of at least one of the world's continents there can be no room for doubt. The literature of these great events at the disposal of the ordinary student is not perhaps so copious as might have been expected. The war was fought to a certain extent behind a temporary veil, in that the staffs of both armies, but especially the Japanese, had the courage to impose unusual restrictions on press correspondents. These restrictions, though, as will be seen later, not incompatible with careful and close study of the greatest campaign of modern times, undoubtedly curtailed the number of correspondents who remained in the theatre of war, and so limited the contemporary narratives emanating from that source. But for Anglo-Saxon students on both sides of the Atlantic another serious cause of restriction is the language difficulty. The Russian and Japanese tongues are known to but few Englishmen or Americans. They take long to master and the inducements to their study have hitherto been regarded as fewer than those offered by many other European and Asiatic languages. Regrettable however though this drawback is, there remain open to the student who lacks special linguistic equipment contemporary records, criticisms, and historical sketches of varying interest and value, but sufficient already in bulk to warrant a stock-taking and preliminary classification of the books either written originally in English or subsequently made available by translation. The contemporary records of the Russo-Japanese War may, as indeed is the case with all great modern campaigns, be conveniently listed under three headings: A. The narratives of press correspondents. B. The reports of neutral professional eye-witnesses. These contemporary records are the pièces justificatives of the historian, the mines from which he delves his ore, mines varying greatly in richness, but yet none of which can be wholly neglected. The classification above given places them in what may prima facie be said to be the inverse order of their relative value, yet the careful student must bear in mind that there are occasions when the observation of the onlooker, especially if he possesses professional training, is more reliable than the testimony of the man whose physical and mental faculties are subject to the severe strain of the combat. It is only by testing, comparing, and weighing the evidence of every class of witness that the truth can be finally obtained. The gigantic tangle of a modern battle, such as that of Liaoyang or Mukden, presents to the historian perhaps the most difficult of all the problems given to him to unravel. The earliest reports to reach the general public from a theatre of war are those of war correspondents. It may therefore be convenient to consider these first. Their comparative paucity has been already mentioned, that is to say, their paucity when they are regarded as historical material, for of a goodly band of press representatives who hastened to Manchuria when hostilities commenced not a few judged that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese staff rendered their mission valueless, and returned to their homes, having seen nothing of the struggle. The personal narratives of such individuals are obviously useless to the historical student and must 'be disregarded. The correspondents who had the patience to remain were well rewarded. The good fortune which crowned the Japanese arms with success both by sea and land in the opening scenes of the war enabled the staff to relax very substantially the restrictions on the press, to allow correspondents to proceed to the front and join the armies in the field, and at times even to lift, for those who were judged discreet, a not ungenerous portion of the veil with which commanders-in-chief screen their plans. Naturally the narratives of observers writing under such conditions vary in proportion to their individual idiosyncrasies and their previous military experience and knowledge. One of the most fortunate of the war correspondents attached to the Japanese War, as well as one of the best equipped in military knowledge, was Mr. William Maxwell, for he had the good fortune to earn the confidence of General Kuroki's staff, and South Africa had taught him much of the soldier's trade. Thus his book1 after stating concisely in its opening chapter the causes of the war deals at once with, for the individual fighting soldier, one of the most interesting points. of the campaign, by recording the actual forecasts of the fighting characteristics of their respective adversaries made before the war by the Russian and Japanese staffs. In an appendix Mr. Maxwell gives us in full the actual memoranda as to this, prepared by the two staffs. The Russian forecast is extraordinary in its inaccuracies. It stated that: "The Japanese infantry never attack with the bayonet; they believe that against the modern rifle bayonet attacks are impracticable, and that the issue must be decided by powder and shot. . . . They do not recognize the necessity of continuing the fight within reach of the bayonet." Yet as Mr. Maxwell points out, "The Japanese proved themselves over and over again most 1 1 William Maxwell. From the Yalu to Port Arthur (London, 1906). dangerous foes with the bayonet. Before Liaoyang a whole division charged and carried a position at the point of the bayonet, and never fired a shot. At the Sha-ho bayonet charges were almost hourly incidents, and demonstrated the fallacy bred in South Africa, that entrenched positions are unassailable save by powder and shot." Elsewhere in this Russian memorandum it is suggested that "the Japanese make frontal attacks without turning movements . . . the Japanese do not like night attacks or night marches." Of the night march of the Mikado's troops, of that "determination to die" with which as Maxwell rightly says the Japanese soldier goes into battle, no idea seems to have penetrated the brain of the officer who penned this document. A comparison of these misconceptions with the lucid and accurate study of the Russian army prepared before the outbreak of hostilities by General Fugii, then commandant of the Tokio Staff College, illustrates the relative reliability of the staffs of the contending armies. The following quotations from Fugii are too striking to be passed over: The Russian troops are by no means so good as many critics imagine. . . The training of the men is too formal. Lack of initiative and of independent action is the weak point of all their officers, if we except the general staff and the officers of the Guards, who are a little better in that respect. . . . Their discipline is maintained, not by training but by the remnant of feudal influence. . . . If there be any great hero to lead them they are not men to fear death, as we have seen at Plevna. . . . Yet if they meet any little reverse they are at once terrified and panic stricken. It is therefore necessary to frighten them at the beginning. Strength and courage are their characteristics in battle, and we must therefore always be careful and never venture on any rash movements. . . . Their infantry often charge with the bayonet but have little skill with the bayonet. . . . Their infantry is not clever at making use of natural objects for cover, and fight awkwardly in mountainous country. ... The Cossacks made no heroic movement in the War of 1877 and their reports were all exaggerated. . . . If our infantry is a little careful we have nothing to fear from the Cossacks. . . . In the War with the Turks there were many mean-minded Russian Officers who placed their personal interest and comfort beyond every other consideration. ... These enlightening documents with Maxwell's own informing sketches of the Japanese generals, whom he had opportunities of studying personally-Oyama, Kuroki, Kodama, Fugii, and Fukushima--are an excellent introduction to the great drama of the war. A clear narrative of the battle of the Yalu follows, written with sound appreciation of the plan of the Japanese commander, and yet with full sympathy for the gallantry of the individual soldier. A comparison of the fight with that of Colenso serves to bring out the thoroughness of the Japanese reconnaissance, the systematic preparation for battle, and the determination with which it was carried through. The close formation adopted by the Japanese infantry, the faulty Russian trenches, the effective artillery fire, the Russian failure to deliver a counter-attack on the Japanese Twelfth Division, and the still more disastrous mistake of holding on too long to what should have been treated merely as a rear-guard position, the splendid gallantry with which Captain Matrizawa and his little. company of infantry died to hold up the Russian retreat at Hamatan -these are the main points brought out in Mr. Maxwell's finely written story. A moving account too is that of the funeral ceremonies after Yalu, when the survivors invoked the spirits of the fallen comrades as "for ever with the Gods" and humbly offered to them divine honors. Notwithstanding this splendid first blow, Kuroki, Mr. Maxwell tells us, after Yalu "greatly feared" an attack from Liaoyang, conceiving that an army twice his own strength might be concentrated against him from that quarter. It was this fear which led to the strong entrenchment of Feng-huang-cheng. But in addition to this, until the battle of Nanshan had been fought, there was much anxiety lest Oku should be assailed from the north. When neither of these possibilities occurred General Fugii is quoted as declaring that General Kuropatkin had lost his opportunity-" he may be a great organizer, but in the field he is not to be feared." Apropos of this Maxwell appropriately quotes Skobeloff's warning to Kuropatkin when serving as his chief of the staff: " You are an ambitious man and will have a fine career, but do not forget my advice-never accept an independent post in which you have to direct affairs." Mr. Maxwell stayed with Kuroki's army up to and including the battle of the Sha-ho, and then went south in time to witness the fall of Port Arthur. Enough, however, has been said of the contents of his book to indicate that it enhances the reputation of its writer and ranks high in the list of contemporary records. Another press correspondent, but of a different class, is Mr. T. Cowen, who in the capacity of correspondent of the Daily Chronicle watched the opening phase of the war, but ceased sending home despatches owing to the severity of the censorship. His book shows considerable skill and knowledge in dealing with the diplomatic events leading up to the war, but his account of the actual operations by land and sea is obviously based on second-hand information. and cannot be regarded as of historical value. Yet there are sug2 T. Cowen, The Russo-Japanese War from the Outbreak of Hostilities to the Battle of Liaoyang (London, 1904). gestive passages in this book which merit attention, notably the comparison of the topography of the Liaoyang peninsula with the county of Cornwall. A readable and accurate account of an actual eye-witness is to be found in A Modern Campaign by Mr. Fraser, who followed Kuroki's army as special correspondent of the London Times from the Yalu to Liaoyang. His chapter on the Artillery Lessons of the War is specially informing, and his preference for a slow but powerful gun rather than a mobile and weak weapon will be concurred in by the majority of soldiers. Mr. Palmer, another war correspondent, covers the same period. and events as Mr. Fraser, but his book reads as if it were a mere verbatim reprint of despatches, written at the front, and scored and gashed by the censor's red pencil. It lacks, moreover, knowledge of military technique, although throwing some interesting side-light on the operations from an amateur's point of view. Here, for instance, is a passage well worth quoting, a few simple but noble sentences spoken by Field-Marshal Yamagata at an interview granted to Mr. Palmer the day after the commencement of hostilities: If you will look at the geographical position of Korea you will see that it is like a poniard pointing at the heart of Japan. If Korea is occupied by a foreign power, the Japan Sea ceases to be Japanese, and the Korean Straits are no longer in our control. Our public men are of many parties, not of two only, as are yours in America. Our Cabinets are the product of coalitions, which, for the time being, seem to His Majesty and the legislative power best to serve the interests of the country. Foreign policy is a thing entirely apart. In the consideration of Korea and Manchuria, all men of all parties needed only patriotism to realize the singleness of our interests. Whatever Cabinet was in power continued the policy of its predecessor, and the policy of all on a question which put the very life of our nation at stake. These four books may be taken as fairly representative of the permanent records placed before the public by the English and American correspondents attached to the Japanese armies. It will be observed that they all deal specially with the achievements of the First Army, and that none carry the story further than the battle of the Sha-ho. No member of the English or American press appears to have had the good fortune to be attached to Oyama's headquarters or to have seen the exploits of his centre and left columns. Of the narratives of correspondents present with the Russian 3 T. Fraser, A Modern Campaign: or War and Wireless Telegraphy in the Far East (London, 1905). * Frederick Palmer, With Kuroki in Manchuria (New York, 1904). |