintiff in the kind of proceedings adopted shall not cause an abatement or dismissal, but merely a change into proper proceedings, and a transfer to the proper docket, and that, in furtherance of justice, pleadings may be amended by the insertion of material allegations, and other statutes relative to amendments, a petition at law, for damages, on a mutual benefit certificate, may, after reversal of judgment thereon, be changed to one in equity by amendment praying that defendant be compelled to levy an assessment on its members to pay the certificate, and such amendment does not introduce a new cause of action.-Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Ass'n. (Iowa.) 87. 28. A policy, payable to the insured's devisees under his last will, does not fail by his death intestate, but is payable to his heirs, and therefore it is harmless error, as to defendant, that, in an action thereon by one claiming under assignments from the widow and heirs, the court reformed the policy by making it payable to deceased's wife on insufficient evidence of mistake.-Id. 29. After decree requiring an association to levy an assessment on its members to pay a policy, which it fails to do, litigation having been pending thereon for six years, a personal decree against it for the amount, with interest from the time the assessment should have been made, is proper, and this though defendant is a non-resident corporation.-Id. Foreign companies. 30. An association, organized for benevolent purposes, under a supervision of a supreme body, which secures its members by the lodge system, upon application and after satisfactory medical examination, requiring an initiation fee, and assessments, and which in case of accidental disability pays a weekly amount, and upon death of the member, to be shown by proper proof, returns the amount of assessments paid, less benefits received, is not a life insurance company, within the meaning of How. St. Mich. § 4225, requiring foreign life insurance companies doing business in that state to make a deposit of securities with the state treasurer, and providing for the recovery in assumpsit of premiums paid before the making of such deposit.-Rensenhouse v. Seeley, (Mich.) 765. 31. Such an association is a fraternal society, within the meaning of the act of 1887, § 25, which excepts from the control of the insurance commissioner fraternal societies, under the supervision of a supreme body, that neither pay any commission, nor employ paid agents.-Id. Interest. See, also, Usury. On paid taxes, see Taxation, 17. 2. Laws Dak. 1879, c. 26, § 7, provided that both the county, and any incorporated village, etc., therein, might require the payment of a license tax to sell intoxicating liquors. The charter of the city of W. provides that it shall have power to license, regulate, and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. Held, that the city had not the exclusive right to license the sale within its limits. Territory v. Webster, (Dak.) 535. Illegal sales. 3. Proof that defendant kept liquors in a one-story addition to a three-story building; that a door opened from the former into a room in the latter, which was used by defendant and his mother as a kitchen; that the mother used the lower floor of the three-story part for a cigar-stand and restaurant; and that customers passed through such part, into defendant's liquor room,-sufficiently conforms to an allegation in an indictment that a liquor nuisance was kept in a three-story building.State v. Gurlagh, (Iowa,) 141. 4. The reports made by a pharmacist to the county auditor showed nearly 3,000 sales. The kinds and amounts of liquor sold did not appear, nor was it shown to whom the sales were made, except in a few instances. Held, that as Laws Iowa, 1886, c. 66, § 8, placed on defendant the burden of showing that the sales were legal, a verdict against him was warranted, though he testified that the sales were legal.-State v. Cummins, (Iowa,) 124. When allowed, see Damages, 12, 13; Part- Criminal prosecution. nership, 5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. Illegal sale, punishment, see Criminal Law, 18. Testimony as to illegal sales, see Witness, 12. 1. A petition for a writ of mandamus, to compel village trustees to approve a liquor bond, alleged that the trustees, on a day fixed for a hearing, arbitrarily refused to approve the bond, or to allow the bondsmen to appear before them, and make a statement of their property, and indorsed it, "Rejected for insufficiency of sureties." The return of the trustees to the rule to show cause stated that, from their investigation and their own knowledge, the property of one of the bondsmen was, in their judgment, insufficient. Held, that the writ would not be granted, since, by Acts Mich. 1887, No. 313, § 8, "if, in the judgment" of the council of the village, the sureties, or either of them, are insufficient, they shall refuse to approve the bond.-Palmer v. President, (Mich.) 850. 5. The monthly statements of a pharmacist, filed in the county auditor's office as required by Laws 1886, c. 83, § 2, become, when so filed, public records, and as such are admissible on prosecution of the pharmacist for illegal sales. Their introduction does not compel defendant to testify against himself. Following State v. Smith, 38 N. W. Rep. 492.-Id. 6. On indictment for liquor nuisance, where the evidence is undisputed that defendant had made sales of liquor, the only question being as to his good faith, the court does not infringe on the province of the jury by assuming the fact, in its charge that defendant had made sales.-State v. Huff, (Iowa,) 720. 7. The court directed the jury to find whether all the sales made by defendant within three years next preceding the finding of the indictment were sold for the actual necessities of medicine. Held, that this was not erroneous as covering a period before the law under which defendant was indicted took effect, it appearing that all the sales shown in evidence were made after that time.-Id. 8. It was for the jury to determine, from the frequency of the sales to the witnesses, from their appearance as men requiring intoxicating liquor for medicine, and whether bought with or without a physician's prescription, whether the sales were made in good faith for the actual necessities of medicine.-Id. 9. Certificates showing purchase of liquor from defendant, though not shown to be public records, are competent evidence, both as corroborative of witnesses' testimony that they procured liquor from defendant, and as an admission on his part that he had made the sales.-Id. Search and seizure. 10. Under Code Iowa, § 1546, providing that when liquor is taken on a searchwarrant, and no person is made defendant, or judgment is in favor of defendant, the costs shall be paid as in cases of criminal prosecutions where the prosecution fails; and section 3807, providing for a fee for the officer who serves the writ,-the writ is served by making the search, and the officer is entitled to his fee, as provided in the former section, though no liquor is found.-Byram v. Polk County, (Iowa,) 102. Injunction. 11. Acts 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 66, § 2, provides that when it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court, by affida vits or otherwise, as the court may order, that a liquor nuisance actually exists or is being maintained, a temporary injunction shall issue as of course, without bond, upon defendant's application for a continuance. Held, that where the complaint alleged the existence and maintenance of such nuisance, and was supported by affidavit, and the record failed to show that the court took or required any further proof, it was error to grant defendant's application for continuance without granting the injunction.-Tibbetts v. Burster, (Iowa,) 707. 12. In an action to abate a liquor nuisance, an answer which does not deny that the nuisance existed and was being maintained at the time the action was brought, but merely alleges that afterward defendant obtained and now holds a permit, is demurrable. Following Halfman v. Spreen, 39 N. W. Rep. 512.-Id. Civil damage laws. 13. Under Pub. Acts Mich. 1883, No. 191, which gives a right of action to the wife or other person injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of a person, widow has a right of action against the liquor seller for the death of her husband caused by an intoxicated person. -Brockway v. Patterson, (Mich.) 192. 14. The fact that a person causing the injury was intoxicated at the time brings the case within the statute. It is not necessary to trace the injury to the intoxication. CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.-Id. 15. In an action by a wife, against a liquor seller, for damages for the death of her husband caused by an intoxicated person, evidence of the habits of the husband as a drinking man is admissible as bearing on the question of damages.-Id. 16. Evidence that the husband was quiet when sober, and quarrelsome when drunk, is admissible as bearing on the question whether he was intoxicated at the time of the injury, and whether his intoxication contributed to the injury.-Id. 17. Statements made by the husband on the night of the injury as to how it was received are not admissible.-Id. 18. In an action under How. St. Mich. § 2268, for selling liquor to a minor, evidence that the minor had drunk liquor at other places than that of defendant is inadmissible, though the minor, as a witness for plaintiff, without objection, denies having done so.-Theisen v. Johns, (Mich.) 727. 19. Although the charge. in such action may have tended to mislead the jury into determining that the widow was entitled to damages for the loss of her husband's support during the expectancy of her life, without reference to the probabilities of the husband's life continuing as long as she might live, yet, where the verdict in her favor is so small that it is evident that the probabilities of the husband's life must have been considered in fixing the amount, the judgment will not be reversed.-Brockway v. Patterson. (Mich.) 192. 20. Under How. St. Mich. § 2268, providing that any person selling liquor to a minor under the age of 18 years shall be liable for actual and exemplary damages to the parent "in such sum not less than $50 in each case as the court or jury shall determine," and section 2269, providing that the damages and costs shall be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction, damages of at least $50 may be recovered in each cause, but the statute does not intend to make $50 the minimum penalty for each sale.-Theisen v. Johns, (Mich.) 727. 21. Where the evidence shows that defendant had made some 50 or 60 illegal sales of liquor, a fine of $500 is not excessive.-State v. Huff, (Iowa,) 720. county auditor, shall be punished, etc., the | and had the same Christian name, and apdriver of a team for one who undertakes with his own wagons to deliver the liquors is punishable; the driver being within a class of like kind with those enumerated to which the words "any other person" refer.-State v. Campbell, (Iowa,) 100. 23. The carriage of liquors from wholesale to retail dealers in the same city, is a conveying within the meaning of such statute, imposing the penalty for conveying liquors "from one place to another within the state. "-Id. JUDGMENT. Collateral attack, see Writs, 6. peared to have incurred a part, at least, of Res adjudicata, see Ejectment, 4; Mort- as to the validity of the modification, being gages, 9. By default. 6. Though three months after a judgment was modified the modification was set aside, and a few days later the order setting it aside was vacated, the question jurisdictional, does not become res adjudicata by the last orders, but can be raised by motion to set aside all the proceedings after the original judgment, at any time.Thompson v. Thompson, (Wis.) 671. 1. A default was rendered against the defendant, a religious corporation, after service upon one of its officers, no appearance 7. When action commenced in the state being made by the corporation. On appli- district court, involving lands described in cation to open the default, the affidavits the complaint as being in "Bottineau's adshowed that the officer served did not in-dition to Minneapolis," is removed to the form any other member of the corpora- circuit court of the United States, and the tion, and circumstances showed that the certified complaint in that court describes officer so served would be personally ben- the lands as being in "Bottinen's addition efited by plaintiff's recovery. The appli- to Minneapolis," the record in the latter cation was seasonably made, and a good court is prima facie applicable to the land defense shown. Held, an order opening in question in Bottineau's addition. the default was within the court's discre- Pierro v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., (Minn.) tion, and proper.-Bray v. Church of St. 520. Brandon, (Minn.) 518. 2. An application for leave to answer after nearly five months' delay, is properly denied.-St. Paul Land Co. v. Dayton, (Minn.) 66. Rendition and entry. 3. In Nebraska, in a term case a county court may, upon the motion of a party to an action, upon due notice to the adverse party, amend a docket entry to conform to the facts; the practice in that regard being assimilated to that of the district court. Grimes v. Grosjean, (Neb.) 137. Res adjudicata. 4. A chattel mortgage was given to secure two promissory notes. The mortgagee brought an action against the mortgagor to recover possession. In that action the defendant alleged as a defense only, and got a verdict on it, that there was a failure of consideration for the notes and mortgage. Held, this is no bar to a counter-claim based on the failure of consideration, in an action on the notes, brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant.-D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Williams, (Minn.) 165. 8. For a single and completed trespass upon and injury to an entire tract of land several actions for damages cannot be maintained. A recovery of damages in respect to a part of the land will bar a subsequent recovery in respect to another part of the tract, the cause of action being en tire.-Id. for want of merits, plaintiff refusing to 9. A dismissal of a petition on demurrer amend, is an adjudication of all matters pleaded, or which could or should have been pleaded in the petition to entitle plaintiff to the relief therein prayed.Lamb v. McConkey. (Iowa,) 77. 10. A discharge, in garnishee proceedings, of the grantee of a deed which the creditor alleged to be fraudulent, will not bar an action by the creditor to have such conveyance declared a mortgage, as the court could not in that proceeding have determined the title to the real estate.Wright v. Mahaffey, (Iowa,) 112. 11. Plaintiff, being employed "for one year at a salary of $1,500 for said year," was discharged, without cause, before the expiration of the year, After a time, he sued for wages accrued since the discharge, 5. On a judgment against one N. Y., a and recovered. Held, that he had experson was garnished as a debtor of N. Y. hausted his remedy, and could not sue or N. S. Y. The latter was N. Y.'s brother, | again for wages accruing after the former |