cannot come before the English courts at all. No constitutional questions, for example, can possibly arise there because the Act of Parliament is supreme. I have not personally made any examination of the matter, but I think it would take away a considerable part of the recent volumes of our California Reports if we should eliminate all those cases which were concerned with the constitutionality of legislative acts.

If, then, we wish to indulge in the luxury of having every act of our Legislature subject to review by the courts, we have either got to provide adequate machinery for that purpose, or we have got to curtail the enthusiasm of some of our legislators.

I think we should be largely influenced in this matter by the recommendations of the Chief Justice and of Justice Shaw, who are here tonight. These men have given an immense amount of thought and time to this very matter. When anyone can keep out of paying an undisputed promissory note for three years by simply being sued, it would seem as if practical people should devise some remedy. It is suggested that this proposed measure is the best one that has been yet proposed, and that instead of trying to find out some possible defects in it, it would be the part of wisdom to accept it and energetically go to work to see if we cannot get it on the ballot in November. (Applause.)

Remarks by William Sexton

MR. SEXTON: Mr. Chairman: Another layman. There are some of us who deal in rhetoric, oratory; others deal in figures. We have not learned from anybody tonight how many cases are decided by the four or five Supreme Courts in a year. Does anybody know?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that was stated in the report of the committee?

MR. SEXTON: How many were decided?

THE PRESIDENT: The Supreme Court delivered 361 opinions last year, the District Courts 553.

MR. SEXTON: How many cases are presented to a court in a year? MR. BOLTON: About that many-a thousand behind.

MR. SEXTON: How many additional courts will it take to catch up with that thousand and keep up with the business generally?

THE PRESIDENT: It was estimated it would take four years, the life of the proposed court, to catch up with the work, including the new appeals that will be taken in the meantime.

MR. SEXTON: We had a Supreme Court longer ago than you people can remember, about fifty-three years ago, of only three judges, and they decided over 600 cases in one year. I wonder if we could not get some of these old fellows back again. (Laughter.)

Remarks by W. B. Bosley

MR. BOSLEY: As one of the members of the committee of this Club I desire to add something to what Chief Justice Angellotti and Mr. Cushing have said.

Much time and thought were given to the consideration of this proposed amendment. I doubt if there was a single member of the committee who did not think that something much more radical, something permanent in its character, would be required as the ultimate solution of the problem before us. But the committee finally agreed upon this measure as the best for immediate and temporary relief of the present situation.

I concur in that conclusion.

Mr. Cushing dwelt particularly upon the fact that this is a growing state, in which many new questions are presented by new legislation and the vast increase of industry and enterprise.

Our present judicial system lacks elasticity. We have a Supreme Court created by our constitution as it was adopted in 1879. We have three District Courts of Appeal, which were created by an amendment to the constitution adopted in 1904. But there is no provision in the constitution under which the Legislature may from time to time add to the number of such courts or to the justices constituting the same, or make any provision for meeting the increased demands upon these

courts.

Something of that kind must be provided for. That, however, is a work that should be taken up following this proposed measure for temporary relief.

The Bar Association and the Commonwealth Club should not think that they have discharged their full duty by proposing this amendment and securing its adoption. The creation of the additional courts provided for in this amendment cannot accomplish more than to aid the existing courts to dispose of the pending appeals and possibly to bring them nearly abreast of their work during the period of four years. This period of time is none too long for us to devise and perfect a judicial system calculated to afford permanent relief for litigants. I prefer to say permanent relief for litigants rather than permanent relief for the courts. The existing courts can only do a certain amount of work, however much the number of appeals may increase.

What we need is a judicial system that will provide for the ultimate decision of all legal questions, and particularly all questions concerning the meaning and effect of the constitution, by one supreme tribunal. We need inferior appellate courts which can determine satisfac

torily the vast majority of cases in which the questions involved are questions of fact or questions requiring the application of settled principles of law. In order that their business may be properly dispatched, it is essential that the Legislature be given power to increase the number of inferior appellate courts from time to time as the exigencies of litigation demand. The provisions of the constitution relating to the courts of original jurisdiction need careful revision in order to eliminate some of the evils incident to the trial of cases before judges elected by local constituencies.

These are some of the things that we should endeavor to accomplish in any revision of our judicial system; and I think the work should be taken up immediately in order that some well-digested plan may be presented to the Legislature for consideration and submission to the people.

While I support the present measure as a means of affording temporary relief, I am free to say that, as a means of permanent relief, it leaves very much to be desired. But this, as Mr. Gregory has said, is a practical matter, and we should deal with it on that basis. As there is nothing better that can be proposed now, we should support this for the good there is in it. (Applause.)

Remarks by A. E. Bolton

MR. BOLTON: I will not make an argument. I think all has been said, perhaps, that can be said by anybody, but I wish to answer the gentleman on the proposition of 600 cases decided in one year by some good old fellow-if we could only have him back. It was my fortune or misfortune to be a young lawyer at the bar at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution, and one of the agitations at that time was for the written opinion--to "make the Supreme Court tell how they do it; we do not want any of this say so." And in the good old times when they decided 600 cases in a year-it may be possible that the figures are a little high, but I would not question it

MR. SEXTON: They were 607.

MR. BOLTON: I take the record as it stands. The present Supreme Court could decide a thousand cases a year if you will let them decide them the way those judges did, by saying "Judgment affirmed”; but that did not satisfy the people. It would not satisfy the people now. I believe if it were left to the lawyers of the State of California, after a full and fair discussion of the pros and cons, the lawyers of California would be satisfied to leave it to honorable gentlemen to say whether the judgment should be affirmed or denied, without any reason. Let me

illustrate it in a homely way: Could you stop the baseball games for the umpire to give his reason for every one of his rulings? I do not believe in written opinions. I believe that written opinions are simply stumbling blocks to the forward progress of justice, and they only delay rather than bring about any good results.

I know that I am digressing a little from the real question, that justice is being denied the people in the State of California. It is not in the question to determine whether we could, if we proceeded in some other plan, find ourselves in a better position. It is a condition that confronts us; and now the question is, will we take this remedy and afterwards look for the cause and try to cure the cause? The physician who would not give you something for temporary relief when you were in pain simply because he wanted to stop and hunt up the cause and cure the cause, would not be a very satisfactory physician. (Applause.)

Remarks by A. P. Black

MR. BLACK: I want to take up your time for just a moment to show the practical result of the long delay in getting decisions. The burden, of course, rests upon the litigants themselves. They have to pay the costs.

A case in our office involves the setting aside of a timber cutting contract. Our client is paying interest on $40,000 at 7 per cent. It cost him over $8,000 in interest while he was waiting for a decision of the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment of the court below. Nobody was at fault and yet that litigant wondered what the remedy may be in the future if he ever had to go to law again. Instead of getting a decision in three months, or six months, at the most, from the time the transcript was filed, he had to wait three years, paying 7 per cent on $40,000. That is just a concrete illustration of the difficulty that we have to confront in our litigation at the present time. It must be that this temporary relief will be granted by the people, if they understand the situation, because they have to pay for it. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: There is a resolution before the meeting, and we have also about reached the hour of adjournment.

I notice my friend Senator Thompson came in a moment ago, the acting Lieutenant Governor, and also from Southern California. I wish he would give us his views in regard to the practice in the South in reference to this amendment. I understand there is a good deal of activity there.

Remarks by Hon. Newton W. Thompson

MR. THOMPSON: Mr. President and Gentlemen: I came here to listen to the discussion of this very interesting question tonight, this

proposed amendment, which affects not only the appellate courts but also the Superior Courts. In our district, Los Angeles, we have more than a thousand cases filed on the average every month, and an average of one appeal to the appellate court every day. There are eighteen departments of the Superior Court and the appellate court in continuous session, and we know something of the problem. I know that efforts are being made there to get signatures for this proposed amendment. I want to call to your mind the fact that at the last election a measure was offered having in view some relief of the appellate courts, and it failed. I would like to leave with you the thought that it must be clearly impressed upon the minds of the citizens of this state that relief is easy. It is my belief if the facts were known there would be no difficulty in having the proposition passed if there be coupled with it the further knowledge that it is only temporary, and that it is to be followed by some rational, thorough proposition that will meet the question. The people in the South are being taught the need of further extension of the judiciary and the privileges of the courts. I assume that the same condition prevails to a lesser degree perhaps in other sections of the state. To my mind the most important thing is to set forth clearly, concisely and succinctly to the voters of the state, the tribunal before whom will be placed the proposition, the need of the proposed measure, its effect, that it is but temporary, and that, following it, all the power, energy and wisdom, and vim and force and vigor of the bar and the bench of this state will be behind some broad, rational proposition, which will put the courts of this state where they ought to be, where litigants can get justice and where it will not be denied because of the multiplicity of actions in any court in the jurisdiction. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Judge Shaw, couldn't we have a word from you before we adjourn, about the advisability of this amendment?

Remarks by Hon. Lucien Shaw

MR. JUSTICE SHAW: Mr. Chairman, I had not expected to say anything, and it hardly need be said that I am in favor of this amendment, as it has already been represented that the members of the court have approved it.

I am glad that some one has mentioned the fact that this is not really, as it has been described, a measure for the relief of the Supreme Court. It is intended, of course, for the relief of the litigants and not for the relief of the court. I do not suppose that any member of the present Supreme Court could do very much more work than he does