1 Van Keuren v. Parmalee, ante; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339; Yandes v. Lefavour, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 371; Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; Foute v. Bacon, 24 Miss. 156; Briscoe v. Auketelle, 28 id. 361; Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219; Bush v. Stowell, 71 Penn. St. 208; Shoneman v. Felgley, 7 Penn. St. 433; Knights v. Clement, 45 Ala. 89; Kallenbach v. Dick inson, 100 Ill. 427.

In the case of Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 351, Mr. JUSTICE STORY, delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The reasoning of LORD MANSFIELD assumes that one party who has the authority to discharge has, necessarily, also authority to charge the others; that a virtual agency exists in each joint debtor to pay for the whole, and that a virtual agency exists by analogy to charge the whole. Now, this very position constitutes the matter in controversy. It is true that a payment by one does inure for the benefit of the whole; but this arises not so much from a virtual agency for the whole as by operation of law, for the payment extinguishes the debt. . . . If the principle of LORD MANSFIELD be correct, the acknowledgment of one joint debtor will bind all the rest, even though they should have utterly denied the debt at the time such acknowledgment was made. . . . By the general law of partnership, the act of each partner during the continuance of the partnership, and within the scope of its object, binds all the others. It is considered the act of each and of all, resulting from a general and mutual delegation of authority. Each partner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his contracts in the partnership business, but he cannot bind it by any contracts beyond those limits. A dissolution puts an end

to the authority. By the force of its terms it operates as a revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right of partners as such can extend no further than to settle the partnership concerns already existing, and to distribute the remaining funds."

Referring to the case of Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104, JUSTICE STORY, in the same opinion, says: "The doctrine in 1 Taunt. stands upon a clear, if it be a legal, ground; that as to things past the partnership continues, and must always continue, notwithstanding the dissolution. That, however, is a matter which we are not prepared to admit, and constitutes the very ground now in controversy. The light in which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after a dissolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause of action against the other partners, except by a new authority communicated to him for that purpose. It is wholly immaterial what is the consideration which is to raise such cause of action, whether it be a supposed pre-existing debt of the partnership or any auxiliary consideration which might prove beneficial to them. Unless adopted by them, they are not bound by it."

The case in which these observations occur was one in which the statute of limitations had run before the promise or admission by one of the partners was made. See also 3 Kent's Com., Lecture 48.

The Supreme Court of New York, KENT, C. J., in Hackley v. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, held that, "after a dissolution of a copartnership, the power of one partner to bind the other wholly ceases. There is no reason why his acknowledgment of an account should bind his copartners, any more than his giving a

promissory note in the name of the firm or any other act." The statute of limitations did not enter into that case, the sole question being as to the power of one partner, who was authorized to adjust the debts due from the copartnership, to bind the others by his admission after the dissolution.

SPENCER, J., in Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 424, referring to the case of Hackley v. Patrick, says: "It seems that the Court of Common Pleas in England have held otherwise (1 Taunt.), but I believe there is more safety in the rule of this court than in a contrary one." The same rule was applied in Baker v. Stackpole, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 420, and it was held that the admission of one partner, either of an account or any fact, made after the dissolution of the partnership, is not admissible as evidence to affect any other member of the firm.

In the New York Court of Appeals, Van Keuren v. Parmalee, 2 N. Y. 523, in a case where a promise was made by one partner nine years after the partnership was dissolved, and four years after the statute of limitations had fully run, to pay a note of the firm, BRONSON, J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "In reference to the statute of limitations, a distinction has sometimes been taken between a promise made before the statute has run and one made after the parties have been exonerated by the lapse of time. That would sustain the defence in this case; for the statute had run upon the claim long before the new promise was made. But the defence may be rested upon the still broader ground that the dissolution of the partnership was a revocation of the agency, and the power of the partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from that moment." The opinion in that case contains an extensive notice of the cases involving the question, and remarks that the "statute of 21 James I. ch. 16, which limited actions on promises to six years, was not very well received by the legal profession, and although the early decisions under it are not open to much observation, it was not long before the courts began to regard the statute with disfavor, and to resort to the most subtle construc

tions for the purpose of restricting its influence. There was a period when one who was spoken to on the subject of an old debt could not well give a civil answer without saying enough to take the case out of the statute. At a later period, and since the commencement of the present century, the courts began to regard this as a beneficial statute, a statute of repose, and commenced the difficult task of retracing their steps." Noticing the brief reasons for the decision in Whitcomb v. Whiting, ante, the court says: "Nothing but the great name of LORD MANSFIELD could have given currency to this reasoning. It is plain enough that 'payment by one is payment for all,' so far as relates to the satisfaction of the debt, but that fact neither shows, nor has any tendency to show, a new promise or acknowl edgment by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an admission that the debt is due, and, like any other admission, it can only affect the party who makes it, unless he has authority to speak for others as well as himself. A joint debtor has no such authority. . . . If the meaning be that there is such an agency as will make the payment by one inure to the benefit of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enough, but it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning be that one joint debtor is the agent of the others for the purpose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming the very point to be proved, and the assumption had neither authority nor argument to support it. There is nothing in the relation of joint debtors from which such an agency can be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie that links them together, and from the nature of the case payment of the debt is the only thing which one has authority to do for all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed at the time to get around the statute of limitations."

The decision in Whitcomb v. Whiting, ante, is said to have been in direct conflict with Bland v. Haselrig, 2 Vent. 151, which was decided ninety years before,

and in the English cases that have followed and in some of the early American cases the same rule was applied, whether the new promise was made before or after the statute had run. "The case of Whitcomb v. Whiting, says BRONSON, J., has been several times questioned in England, and in Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 B. & C. 23, the court seemed much disposed to disregard it. But the authority of a great name has proved more than a match for common sense. The learned judge reviews the cases in New York, beginning with Smith v. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, when the statute of limitations was in bad repute, and when few men ventured to think for themselves after LORD MANSFIELD had spoken, and shows that the courts of that State have been constantly struggling against the arbitrary rule of the judicial Warwick of England, until it has been entirely overthrown, and the Supreme Court of the United States sanctions the emancipation. A still later case in New York was that of Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N. Y. 176, where payments were made by one of several joint makers of a note before the statute of limitations had run upon it, and it was insisted by the plaintiff that this payment took the case out of the statute as to all the joint makers. The court remarks that it was very well settled in New York before the case of Van Keuren v. Parmalee, upon authority, that payment by one of several joint debtors, before the statute had run, operated to take the case out of the statute as to all; but the court in this case, upon principle, held that such payments do not affect the defence of the statute as to the other debtors. The court says: "If a new promise is satisfactorily proved, the debt is renewed. The question still recurs, Who is authorized to make such a promise? If one joint debtor could bind his co-debtors to a new contract by implication, as by a

1 Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368; Schindel v. Gates, 46 Md. 604; Beardsley v. Hull, 36 Conn. 270; Green v. Greenborough Female College, 83 N. C. 449; Merritt v. Day, 38 N. J. L. 32. But in

payment of a part of a debt for which they were jointly liable, he could do it directly by an express contract. The law will hardly be charged with the inconsistency of authorizing that to be done indirectly which cannot be done directly. If one debtor could bind his co-debtors by an unconditional promise, he could by a conditional promise, and a man might find himself a party to a contract to the condition of which he would be a stranger. . . . And in principle I see not why a promise made before the statute has attached to a debt should be obligatory when made by one of several joint debtors, when it would not be if the action was barred. The statute operates upon the remedy. The debt always exists. An action brought after the lapse of six years upon a simple contract must be upon the new promise, whether the promise was before or after the lapse of six years, express or implied, conditional or absolute."

In Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Alabama, Kansas, and Nebraska this doctrine would seem to be held, carrying out the principle of decided cases.

After a joint debt has been barred by the statute, part payment by one of the joint debtors does not revive the debt as to the others. Biscoe v. Jenkins, 10 Ark. 108; Mason v. Howell, 14 id. 199. And this rule holds as to a payment made by one partner after the partnership is dissolved. Myatts. Bell, 41 Ala. 222. In Emmons v. Overton, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 643, it was held that a part payment made by a surety after all right of action upon the note is barred does not renew the note as to the balance. Where the maker and indorser of a note are sued jointly, proof that the indorser made payments at different times within six years will not vary or affect the liability of the maker, or deprive him of the advantages of the bar

North Carolina, by statute, the power of one partner to bind the others by an admission or part payment is expressly taken away by statute, but the power of one joint maker of a note to bind the others

of the statute. Bibb v. Peyton, 19 Miss. 275. Nor will a payment made by one of two sureties remove the statute bar as to the other. Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124. It is settled in New York that an acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, or a part payment made by one of several partners after dissolution of a firm, or by one of joint and several debtors, will not renew the debt against the others, under the statute of limitations.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Covert,

by an admission or payment before the statute has run is retained; hence the decision in the case last cited, relating merely to the power of a principal to bind a surety by a part payment of interest before the statute had run, is applicable to the point cited, upon the ground that the decision, except for the restraint of the statute, would be equally applicable in the case of copartners. The court, in Schindel v. Gates, ante, seems to give its assent to the doctrine of Whitcomb v. Whiting. At least, it does not express any disapproval of the doctrine of that case; and ROBINSON, J., in referring to the case of Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill (Md.), 86, says: "The court, in Ellicott v. Nichols, fully recognized the decision of Whitcomb v Whiting, and said that the part payment of principal and the payment of interest relied on to take the case out of the bar was made within the legal time and before the statute had attached. The rule thus laid down in Ellicott v. Nichols has been the accepted law of this State for nearly thirty years, and, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, it is not to be questioned. It may not be amiss, however, to say the same rule has received the sanction of the highest courts in other States. Selltey v. Selltey, 2 Hill (S. C.), 496; Steele v. Jennings, 1 McMull. (S. C.) 297; Goudy v. Gillam, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 28; McIntire v. Oliver, 2 Hawks (N. C.), 209; Walton v. Robinson, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 341; Emmons v. Overton, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 643. In regard to the supposed hardship of the rule as against sureties to a note,

From this con

29 Barb. (N. Y.) 435. Payment of inter. est on a note by one of two joint makers, at the request of the other, is sufficient to take the debt out of the statute of limitations, as against both the makers. Munro v. Potter, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 358. See also Searight v. Craighead, 1 Penn. 135; Brewster v. Handman, Dudley (Ga.), 138; Levy v. Cadet, 17 S. & R. (Penn.) 126; Yandes v. Lefavour, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 371; Beloit v. Wynne, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 534.

the answer is, that it is always in their power to inquire whether it has been paid, and, if it remains unpaid, to compel the holder to proceed against the principal, or to pay the note and proceed in their own name. The demurrer to the defendant's third plea was, therefore, properly sustained. The note in this case was a joint and several note, and the fact that the defendant signed it as surety in no manner affected the plaintiff's right to recover. As between the defendant and the principal, the relation of the former as surety was of course material, because the latter, if compelled to pay the note, had his remedy over against the principal; or, if the note was paid by the principal, such relation would protect the surety from any claim for contribution. In this case the payments of interest were made from year to year by the principal, and before the statute had attached, and such payments were sufficient, in our opinion, to prevent the bar of limitations."

1 Mix . Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421. And this seems also to be the rule in England. Thus, in a recent case, it was held that one of two partners must be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have authority to make a payment on account of a debt due by the firm, so as to take the debt out of the statute of limitations as against the other; and in a case where A., one of the partners in a firm, gave instructions to their solicitor to put in force and realize a bill of sale held by the firm, and to place the proceeds when received "to the account of the firm," who were

1

then indebted to the solicitor for his bill of costs, and the solicitor having sued the two partners for the balance of his bill of costs, B. pleaded the statute of limitations, it was held (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division), that there was sufficient evidence for the jury of a part payment so as to take the case out of the statute of limitations as against B. Court of Appeal, March 12. Goodwin v. Parton, 42 L. T. Rep. N. s. 568.

1 In Smith v. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, the court held that an acknowledgment made by one partner after the partnership was dissolved was binding upon the others, where it appeared that by an advertisement in a newspaper they had appointed him as liquidating partner to close up the firm business, and to collect the debts due to, and pay those due from, the firm, upon the ground that he thereby was clothed with a special agency which made his acts within the scope of such authority binding upon them. And a similar doctrine has recently been held in the Superior Court of New York. Thus, after a firm had gone into liquidation, A. paid to his partner B. $50,000 in funds and credits, to be applied towards paying the debts thereof, B. agreeing to pay the same in full. Held, that a part payment made by B. on a claim against the firm would take the case out of the statute of limitations, although the whole of the $50,000 had previously been applied by B. to the payment of other firm liabilities. Burnett v. Snyder, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 577.

2 Haight v. Avery, 16 Hun (N. Y.), 252; Pitts v. Hunt, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 146; National Bank of Delaware v. Cotton (Wis.), 24 Alb. L. J. 451. In Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 558, where sureties on a joint and several note were called upon for payment, and they directed the holder to call upon the principal for payment, and the principal made a payment on the note, it was held such an acknowledgment of liability as to arrest the running of the statute against him. In Huntington v. Ballou, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 120, where the maker made payment of interest on the note, reciting in the receipt that it was made by an accommodation indorser, by the hand of the maker, and the indorser, when afterward shown the receipt by the holder, examined it and expressed his approval of it, it was held that the payment took the case out of the statute, as to such indorser. It is said in the opinion that "the holder had the right thereafter to suppose that the payment made by the maker was so made with the full understanding and arrangement that it should be so made for the indorser." This holding was approved and the judgment affirmed in First Nat. Bank of Utica v. Ballou, 49 N. Y. 155, and in this case it was also held that the requirement of the statute, that an acknowledgment or promise to take a case out of the operation of the statute must be in writing, does not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest, and prescribes no new rule of evidence as to the fact of such payment, which may be