Extract of a report made by Commander Kimberly, of the United States steamer Benicia, to Admiral Rogers, describing his trip from Chefoo to Tungchow, with the American missionaries on board.

On the 20th instant, the translation having been finished, I received on board the American missionaries, their teachers and servants, also their children, amounting to a total of twenty-four persons, together with Mr. Solbe and servant, whose names are appended to a list appended to this letter, marked A, and at 10 a. m. got under way, and stood out of the harbor bound for Tungehow-foo, and anchored off that city at 2.15 p. m. the same day, and immediately sent an officer on shore to communicate with the chipfu (prefect) and to request an audience. The officer so sent returned, and informed me that I would be received at any time. I went on shore immediately, accompanied by several officers of the ship, and Mr. Solbe, the interpreter, and held the audience, being received in the usual way.

Your instructions to me (translated) were read by the interpreter in my presence, to the chipfu, (prefect,) who, in reply, said: "That there was no necessity for the missionaries ever leaving Tungchow-foo; that he had received orders from the governor-general of the province to receive and protect them; and, furthermore, that he was able to protect them in every way, and that he was willing, and would protect them." He requested that he might be allowed to retain the instructions read to him, which request I granted. I asked him to give me a letter stating that he was willing to and would and could protect the missionaries, which letter he sent off to the ship the next day.

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After the audience with the chipfu (prefect) it was so late that the missionaries were not landed until Friday, the 21st instant, when, as I had requested at the interview with the chipfu, a messenger was sent on board of this vessel to invite them (the missionaries) on shore to return to their homes, which had been carefully cared for and protected by the authority of Tungchow-foo since the missionaries had fled. Having concluded the business successfully, and having safely landed the missionaries and their baggage, I got under way at 2.30 p. m. the same day, and arrived at this anchorage off Chefoo at 8.45 p. m.

The missionaries expresed themselves perfectly satisfied with everything that had been done in regard to returning them to their homes, and wished me to visit the shore and walk about the city with the officers of the ship in full uniform, which I declined to do, as, after the promises made by the Chinese officials, I considered it unnecessary, and the Chinese being perfectly willing, and pleased, as far as I could judge, that they had returned. From my interview, I came to the conclusion that there never existed any real danger at Tungchow-foo, but the missionaries were frightened by the threats of some Chinese not in authority. Mischievous persons are found in every community, and Tungchow-foo is not free from this infliction.

The massacre of Tien-tsin capped the climax, and the missionaries left in consequence. The missionaries, in conversation with me on the passage up to Tungchowfoo, complained that their grave-yard had been desecrated, in having some of the tombstones defaced. After the important business of the audience had been disposed of I took the oportunity of stating this complaint to the prefect, who earnestly replied that he would take all means in future to protect them, and to punish any person for any acts of the kind complained of.

Memorandum note from the Prefect Heng, of Tungehow, to Commander Kimberly, of the United Statessteamer Benicia, stationed at Chefoo.

In the interview held on the 20th instant, between Captain Kimberly and the prefeet, Captain Kimberly stated that the foreign missionaries who, apprehensive of violence from the rumors which were circulating, and to which they had given ear, had removed from Tungchow, where now, their fears being dissipated, desirous of returning to and, as of old, taking up their abode in that city. In view of this, Captain Kimberly enjoined upon the resident officials their duty of protection according to treaty stipulations. In regard to this interview, the prefect has to remark that it is the duty of China's officials to afford full protection to the missionaries of all countries who may be quietly pursuing their calling in China, and not to allow them to meet with molestation or interference.

His humble brother Heng Kioang salutes Captain Kimberly.

No. 51.]

No. 26.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.

Peking, February 10, 1871.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, (Received April 26.) SIR: By the terms of the French treaty of 1858 with China, the time has now arrived for its revision, in case one or both parties demand it. A few months since the chargé d'affaires of France gave formal notice that it was the intention of his government to demand a revision, the particular points of which would be made known at the proper time.

In communicating these facts to me verbally, Count Rochechouart appeared to be anxious to enlist the aid and support of all the treaty powers, so far as practicable, to the end that such modifications of the old concessions might be made, and such new ones obtained as would prove beneficial to all countries having intercourse and commercial relations with China.

Before committing myself to any definite course of action, I asked, as a preliminary step, that he would give me, in writing, a short memorandum of the alterations he thought necessary and practicable, that I might be able to consider the matter intelligently, and, if necessary, communicate with my Government, with a view to asking instructions. He accordingly addressed me a note, in which these points are briefly stated, a translation of which I beg to inclose herewith.

In the conversation referred to, I was informed that, prior to the rejection by the British government of the convention of 1869, an agreement had been come to between France and England, by which joint action would be taken in the matter of treaty revision under and by virtue of the stipulation contained in the French treaty.

What effect the war and the overthrow of the government of the empire may have upon such an arrangement, if made, you can judge of better when this reaches you than I can at this moment.

In order that you may be in possession of my views, based upon the best information I have been able to gather, I beg, most respectfully, to offer some suggestions upon the several points raised by the French chargé d'affaires.

First. The question of audience.

In my opinion, it is unwise to raise or discuss this question until the Emperor attains his majority. The government of the empire being the same now that it has been since diplomatic relations were established at Peking, and as all foreign governments have, up to this time, waived the right of audience because of the Emperor's minority, this course should be continued until a valid reason can be assigned for a change. An earnest attempt to effect a change now would be likely to result in injury instead of benefit.

It would, I think, be quite impossible for the regency to enter into any engagement by which the Emperor would feel bound to grant audience to the foreign representatives at any fixed date in the future. It is doubtful if the Emperor would consider himself bound by such a contract, if made; and any attempt of the kind by Prince Kung and his associates would arouse all the hostile reactionary forces in the capital and in the provinces to resist the innovation.

In considering the propriety of insisting upon this point now, an estimate should be made of the advantages or disadvantages likely to result from an immediate change in the government, and also of an entire change in the personnel of the Foreign Office.

If a solution of the problem be insisted upon now, and the Chinese conclude that there is no way of evading or postponing the matter, it would result, undoubtedly, in the immediate setting aside of the regency and bringing forward the young Emperor, a youth scarcely fifteen years of age, to assume the duties and responsibilities of sovereign de facto; thus throwing upon him the responsibility of acceding to, or refusing to comply with, the demand. What he would do under such circumstances cannot be conjectured with any certainty.

From the meager knowledge we have of this youth and his surroundings, I infer that he is being trained, in the mode pointed out by Confucius, by tutors who have seen little and know less of foreigners or their relations. It is altogether likely that the views and feelings of these people would, if known by us, be considered anti-progressive and reactionary, and their influence with the Emperor could not be otherwise than harmful.

Their opinions would be sought as a guide instead of those of Prince Kung and the members of the Foreign Office, and when a difference of opinion occurred, the former would outweigh the latter. And, besides, there are to be found in China, as in every other country, men anxious to obtain place and power, who would resort to every kind of artifice and intrigue to supplant the present officials in the good opinion of the Emperor, the result of which, if successful, would be to displace Prince Kung and his associates, and fill their places by new men, conceited and supercilious, ignorant of their duties and obligations. It would require a war and years of experience to teach them what the present officials have already learned.

In view of these considerations, I would advise patience on the part of all foreign governments. It is the part of wisdom to hold fast to the men now in power, until more mature years will insure a sounder judgment to guide the young Emperor, when he emerges from his seclusion to assume the responsibilities of an actual sovereign.

There will be no loss of dignity by continuing for a few years longer the course pursued for the last ten; and besides, if the question be postponed until the Emperor becomes of age, according to his own laws and customs, there will then be a distinct and definite ground for making the claim without regard to treaty, which will be recognized as valid by the civilized world. It will also furnish a plausible excuse, if one is needed, for conceding to a demand which can no longer be postponed or resisted.

But while arguing in favor of postponement, I am entirely opposed to abandoning or giving it up without a struggle.

When the time comes for the Emperor to assume his duties de facto, whether it be sooner or later, my opinion is clear and decided that it will be the duty of all foreign governments to demand for their representatives the same rights, privileges, and courtesies that were accorded to the diplomatic representatives of China, when they visited the courts and capitals of Europe and America; and in case of peremptory refusal, I should not hesitate to advise the withdrawal of legations from Pekin, and a resort to such other measures as might be found necessary to enforce a compliance with the demand.

If it is expected that the plan now inaugurated shall be carried outtreating China as one nation, and the imperial government as the only responsible power-it is absolutely necessary that the rights, privileges, and immunities of the diplomatic corps, customary in all civilized and enlightened countries, shall be recognized by the supreme authority of China.

No one thing would do more to disabuse the minds of the people of their absurd pretensions of superiority over all other peoples, and of the divine right of the Emperor to "rule all nations, whether within or without." Nor do I believe that a firm demand, made at the appropriate time by all the treaty powers, will meet with a refusal.

There will be no need of elaborate regulations in regard to the forms and ceremonies. A simple declaration to the effect that the usual forms customary in the United States and Europe shall be observed would be ample.

Second. The right to place salaried consuls at any point, either on the coast or in the interior, and that any place where such a consul resides shall be open to foreign trade.

This is a loose proposition, and one that never will be assented to by the Chinese government unless driven by force into submission. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, in the interest of foreigner or native, it ought to be. If M. Rochechouart means that when France or any one treaty power chooses to place a consul at any point other than those already open to trade, the place shall be considered open to the residence and trade of all countries having treaties with China, which contain the "favored nation" clause, whether they have consuls or not, does not seem clear. If such is a correct interpretation of his meaning, (and I think it is,) the demand is unjust.

The Chinese government having, by treaty, yielded jurisdiction over the persons of all foreign residents upon its soil, so that it cannot punish them even by fine, it is obligatory upon all treaty powers to provide a mode of punishing their citizens and subjects for infractions of treaty and regulations, and it is but a simple act of justice and good faith that their laws should be made effective for this purpose.

I regret to be compelled to say that a due observance of this portion of treaty obligations has been too much neglected by nearly all foreign governments, of which the Chinese have just cause of complaint. The United States have done as well or better than most governments, (England excepted;) at the same time, candor compels me to say that we have not performed our duty; and if Congress could see clearly the anomalous condition of things where ex-territoriality is claimed and exercised, as is the case here, I feel quite sure there would be no delay or hesitation in providing, through a more perfect consular system, the means of carrying out honestly and in good faith our part of treaty engagements. But if we have failed in part to do our duty, France has done worse. She has salaried consuls at Canton, Foo-chow, Shanghai, Hankow, and Tientsin only, while at Swatow, Amoy, Ning-po, Ching-kiang, King-kiang, Chefoo, Newchwang, and on the Island of Formosa, there are either merchant consuls or none at all. Generally at these ports last named France is entirely unrepresented. It is true that the trade of France is small, amounting only to one per cent. of the aggregate, and, therefore, expensive consular establishments at all the ports may appear to the government quite unnecessary. But if her trade will not justify the expense of consuls at the ports already open to trade, what plausible argument can be urged in favor of sending salaried consuls to other points? England might, with some propriety, urge such a point, but with France the case is entirely different. Nor would France or any other country be likely to agree to keep continuously salaried consuls at such points, in case the demand was acceded to. The selection of any point in the interior for trade would be an experiment, and experience might prove its inutility for the purpose. In case the consul should be withdrawn, would the place where he resided be closed to trade? With such an

understanding in the beginning there would be little inducement for a permanent outlay of capital by merchants in order to test the question fairly, in which case it would rest with peddlers, and not merchants, to determine the eligibility of such points for foreign trade.

I see so many objections to such a treaty provision, and so many chances of its proving a delusion and a snare, that, unless the proposition can be more definitely defined, I should not be inclined to favor it. If the exact truth could be ascertained, it would be found, I expect, that the whole idea of the French chargé in this scheme is the better protection of the French missionaries; and were it possible to obtain the concession asked for, these additional consuls would be, to all intents and purposes, agents of Roman Catholic missionaries. Their official positions and influence would be used to sustain missionary claims and assumptions, some of which have been described in a former dispatch. So far as trade is concerned, it may well be questioned whether the presence of French consuls in the interior would not prove a damage instead of a benefit.

Third. The right to navigate by steam all water-courses that will float a vessel drawing ten feet or more. This, if put in some more definite form, of which it is susceptible, would be a great advantage to foreign trade, and a benefit to China. If granted it would open the Yang-tsze River about three hundred miles above Hankow, and possibly the river Han and the Poyang Lake. The former would be quite certain, but of the latter there would be some doubt. Our scanty information hardly justifies a decided opinion upon the question of the navigability of the interior water-courses of this country, their maximum and minimum depth of water, &c.

The carrying trade is one of the most important interests to foreigners, and any concession which will increase it will prove of great value to foreign commerce, and also be a benefit to the natives. The Chinese merchants avail themselves of steam transportation because of its greater speed and certainty, and less risk. This the officials begin to see and appreciate also. An illustration of this may be seen in the fact that during the year 1870 a considerable portion of the tribute rice and grain, which comes from the provinces annually to Peking, was brought in foreign vessels and steamers to Tien-tsin. This is the first experiment of the kind made by the government. It proved so satisfactory that it is expected a much larger quantity will be transported in this way during the present year.

The interests of foreign merchants are chiefly imports and exports of merchandise, and carrying trade on the coast and in the interior. Up to this time the latter is confined to the river Yang-tse from Shanghai to Hankow, and the Pei-ho to Tien-tsin. Beyond these three branches of trade there is little in which the foreign merchant can compete with the native. Experience proves that the Chinese will do most of the local and internal trade, and it is quite according to reason that it should be so. Among themselves there is a credit system, regulated by law and custom, and thus rendered quite safe. As between natives and foreigners, it would be hazardous to the latter; and, besides, the expenses of a native merchant are so trifling that he can conduct a business successfully upon profits that would be ruinous to a foreigner.

In my opinion the extension of trade by steamers, particularly inland, is, on the whole, the most important of all the schemes that are put forward for "opening up" China, and one that is open to less objections than any other. It is even more important to American merchants than the extension of the import trade, and will continue to be until