R. v. Reno and another, 4 Can. L. J., 315 R. v. Sattler, 1 Dearsley and Bell, C. C., 525 R. v. Sawyer, R. and R., 294 R. v. Tubbee, 1 Upp. Can. Practice Reps., 98 202, 208 R. v. Weil, 9 Q. B. D., 93; 53 L. J. (Q.B.), 419; 46 L. T. (N.S.), 592 R. v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. D., 42; 48 L. J. (M.C.), 37; 37 L. T. (N.S.), 544; 26 W. R., 44. R. v. Young, St. Alban's Raid . 171 50, 94, 102 116 Renneçon, Dalloz, Jurisp. Gén. 1867, i. 281 Rich's Case, Dalloz, Jurisp. Gén. 1877, i. 463 112, 183, 191 Robbins, Bee, Adm. Reps., 267; Wharton's State Trials, 392. Robinson, R. v., 6 Can. L. J., 98 Rosenbaum, In re, 20 Low. Can. Jurist (Q.B.), 165. Rutter, In re, 7 Abbott, N.Y. Practice (N.S.), 67; U.S. St. Alban's Raid 31 187 219 37 115 120 195 31 50, 94, 102 Sattler, R. v., 1 Dearsley and Bell, C. C., 525 217 Sawyer, R. v., R. and R., 294 Blatchford, Circ. Ct. Reps., 502 Sauve, Dalloz, Jurisp. Gén. 1862, v. 159 Scott, Ex parte, 9 B. and C., Sheazle and others, In re, 1 Woodbury and Minot, Mass., 66. Short v. Deacon, 10 Sergeant and Rawle, 125. Smith, Ex parte, 3 McLean, 121 Smith, Re Trueman B., 4 Can. L. J., 118; Amer. Law Rev., iii. 178 State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St., 273 Stupp, In re Joseph, 11 Blatchford, Circ. Ct. Reps., 124; 12 Terraz, Ex parte, 4 Ex. D., 63; 42 L. J. (Ex.), 214; 39 L. T. (N.S.), 502; 27 W. R., 170 185 144 Tivnan, 5 Best and Smith, 645; 33 L. J. (M.C.), 201 (Tirnan); PAGE 12 W. R., 848 (Turnan); 10 L. T. (N.S.), 499 (Tivnan) . 124, 140, 148 Tubbee, R. v., 1 Upp. Can. Practice Reps., 98. Van Aernam, R. v., Upp. Can. Reps., 4 C. P., 288 . Vidil, Baron de, Rep. Gén. de Jurisp., vii. 140 Von Aernam, Ex parte, 3 Blatchford, Circ. Ct. Reps., 160 92 70 66, 112 84 179, 181 189, 192 78 66 .93, 96 .39,88 202, 208 151, 152, 208 83 171 Warner, In re Asher, 1 Upp. Can. L. J., 16 Williams v. Beacon, 10 Wendell, 636 Worms, Charles, Ea parte, 22 Low. Can. Jurist, 109 147 83 120 m A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION. CHAPTER I. THEORY OF THE SUBJECT. THE subject of extradition has been discussed far more in its political than in its legal aspects. National interest, prejudice, or passion has always governed the deliberations of senates, and has sometimes affected the decisions of the courts. An attempt is made in this volume to ascertain the true principles of the question, and, as briefly as correctness will permit, to trace the history of the law in the United States, England, Canada, and France, and to indicate the rules of practice observed in each of those countries. In discussion upon this subject it has been often said that the majority of jurists deny the existence of any right to demand extradition. That this assertion is incorrect will be seen by an examination of the opinions of some of the most eminent of early or recent writers. B Beginning with the great jurist who may be considered the founder of modern public law, we find Grotius expressing a very clear opinion as to the existence of this duty : 'Punishment, as we have said, according to Natural Law, may be inflicted by any one who is not open to a like charge; though, no doubt, it is in conformity with civil institutions that the delicts of individuals with regard to their own community should be left to that community, and to its rulers, to be punished or passed over as they choose. But there is not the same full power left to them in delicts which in any way pertain to human society in general; for these, other states may prosecute, as in particular states there is a prosecutor of certain offences which any one may put in motion; and much less have they such a power in offences by which another state or its ruler is specially assailed, and in which, consequently, the state or the ruler have, on account of their dignity or security, a right of exacting punishment as we have said. This right is not to be impeded by the state in which the offender lives, or its ruler. 'But since states are not accustomed to permit another state to enter their territory armed for the sake of exacting punishment, nor is that expedient; it follows that the city where he abides who is found to have committed the offence ought to do one of two things-either itself, being called upon, it should punish the guilty man, or it should leave him to be dealt with by the party who makes the demand; for this is what is meant by giving him up,' so often spoken of in history. . . . . All which passages, however, are so to be understood, that the people or king are not strictly bound to give up the person, but, as we have said, to punish him. It is a disjunctive obligation." (Bk. ii. c. 21, §§ 3, 4.) Vattel lays down the same principle of a duty, either to punish the fugitive criminal or to deliver him up to the injured state, in very explicit terms, and adds: "This is pretty generally observed with respect to great crimes, which are equally contrary to the laws and safety of all nations. Assassins, incendiaries, and robbers are seized everywhere, at the desire of the sovereign in whose territories the crime was committed, and are delivered up to his justice. The matter is carried still further in states that are more closely connected by friendship and good neighbourhood. Even in cases of ordinary transgressions, which are only subjects of civil prosecution, either with a view to the recovery of damages, or the infliction of a slight civil punishment, the subjects of two neighbouring states are reciprocally obliged to appear before the magistrate of the place where they are accused of having failed in their duty. Upon a requisition of that magistrate, called 'letters rogatory,' they are summoned in due form by their own magistrates, and obliged to appear. An admirable institution, by means of which many neighbouring states live together in peace, and seem to form only one republic." (Bk. ii. § 76.) The principal authority quoted against the existence |