State its territory and a republican form of government. The guarantee of territory, as already recited, was rejected on account of the uncertainty of its extent and the conflicting claims of States and of the United States. In the discussion upon it, Mr. Read added the reason that the proposal "abetted the idea of distinct States, which would be a perpetual source of discord. The only cure for this evil was in doing away States altogether, and uniting them all in one great society."

The clause was first passed in committee with an amendment so as to guarantee "a republican constitution and its existing laws" to each State. When it came up for discussion Gouverneur Morris assailed the guarantee of laws. He would not have "such laws as exist in Rhode Island guaranteed." It was explained that the object was " merely to secure the States against dangerous commotions, insurrections, and rebellions." Mr. Mason thought that without this right "the general government must remain a passive spectator of its own subversion," as rebellions against the United States would originate in the individual States. Mr. Houstoun did not want existing state constitutions guaranteed; some of them, like that of Georgia, were bad.

Mr. Gorham "thought it strange that a rebellion should be known to exist in the empire,

Mr. Morris had indulged prejudices and fears respecting "that range of new States which would soon be formed in the West," and wanted "a rule of representation so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the national councils." Their interests would be different; they would know less of the public interest; and, " in particular, will be little scrupulous of involving the community in wars, the burdens and operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States." There ought, therefore, to be provisions "to prevent the maritime States from being hereafter outvoted by them." Mr. Gorham had expressed similar opinions in favor of "dealing out the right of representation in safe proportions to the Western States."

Mr. Gerry also would turn attention "to the dangers apprehended from the Western States." He would admit them on liberal terms, but not put himself in their hands. They would oppress commerce and drain wealth into the Western country. He would limit the number to be admitted, so that they could never outnumber the Atlantic States. He proposed to limit the number of representatives in the first branch from the new States, so that they should never exceed the number from the old States which should accept the Constitution, and Mr. King seconded him. Mr. Sherman thought

"there was no probability that the number of new States would ever exceed that of the existing States. Besides, we are providing for our children and our grandchildren, who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States as of the old States. On this consideration alone we ought to make no such discrimination as that proposed." Mr. Gerry admitted there was "a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the Western country, but he did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants." His motion was wisely defeated by five votes against four, with Pennsylvania divided.

The power was impliedly left in Congress to impose conditions on the admission of new States not involving their equal representation; but it has never been harshly used, and only applied to the public lands and Union property, for which they, in turn, have been well compensated out of the public land. The injustice. now is more often seen in refusal of admission when solicited and merited. They have nullified all the original fears entertained by the Atlantic States and have vastly strengthened the Union.

NATIONAL CONTROL OVER STATES.

In the Virginia plan, as submitted by Governor Randolph, appeared the following pro

vision: that the national legislature ought to be empowered "to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsisting under the authority of the Union; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles thereof."

This proposition seemed to be the corollary of the other which immediately preceded it: "that the national legislature ought to be empowered... to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." Neither Mr. Pinckney nor Mr. Rutledge, nor Mr. Randolph himself nor Mr. Madison, liked the vagueness of the term “incompetent." They all wished it might be possible to enumerate the powers. Nevertheless, the phrase was adopted by a vote of all the States except Connecticut, which was divided.

On the right to negative state laws, it passed without even a dissent, upon its first consideration.

Upon the right to use the force of the Union against delinquent States, Mr. Madison doubted its practicability and justice "when applied to people collectively and not individu

ally." ." He hoped to find a system which would render this resource unnecessary; and moved a postponement, which was agreed to.

The right to negative state laws came up again a few days later, when Mr. Pinckney moved to make the clause read, "That the national legislature shall have authority to negative all laws which they should judge to be improper." He said that "the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that this universal negative was in fact the corner-stone of an efficient national government." Mr. Madison agreed with him. Mr. Gerry had “no objection to authorize a negative of paper money and similar measures," but did not want the power to go too far. Mr. Sherman wanted the negative to be defined. Mr. Wilson made a cogent argument for the clause, reminding the Convention of the brotherly self-abnegation of States in the beginning of the Revolution, when they would say, "We are now one nation of brethren, we must bury all local interests and distinctions. The tables at length began to turn, jealousy and ambition to display themselves. Each endeavored to cut a slice from the common loaf, till at length the Confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands. It is the business of this Convention to correct its vices, especially the want of an effectual control in