238. The Court regarded a tax on the sale of an article imported only for sale, or a tax on the thing imported, in the hands of the importer, as equivalent to a tax or duty upon imports. If such a tax could be imposed at all, it might be made so heavy as to amount to a prohibition, and thus defeat the revenue by import, so far as it is drawn from importations into the state laying the tax.

239. But when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it loses its distinctive character as an import, and becomes subject to the taxing power of the state.

Tonnage Duties, &c.

240. No state can, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

241. By tonnage is meant the capacity or burden of a vessel expressed in tons, which is ascertained by measurement, according to a rule prescribed by an Act of Congress; and the duty, so called, is the sum levied upon such vessel after a certain rate for every ton. The states are prohibited to impose such a duty,

or any duty on a ship, without the consent of Congress, for the same general reason that they are prohibited to impose duties on imports or exports without a similar consent, namely, that there may be a uniform system in all the states: in a word, that harmony may prevail in place of diversity, inequality, and discord.

Troops and Ships of War.

242. The states are prohibited to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, without the consent of Congress, because the power to declare war, raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy, is confided to Congress, and is supposed to be adequate to the security of the states without their keeping up military armaments themselves. Besides, if the states were at liberty to keep on foot standing forces, it might lead to collisions among them or with the general government, or end in the establishment of military governments in place of civil institutions.

Compacts.

243. The restriction, that no state shall enter into ány agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, without the consent of Congress, is intended to prevent any infringement of the rights of the national government. The words are used in their broadest sense, and were intended to

cut off all negotiation and intercourse between the state authorities and foreign nations. They cannot, for example, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact, express or implied, to deliver up fugitives from justice from a foreign state, who may be found within their limits.

244. Coupled with the previous clause, which prohibits any state from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, the door is closed against any political or other arrangements and combinations, on the part of the states, which might interfere with the stability and harmony of the Union, or the rights and controlling authority of the government of the Union. The consent of Congress, however, to agreements between states need not be express, but may be implied from its legislation on the subject.

Prohibition as to War.

245. The power of declaring war being confided to Congress, it is very proper that the states should be prohibited to engage in it without the consent of Congress, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Otherwise all the states might become involved in war in consequence of the folly, caprice, or rashness of any single state. When actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay, the

states have the right to raise troops without the consent of Congress, and provide for their own safety.

Implied Prohibition as to Taxation.

246. In addition to the express prohibitions upon the states, which we have mentioned in the preceding sections, there is an important implied one, namely, that the states shall not tax any of the instruments employed by the government in the execution of its powers. They cannot tax the mail, nor the mint, nor patent rights, nor the papers of the customhouse, nor judicial process, nor stock issued for loans to the United States, nor the salaries of officers of the United States, nor ships, nor munitions of war, nor, in a word, any of the means or agencies employed to carry into effect the objects of the government.

THE PRESIDENT.

General Observations.

247. The vigor and efficiency of every government essentially depend upon its executive authority. Hence all lawgivers have bestowed great attention upon its constitution. If too much power is confided to this department, it may be employed to overthrow the other departments, and concentrate all the powers of government in its own hands; if too little, then its action is languid, and imbecility marks all its movements. Various expedients have been resorted to in order to guard against abuse on the one hand, and weakness on the other. In some cases the executive power has been divided among several persons; in others concentrated in a single hand. In some cases it has been declared hereditary; in others elective, while again there has been no distinct executive department all the powers of government being united in a single assembly. This was the case under the Confederation, the whole power of the government being vested in Congress.

248. The evils of this latter system had been too