we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up. By the time that this message reached me, General A. P. Hill had already been warmly engaged and had been repulsed, and Carter's artillery battalion of Rodes' division had opened on the flank of the enemy with fine effect. The enemy were rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up. I determined to push the attack vigorously.

General Rodes had drawn up his division with Iverson's brigade on the right, Rodes' old brigade (Colonel O'Neil) in the centre (these two on the ridge leading to the west of Gettysburg), and Doles on the left in the plain. The 5th Alabama regiment was kept by General Rodes to guard the wide gap left between O'Neil and Doles. Daniel and Ramseur were in reserve.

He at.once moved forward, and after advancing for some distance in line he came in sight of the enemy, and O'Neil and Iverson were ordered to attack, Daniel advancing in line 200 yards in rear of Iverson to protect that flank. At this time only desultory artillery firing was going on in Hill's front; Carter was warmly engaged. O'Neil's brigade, advancing in some disorder in a different direction from that indicated by Major-General Rodes in person to Colonel O'Neil, and with only three regiments (the 3d Alabama by some mistake being left with Daniel's brigade), was soon forced to fall back, although the 5th Alabama was sent to its support. Iverson's brigade was thus exposed, but the gallant troops obstinately stood their ground till the greater part of three regiments had fallen where they stood in line of battle. A few of them being entirely surrounded, were taken prisoners; a few escaped. The unfortunate mistake of General Iverson at this critical juncture in sending word to Major-General Rodes that one of his regiments had raised the white flag and gone over to the enemy, might have produced the most disastrous results. The 12th North Carolina, being on the right of his brigade, suffered least.

A slight change of Iverson's advance had uncovered the whole of Daniel's front, and he found himself opposed to heavy bodies of infantry, whom he attacked and drove before him till he reached a railroad cut extending diagonally across his front and past his right flank, which checked his advance. A battery of the enemy beyond this cut, near a barn, enfiladed his line, and fresh bodies of infantry poured across the cut a destructive fire, enfilade and reverse. Seeing some troops of the 3d Corps lying down beyond the railroad in front of the enemy, who were on his right flank, General Daniel sent an officer to get them to advance. As they would not, he was obliged (leaving the 45th North Carolina and 2d North Carolina battalion to hold his line). to change the front of the rest of his brigade to the rear and throw them across the railroad beyond the cut, where having formed line directly in front of the troops of Hill's corps already mentioned he ordered an advance of his whole brigade, and gallantly swept the field, capturing several hundred prisoners in the cut. About the time. of his final charge, Ramseur, with his own and Rodes' brigades and remnants of Iverson's, under Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G. of the

brigade (who had rallied the brigade and assumed command), had restored the line in the centre. Meantime, an attempt by the enemy to push a column into the interval between Doles and O'Neil had been handsomely repulsed by Doles, who changed front with his two right regiments and took them in flank, driving them in disorder towards the

town.

All the troops of General Rodes were now engaged, the enemy were moving large bodies of troops from the town against his left, and affairs were in a very critical condition, when Major-General Early, coming up on the Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving against Doles' left, and ordered forward Gordon's brigade to the left of Doles, which, after an obstinate contest, broke Barlow's division, captured General Barlow and drove the whole back on a second line, when it was halted, and General Early ordered up Hays' and Hoke's brigades on Gordon's left, and then drove the enemy precipitately towards and through the town, just as Ramseur broke those in his front.

General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade. The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and Early entering by the York railroad at the same time that Rodes came in on the Cashtown road, they together captured over 4000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of Early's division. As far as I can learn, no other troops, than those of this corps entered the town at all.

The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as "Cemetery Hill," south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the commanding General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the 3d Corps having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to our left flank our extreme left and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenant T. T. Turner of my staff and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.

I received orders soon after dark to draw my corps to the right in case it could not be used to advantage, where it was, that the commanding General thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a good one on that side. I represented to the commanding General that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy at dark, as reported by Lieutenants Turner and Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge. He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters after twelve o'clock at

night I sent orders to Johnson by Lieutenant and A. D. C. T. T. Turner to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so. General Johnson stated in reply to this order that after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill, with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party on nearing the summit was met by a superior force of the enemy, which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape. During this conversation with General Johnson a man arrived, bringing a despatch dated at 12 midnight, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from General Sykes to General Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted four miles from Gettysburg and would resume its march at 4 A. M. Lieutenant Turner brought this despatch to my headquarters, and at the same time stated that General Johnson would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice of the fact that the enemy were in possession of the hill, and had sent him further orders. Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place. Meantime orders had come from the General commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the right. Lieutenant Turner at once returned to General Johnson and delivered these instructions, directing him to be ready to attack; Early being already in line on the left and Rodes on the right of the main street of the town, Rodes' right extending out on the Fairfield road.

Early in the morning I received a communication from the General commanding, the tenor of which was that he intended the main attack to be make by the First Corps, on our right, and wished me, as soon as their guns opened, to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered. I made the necessary arrangements preparatory, and about 5 P. M., when General Longstreet's guns opened, General Johnson commenced a heavy cannonade from Andrews' battalion and Graham's battery, the whole under Major Latimer, against the "Cemetery Hill," and got his infantry into position to assault the wooded hill. After an hour's firing, finding that his guns were overpowered by the greater number and superior position of the enemy's batteries, Major Latimer withdrew all but one battery, which he kept to repel any infantry advance. While with this battery, this gallant young officer received, from almost the last shell fired, the wound which has since resulted in his death. Colonel Brown says justly of that calamity: "No greater loss could have befallen the artillery of this corps." Major Latimer served with me from March 1862, to the second battle of Manassas (August 28th, 30th, 1862.) I was particularly struck at Winchester (25th May, 1862), his first warm engagement, by his coolness, self-possession and bravery under a very heavy artillery fire, showing, when most needed, the full possession of all his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those of any officer in my command.

Immediately after the artillery firing ceased, which was just before sundown, General Johnson ordered forward his division to attack the

wooded hill in his front, and about dusk the attack was made. The enemy were found strongly entrenched on the side of a very steep mountain, beyond a creek with steep banks, only passable here and there. Brigadier-General J. M. Jones was wounded soon after the attack began, and his brigade, which was on the right, with Nicholls' Louisiana brigade (under Colonel Williams), was forced back, but Steuart on the left took part of the enemy's breastworks, and held them until ordered out at noon next day.

As soon as information reached him that Johnson's attack had commenced, General Early, who held the centre of my corps, moved Hays' and Hoke's brigades forward against the "Cemetery Hill." Charging over a hill into a ravine, where they broke a line of the enemy's infantry posted behind a stone wall, up the steep face of another hill and over two lines of breastworks, these brigades captured several batteries of artillery, and held them until finding that no attack was made on the right, and that heavy masses of the enemy were advancing against their front and flank, they reluctantly fell back, bringing away seventy-five to one hundred prisoners, and four stands of captured colors.

Major-General Rodes did not advance for reasons given in his report. Before beginning my advance, I had sent a staff-officer to the division of the 3d Corps on my right, which proved to be General Pender's, to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of General Lane (who succeeded Pender, wounded), and who sent word back that the only order he had received from General Pender was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented. I then wrote to him that I was about attacking with my corps, and requesting that he would co-operate. To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made. The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for Rodes' division to attack, though had it been otherwise I have every reason to believe from the eminent success attending the assault of Hays and Avery that the enemy's lines would have been carried.

I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades of Rodes' division.

Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that General Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock; but as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after two o'clock. Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance, the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Steuart the evening before. They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, where the precipitous nature of the hill and an abattis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his further advance. In Johnson's attack the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and as they ran across an open space to another work, were exposed to the fire of Daniel's brigade, at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at

* Avery commanded Hoke's brigade.

this time under no fire of consequence, their aim was accurate, and General Daniel thinks that he killed here, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting.

Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about one P. M., to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me also, and I sent Captain Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation, and General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark.

At midnight my corps fell back, as ordered, to the range of hills west of the town taken by us on Wednesday, where we remained until and during the fourth, unmolested.

The behavior of my troops throughout this campaign was beyond praise, whether the point considered be their alacrity and willing endurance of the long marches, their orderly and exemplary conduct in the enemy's country, their bearing in action, or their patient endurance of hunger, fatigue and exposure during our retreat. The lists of killed and wounded, as well as the results gained, will show the desperate character of the fighting.

In the infantry, Daniel's brigade of Rodes' division, and in the artillery, Andrews' battalion of Johnson's division, suffered most loss. The 2d North Carolina battalion of Daniel's brigade lost two hundred out of two hundred and forty men, killed and wounded, without yielding an inch of ground at any time.

Back to Darksville.

By order of the commanding General, the 3d Corps was to move . at dark on July 4th, and the 1st Corps to follow with the prisoners mine being the rear-guard. Next day, the 3d was to take the rear, etc. At ten A. M. on the 5th, the other corps were not all in the road, and consequently mine did not take up the march till near noon, and only reached Fairfield at 4 P. M. Here the enemy, who had been threatening our rear, and occasionally opening a fire of artillery on the rear-guard (Gordon's brigade of Early's division), showed more boldness in attacking, throwing out a line of skirmishers over a mile in length. They were repulsed, and a battery which was shelling our column driven off. We encamped for the night on a hill one and a half miles west of Fairfield; and next day, July 6th, the 3d Corps moving by another road, we were still in the rear; Rodes' division acting as rear-guard and repelling another attack of the enemy. The 45th North Carolina of Daniel's brigade being summoned to surrender, attacked the troops making the summons, and drove them out of a wood in which they were posted. The enemy did not follow much beyond Fairfield. The road was again blocked till noon. That night we encamped near Waynesboro', and reached Hagerstown about noon. of the 7th of July.

On the 11th we were moved into line between Hagerstown and