222. It is obvious that if the states were at liberty to make treaties, or form alliances and confederations, there would be no harmony or uniformity in our relations abroad, and no stability or independence at home. The separate states might form conflicting treaties and alliances, and enter into such engage ments as would give foreign powers an opportunity to interfere and exercise a control in our affairs. The treaty-making power, therefore, is denied to the states, and confided to the government of the Union.

Letters of Marque and Reprisal.

223. Though letters of marque and reprisal are sometimes granted in peace, as a means of redress, and not as a measure of hostility, yet they are usually the precursor of war whether so intended or not. Hence it would be most unwise to put it in the power of a single state to involve the whole country in hostilities, by adopting a measure which would be likely to incur them.

Coinage.

224. The power to coin money is denied to the states, and confided exclusively to Congress, in order to secure a uniform currency in place of coins of various forms and weights, which otherwise might be put in circulation. It has been said, and truly, that

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if the states could coin money and regulate its value, then there might be as many different currencies as states. Yet the same practical consequence follows from the power which the states exercise of authorizing the circulation of bank paper as currency. A bag uniform metallic currency is secured by giving to Cel Congress the exclusive authority to coin money and regulate its value; but there is no such uniformity in the paper currency of the states, which is the actual and well-nigh universal substitute for coin. The paper currency of the states, however, under recent legislation, has almost entirely given way to the circulation of the national banks. It has been supposed that the taxing power of Congress was confined to the purpose of raising revenue; yet in aid of the Se circulation of the national banks, the state banks

have well-nigh been taxed out of existence, and this
too under acts of Congress passed avowedly for the
purpose. The constitutionality of this taxation too
has been sustained by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The force of the decision, however,
is much impaired by the fact that it was the decision
of a divided court.

Bills of Credit.

225. Bills of credit, which the states are prohibited to emit, are bills issued by a state on the faith of the state, and intended to circulate through the commu

nity in the ordinary business of life as noney. Bonds or obligations, therefore, issued by or on behalf of a state, binding it to pay money at a future day, for purchases which it has made, or for services received, or for money borrowed, are not bills of credit within the meaning of the Constitution. Neither are the bills issued by banks which a state incorporates, though the state may be a stockholder in such banks, or even the exclusive owner of the stock. But if the bills were issued on the credit of the state, instead of the credit of the funds of the bank, it would be otherwise.

Legal Tender.

226. Though the states authorize the issue of paper money, they are prohibited to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. During the Revolutionary War and subsequently, attempts were frequently made to maintain the credit of paper money, by making it a tender in payment of debts-the result being gross wrong and injustice to creditors. Instances were not wanting where the debtor had received gold and silver, and yet was enabled to pay his debt with paper money, which was so depreciated as to be nearly worthless. It was to prevent the possibility of such grievances that the states were inhibited to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.

Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws.

227. We have already seen that Congress can pass no bill of attainder or ex post facto law (sec. 206), and for the same reason the states are equally prohibited to pass such laws. A power to do so could scarcely be exercised by the most judicious hands without oppression and injustice, and is, therefore, denied both to Congress and the state legislatures. But an ex post facto law, it will be recollected, relates to criminal proceedings. Hence the Constitution does not prohibit the states from passing retrospective laws which relate to civil proceedings, though such laws may destroy vested interests or affect private rights. A contract, for example, founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration is void; yet it would not be repugnant to the Constitution for a state to enact that all such contracts should be valid and binding upon the parties, though such enactment would be retrospective in its character.

Impairing the Obligation of Contracts.

228. The states can pass no law impairing the obligation of contracts; but there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids Congress from passing such

laws. Any deviation from the terms of a contract, by which the intentions of the parties are enlarged or abridged, or in any manner changed, as by postponing or accelerating the period of performance, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are expressed, however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impair its obligation. Laws, however, which merely affect or change the remedy by which a contract is enforced, do not impair its obligation, provided effectual though different means of enforcing it remain.

229. The contracts to which the Constitution refers are those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. Such contracts, whether entered into between individuals, or states, or corporations, or between a state and individuals, cannot be impaired by state legislation.

230. A state is as much inhibited from impairing its own contracts, or contracts to which it is a party, as it is from impairing the obligation of contracts between individuals. When, therefore, a state makes a grant of lands or corporate powers, an implied contract arises that it will not reassert the right with which it has parted. Thus, when a state makes a conveyance of land, such conveyance cannot be re