statute than a court of law.1 Indeed, LORD REDESDALE, in an English (N. Y.) 460; Rhyn v. Vincent, 1 McCord (S. C.) Eq. 310; Murray v. Coster, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 522; Kane County v. Herrington, 50 Ill. 232; Atwater v. Fowler, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 417; Kane v. Blood good, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) Ch. 90; Lansing v. Starr, 2 id. 150; Badger v. Badger, 2 Cliff. (U. S. C. C.) 137; Conover v. Conover, 1 N. J. Eq. 403. Effect will be given to the statute of limitations in equity as well as at law in proper cases. Lewis v. Marshall, 1 McLean (U. S.), 16; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 32; Lewis v. Marshall, 5 id. 469; Sharp v. Sharp, 15 Vt. 105; Collard v. Tuttle, 4 id. 491; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 587; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 id. 460; Lansing v. Starr, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 150; Murray v. Coster, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 576; s. c. 5 Johns. (N.Y.) Ch. 522; Atwater v. Fowler, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 417; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 90; Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. Eq. 685; Conover v. Conover, id. 403; Watkins v. Harwood, 2 Gill & J. 307; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland (Va.), 236; Harrison v. Harrison, 1 Call (Va.), 419; Ryan v. Parker, 1 Ired. Ch. 89; Mardre v. Leigh, 1 Dev. (N. C.) Eq. 360; Van Rhyn v. Vincent, 1 McCord (S. C.) Ch. 310; Cumming v. Berry, 1 Rich. (S. C.) Eq. 114; Moore v. Porcher, 1 Bailey Ch. 195; Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ala. 90; Wood v. Wood, 3 id. 756; Armstrong v. Campbell, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 201; Shelby v. Shelby, Cooke (Tenn.), 179; McDowell v. Heath, 3 A. K. Mar. 222; Thomas v. White, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 177; Perry v. Craig, 3 Mo. 316. And an allegation in the bill that the plaintiff has been prevented by fraud from asserting his claim is unavail. ing. McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. (N.Y.) 460. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, courts of equity are bound by the statute equally with courts of law. And there are other cases, not of concurrent jurisdiction, where the statute is applied by way of analogy to the law. Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mas. (U. S. C. C.) 95. In prescribing the time within which a bill of review may be brought, a court of equity will adopt the analogy of the statute limiting the time within which an appeal may be taken to a decree. Thomas v. Harvie, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 146. A court of equity will give full effect to the statute of limitations, as well as throw out stale demands and claims; but when it perceives that the party complaining has equitable rights, and that the remedy at law might have proved to be insufficient; that the answer admits that they have never been relinquished, or compensation made for them, and that they still exist; and alleges that no resistance has been made to the enjoyment of them up to the time of filing the answer, it will not refuse to give relief, being a case proper for it, although the claim has been outstanding for a long time. Chapman v. Butler, 22 Me. 191. It will not presume the extinguishment of an equity of redemption from lapse of time, where the person entitled is under any of the disabilities specified in the statute of limitations, Wells v. Morse, 11 Vt. 9. Nor does the statute constitute directly a defence to a bill in chancery; but the court will, in analogy to the statute, presume a settlement and payment from the lapse of the same time, if the presumption be not rebutted by evidence which satisfactorily accounts for the delay, and the case do not come within the exceptions of the statute. Spear v. Newell, 13 Vt. 288; Mardre v. Leigh, 1 Dev. (N. C.) Eq. 366; Ryan v. Parker, 1 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 89; Harrison v. Harrison, 1 Call (Va.), 419; Watkins v. Harwood, 2 G. & J. (Md.) 107; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland (Md.) Ch. 236; Mitchell v. Woodson, 37 Miss. 567; Mandevill v. Lane, 28 id. 312; Borden v. Perry, 20 Ark. 293; Harris v. Mills, 28 Ill. 44; McDowell v. Heath, 3 A. K. Mar. (Ky.) 222; Shelby v. Shelby, Cooke (Tenn.), 179; Murphy v. Blair, 12 Ind. 184; Bailey v. Carter, 7 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 282; Thomas v. Harvie, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 146; Judah v. Brandon, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 506; Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 129; Perkins v. Cartwell, 4 Harr. (Del.) 270; Lansing v. Star, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 150. 1 Bailey v. Carter, 7 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 282. A court of equity will give effect to the statute in all cases where the plaintiff could have brought an action at law for the same matter. Goddell v. Kimmel, 99 case,1 before the adoption of the statute of Wm. IV., which expressly extends the statute to courts of equity, went so far as to hold that courts of U. S. 201; Mann v. Fairchild, 2 Keyes (N. Y.), 106; Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 266; Clark v. Ford, 8 Keyes (N. Y.), 370; Stafford v. Bryan, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 532; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 id. 532; Spoor v. Wells, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 199; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 152; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. (U. S.) 143; Pratt v. Northam, 5 id. 95; Hunt v. Wickliffe, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 201. A plea of the statute of limitations was overruled upon letters produced, assigning reasons for declining to pay, and recommending plaintiff to bring an action, as amounting to a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to take it out of the statute, upon the authorities, though against principle. Baillie v. Sibbald, 15 Ves. 185; Baillie v. Lord Inchiquin, 1 Esp. 435. Payment of a dividend under a commission of bankruptcy against one partner raises a new assumpsit by the other, depriving him of the benefit of the statute of limitations. Ex parte Dewdney, 15 Ves. 499. Before the statute of 4 Anne, c. 16, § 19, there were no exceptions in the statute of limitations in this country; and even since that time it has been held that the saving in that statute is not to be extended according to equity; for though the courts of justice may be shut up (tempore guerra), so as that no original could be filed, yet the statute continues to run against a demand. Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 93; Aubry v. Fortescue, 10 Mod. 206; Hall v. Wybourn. 2 Salk. 420. The statute of limitations is founded upon the soundest principles, and courts of equity are bound to adopt it where the legal and equitable title so far correspond, as that the only difference is, that the one must be enforced in this court, the other in a court of law. MANNERS, C., in Medlicott v. O'Donel, 1 B. & B. 166. The statute does not bar a bill of revivor, after a decree to account, but it rests in the discretion of the court to give or refuse relief. Egremont v. Hamilton, 1 B. & B. 531; Hol lingshead's Case, 1 P. Wms. 742; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 607. In Sugar River Bank v. Fairbank, 49 N. H. 139, BELLOWS, C. J., in commenting upon the extent to which a court of equity will go in enforcing statutes of limitations, says: "As a general rule, courts of equity are bound by a statute of limitations equally with courts of law, and they cannot disregard the plain requirements of such statute; for that would be to repeal it. Even when the statute, in terms, applies only to actions at law, which are enumerated, courts of equity act in analogy to it, and refuse to grant relief in cases coming within its provisions. In the case of executors and administrators the limitations imposed by statutes are more stringently enforced than those of the general statutes of limitations, both at law and in equity; and it has been held that the omission to embody in the former statute the exceptions contained in the latter indicate the purpose to make the bar of suits against executors and administrators absolute." See also Atwood v. Rhode Island Agricultural Bank, 2 R. I. 191; Walker v. Cheever, 39 N. H. 420; Judge of Probate v. Brooks, 5 id. 82; Cutter v. Emery, 37 id. 567; Ticknor v. Harris, 14 id. 272; Burdock v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 234; McCartee v. Camel, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 455; Flood v. Patteson, 29 Beav. 293; Sibbering v. Balcarras, 3 De G. & Sm. 735; Downes v. Bullock, 9 H. L. Cas. 1; Wright v. Vanderplank, 2 K. & J. 1; Mills v. Drewitt, 20 Beav. 632; Portlock v. Gardner, 1 Hare, 594. A claim by a creditor, against a legatee, to have the legacy refunded for payment of the debt, will be barred, in analogy to the statute of limitations, by a lapse of four years from the time when the insolvency of the executor was ascertained by a return of nulla bona to an execution against him. Miller v. Mitchell, 1 Bailey (S. C.) Ch. 437. The statute of Tennessee does not run to bar the recovery of a legacy from the executor, 1 Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 629. equity did not adopt the statute merely by analogy of, but in obedience to, the statute; and so generally did the English courts of equity follow the statute, that the enactment of the statute referred to was regarded as little more than giving a statutory sanction to a well-established rule of those courts.1 The statute is regarded as a defence, as well in equity as in law, where it confers absolute rights upon the party seeking its benefits. Thus, it would be preposterous to suppose that, where the title to lands has become absolute in a person by an adverse possession of them for the statutory period, a court of equity is not bound to give effect to such title, as well as a court of law; and it may be safely said that, regardless of the question whether the statute is applied in express in equity, there being no statute of that State giving a legal remedy. McDonald v. McDonald, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 145. Where, by statute, the action of assumpsit is limited to three years, and that of debt to six, a cause of action on which assumpsit or debt may be brought will not be barred in the form of debt under six years; and where a bill in equity is founded on the same cause of action, the limitation will be to six years. Burdoine v. Shelton, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41. Where a party attempts to enforce in equity a claim, on which debt or assumpsit would lie, if he had sued at law, the limitation of the former action being three years, and that of the latter six years, it will be considered, in respect to the statute of limitations, as an action of debt. Bedford v. Brady, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 350. Twenty years' adverse possession succeeding an actual or virtual disseisin bars a suit in equity as well as at law, and three years added to such adverse possession, after infants, who hold a claim to land in controversy, have arrived at full age, bars their claim. Gates v. Jacob, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 306; Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Sum. (U. S.) 152; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 61; Coulson v. Walton, 9 id. 62; Lewis v. Marshall, 5 id. 470; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. (U. S.) 189; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 15 Pet. (U.S.) 233; Peyton v. Stith, 5 id. 485; Bank v. Daniel, 12 id. 33; Hayman v. Keally, 3 Cranch (U. S. C. C.), 325. 1 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 56; Hollingshead's Case, 1 P. Wms. 743; Edsell v. Buchanan, 2 Ves. 83; South Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms. 143. The true meaning of the statute of limitations, as applied to titles to land, is, that the party should have twenty years, during which it should be open to him to assert his title, and failing to do so a court of equity can afford no relief to him; and in such cases the court acts not by analogy, but in obedience to those statutes, considering themselves bound thereby in all cases of legal titles and legal demands; and wher ever the legislature has limited a period for law proceedings, courts of equity will deem themselves equally restricted in analogous cases. Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 630; Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645. So, with respect to the operation of the statute of limitations upon cases of trusts in equity, the distinction is, if the trust be constituted by act of the parties, the possession of the trustee is the possession of the cestui que trust, and no length of such possession will bar; but if a party is to be constituted a trustee by the decree of a court of equity, founded on fraud, or the like, his possession is adverse, and the statute of limitations will run from the time that the circumstances of the fraud were discovered. Hollingshead's Case, 1 P. Wms. 742; Lockey v. Lockey, Prec. Ch. 518; Booth v. Lord Warrington, 1 Bro. P. C. 455; Weston v. Cartwright, Sel. Ch. Cas. 34; South Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms. 158; Bicknell v. Gough, 3 Atk. 538. Every new right of action in equity must be acted upon within twenty years after it accrues. Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645; Floyer v. Lavington, 1 P. Wms. 270; Delorain v. Brown, 3 Bro. C. C. 633; Beckford v. Close, id. 644; Hercy v. Dinwoody, 4 id. 257. terms to courts of equity, it is in all cases, except where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, bound thereby, when the statute has conferred absolute rights upon a person, or when its jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is only concurrent with that of courts of law.1 The principal reasons for this analogous application of the statute in courts of equity are, that the evils resulting from great delay in enforcing equitable rights are equally as great as those resulting from delay in enforcing legal rights, and also because, unless courts of equity acted in analogy to these statutes in cases where a party has a choice of forums, the result would be that the effect and real end of the statute would be eluded.2 But in cases where relief is sought upon the ground of fraud 1 Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 420. This doctrine is adopted in the United States courts, and in those courts it is held that, in all that class of cases in which courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, they are bound by general statutes of limitation, in the same manner as courts of law, and act in obedience to the statute, and not merely in analogy to it. Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 32; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. (U. S.) 143; Pratt v. Northam, id. 95. See also Union Bank of Louisiana v. Stafford, 12 How. (U. S.) 327. The statute is a bar to an equitable right, when at law it would have operated against a grant. Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 61; affirming s. c., 1 McLean (U. S. C. C.), 85. So, too, they are applied by conrts of equity, in all cases where at law they might be pleaded. Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 62. Effect will be given to the statutes of limitations in equity as well as in law, and as well where the origin of the conflicting titles is adverse as in other cases. Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 61. Thus, where an actual adverse possession has continued for twenty years, it constitutes a complete bar in equity, wherever the same possession would operate at law to bar an ejectment. A court of equity considers an equitable claim to land as barred, when the right of entry is lost. The right to file a bill does not continue beyond that time, until the time for bringing a writ of right has passed. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 152; Hunt v. Wickliffe, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 201; Peyton v. Stith, 5 id. 485; Lewis v. Marshall, id. 470; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 15 id. 233. In obedience to this rule a bill claiming title to, and praying for the possession of, lands will be dismissed, if the complainant and those through whom he claims have taken no steps to assert their rights for thirty years; the land being all that time in the adverse possession of their defendants and their ancestor. The claim is barred by twenty years' adverse possession. Pindell v. Mulliken, 1 Black (U. S.), 585. So, too, within the peculiar jurisdiction of courts of equity, those courts, although not in strictness bound by statutes of limitation, act by analogy to it, and, in a proper case, apply, as an equitable rule, the limitation prescribed by the statute. Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. (U. S. C. C.) 143; Pratt v. Northam, id. 95; Baker v. Biddle, Baldw. (U. S. C. C.) 394. See also Union Bank of Louisiana v. Stafford, 12 How. (U. S.) 327. The power conferred by the statute laws of some of the States, upon courts of probate, to direct a sale of the real estate of an intestate for the payment of debts, must be exercised within a reasonable time after the death of the intestate; and gross neglect or delay on the part of the creditors for an unreasonable time ought to be held to be a waiver or extinguishment of it. Although this power is not within the purview of the statute of limitations, it is within its equity; and by analogy to the cases where a limitation has been applied to other rights, the reasonable period within which this power may be exercised ought to be limited to the same period which regulates rights of entry. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 59. 2 Roosevelt v. Marks, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 266; Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) on the part of the defendant, the courts, in a proper case, depart from this rule, and will give relief, unless the plaintiff has been guilty of unreasonable laches in seeking his remedy in equity.1 In an English case,' the plaintiff brought a bill in equity to recover a large sum of money which he had been induced to pay to the defendant under fraudulent representations from him that he had paid a large sum of money to bring about a marriage between the plaintiff and his wife. The marriage took effect, and the plaintiff, led by the continuous misrepresentations of the defendant, paid to him the money stipulated. Nine years after the money had been paid the original fraud and subsequent management to delude the plaintiff was discovered, and then it was ascertained that the defendant not only never had paid, but also that he never was bound to pay, a farthing on account of the marriage. To the bill the defendant set up the statute of limitations, and the questions propounded for argument were: First, whether an action at law could have been maintained to recover damages for the fraud; second, if it could, at what time did the cause of action accrue; and, third, whether, supposing the fraud had not been discovered until after the expiration of six years from the accruing of the cause of action, a court of equity, after that time, could give relief." 33; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) and sound doctrine, in a court of equity;" and that courts of equity are perfectly right in saying "that a party cannot in 152. 1 Evans v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 213. 2 Booth v. Warrington, 1 Bro. P. C. good conscience avail himself of the stat445. 8 This case has been followed by numerous cases involving the same question. Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. (U. S.) 143. LORD REDESDALE, in the case of Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 429, declared that where a title exists at law and in conscience, and the effectual exertion of it at law is unconscientiously obstructed, relief should be given in equity. And the same judge, in Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 634, says, "that the reason why the statutes of limitation in case of the defendant's fraud ought not to prevail in a court of equity, is, that the conscience of the party, being so affected, he ought not to be allowed to avail himself of the length of time." In Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 141, it was held, that, in case of an equitable estate, "the statute of limitations would be a bar where there has been no fraud;" and in Troup v. Smith's Exrs., 29 Johns. (N. Y.) 47, SPENCER, C. J., says, in allusion to the before-mentioned doctrine of LORD REDESDALE, "This is very intelligible ute, when by his own fraud he had prevented the other party from coming to a knowledge of his rights." In the case of Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. (U. S.) 143, the same doctrine is very distinctly and fully recognized, and is said to apply as well to cases in which the jurisdiction of courts of law and equity is concurrent, as to such as are exclusively of equitable cognizance. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. (U. S.) 561, in discussing this subject, say: "In a case of actual fraud, we believe no case can be found in the books in which a court of equity has refused to give relief in the lifetime of either of the parties upon whom the fraud is proved." The First Massachusetts Turnpike Co. v. Tidd, 3 Mass. 201, was an early and well-considered case, and has been noticed and approved by many other cases in this country, in which the Chief Justice says: "If this knowledge is fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff by the defendant, we should violate a sound principle of law if we permitted the defendant to avai |