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with respect to them, indicates an intention on the part of the legisla ture that they shall still remain within the exception contained therein. This is still unquestionably the rule in reference to all matters where the wife is not capacitated to sue or be sued; but it is held in California and in Maine that in cases where a married woman is authorized by statute to sue alone, the saving in the statute of limitations is abrogated as to her. But in New York it is held that the removal of a married woman's disability to sue does not deprive her of the benefit of the saving clause in the statute, unless, as is now the case in that State, the statute omits her from the saving clause; and in Massachusetts the saving clause is extended to infants, insane persons, and persons" disabled by marriage,' "4 which would seem to apply only to cases where, by coverture, a woman cannot sue. It may be stated as a general proposition that where coverture is made a disability, the statute of limitations never begins to run against a married woman while she is covert." But if the statute had begun to run upon her claim before her marriage, her subsequent coverture does not suspend its operation. But while as to the wife the operation of the statute is

1 Cameron v. Smith, 50 Cal. 303. In Massachusetts, Gen. Stat. 1882, the saving is restricted to those "disabled by marriage."

2 Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301.

8 Clark v. McCann, 18 Hun (N. Y.), 13.

4 2 Rev. Stat. p. 1115, § 9.

5 Jones v. Reeves, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 132; Sledge v. Clopton, 6 Ala. 589; Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447; McLane v. Moore, 6 Jones (N. C.) L. 520; Michan v. Wyatt, 21 Ala. 813; McLean v. Jackson, 12 Ired. (N. C.) 149; Fatheree v. Fletcher, 31 Miss. 265; Fearn v. Shirley, 3 id. 301; Meegan v. Boyle, 19 How. (U. S.) 130; Gage v. Smith, 27 Conn. 70; Watson v. Watson, 10 id. 77; Drennen v. Walker, 21 Ark. 539; Caldwell v. Black, 5 Ired. (N. C.) L. 463; Randall v. Raab, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 307; Willson v. Betts, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 201; Dunham v. Lege, 52 N. Y. 229. The statute of limitations does not run against a married woman, to whom property had been left in trust, after her coverture, she being within the exception in the statute in favor of femes covert, in a case where she and her husband are suing in equity for the recovery of the property. Flynt v. Hatchett, 9 Ga. 328.

6 Welborn v. Weever, 17 Ga. 267; Mitchell v. Berry, 1 Met. (Ky.) 602; Kil

lian v. Watt, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 167. In Becton v. Alexander, 27 Tex. 659, it was held that the fact that some of the plaintiffs are femes covert and infants, at the commencement of the suit, does not deprive the defendants of the benefits of their limi tation as to the others, and that to prevent it from being operative against the femes covert, &c., it must be shown that the disability preceded the commencement of the action. See also Pendergrast v. Gullatt, 10 Ga. 218. In Killian v. Watt, ante, the court held that where a cause of action accrues to the wife before marriage, her subsequent coverture does not bar the statute of limitations. This ruling is in obedience to the well-settled rule that where the statute has once begun to run, no subsequent disability can suspend its operation. Cole v. Runnels, 6 Tex. 232; Chevallier v. Durst, 6 id. 239; Den v. Richards, 15 N. J. L. 347; Peck v. Randall, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 165; Lynch v. Cox, 23 Penn. St. 265; Pearce v. House, Term Rep. (N. C.) 305; McCoy v. Nichols, 5 Miss. 31; Fewell v. Collins, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 286; Fitzhugh v. Anderson, 2 H. & M. (Va.) 289; Faysoux v. Prather, 1 N. & McC. (S. C.) 296; Parsons v. MeCracken, 9 Leigh (Va.), 495; Stowel v, Zouch, 1 Plowd. 356; Duroure v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300; Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Tannt. 830; Bunce v. Walcott, 2 Conn. 27. The course

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suspended, yet it is not, on that account, saved to the husband, or the grantee of the husband and wife, as to rights which he acquires in the wife's property. The rule is, that where the husband sues in right of his wife, he cannot avail himself of her disability. The disability that saves a claim from the operation of the statute is of a personal character, and can only be set up by the party in whose favor it exists, and those claiming under him; nor is it available to a person claiming under such disabled person, if he has, at all times since the disability accrued, been in a position to assert and enforce the right; and for this reason the husband cannot avail himself of the wife's disability as to rights which he acquired by coverture over, to, or in her estate.* But this must be understood as applying only to that class of claims which the husband could have enforced during coverture. If the wife's property is taken upon execution upon her husband's debts, or illegally sold, the statute does not begin to run against her until her husband's death; but it begins to run against her heirs immediately upon her death, except as to such property as by law the husband is entitled to a life estate in. In Pennsylvania, it was held that

6

of decisions both in England and in this country has established the rule beyond any doubt, that, when the statute has once commenced to run, it runs over all subsequent disabilities and intermediate acts and events. And there is no distinction between a disability or impediment on the part of the plaintiff, or where it arises from some change or event that has happened to the debtor; nor is there any distinction in this respect between a voluntary and an involuntary disability. Dekay v. Darrah, 14 N. J. L. 288. Where an adverse possession commenced during the life of the ancestor, it is not suspended by the title descending to a feme covert. Jackson v. Robins, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 169; Flemings v. Griswold, 3 Hill (S. C.), 85. This question was considered in Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227, and the rule established, that there is no saving in the statute of limitations for any disability in the heir supervenient to the disability of the person to whom the right of entry first accrued.

1 Carter v. Cantrell, 16 Ark. 154. In Greggs v. Tesson, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 150, where a married woman was the owner of land in which, by force of the law of the state, her husband had a life interest, the grantee of the husband and wife was not saved from the operation of the statute by

the wife's disability, because he might have brought ejectment, counting on his interest immediately upon acquiring the right. McDowell v. Potter, 8 Penn. St. 189.

2 McDowell v. Potter, 8 Penn. St. 189. 3 Watson v. Kelly, 16 N. J. L. 517; Thorpe v. Corwin, 20 id. 311.

4 Gregg v. Tesson, ante. In Carter v. Cantrell, 16 Ark. 154, it was held that a right of action for the recovery of slaves belonging to the wife is not, on account of the wife's disability to sue for the same in her own name, saved to the husband in an action by husband and wife, after the statute would have otherwise attached.

5 State v. Layton, 4 Harr. (Del.) 8. 6 McDonald v. McGuire, 8 Tex. 361; Meanor v. Hamilton, 27 Penn. St. 137; Caller v. Motzer, 13 S. & R. (Penn.) 356. If a married woman loans money to her husband during coverture, the statute does not run upon her claim until his death. Towers v. Hayner, 3 Whart. (Penn.) 18. And the same rule prevails where she loans money to a firm of which the husband is a member. Kutz's Appeal, 40 Penn. St. 90.

7 Carpenter v. Schermerhorn, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 314; Marple v. Myers, 12 Penn. St. 122; Lenhart v. Ream, 74 id. 59; Henry v. Carson, 59 id. 297.

8 Meanor v. Hamilton, ante.

where a sale of land on execution against a deceased debtor has been acquiesced in for thirty or forty years by the family of the decedent, a jury should not disturb the purchaser's title, except upon the most overwhelming proof of fraud, and that, although the disabilities of coverture or infancy have not been removed long enough to make the statute bar complete, yet that the long silence of husbands and guardians is entitled to weight as evidence of such an acquiescence as to protect the purchaser's title. But it is hardly believed that this doctrine can stand. To permit the circumstance that a husband or guardian had acquiesced in an improper interference with the property of the ward, to overcome the protection which the statute is intended to afford to persons under such disabilities, is an assumption by the court of authority to abrogate the clear and unequivocal provisions of a statute, and that, too, for the very reasons that led to the adoption of the statute itself.1 In Ohio, it has been held that equity will refuse relief in a case where a part of the applicants for relief are under no disability, even though some of them are under the disability of coverture, where they are all adults, and have slept upon their rights for so many years that the granting of the relief prayed for would operate as a fraud upon the defendants. But in such a case the parties under disability, upon the removal thereof, can stand upon their legal rights. In New York, married women being given control over their own property, and the right to sue in their own name, no provision is made saving their rights from the operation of the statute; and the repeal of the saving clause in their favor is held to apply to claims existing before the repeal. Thus, where a woman, married in November, 1857, when a bond and mortgage became due to her, neglected to bring an action thereon until December, 1877, the saving clause as to married women having been omitted from the statute in 1870, it was held that her remedy was barred by the lapse of twenty years. In Wisconsin, no exception is made in favor of married women, the statute of that State in this respect being the same as in New York. In Iowa, coverture is not within the saving clause. In Massachusetts, the statute only saves the rights of married women where they are disabled by coverture; that is, where they are not clothed with authority to prosecute their rights by suits in their own name. In California and Indiana, married women are not within the saving clause of the statute, except as to those rights for the enforcement of which the husband is a necessary party. In West Virginia, coverture is within the exception of the statute, except in those cases where a married woman holds lands as her sole and separate property. In all the other States, coverture is within the saving clause of the statute; and the circumstance that a married woman is clothed with the

1 Piatt v. Smith, 12 Ohio St. 561.
2 Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh (Va.), 79.

8 Acker v. Acker, 81 N. Y. 143, reversing the same case in 16 Hun (N. Y.), 173.

power to sue in her own name does not defeat the exception, because, although she may not be within the reason of the statute, she is nevertheless within its letter, and the legislature not having seen fit to repeal the saving clause as to her, the courts have no power to do so.

SEC. 241. Imprisonment. — Under the statute of James, the disability arising from imprisonment relates to a restraint of one's liberty under process or color of law, or an involuntary restraint that prevents the person from fully availing himself of the remedies provided for the enforcement of his legal rights. Thus, in this country it has been held that a person held in slavery is imprisoned, within the meaning of the term as used in these statutes,' and that the disability does not cease until he is emancipated. In New York, the saving is restricted to persons imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than life; and the provision is the same in Wisconsin, Missouri, California, Oregon, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Arizona, Dakota, Idaho, Montana and Utah; while in Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Nebraska, Texas, and Wyoming this disability applies to any person "imprisoned," and therefore applying in all those instances to which the statute of James applied, and embracing persons imprisoned upon civil as well as criminal processes, or deprived of their liberty by any process of law or statute. In Illinois, in order to be within the saving of the statute, the person must be imprisoned upon a criminal charge; in Michigan, in the state-prison; and in Arkansas, imprisoned" beyond the limits of the State." In Connecticut, New Hampshire, Iowa, Kansas, New Jersey, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, and New Mexico imprisonment is not recognized as constituting a disability, and no saving exists in favor of persons restrained of their liberty.

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In those States in which imprisonment constitutes a disability, the circumstance that the plaintiff might have commenced an action upon a claim existing at that time, but did not, does not deprive him of the saving of the statute, as it is well settled that the statute does not prevent a person under a disability from suing if he elects to do so; nor is he obliged to sue simply because he can; nor even if he should bring an action while the disability existed, and failed in it upon technical grounds, would he be deprived of the saving of the statute when the disability is removed.

SEC. 242. Alien Enemy. -In Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, South Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, California, Oregon, Minnesota, Alabama, Nevada, Arizona,

1 Matilda v. Cranshaw, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 209.

2 Price v. Slaughter, 1 Cin. (Ohio) 429.

3 Piggot v. Rush, 4 Ad. & El. 912.

4 Chandler v. Villette, 2 Saund. 117 c.

Dakota, Idaho, and Utah, the statutes contain an exception in favor of a person who is a citizen of a country at war with the United States, providing that during the continuance of such hostilities the statute shall be suspended and not considered as a part of the period limited for the commencement of an action. In Nevada, it is provided, however, that a citizen of a State in rebellion against the United States government shall not be treated as an alien. None of the statutes of the other States contain this exception, and consequently in none of the other States is there any saving in favor of an alien enemy.

SEC. 243. Injunction. Except in those States where a saving is expressly made in favor of parties, where the commencement of an action is enjoined, the fact that an injunction has been procured preventing the bringing of an action upon a certain claim does not save it from the operation of the statute; nor can a court of equity make any order which will prevent the running of the statute during such period, but the remedy of the party is through an application to the court for an injunction to restrain the party from pleading the statute. But in Vermont, New York, Arkansas, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Minnesota, North Carolina, and South Carolina, it is provided that, when the commencement of an action is enjoined, the time during which the injunction "is in force" shall not be deemed a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. In Alabama, California, Oregon, Wisconsin, Nevada, Arizona, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Utah, the same exception is made not only where the commencement of an action is prevented by injunction, but also where it is prevented by any statutory prohibition. In Mississippi, the same provision is made where the commencement of an action is prohibited by law, or restrained or enjoined by the order, decree, or process of any court of the State. In Michigan, no exception is made where an action is enjoined, but it is provided that the time during which any case in chancery, commenced by any debtor, has or may be pending and undetermined, shall not be computed as constituting any part of the time. limited, as to the particular debt or subject-matter of such proceeding in chancery.

It will be noticed by the language of these statutes that the suspension only exists while the injunction is in force, therefore the circumstance that an application has been made for an injunction, and is pending, will not save the statute, whether the injunction is or is not subsequently granted; and if the statute runs upon a claim while a petition for an injunction is pending, but before it is granted or denied,

1 Barker v. Millard, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 572; Robertson v. Alford, 21 Miss. 509; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss. 213; Rice v. Lawan, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 149; Doughty v. Doughty, 10 N. J. Eq. 34. In De Kay v. Darrah, 3 id. 288, it was held that, while

the circumstance that the bringing of an action has been enjoined will not save the statute as to the claim involved, yet that a court of equity under such circumstances may enjoin a party from setting up the statute in bar of the action.