and the city falls. The American fighters took them as their sires took the hills from 1776 to 1865.

The first fight of any moment was at Guanimas, where the rough riders and the black regulars pushed through the tropical woods, the left of the line. The struggle was one calling for the best in a soldier. The heavy and thick growth of timber precluded plankers or scouts and effectually concealed the enemy, affording them every advantage. It was no ambush or surprise, as has been said by ignorance or malice. It was known that the Spaniards were there in force and must be driven out. How many there were was not known and was not a question apparently of much importance. The Americans at a heavy cost pushed through, fighting a series of individual combats, for the commanders could not keep in touch, and the enemy driven in at every point fell back into their intrenchments nearer the city.

There is little doubt that had the American commander pushed ahead for Santiago immediately on landing, as the navy advised, the fight at Guanimas would have ended the campaign.

The fortifications and obstacles which cost so many lives at El Caney and San Juan were practically all built after Guanimas. No effort on the part of the Americans was made to prevent this nor was there any systematic attempt to obtain knowledge of the ground in front, or open trails over this ground. General Chaffee on his own responsibility scouted the ground in his front and seems to have been the only general who did.

The fights for El Caney and San Juan hills were a series of rushes and charges. Tactics and strategy were nothing, courage and initiative the whole affair.

The only plan made was not carried out on account of its taking longer to secure control of El Caney than had been anticipated. Both hills were taken at a heavy price, so heavy that it was doubted whether or not the Americans could keep what they had secured. For some days it seemed impossible that the Americans could successfully resist an attempt by the Spaniards to retake the line of intrenchments. That is, it was

doubtful in the minds of the scientific soldier. There was no question in the minds of the American fighting line.

The destruction of the Spanish fleet and the arrival of General Miles put a new aspect on affairs and the campaign of Santiago was over.

The Americans then turned their attention to Porto Rico. This rich island, while never so oppressed as Cuba, was also a victim of the Spaniard and crying aloud for succor. General Miles, with a well equipped and skillfully commanded force of regulars and volunteers, sailed for Porto Rico in July.

The expedition had several advantages for the Americans over the one which sailed from Tampa in June for Cuba. Miles was not obliged to land at a given point. He had a definite plan. He did not proclaim it in the newspapers. He was not hampered by the staff, in fact he practically dispensed with it and wisely looked to the navy to act in this capacity.

While the world was awaiting the news of the landing and investment of San Juan, the capital of the island, the Americans reported the capture of Ponce de Leon, the city of next importance on the island, after the capital.

From Ponce, having thus taken the enemy in the rear as it were, General Miles planned and carried out a masterful campaign, with the cordial encouragement of the natives, and had the island practically won when hostilities were suspended.

The two campaigns, Santiago and Porto Rico, stand out in sharp contrast. The one showing what the American army can do in spite of mismanagement; the other how well it works when skillfully handled. It is the sarcasm of fate that had General Miles made a blunder or two and then allowed his men to win a bloody battle, he would have stood in history among the great warriors.

The army was called upon, during the war, for very little in the Philippines. The Spanish were cooped up in the city of Manila and Dewey's victory sealed their doom. It was more a problem of diplomacy than war that confronted the army and the fighting there was almost perfunctory, to save "Spanish honor."

The final capture of Manila, aided by the navy, was notable in that so much was done from a political standpoint,

with so little suffering to non-combatants. It is a monument to the coolness and forbearance of the American soldier.

Although the Spanish-American war was so brief and the numbers engaged comparatively few, the consequences were mighty. This war will ever stand out in history as will no other. Nations and peoples have fought for life, for freedom, for loot, for land, for glory, but never before was a war fought for charity. The Spaniards had nothing America wanted enough to pay one drop of blood for. Spain had long ceased to be a menace. The whole world could not be a menace. The American people fought the Spanish war because they had decided that wrong should cease in their continent. They asked no price of the Cubans, they demanded no indemnity of Spain. They fought from pure motives, they came out without a stain.

Again the American army found the result of a war greater than could have been dreamed. Although the Americans knew it not, the great republic still lacked one thing in the world. The republic had fought to be free. It had fought to be united. Now it had fought to be respected. The war surprised those at home almost as much as it did the world. It was suddenly realized that America was great and powerful as well as big and rich. Henceforth America was at the head of the world's council board, as mighty as the mightiest. And to attain this by an unselfish war, by a struggle with no aftermath of hate-verily America had come into her heritage.

Of the minor results of the war the acquisition of alien lands and wild people was not the least. A long apprenticeship in handling the American Indian, the most intelligent savage in the world, had prepared her statesmen for the problem. Other nations offered prompt advice and prompter criticism, but being based not on altruism, but exploitation, it was not taken, and well it is that it was not.

The delays, hardships and deaths in the war, cruel as they were, taught, and it seems well taught the need of preparation. No nation, not even America, is sure of continual peace, and now it is known of all men that this is true. The next war will not find the American army shackled by relics, hampered by theorists and choked by incompetents.

Greater than freeing the Cubans, greater than showing that the American is still the greatest fighter in the world, greater than winning the awe and respect of all men, greater than raising wild peoples, greater than all of these is the fact, only in after years to be fully recognized, that the Spanish war crushed out of America the worship of things only material.

The bitter experience of every soldier, other than from a hostile bullet, was due to the follies and selfishness of those who put personal ambition and money success above the flag. Not a boy who languished in the trenches, not an observer who saw suffering that should never have been, but came home and told the reason why. They brought the leaven and slowly but surely the idea grew that honesty and honor can not be bought, cannot thrive, cannot even live under the false gods who had crowded into the American pantheon. Inefficiency, dishonesty, peculation, selfishness, all these killed men in Cuba. The bitter hatred of these, our nearest foes, would not down and from this feeling grew and waxed strong the demand for civic honesty and personal integrity in all of our servants.

The army of the Spanish war, while it knew not, realizes it not to this day, fought and gave the death blow to the greatest danger the American republic has ever faced, the danger that has killed every dead republic in the archives of time.

The most dangerous, the most cruel, the most insidious foe was chased out of his lair at Santiago, done to death in the jungles of the Philippines. No longer in America does the thief and the robber lead, no longer is the gross above the good. Gold covers no sins, wealth alone commands no respect.

Honor, patriotism and charity again are on our standard.
This is what the American army did.

THE ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

BY LUKE E. WRIGHT.

[Luke E. Wright, governor general of the Philippines; born in Tennessee, 1847; practiced law in Memphis, and for eight years was attorney general of Tennessee; active in relief measures during the yellow fever epidemic of 1878; was appointed a member of the United States Philippine commission in 1900, and although a democrat, he was appointed president of the commission by President Roosevelt, 1903.]

The insurrection against Spain, which began in 1896 and was afterwards continued against the United States, finally developing into a guerrilla warfare, caused widespread demoralization among the mass of the people,and as a result ladronism greatly increased. After the collapse of the insurrection and after all organized opposition to our authority had ceased the great mass of the people resumed their ordinary and peaceful vocations, but they continued to suffer from the depredations of numerous bands of ladrones, who not infrequently were commanded by some veteran outlaw whose career extended back to Spanish times. It was obviously necessary that these bands should be exterminated before it would be possible for the people to live in safety in their homes or to till their fields; hence, at an early day after the establishment of civil government, the Philippines constabulary, composed of natives commanded as a rule by American officers, was organized and began operations against them with most satisfactory results.

These predatory bands as a rule contented themselves with preying upon their own people, often killing or mutilating those who refused them assistance or were supposed to be unfriendly to them. Sometimes, as a measure of protection, the unfortunate people who were exposed to their depredations would compound with them by furnishing them food and information, which would enable them to elude the constabulary, but as a general rule the people lived in deadly fear of them, and with good reason. As the people came to understand that the government had both the will and the ability to protect them they began to co-operate cordially with the constabulary and