the principles avowed in those communications, and assert those upon which our government is founded; and while disclaiming all intention to propagate them by force, and all interference with the affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate, by force, any part of these continents to their will."

Here again is seen the gestation in Mr. Adams's fertile and resolute mind of the other branch of the Monroe Doctrine, and he notes that his "views were approved by the President."

Prior to the 25th of November, the Secretary of State had prepared his draft of a reply "intended as a firm, spirited, and yet conciliatory answer to all communications lately received from the Russian government, and at the same time an unequivocal answer to the proposals made by Canning to Mr. Rush. It was meant also to be eventually an exposition of the principles of this government, and a brief development of its political system as henceforth to be maintained: essentially republican - maintaining its own independence, and respecting that of others; essentially pacificstudiously avoiding all involvement in the combinations of European politics, cultivating

peace and friendship with the most absolute monarchies, highly appreciating and anxiously desirous of retaining that of the Emperor Alexander; but declaring that, having recognized the independence of the South American states, we could not see with indifference any attempt by European powers, by forcible interposition, either to restore the Spanish dominion on the American continents, or to introduce monarchical principles into those countries, or to transfer any portion of the ancient or present American possessions of Spain to any other European power."

At this time, it appears by a remark of Mr. Adams, the President had already prepared a paragraph of his message relating to this subject, to which his despatch was to be "conformable." The draft of Mr. Adams was the subject of repeated discussions at the meetings of the Cabinet. President Monroe thought it too strong in its expressions. He was cautious, even timid, from fear of offending the Russian emperor, and believed it imprudent to state, as Mr. Adams desired, the principles of our republican government in answer to Count Nesselrode's statement of imperial principles. Messrs. Wirt, Calhoun, and Southard took part in the discussions, and Mr. Gallatin was called in for counsel.

Very soon after the reception of the Can

ning proposals from Mr. Rush, the President had communicated them to the venerable patriot at Monticello for his opinion. Mr. Jefferson had represented his country at Paris and at London, and both as President and as a retired citizen was well advised of the course of European affairs. Nothing had ever shaken his republican faith or his sincere patriotism. Mr. Monroe confided to him the correspondence which contained the germs of such an important feature of American policy, and which possibly involved the independence of the Spanish-American republics, with the fate of liberty itself in the western hemisphere. On the 24th October, 1823, Mr. Jefferson, at the age of eighty years, responds with the vigor and vivacity of youth:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. . .

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. . .

"Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing

would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war."

After speaking of the question of the United States acquiring some Spanish-American domains, and finding it impracticable, he continues:

"I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, — that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother

country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and, most especially, their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way."

By desire of the President, Mr. Jefferson transmitted the Rush correspondence to that other experienced statesman of Virginia, Mr. Madison, whose retirement at Montpelier, and his age of seventy-two years, could not prevent patriotic appeals to his wisdom and experience. The junior of Mr. Jefferson by eight years, the response of Mr. Madison indicates a mind by far senior to that of his more vivacious compatriot. His logical mind accepts the situation as portrayed, and sees clearly the necessity "to defeat the meditated crusade" against American independence. Under date of October 30, 1823, he writes to President Monroe:

"It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours, has presented a cooperation for an object the same with ours. With that coöperation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the way she has proposed; keeping in view, of course,