Opinion, per ROBINSON, J. and therefore one to which the right of trial by jury was guaranteed by the constitution, that being a question long settled in favor of plaintiff's contention and in no sense debatable. The interpretation of evidence and the inferences to be drawn from evidence, the effect of evidence and inferences, can by no stretch of the imagination be construed to involve the construction, interpretation or application of any provision of the constitution. In the instant case it involved the accuracy of the court's memory as to the extent of the evidence adduced, and his judgment as a matter of law as to the effect of and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence. In the case of Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St., 628, this court, speaking through Ranney, J., held, at page 645: "There is still less difficulty in defending the exercise of this power [the right to withdraw a case from the consideration of the jury and direct a nonsuit] from the imputation of being an encroachment upon the constitutional right of trial by jury. * When all the evidence offered by the plaintiff has been given, and a motion for a nonsuit is interposed, a question of law is presented, whether the evidence before the jury tends to prove all the facts involved in the right of action and put in issue by the pleadings." In Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S., 301, the supreme court of the United States held: "The granting, by a trial court, of a non-suit for want Opinion, per ROBINSON, J. of sufficient evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff is no infringement of the constitutional right of trial by jury." * * Were this court to hold that every directed verdict involved a constitutional question, it would be compelled to hold that the provision of the constitution, Section 2, Article IV, "It [the supreme court] shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving questions arising under the constitution of the United States or this state," gave it appellate jurisdiction in all jury cases where there had been denied to either party the privilege of submitting to such jury any evidence, however incompetent or irrelevant, tendered by such party. For if a ruling of the trial court upon the question whether there has been some evidence tending to prove every essential fact of plaintiff's case involves a constitutional question, then an adverse ruling upon any evidence which a party might conceive would tend to support his cause of action, or defense, would to that extent be a deprivation of his right to a trial by jury, and would, therefore, involve a constitutional question, and thus the limitation upon the jurisdiction of this court, to review "cases of public or great general interest" only upon direction to courts of appeals to certify their records, would become nugatory; for every litigant whose cause is triable to a jury could compel this court to review his case by the simple expedient of tendering evidence which the trial court would be obliged to reject. In consequence the evils in that respect which the Constitution of 1912 sought to remedy would be revived. Statement of the Case. For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the petition in error is sustained. Motion sustained. MARSHALL, C. J., JOHNSON, HOUGH, JONES and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur. WANAMAKER, J., dissents. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DUNKIRK, OHIO, V. SMITH ET AL. Judgments-Vacation, modification or suspension-During or after term of rendition — Inherent and statutory rights of court -Section 11631 et seq., General Code. 1. A court of general jurisdiction, such as the common pleas court, has control of its own orders and judgments during the term at which they are rendered, which control may be exercised, within the sphere of sound discretion, as an inherent right founded upon common law. 2. The procedure announced in Chapter 6, Division 4, Title IV, Part Third, of the General Code, entitled "Other relief after judgment," relates to the vacation and modification of judgments by the court, after the term at which they were made, and does not limit a court of general jurisdiction in the exercise of its control over its judgments during the term. (No. 16348 — Decided March 8, 1921.) CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Allen county.* This case is here on certificate by the court of appeals of Allen county, stating that it finds its judgment affirming the common pleas court of Allen county in conflict with a judgment previously * Certified as being in conflict with City of Cincinnati v. Archiable, 4 Ohio App., 218.— REPORTER. Opinion, per HOUGH, J. pronounced upon the same question by the court of appeals of Hamilton county. The judgment of the court of common pleas was one suspending a judgment of that court rendered at the same term. At the September term, 1918, the court of common pleas awarded judgment to the plaintiff in error upon a cognovit note. At the same term, to-wit, December 28, 1918, the defendants in error having filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or modify this judgment, the court, after receiving evidence to support the motion, suspended the judgment theretofore entered, and gave leave for the filing of a defense to the note, without prejudice to the lien of said judgment on the property of the defendants. The evidence received and considered upon the hearing of this motion was included in a bill of exceptions, and is part of the record here. Mr. W. L. Parmenter, for plaintiff in error. Mr. T. R. Hamilton, for defendants in error. HOUGH, J. In the consideration of this case it is important to first note that the action of the common pleas court in suspending the judgment was one taken at the same term in which the original judgment was rendered, and was not the vacation or modification of a judgment under Section 11631 and the following sections of Chapter 6, Division 4, Title IV, Part Third, General Code, entitled "Other relief after judgment." The relief mentioned in this chapter applies only to judgments entered at a former term. The legis Opinion, per HOUGH, J. lature has provided a method of procedure for the vacation of a judgment after the term at which it was entered, and has enumerated the grounds under which that relief may be sought, but has failed to provide for relief upon the same subject during the term; excepting, of course, the remedy provided for a new trial after verdict or decision and before judgment. In this absence of legislative enactment the common-law rule must apply, for it would be a strange anomaly indeed that a court given the power to vacate its judgment after the term should have no power to vacate a judgment within or at the same term. Examination of the authorities discloses the fact that at common law a court of general jurisdiction is endowed with the power to control its own orders and judgments during the term at which they are rendered, and the power to vacate or modify them is in the exercise of a sound discretion; and this is an inherent power, in no way regulated or abridged by statute. This principle was early announced in the case of Huntington & McIntyre v. Finch & Co., 3 Ohio St., 445, and the doctrine is approved in later cases of this court, notably Knox Co. Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Doty, 9 Ohio St., 505; Niles v. Parks, 49 Ohio St., 370; Huber Mfg. Co. v. Sweny, 57 Ohio St., 169; Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St., 616, and in others. There appears to be no limitation or restriction to the rule except that the power must be exercised with a sound discretion-limited only to cases in which there is an abuse of discretion. It |