was only to be obtained by paying a tax to the state, was repugnant to the constitution, laws and treaties of the Union. If the state of Maryland had the power to lay such a restraint on the importation and sale of foreign goods, every other state must have the same power; and the consequence would be, that this power of taxation would directly interfere, both with the power of regulating commerce, and with the taxing power of congress. The qantum of tax imposed by the state could make no difference. The same principle would apply, as in the attempt of the same state to tax the Bank of the United States, where the court held, that a power to tax, was a power to tax limited only by the pleasure of the state; and that it was, therefore, a power to destroy. Mc Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. In the present case, the power was denied, upon two grounds; first, because the power exerted by the law in question is that of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, which the court has determined to be exclusively vested in congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Secondly, because it was that of laying an impost, or duty, on imports, without the consent of congress. In order to determine whether the present law interfered with the exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it was only necessary to see, whether it undertook to prescribe the terms on which commerce may be carried on with foreign *nations, and among the states. If it were a power to prescribe those terms, it was a power to prescribe the [*434 whole terms. After congress, in the exercise of its exclusive power, has prescribed certain terms, it is incompetent for the states to add other terms. Could there be any doubt, that the exclusive power of regulating foreign commerce included that of prescribing to all the citizens of the Union the conditions, and the whole conditions, on which they shall be permitted to bring into the United States, for sale and consumption, the productions of foreign countries? This power does not stop with the permission to bring them in; for if the states may prohibit their sale, or restrain or burden it, in any mode, they may, in effect, prohibit their importation. If they may prevent their sale, they may prohibit their barter or exchange, or use and consumption in the country, in any and every mode; and thus effectually defeat the beneficial exercise of the permission to import. The states might even confiscate the goods, or order them to be burnt and destroyed, after they were landed; and this would no more interfere with the right of importation, according to the opposite argument, than the law now in question. And it was asked, whether the sagacious statesmen who framed the constitution meant to confer upon congress a power so idle and illusory? They looked to the exercise of this power of regulating commerce as a great source of national wealth and aggrandizement. Federalist, No. 11. They looked to it as a great means of developing the agricultural and manufacturing resources of the country, and its general industry; as an instrument by which the nation should be enriched at home, and rendered capable of countervailing the commercial regulations of foreign and rival nations. But if the power of regulating commerce ceases, on the landing of the goods, and the whole subject is then delivered over to the discretion of the respective states, with their various partial and discordant views of policy, its exclusive exercise by congress will be utterly vain and useless. So that the very existence of that commerce, a power of regulating and preserving Brown v. Maryland. which is so studiously conferred on congress, *is, at last, made to depend upon the caprice and pleasure of the states. What signifies the power of regulation, if the states may destroy the very substance of the thing to be regulated? Uniformity, or permanency of regulation, with a view to any purpose of policy, in regard to the agricultural, manufacturing or commercial interests of the nation, is, of course, as much out of the question, as if there were no Union, or as if it were still infected with all the debilty of the former confederation. The same state power, exercised upon short-sighted and narrow views, might be exerted so as to defeat the other branch of the power, that of regulating commerce among the states. The free intercommunication which now prevails between the states, may be effectually checked, by requiring a similar license to import into a particular state, the productions of other states. So also, what the state may do as to imports, it may do as to exports. It may require a license from the exporting merchant, and thus, in effect, lay a duty on exports, although both the states and congress are expressly forbidden in the constitution from laying such a duty; and the whole power of regulating the commerce, both of exports and imports, is exclusively vested in congress. By the joint exercise of these two usurped powers, the state may establish a total non-intercourse with other states, and with foreign nations, in direct violation of the laws, and treaties and constitution of the Union. Or it may make a discrimination among foreign nations, or among the different states, with a view of discouraging their commerce, or of encouraging some branch of its own internal industry, in direct repugnancy to the policy of the Union, as exhibited in its laws and treaties. One of the avowed objects for conferring the power of regulating commerce upon congress, was that of raising a revenue for the support of the national government. It was foreseen, that the prosperity of commerce would best be promoted by uniform regulations contained in the laws and treaties of the Union; and it was also foreseen, that an impost was that species of taxation best suited to the genius and habits of the American people. Federalist, No. 12. *But if the power now in *436] question may be exercised by one state, it may be exercised by all; and the principal source from which the revenues of the Union were to be derived, will be dried up, or diverted to local purposes. In short, it was insisted, that all the evils for which the constitution was intended to provide an effectual remedy, would be entailed upon the country, by confirming the validity of such state laws as the act now in question. March 12th, 1827. MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the court of appeals of Maryland, affirming a judgment of the city court of Baltimore, on ar indictment found in that court against the plaintiffs in error, for violating an act of the legislature of Maryland. The indictment was founded on the second section of that act, which is in these words: "And be it enacted, that all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares or merchandise, by bale or package, or c wine, rum, brandy, whiskey and other distilled spirituous liquors, &c., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce, shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a license, as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars; and in case of neglect or refusal to take Brown v. Maryland. out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures as are prescribed by the original act to which this is a supplement." The indictment charges the plaintiffs in error with having imported and sold one package of foreign dry goods, without having license to do so. A judgment was rendered against them on demurrer, for the penalty which the act prescribes for the offense; and that judgment is now before this court. The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of a state can constitutionally require the importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the state, before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported. It has been truly said, that the presumption is in favor of every legis lative act, and that the whole burden of proof lies on him who denies it constitutionality. The plaintiffs *in error take the burden upon themselves, and insist, that the act under consideration is repugnant to [*437 two provisions in the constitution of the United States. 1. To that which declares that "no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." 2. To that which declares that congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." to 1. The first inquiry is into the extent of the prohibition upon states lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports.' The counsel for the state of Maryland would confine this prohibition to laws imposing duties on the act of importation or exportation. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error give them a much wider scope. In performing the delicate and important duty of construing clauses in the constitution of our country, which involve conflicting powers of the government of the Union, and of the respective states, it is proper to take a view of the literal meaning of the words to be expounded, of their connection with other words, and of the general objects to be accomplished by the prohibitory clause, or by the grant of power. What, then, is the meaning of the words, "imposts or duties on imports or exports?" An impost or duty on imports, is a custom or a tax levied on articles brought into a country, and is most usually secured, before the importer is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership over them, because evasions of the law can be prevented more certainly by executing it while the articles are in its custody. It would not, however, be less an impost or duty on the articles, if it were to be levied on them, after they were landed. The policy and consequent practice of levying or securing the duty before, or on entering the port, does not limit the power to that state of things, nor, consequently, the prohibition, unless the true meaning of the clause so confines it. What, then, are "imports ?" The lexicons inform us, they are "things imported." If we appeal to usage for the meaning of the word, we shall receive the same answer. They are the articles themselves which are brought into the country. "A duty on imports," then, is not merely *a duty [*438 on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported. It is not, taken in its literal sense, confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the country, but extends to a duty levied after it has entered the country. The succeeding words of the sentence which limit the prohibition, show the extent in which it was understood. The limitation is, "except Brown v. Maryland. what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." Now, the inspection laws, so far as they act upon articles for exportation, are generally executed on land, before the article is put on board the vessel; so far as they act upon importations, they are generally executed upon articles which are landed. The tax or duty of inspection, then, is a tax which is frequently, if not always, paid for service performed on land, while the article is in the bosom of the country. Yet this tax is an exception to the prohibition on the states to lay duties on imports or exports. The exception was made, because the tax would otherwise have been within the prohibition. If it be a rule of interpretation to which all assent, that the exception of a particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the lawgiver, the thing excepted would be within the general clause, had the exception not been made, we know no reason why this general rule should not be as applicable to the constitution as to other instruments. If it be applicable, then, this exception in favor of duties for the support of inspection laws, goes far in proving that the framers of the constitution classed taxes of a similar character with those imposed for the purposes of inspection, with duties on imports and exports, and supposed them to be prohibited. If we quit this narrow view of the subject, and, passing from the literal interpretation of the words, look to the objects of the prohibition, we find no reason for withdrawing the act under consideration from its operation. From the vast inequality between the different states of the confederacy, as to commercial advantages, few subjects were viewed with deeper interest, or excited more irritation, than the manner in which the several states exercised, or seemed disposed to exercise, the power of laying duties on imports. From motives which were deemed sufficient by *the statesmen of that *439] day, the general power of taxation, indispensably necessary as it was, and jealous as the states were of any encroachment on it, was so far abridged, as to forbid them to touch imports or exports, with the single exception which has been noticed. Why are they restrained from imposing these duties? Plainly, because, in the general opinion, the interest of all would be best promoted, by placing that whole subject under the control of congress. Whether the prohibition to "lay imposts or duties on imports or exports," proceeded from an apprehension that the power might be so exercised as to disturb that equality among the states which was generally advantageous, or that harmony between them which it was desirable to preserve, or to maintain unimpaired our commercial connections with foreign nations, or to confer this source of revenue on the government of the Union, or whatever other motive might have induced the prohibition, it is plain, that the object would be as completely defeated, by a power to tax the article in the hands of the importer, the instant it was landed, as by a power to tax it while entering the port. There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the sale of an article, and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country; the one would be a necessary consequence of the the other. No goods would be imported, if none could be sold. No object of any description can be accomplished by laying a duty on importation which may not be accomplished with equal certainty, by laying a duty on the thing imported, in the hands of the importer. It is obvious, that the same power which imposes a light duty, can impose a very heavy one-one Brown v. Maryland. which amounts to a prohibition. Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed. If the tax may be levied in this form by a state, it may be levied to an extent which will defeat the revenue by impost, so far as it is drawn from importations into the particular state. We are told, that such wild and irrational abuse of power is not to be apprehended, and is not to be taken into view, when discussing its existence. All power may be abused; and if the fear of its abuse is to constitute an argument against its *existence, it might be urged against the existence of that which is universally acknowledged, and [*440 which is indispensable to the general safety. The states will never be so mad as to destroy their own commerce, or even to lessen it. We do not dissent from these general propositions. We do not suppose any state would act so unwisely. But we do not place the question on that ground. These arguments apply with precisely the same force against the whole prohibition. It might, with the same reason be said, that no state would be so blind to its own interests as to lay duties on importation which would either prohibit or diminish its trade. Yet the framers of our constitution have thought this a power which no state ought to exercise. Conceding, to the full extent which is required, that every state would, in its legislation on this subject, provide judiciously for its own interests, it cannot be conceded, that each would respect the interests of others. A duty on imports is a tax on the article which is paid by the consumer. The great importing states would thus levy a tax on the non-importing states, which would not be less a tax, because their interest would afford ample security against its ever being so heavy as to expel commerce from their ports. This would necessarily produce countervailing measures on the part of thore states whose situation was less favorable to importation. For this, among other reasons, the whole power of laying duties on imports was, with a single and slight exception, taken from the states. When we are inquiring, whether a particular act is within this prohibition, the question is not, whether the state may so legislate as to so hurt itself, but whether the act is within the words and mischief of the prohibitory clause. It has already been shown, that a tax on the article, in the hands of the importer, is within its words; and we think it too clear for controversy, that the same tax is within its mischief. We think it unquestionable, that such a tax has precisely the same tendency to enhance the price of the article, as if imposed upon it while entering the port. The counsel for the state of Maryland insist, with great reason, that if the words of the prohibtion be taken in their utmost latitude, they will abridge the power of taxation, which all admit to be essential to the states, to an extent which has never yet been suspected, and will [*441 deprive them of resources which are necessary to supply revenue, and which they have heretofore been admitted to possess. These words must, therefore, be construed with some limitation; and, if this be admitted, they insist, that entering the country is the point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the state to tax commences. It may be conceded, that the words of the prohibition ought not to be pressed to their utmost extent; that in our complex system, the object of the powers conferred on the gov ernment of the Union, and the nature of the often conflicting powers which |