thought it best to return to the original plan, and despairing of more unanimity on any new proposition, the Convention reinstated it, and it went in that form to the Committee on Detail.

This committee reported accordingly that the executive should have the style "The President of the United States," and should be elected by the legislature by ballot. (The title of President was then borne by Franklin as chief magistrate of Pennsylvania.) Attention was called to the necessity of inserting the word "joint" before ballot, or the two Houses might negative each other's choice; and it was inserted. The motion to take the vote by States was defeated; the motion requiring a majority of personal votes was adopted, ten States to one. Then the old question of Presidential electors was again raised and argued, and only failed by an equality of votes, four to four, two divided, and one absent. The question was subsequently referred to a committee of eleven, who reported a plan which tended to concentrate opinions. It fixed his term at four years, with reëligibility, and provided for electors to be selected in each State as its legislature should direct, and equal in number to its total representation in the two Houses of Congress. They were to vote in their respective States, and not in a general college as at one time proposed.

Thus they were removed from foreign influence, from the danger of cabals and intrigues; and this mode left the President independent of the legislature, while the term was so short as to prevent usurpation of power for personal objects, and went far to obviate objections before made to his reëlection. There were still criticisms, but this method finally prevailed and was inscribed in the Constitution. Upon no other subject did the opinion of the Convention so often sway to and fro as upon this. But the experience of a century has, in the main, justified the system, saving, perhaps, the duration of the term fixed at four instead of six years.

On the point of reëligibility there has never been any answer to the old question, Why should not the people be allowed to reëlect a good officer satisfactory to them in the administration of his office? And the term of four years was fixed because of this reëligibility. On the other hand, there has never been a satisfactory answer to the other old question, How can the selfish desire for a reëlection be prevented from influencing the public conduct of an officer if he is reëligible? And there seems to be no answer which involves less than a change in the nature of man. The fathers limited as far as possible the selfish motive by confining it to actions which would

benefit the majority of men, and which should be favorable to their interests as the great constituency which could give or refuse the reëlection. At the same time, his conscience was subjected to his ambition in respect to actions which should excite popular clamor or applause.

IX

OTHER SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE

CONSTITUTION

UNTIL the Committee of Detail was appointed, the Convention had sought to confine their discussions to the outline of organization and to the broad principles of a government for the Union. The first battle, and that of the highest importance, had been fought for position. The fundamental question had been, Should the government be founded upon the States, or upon the people of the United States? Should it be a compact a league — between sovereign States, as was the Confederacy, or should it be a single national government, extending behind the chartered States, and reposing upon the American people? It had been decided in favor of the united people; and that they, not the States, should constitute the new government, "to consist of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary."

The second vital struggle had been upon the two questions, How shall the local interests of the small States find protection in general legislation against the interests of the great States, represented as the latter would

be by an immense numerical majority? How shall the greater wealth and population of the large States be secured against the practical control of the minority, if proportional representation is disallowed? These questions had been settled by giving the small States an equal representation in the second branch, and to the large States their proportional number of the first branch.

It had been further decided that both Houses should have the power to originate legislation. But as the power to tax and to regulate commerce had been the great argument of the more populous States in favor of proportional representation in both branches, it had been agreed by the smaller States, "that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government, shall originate in the first branch, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch."

It had been further agreed, touching the general powers of Congress, that they should have all the legislative rights before vested in the Confederacy; "and, moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony