instance, the bare presentation of the facts of auto-sugges. tion compels assent to the two-mind theory as a self-evident solution of the problem. And yet, for the present assuming that a physical demonstration is impossible, it may not be unprofitable to draw the attention of the reader to the absurdities involved in the one-mind theory. To that end let us state the essential proposition relating to the phenomena of auto-suggestion which the one-mind theory necessarily presupposes to be true. It is this: "One mind is able, by auto-suggestion, to convince itself of the truth of a proposition which it knows to be false." It will at once be seen, not only that the proposition involves a palpable absurdity, but it also involves a positive contradiction in terms. Now, there is no rule of logic more manifestly and self-evidently valid than that a proposition involving a positive contradiction in terms is necessarily false. And yet, if we are to accept the one-mind theory as the true one, we must be prepared to accept as true a proposition which, by its very terms, is absolutely untrue. Nevertheless, in one sense of the word, it is true that an individual (mark the distinction) may, by auto-suggestion, convince himself of the truth of a proposition which he knows to be false; but that is an absurdly loose and unscientific way of stating the proposition. Stated as follows, it is manifestly true: "The objective mind of an individual may, by auto-suggestion, convince his subjective mind that a proposition is true, which proposition his objective mind knows to be false." The proposition, thus stated, will receive the instant assent of every alienist who has intelligently studied the facts of experimental psychology. He will at least agree that, considered as a working hypothesis for the systematic study of the problems of insanity, the dual-mind theory is perfect. I submit that a perfect working hypothesis is necessarily a true one.

The next proposition in the order of statement is that "the subjective mind is incapable of independent reason

ing by the processes of induction." This, as before stated, is a corollary of the law of suggestion; and much of what has been said will apply with equal force to this proposition. It is obvious that the dual hypothesis affords the only solution of the problem; for it is manifestly unthinkable that one mind can at once be capable and incapable of inductive reasoning.

The third proposition, which relates to the power of the subjective mind to reason deductively from given premises to correct conclusions, may be dismissed with the statement that it is not set down as one of the powers which differentiate the two minds by antithesis. The difference is only in degree; but it is so enormous that it must be held to be cumulative evidence of duality.

The same remarks apply with even greater force to the fourth proposition, which relates to the perfect memory of the subjective mind. Its prodigious positive power in that direction, when compared with the feeble efforts at recollection of the objective mind, has all the effect of contrast, and must be considered as an important factor in the problem of duality. It is certainly difficult to imagine one mind as being possessed of two sets, as it were, of faculties, with identical functions differing only in degree, whilst the more perfect of the two is observable only under abnormal conditions of the body.

The fifth and sixth propositions, relating, respectively, to the emotional nature of the subjective mind, and to its power of moving ponderable objects without physical contact, have been sufficiently discussed already. The seventh and eighth propositions, relating, respectively, to telepathy and the abnormality of subjective activity, can be more appropriately discussed in forthcoming chapters. In the mean time it can be truthfully said that the distinctive characteristics embraced in the four propositions last named, present in themselves indubitable evidence of the

238 DEMONSTRATION OFf the future life.

truth of the dual hypothesis, in that there is no other rational way of accounting for all the varied phenomena which they represent.

The ninth proposition will be discussed in a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XV.

DUALITY DEMONSTRATED BY ANATOMY.

The Brain not the Sole Organ of the Mind. - Surgeon-General Hammond's Researches and Experiments. The Instinctive Faculties. - The Subjective Mind acts independently of the Brain. Instinctive Acts Performed after the Brain was totally eliminated. Children Born without a Brain perform all the Instinctive Functions. - The Medulla Oblongata and the Spinal Cord the Organs of the Subjective Mind. — Idiots without a Brain evince Talent for Music, Mathematics, etc.

THUS

HUS far the proofs adduced in support of the dual hypothesis have been confined to the facts of experimental hypnotism and the various other forms of psychic phenomena. This has been done for the reason that in themselves those facts are amply demonstrative of the truth of the hypothesis. But it has often been asked if the facts of cerebral anatomy, physiology, or experimental surgery throw any light whatever upon the subject. This is a pertinent question, because, if those facts are irreconcilable with the hypothesis, the latter must fail under the inexorable rule that one clearly demonstrated adverse fact is sufficient to disprove the most plausible hypothesis. If, therefore, the dual hypothesis is the true one, all the facts of Nature, whether of psychic phenomena or of physical structure, must conspire to demonstrate it. At least, there must be no fact that will disprove it. Thus, if it could be clearly demonstrated that the brain is the sole organ of the mind, the hypothesis of duality must fail for want of a plurality of organs through

which a second mind could manifest itself. It is true that the brain itself is dual in a purely physical sense, that is, there are two hemispheres; but it is demonstrable that they are duplicate organs of the same mind. There is no evidence (except in novels 1) that the two hemispheres are not identical in function and normally synchronous in action.

If, therefore, duality of mind is to be demonstrated by reference to the physical structure of the animal man, we must expect to find an organ for one of the minds outside of the brain and measurably independent of its conditions or even of its existence. It must, moreover, be the organ of the subjective mind; for it is demonstrable that the brain is the organ of the objective faculties. The organ of the subjective mind must, therefore, be the organ of the instinctive faculties. If it is the organ of the instinctive faculties, it is necessarily the organ of the faculties of intuition and all the others which have been designated as subjective.

Fortunately we have not far to look for demonstrative evidence that the required organ exists, not only in man, but in the lower animals as well. In support of this declaration I shall now cite some passages from the writings of one of the ablest living scientists; namely, SurgeonGeneral Hammond. What he has said on the subject was written without reference to the dual hypothesis, and certainly without reference to its bearings upon the question of a future life. It has, therefore, all the greater evidential value, for that it was written solely in the interests of pure science, and by one whose professional reputation as an alienist is international, whose works have been translated into every modern language, and are used as textbooks by the medical profession in every civilized country.

More than twenty years ago Dr. Hammond delivered an address before the New York Neurological Society, entitled 1 See "The Hoosier Schoolmaster."