to ours expressly held that the widow did not take as heir. The proposition is fully discussed in two cases which have been repeatedly followed by the Indiana courts. May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575; Brannon v. May, 42 Ind. 92. There are decisions of other courts construing similar statutes where it is held that the widow does not take as heir of her husband. Gauch v. St. Louis, M. L. Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 251; Crenshaw v. Moore, 124 Tenn. 528, 137 S. W. 924; Kendall v. Kendall, 42 Ia. 464. The Supreme Court of Maine, in construing a similar statute (Golder v. Golder, 95 Me. 259), says: "The statute does not change the status of the widow with reference to her deceased husband's estate. It enlarges her interest by giving her an estate in fee instead of an estate for life. She still takes, not as heir, but as widow."

Another reason why the estate taken by the widow is not necessarily within the meaning of our statute is that that which is conferred under the statute by virtue of the marital relation comes to her as a new acquisition. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Bookout v. Bookout, 150 Ind. 63, said: "Marriage in the eye of the law is held to be a valuable consideration, and the wife is regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consideration of all the property which accrued to her by virtue of her marital rights." There is still another reason why the estate of the widow was not ancestral, within the meaning of our statutes of descent and distribution, so as to cast it back to the blood of the original donor. This court, in Oliver v. Vance, 34 Ark. 564, said: "The person last entitled to possession, or last invested with the vested remainder, remains the propositus, whose nearest heirs are to be traced. They must, however, be of the blood of the person from whom the benefit came, that is to say, the line of descent must be traced on that line, leaving off the side which bore no relation to the donor. In the case in judgment, we drop the mother altogether, since the land did not come through her, nor any of her blood. We take the father's line, because we find the lands came from a relative of the blood of the father.

But we retain the deceased Van R. as the propositus, and seek his heirs on that side, and not the heirs of the original donor. Any construction of the law, which, on failure of descendants of a donee, would make the donor the propositus, would, in effect, enable one by gift or devise of land to a kinsman, to reserve a reversion to his heirs after an estate of inheritance given to another. This would contravene the policy of our laws." Again, in the case of Johnson v. Phillips, 85 Ark. 86, we said that the "person last entitled to possession, or last invested with the vested remainder, remains the proposi tus, whose nearest heirs are to be traced." Now, it would be impossible to follow our statutes of descent and distribution in this case if we treat the estate as an ancestral one within the meaning of the statute, for if we take the deceased widow as the propositus, we can find no heir of blood of the original donor. The widow herself not being of the blood of the original donor, none of her heirs could fall within that line. It necessarily follows that that statute has no application in this case. Our conclusion therefore is that the chancellor was correct in his holding that the Boyd heirs, that is to say the heirs of the widow of J. K. Bowers, inherited an undivided half of the lands which constituted a new acquisition of said J. K. Bowers.

The Travis heirs insist on their cross-appeal that the court awarded lands to appellant which were not in fact ancestral, for the reason that J. K. Bowers purchased an undivided interest from the appellant. The decree of the chancellor dealt, only with the undivided interest of J. K. Bowers, which he inherited from his father, and the chancellor evidently held that the other undivided half was still owned by appellant. It is undisputed that Mrs. Barton inherited an undivided half of these lands from her father; and while there are some vague and uncertain statements in the record that she had sold her interest to her brother, J. K. Bowers, she disputes that fact, and the evidence is not sufficient to warrant a finding that she did convey. Of course, if she

had conveyed her interest to her brother, that would have constituted a new acquisition on his part. But the chancellor found that she had never made any such conveyance and therefore that she owned an undivided half in the lands, and that she inherited from her brother the other undivided half which was an ancestral estate in his hands.

Upon the whole, we think the decree of the chancellor was correct and the same is affirmed.

1.

2.

ROBERTS v. STATE, USE LOGAN COUNTY.

Opinion delivered January 18, 1915.

COUNTY FUNDS-DEPOSITORY.-Act No. 196, Acts 1909, providing for the selection of a county depository for public funds in Logan County, and providing for the liability of the sureties on the bond of said depository bank, is in force, and sureties on the bond of such bank are liable to the county for public funds deposited in the said bank.

COUNTY FUNDS-DEPOSITORY-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS OF DEPOSI⚫ TORY BANK.-Act 113, Acts 1913, providing for the individual lia bility of stockholders of banks, does not repeal section 4, Act 196, Acts 1909, which makes all stockholders of a bank liable for all public funds that such bank shall fail to pay over on demand to the person entitled to receive the same.

Appeal from Logan Circuit Court, Southern District; Jeptha H. Evans, Judge; affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This is a suit by the prosecuting attorney, in the name of the State, for the use of Logan County, to recover from the Logan County Bank, as principal, and the sureties on its bond and certain stockholders a judgment for $17,099.59, for funds alleged to have been deposited by the county treasurer with the bank as the depository of the public funds. The complaint alleged that the bank was selected as the depository of the public funds under the statute; that it executed and filed its bond, as required by law, in the sum of $35,000.00; that the treasurer of Logan County had from time to time deposited the county funds, had drawn checks thereon,

leaving a balance in the hands of the bank in the sum of $17,099.59, on May 25, 1914, which the bank had failed and refused to pay upon checks of the treasurer or otherwise, and that on May 25, 1914, the State Bank Commissioner took charge of the bank on account of its insolvent condition. The prayer was for judgment in the sum of $35,000, to be applied to the satisfaction of the amount alleged to be due, and the balance be held for the benefit of those entitled thereto.

John M. Davis, the State Bank Commissioner, was made a party, and he answered, admitting that the bank had been taken over by him and that the affairs of the bank were then in process of liquidation under the laws governing State banks.

J. L. Roberts, one of the defendants, answered, and among other things, denied that the deposit for which recovery was sought was according to law, and alleged that section 36 of the act of 1913 repeals the act making stockholders of a bank liable for public funds.

The court sustained a demurrer to the answer of Roberts and found that the bank was duly selected as the depository of all the public funds of Logan County, and that the bond was duly executed as the law requires; that the appellants were stockholders and liable for all the public funds due the county treasurer under section 4 of Act No. 196, approved May 1, 1909, and it rendered. judgment against the appellants, as stockholders, and bondsmen, for the amount sued for, with interest, and ordered that all dividends from liquidation of the assets. of the Logan County Bank paid by the State Bank Commissioner to the county treasurer upon the county deposit account be entered as a credit upon the judgment.

The appellants duly prosecute this appeal.

Carmichael, Brooks, Powers & Rector, for appellant. 1. The purpose of the deposit was for the purpose of getting interest and not for safe-keeping. Act 57, p. 176, 1913, Kirby's Dig., § 1990. The statute as to stockholders is not only penal but in derogation of the com

mon law and must be strictly construed. 59 Ark. 356; 82 Id. 247. Safe-keeping means a special and not a general deposit. 7 Words & Phr., 6283-4. It is in the nature of bailment, and the money must be paid over on demand. 62 Ala. 340; 34 Am. Rep. 24; 97 Ark. 374; 31 L. R. A. 851.

2. Any material alteration of a stockholder's liability or obligation without his consent, discharges the stockholder from liability. 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 702; 61 Atl. 36; 65 Ark. 550; 93 Id. 472; 98 N. E. 886; 181 Mo. 300. Sondgrass v. Schader, 40 A. L. R. 430; Brandt on Guar. & Sur., p. 376; 103 Ark. 483; 35 Id. 468.

3. The special act repeals section 1990 of Kirby's Digest. While repeals by implication are not favored, if the latter act covers the entire subject-matter and deals with the whole subject it will be held to be a repeal of the former act, or if there is a repugnancy between the provisions and the latter covers the whole subject, plainly showing the latter was intended as a substitute, it repeals the former act. 92 Ark. 600; 100 Id. 504; 101 Id. 238; 80 Id. 411; 82 Id. 302; 105 Id. 77, and many others.

4. Section 36 of the act of 1913, repeals section 1990 of Kirby's Digest, 14 Wis. 700; 80 Am. Dec. 797; 97 Ark. 374; Boaz v. Coates, 41 Ark. L. R. 23; Suth. on Stat. Const., § 140.

Anthony Hall, for appellee.

The special act does not repeal section 1990, Kirby's Digest. The liability of stockholders is based on section 4 of Act 196, Acts 1909, p. 577, and remains in full force. 97 Ark. 374. There is no repugnancy between the two acts. 93 Ark. 621; 88 Ark. 234. The judgment is correct.

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts). I. Act 196, approved May 1, 1909, provides for a depository of the public funds of Logan County. Sections 1 and 3 of that act were amended by Act No. 57, approved February 15, 1913, providing for the creation of separate depositories in the northern and southern districts of Logan County, and by changing the time for receiving bids from the