The notice may also be served by post, by a registered letter addressed to the person on whom it is to be served at his last known place of residence or place of business; and, if served by post, shall be deemed to have been served at the time when a letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; and, in proving the service of such notice, it shall be sufficient to prove that the notice was properly addressed and registered.

Where the employer is a body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, the notice shall be served by delivering the same at, or by sending it by post in a registered letter addressed to the office, or, if there be more than one office, any one of the offices of such body.

A notice under this section shall not be deemed invalid by reason of any defect or inaccuracy therein, unless the judge who tries the action arising from the injury mentioned in the notice shall be of opinion that the defendant in the action is prejudiced in his defence by such defect or inaccuracy, and that the defect or inaccuracy was for the purpose of misleading.

8. For the purposes of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires :

The expression "person who has superintendence entrusted to him," means a person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, and who is not ordinarily engaged in manual labour: The expression "employer" includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate;

The expression "workman" means a railway servant and any person to whom the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, applies. 9. The Act came into operation on the 1st January, 1881; and10. Is to continue in force till 31st December, 1887, and to the end of the then next session in Parliament. (Haynes's Student's Statutes, 2nd ed., 149-152; see recent cases of McGiffen v. Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Co. (Ld.), 52 L. J. Q. B. D. 25; Munday v. The Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. D. 119.)

MAXIMS.

126. Explain and illustrate the maxim “Expressum facit cessare tacitum."

From certain facts and circumstances arising in connection with the dealings of certain persons, the law implies certain contracts or promises, but such implied contracts or promises only arise where there is no express promise between the parties, in accordance with this maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum, which, when construed, means "Express contracts or promises make implied ones of no effect." A party, therefore, cannot be bound by an implied contract when he has made an express contract as to the same subject-matter, even although the latter be avoided by fraud. He may, it is true, repudiate the contract entirely on this ground, but if he sues the other party in contract at all it must be on the express contract. Thus, although the word "demise" implies a covenant for quiet enjoyment, yet it is qualified and restrained by an express covenant for quiet enjoyment. Upon the same principle the custom of the country in regard to the claims of the outgoing tenant of a farm shall prevail even where there is a lease, if such lease contains no stipulations as to the terms of quitting which can exclude the custom; yet where the lease or agreement contains any express terms on the subject evidence of the custom shall be excluded. (Chitty on Contracts, 10th ed. 62, 98; see Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Smith's L. C. 598; Dougl. 201; Haynes's Student's L. C. 73.)

127. " Ignorantia juris haud excusat." Explain the application in equity of this maxim, and the sense to be given to the word "jus.” What is the rule as regards family arrangements?

This maxim means "Ignorance of law (juris) is no excuse," i.e., in cases where the maxim applies, if the consequences of a man's act are different from what he intended; and those consequences arise solely from his acting upon a misapprehension of the law on the subject, it will be no answer to say that he would have acted differently had he known the law. The maxim applies to all the rules of the common law. It does not, however, apply to all the rules which only formerly obtained in the old Courts of Equity, as, for instance, the doctrine of election. If a person is called upon pursuant to that doctrine to choose between two alternate rights under or against a deed or will, it is necessary for another person who wishes to assert that such person has elected, to prove, in cases of dispute, that the elector knew he had such rights, and the consequences of

electing either way, and with all this knowledge has elected deliberately. "Jus" here is limited to the rules laid down by the common law, the Legislature, and such of the rules of equity as do not require strict proof in cases of dispute that such doctrines were brought home to the notice of the party to be bound by its operation.

The rules or rather the practice of all the Courts is to support as far as possible family arrangements where there is no proof of mala fules or proof of fraud having been practised on the parties to them, provided all the parties are competent to enter into such arrangements. Where a family arrangement has been come to bonâ fide, and has been acted upon for years, it will require a very strong case indeed to upset it. The Court in so acting has regard to the importance of preserving honour and peace amongst the members of a family. Rights compromised in such cases are not judged by the same hard and fast rules as apply to rights compromised by strangers. Each party to a family arrangement must however disclose all material facts affecting the rights of each of the other parties known to him or her, although he or she may have greater facilities for obtaining information than the others have or can have.

This disclosure is not required in the case of compromises by strangers, unless there is a fiduciary relationship existing between the parties. (See Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Swanston's Rep. 400, and Stapilton v. Stapilton, 1 Atkyn's Reports, 2; 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq. 836; Haynes's Student's Leading Cases, 197; Westby v. Westby, 2 D. & War. 503; Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31; Williams v. Williams, L. R. 2 Ch. 294; Dunnidge v. White, 1 Swanst. 137; Stewart v. Stewart, 6 C. & F. 911; Scott v. Scott, 11 Ir. Eq. Rep. 74; Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

128. Certain goods are sent to be laden on board a general ship. The goods are negligently stowed by the stevedore, who has been appointed by the shipper, and are damaged. Is the master of the ship liable for the damage? Will it make any, and if any what, difference if the charter-party contains a clause that the stevedore shall be paid by and act under the master's order?

The master is not liable for the damage caused by the negligent stowage of the goods by the stevedore, because the stevedore was neither the servant nor agent of the master, for he was appointed by the shipper whose servant he was.

If the charter-party had in the above case contained a clause that the stevedore should be paid by and act under the master's order, it would not make any difference except as to any acts actually done by the stevedore in pursuance of, and in execution of the master's orders, and for such last-mentioned acts the master would be responsible if negligently done so as to cause dmaage. (Blackie v. Stembridge, 28 L. J. C. P. 329; 6 Com. B. Rep. N. S. 894; and see Swainson v. Garrick, 2 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 255.)

129. What advice would you give C. and Co. in the following case? and give reasons for the advice you give :-C. and Co. shipped a cargo of beans on board F. and Co.'s ship under a bill of lading from Alexandria to Glasgow, with leave to call at intermediate ports, deliverable to C. and Co.'s order, on payment of freight by consignee. The ship called at Liverpool, and on going out met with a collision (a peril excepted in the bill of lading) and was obliged to put back for repairs, which detained her a few days. The beans were damaged by sea-water in consequence of the collision, to which damage the attention of the master was called, and to the fact that they would be seriously injured unless taken out and dried at once, and then re-shipped. The master refused to take that course. beans were carried on to Glasgow, and on their arrival they were much deteriorated in value beyond what they would have been had they been dried at Liverpool, where there was plenty of accommodation for doing so, during the time the ship was detained there.

The

We should advise C. and Co. to sue F. and Co., the owners, for damages for the amount of the deterioration in value beyond what they would have been worth had they been dried at Liverpool. The cost of the unshipping, drying, and re-shipping of the beans at Liverpool might have been charged to the cargo as particular average, and the drying, &c., would not have unreasonably delayed the voyage. There was a duty upon the master of the ship as representing the owners to have taken such active measures to check

and arrest the injurious consequences of damage done to the cargo by perils excepted in the bill of lading. (See Notara and Another v. Henderson and Others, 41 L. J. Q. B. 158; L. R. 7 Q. B. 225.)

130. B., a merchant in New York, buys a cargo of corn for and upon the order of C., a merchant in Liverpool, and takes a bill of lading for it deliverable to his own order. B. then draws bills of exchange for the cost of the cargo on C., which bills are accepted in due course, and sells them to a New York bank, to whom he also indorses the bill of lading. He sends invoices and a letter of advice to C., showing that the cargo is bought and shipped on his account. On arrival of the corn at Liverpool, and before payment of the bills of exchange, C. demands delivery, which is refused. What are the legal rights of the bank and C. respectively?

The bank has a right to the corn should the bills be not paid at maturity.

If the bills are paid at maturity, C. has the right to the corn, and in order to secure it he can call upon the bank to indorse the bills of lading to him. (See Gilbert v. Enignon, L. R. 8 Ch. 16; Ranken v. Alfaro (App.), 46 L. J. Ch. 832; L. R. 5 Ch. D. 786; Banco de Lima v. The Anglo-Peruvian Bank, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 160.)

131. A bill of lading contains special clauses exonerating the shipowner from even the perils induced by the negligence of his servants. During the voyage the cargo is damaged by sea-water, caused, as it afterwards turns out, by a negligent act of omission on the part of one of the crew, which rendered the ship unseaworthy before she left her port of loading. Will the clauses in the bill of lading prevent the owner of cargo from recovering against the shipowner in respect of such damage? Give reasons for your answer.

No; the owner is liable to the cargo-owner upon his implied warranty that the ship is seaworthy, for there is here no agreement to the contrary. The special clauses in the bill of lading would exonerate the shipowner under the maxim Expressum fucit cessare tacitum did they apply, but they do not, because the bill of lading does not apply until the goods are actually received on board Kopitoff v. Wilson, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 377, 380; Cohen v. Davidson,