222 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error. They did not admit that his belief was correct nor that his information was accurate. They, in their petition, specifically denied the same. Secretary Garfield averred no personal information on the subject. All that he stated was but hearsay or opinion. And it was hearsay or opinion after the fact, the event, as he admits by not denying the averments of the petition, and as the court knows judicially, he was not Secretary of the Interior or connected with that department of the Government when the names of plaintiffs were stricken from the rolls. 13 Ency. Pl. & Prac., p. 723; Harwood v. Marshall, 10 Maryland, 464; Moses on Mandamus, p. 210. Argumentative inferences in a return, or sworn allegations which are merely constructive deductions, cannot be treated as presenting distinct issues of fact. People v. Kilduff, 15 Illinois, 502. The authorities cited by the court below and relied upon by defendant in error are all cases where fraud was admitted or made out by petitioners' own pleadings or the admitted facts, or where parties were standing on a small legal technicality opposed to manifest intent or justice and, as a rule, where mandamus was granted, a public wrong would have been occasioned without possibility or practicability of redress. They therefore are not applicable. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr for defendant in error: Relators are not entitled to the aid of the extraordinary writ of mandamus because their enrollment was procured by fraud. This element of fraud distinguishes this case from Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249–264. By their demurrer, upon which they have elected finally to stand, relators admit the allegation of fraud, as well as that they are not members of the Cherokee Nation. In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 257. Opinion of the Court. 222 U.S. A court of law, following the rule in equity, will not lend its aid by the extraordinary writ of mandamus to enforce rights fraudulently acquired. High's Ex. Remedies, § 26; Merrill on Mandamus, §§ 68-72; 2 Spelling on Injunction, §§ 1371, 1380; People v. Assessors, 137 N. Y. 201; People v. Jeroloman, 139 N. Y. 14. See also to the same effect: Commonwealth v. Henry, 49 Pa. St. 530, 538; State v. Commissioners of Phillips Co., 26 Kansas, 419; State v. Graves, 19 Maryland, 351; Macoupin County v. The People, 58 Illinois, 191; People v. Ketcham, 72 Illinois, 212; Borough of Ansonia v. Studley, 67 Connecticut, 170; People v. Judge of Superior Court, 41 Michigan, 31; State v. Jersey City, 42 N. J. Law, 94; State v. Home Street Ry. Co., 43 Nebraska, 830. It is unnecessary to consider whether relators had sufficient opportunity to be heard in the cancellation proceedings. Having, by their demurrer, admitted that their enrollment was procured by fraud, and having elected to stand thereon, they are not entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus in enforcing any rights so secured, to the injury of the Cherokee Nation. Memorandum opinion by direction of the court. By MR. JUSTICE LAMAR. 1. Where, under the provisions of acts of Congress, and after a hearing, the names of relators were duly entered as Creek Freedmen by blood on the rolls made and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, rights were acquired of which the freedmen could not be deprived without that character of notice and opportunity to be heard essential to due process of law. Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249. 2. Notice to the attorney of such freedmen, given a few hours before the hearing of a motion to strike their names, on the ground that their enrollment had been secured by perjury, was not such notice as afforded due process. 222 U.S. Opinion of the Court. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 399, 409; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701, 708; Iowa Central Railway Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 393; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 414. 3. In the absence of other controlling facts, the Secretary of the Interior could have been required by mandamus to restore the names of those thus arbitrarily stricken off without notice. Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249. 4. But mandamus is not a writ of right. It issues to remedy a wrong, not to promote one, and will not be granted in aid of those who do not come into court with clean hands. 5. Although the petition for the writ alleged that relators were freedmen duly enrolled and denied the truth of the testimony on which their names were stricken off, yet where the answer of the Secretary referred to that testimony and alleged, "on information and belief, that the relators were not freedmen members or members by blood or marriage of the Creek Nation, and that their enrollment had been procured by fraud," a defense was stated, proof of which would have defeated the right to a restoration of relators' names, even though they had been improperly stricken from the rolls without due process. United States ex rel. Redfield v. Windom, 137 U. S. 636, 646; In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 257. 6. Where a general demurrer to an answer containing such defense was overruled, and the relators, instead of replying, elected to stand on their demurrer, the writ of mandamus was properly refused. In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 257. 7. To have issued the writ would have involved the useless thing of requiring relators' names to be reëntered, and in other proceedings having their names stricken because the original enrollment had been procured by fraud, thus admitted by the demurrer. VOL. CCXXII-14 Affirmed Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 222 U.S. BANKER BROTHERS COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, No. 72. Argued November 17, 1911.-Decided December 4, 1911. The relation of vendor and vendee, and not that of principal and agent, exists where the manufacturer sells goods to another under exclusive contract and delivers goods only on payment of draft attached to bill of lading. In this case held, that goods manufactured in another State and delivered only, in pursuance of contract, after payment of draft attached to bill of lading, are at rest and subject to the laws of the State while in the hands of the consignee before delivery by him to a purchaser from him, notwithstanding the consignee only ordered them after a contract with the purchaser had been made. Where the relation of principal and agent exists between one selling goods in one State which are manufactured in another State and the manufacturer, sales made by the former within his own State are not interstate commerce transactions but are subject to the taxing power of the State. Where the transaction of sale of an article manufactured in another State is wholly intrastate, as between vendor and vendee, it does not become interstate and immune from state taxation because the purchaser pays freight from the place of manufacture or because the purchaser obtains a warranty direct from the manufacturer. THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Pennsylvania taxing sales of automobiles, as enforced in this case, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward J. Kent and Mr. Harvey A. Miller for plaintiff in error: The plaintiff in error is engaged in interstate commerce, and, therefore, not liable to taxation by the State. Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507; Colwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622; 222 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489; Wilton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 166. The automobile sold is always actually ordered and the order signed by the purchaser submitted to the factory at Buffalo, New York, where it must first be accepted, after which the automobile is shipped to fill the order to the particular individual named therein. Mr. George H. Calvert, with whom Mr. John C. Bell, Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania, Mr. James M. Magee, Mr. Donald Thompson and Mr. Murdoch Kendrick, were on the brief, for defendant in error: Merchandise, even though an article of interstate commerce, is subject to state taxation, provided the act imposing such tax does not attempt to regulate interstate commerce or discriminate against it. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 436; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 520; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 320; American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 146; Darnell v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 119; Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 479. Upon receipt of the automobile by Banker Brothers Company, it had reached its destination and was at rest in the State within the meaning of that rule. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 228; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 578; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 96. The act levying the tax does not attempt to regulate interstate commerce and does not discriminate against it. Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U. S. 501. The right of the State to tax trades, professions, and occupations, cannot be questioned by the Federal Government. Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. St. 628; Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U. S. 1. Admitting that the majority of defendant's sales are of foreign cars, yet this fact is not material in determining |