of the several states shall be authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto; and the records and judicial proceedings of their courts shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the attestation is in due form.

383. Records and judicial proceedings, when thus authenticated, are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence they are taken.

384. Hence the judgment of a state court has the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court within the United States which it had in the state where it was rendered. The merits of the judgment cannot be re-examined. It may be shown, however, that it was obtained by fraud, or that the court rendering it had no jurisdiction, in which cases it is entitled to no faith or credit. Nor would it be entitled to any faith or credit out of the state in which it was rendered, if recovered against a nonresident party without notice to him.

Privileges of Citizens.

385. The citizens of each state are entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

states.

386. The privileges and immunities which are here secured to the citizens of each state in all the other states may be summed up as follows:-The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold, and dispose of property of every kind; to be exempted from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; and to exercise the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state. In a word, the citizens of one state going into another are entitled to protection by the government of such state; to the enjoyment of life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, subject, however, to such restraints as the laws and Constitution may have prescribed for the general good of the whole.

386. But a citizen of one state cannot claim any rights which under the laws of another state belong

only to residents of the state. To enjoy such rights he must become domiciled there. He is, however, entitled to protection against any discriminating legislation which would place him in a worse situation than belongs to the proper citizen of the particular state. Hence a state license tax, which discriminates against commodities of other states is void, as abridging the privileges and immunities of the citizens of such other states. We may add, that the privileges and immunities referred to in the foregoing clause are those which belong to the citizens of the states as such, and are left to the state governments for security and protection, and are beyond the scope of the legislative and constitutional power of the government of the United States. We may add further, that the right to admittance to practice law in the courts of a state is not one of the privileges and immunities which a state is forbidden to abridge.

Fugitives from Justice.

387. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

388. It is a question upon which jurists differ,

whether it is the duty of a nation, in the absence of
a positive engagement, to surrender fugitives from
justice who have sought shelter within its limits. It
might, perhaps, be clearly implied that, in such a
union of states as ours, every state is bound to deny
an asylum to the criminals of the other states. But
the Constitution has not left so important a question
to inference or implication; it has enjoined it as a
mutual obligation upon the states to deliver up, on
demand, fugitives from justice. And Congress by
law have prescribed the mode of proceeding when a
fugitive from justice is demanded.

3881. The words "treason, felony, or other crime"
include every offence forbidden and made punishable
by the laws of the state where the offence is commit-
ted. And it must appear from the papers that the
alleged fugitive committed the crime with which he is
charged in the state from which the requisition pro-
ceeds. The obligation to surrender fugitives from
justice rests upon the mutual good will and good faith
of the states; and, hence, if the governor of a state
should refuse on proper demand to deliver up such
fugitive, the Federal courts have no power to compel
him to perform the duty.

Fugitives from Labor.

389. No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, In old trimes

shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

390. Before the adoption of the Constitution, a slave escaping from one state into another could only be recovered as a matter of comity and favor, not as a matter of right. Because, by the law of nations, no independent state is bound to recognise the state of slavery as to foreign slaves found within its territory, when such recognition is in opposition to its own policy and institutions.

391. Hence the constitutional provision which makes that a matter of legal right which before could be claimed only as a matter of favor. Under the Constitution, therefore, a fugitive from service or labor cannot, in consequence of any law or regulation of the state into which he may have fled, be discharged from such service or labor, but must be delivered up on claim of the party entitled to his service or labor.

392. There must, however, be an escape. The Constitution does not extend to the case of a slave voluntarily carried by his master into a state in which slavery is not tolerated, or who goes there with his master's permission, and then escapes or refuses to return. Whether such a person shall be