Opinion of the Court. to any of said courts before the first day of July, anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-one." The act of March 3, 1891, went into immediate operation. In re Claasen, 140 U. S. 200. But the jurisdiction of this court having been preserved in respect of writs of error or appeals sued out or taken before July 1, 1891, by the joint resolution, we had jurisdiction of the appeal of Marcus which was taken June 12 of that year. This case does not come within either of the classes of cases specified in section 5, and the appeal was not prayed until August 20, 1893. It must therefore be dismissed. National Exchange Bank v. Peters, 144 U. S. 570; Wauton v. De Wolf, 142 U. S. 138; Ogden v. United States, 148 U. S. 390; Aspen Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31; Voorhees v. Noyes Manfg Co., 151 U. S. 135; Nashua & Lowell Railroad v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 5 U. S. App. 97. It is said, however, that the disposition of the case involved the construction and application of the mandate of this court as to costs. If it could be contended that our mandate had been misconstrued or disregarded, this would not give complainants the right of appeal after July 1, 1891, but the remedy would be by mandamus. City Bank v. Hunter, 152 U. S. 512. Lest, however, appellants might unnecessarily seek a review of the matter in that form of procedure, we deem it proper to say that the Circuit Court was right in the view taken of the mandate. The remedy of appellants lay in an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Texas & Pacific Railway v. Anderson, 149 U. S. 237, the action of the Circuit Court conformed to the mandate, and there were no proceedings subsequent thereto not settled by the terms of the mandate itself, and we therefore held, upon the authorities cited and for the reasons given, that, on the facts appearing in that record, the Circuit Court of Appeals could not review by writ of error the judgment of the Circuit Court. But in this case the Circuit Court was at liberty to consider, as it did, the application for an allowance out of the fund on the footing of costs between solicitors and clients, and its action in that regard was open to review in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Appeal dismissed. Statement of the Case. ROBERTS v. LEWIS. CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. No. 1044. Submitted April 23, 1894. — Decided May 14, 1894. Under a will, by which the testator devises and bequeathes to his wife "all my estate, real and personal, of which I may die seized, the same to be and remain hers, with full power, right and authority to dispose of the same as to her shall seem most meet and proper, so long as she shall remain my widow, upon the express condition, however, that if she should marry again, then it is my will that all of the estate herein bequeathed, or whatever may remain, should go to my surviving children, share and share alike," the widow has power during widowhood to convey to third persons an estate in fee simple in his lands. Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, overruled; and Little v. Giles, 25 Nebraska, 313, followed. THIS was an action of ejectment, brought June 11, 1887, by Walter F. Lewis against Artemas Roberts, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, to recover possession of six lots in the town of South Lincoln, in the county of Lancaster and State of Nebraska. The Circuit Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the case was taken by writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which certified to this court the following facts: On May 10, 1869, Jacob Dawson duly made his last will, which was duly admitted to probate in 1869 after his death, and which, omitting the formal parts, was as follows: "After all my lawful debts are paid and discharged, the residue of my estate, real and personal, I give and bequeath and dispose of as follows, to wit: To my beloved wife, Editha J. Dawson, I give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, of which I may die seized, the same to be and remain hers, with full power, right and authority to dispose of the same as to her shall seem most meet and proper, so long as she shall remain my widow, upon the express condition, how Statement of the Case. ever, that if she should marry again, then it is my will that all of the estate herein bequeathed, or whatever may remain, should go to my surviving children, share and share alike, and in case any of my children should have deceased leaving issue, then the issue so left to receive the share to which said. child would be entitled. I likewise make, constitute and appoint my said wife, Editha J., to be executrix of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills made by me." At the time of his death, he had a perfect title to the lots in controversy in this suit. On March 15, 1870, Editha J. Dawson conveyed these lots by warranty deed to Paran England, who, on December 15, 1871, conveyed them by warranty deed to Roberts, the plaintiff in error. On December 14, 1879, Editha J. Dawson married Henry M. Pickering. On September 15, 1879, the children of Jacob Dawson made a warranty deed of these lots to Hiland H. Wheeler and Lionel C. Burr; and Wheeler and Burr afterwards made a warranty deed thereof to Ezekiel Giles, who, in May, 1887, conveyed them by warranty deed to Lewis, the defendant in error. While the title in these lots was vested in Giles as aforesaid, he brought an action claiming under that title to recover another lot in the same county, which had belonged to Jacob Dawson at the time of his death, against one Little, who claimed under a deed executed by Editha J. Dawson during her widowhood. That case was brought by writ of error to this court, which held at October term, 1881, that under the will of Jacob Dawson his widow only took "an estate for life in the testator's lands, subject to be divested on her ceasing to be his widow, with power to convey her qualified life estate only," and that "her estate in the land and that of her grantees determined on her marriage with Pickering." Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291. After that decision, but whether before or after the aforesaid deed from Giles to Lewis did not appear, a suit was brought in the district court of Lancaster county by various grantees of the widow against Giles to quiet their title against the title claimed by Giles under the aforesaid deed from the Counsel for Parties. children of Jacob Dawson; and was taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, which held that the will of Jacob Dawson, under the statutes of the State of Nebraska, enabled his widow, prior to her remarriage, to convey an estate in fee simple in any of the lands whereof her deceased husband had died seized. Little v. Giles, 25 Nebraska, 313. Upon these facts, the Circuit Court of Appeals duly certified to this court the following questions or propositions of law: "First. In determining the nature of the estate that became vested in said Editha J. Dawson under said will of her deceased husband, Jacob Dawson, in and to lands situated in the State of Nebraska, whereof said Jacob Dawson died seized and possessed, should the Circuit Court of Appeals be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, 300, or by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska in Little v. Giles, 25 Nebraska, 313, 334 ? "Second. Did the aforesaid will of Jacob Dawson vest his widow with such an estate in lands whereof the testator died seized, situated in the State of Nebraska, that during her widowhood she could convey to third parties an estate in fee simple therein? "Third. Should the construction of the will of Jacob Dawson, deceased, which was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, be adhered to by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in determining the right of Walter F. Lewis in and to the property heretofore described, in view of the fact that said Walter F. Lewis purchased said property subsequently to the promulgation of said decision in Giles v. Little, and prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska in the case of Little v. Giles, 25 Nebraska, 313?" Mr. N. S. Harwood and Mr. John II. Ames for plaintiff in error. Mr. J. M. Woolworth and Mr. L. C. Burr for defendant in error. VOL. CLIII-24 Argument for Defendant in Error. The general rule is that the laws of the several States shall be regarded as rules of decision in the Federal courts in cases to which they apply, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide. In trials at common law this is prescribed by statute. In suits in equity and admiralty, it has been established by a long course of decisions. It is of equal force and application in all the jurisdictions of the Federal courts. But stated in these general terms, the rule leaves many interesting questions. One, and a radical one, is what are the laws of the several States which shall be rules of decision in the Federal courts. The cases do not show that this court has ever yielded its judgment to that of a state court when it has deliberately spoken first. The question always being what is the local law, this court always, in obedience to the spirit of the general rule, accepts the exposition of it by the local court, if such exposition has been given. But if this court is, by the exigencies of an orderly litigation, first called on to determine the local law and it does so, it does not yield its judgment to that of a local court afterwards pronounced, save only when, as in all other cases, it becomes satisfied upon its own independent examination that it has fallen into error. Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. In the latter case Chief Justice Taney, after examining the decision in the former case, said: "It now appears, however, that the question has since been brought before the courts of the State, and it has been settled by its highest tribunals that the clause in the constitution above referred to did of itself, and without any legislative enactment, prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise and for sale, and render all contracts for the sale of such slaves made after May 1, 1833, illegal and void. And it is argued that inasmuch as this court adopts the construction given by the state courts to their own constitution and laws, we ought to follow the decisions in Mississippi, and declare the case before us to be void, notwithstanding the case of Groves v. Slaughter. But we are not aware of any decision in this court which presses the rule so far, or that would justify this court in declaring |