Myrick vs. M. C. R. R. Co. delivered the cattle to the connecting carrier at Detroit, for their place of destination. Second. That even if the contract with the plaintiff was for the transportation of the cattle in question from Chicago to Philadelphia, it fully performed its undertaking in that behalf by the delivery of the cattle to the North Philadelphia Drove Yard Company, and that the loss to the plaintiff occurred through the neglect of said Drove Yard Company, for which defendant is not responsible. It is conceded that the plaintiff did ship by the defendant's road, the two lots of cattle in question; that the cattle passed over the defendant's railroad to Detroit and from there over connecting railroad lines to Philadelphia, reaching the latter place by what is known as the North Penn. Railroad, and that the North Penn. Railroad Company delivered the cattle to the North Philadelphia Drove Yard Company, a corporation or firm owning and managing certain cattle yards in the vicinity of Philadelphia, fitted up with conveniences for receiving and yarding live stock; that the first lot of said stock arrived at the drove yards on the 11th of November, and the last on the 18th of November, and that the officers or managers of the drove yards delivered the cattle to J. and W. Blaker, without the surrender of the receipt or bill of lading which the defendants had issued to Myrick, and which Myrick had indorsed to the bank, and without the order of Myrick. The following is a copy of one of the shipping receipts given by defendant to plaintiff, the other being like it except as to date. [Michigan Central Railroad Company, Chicago Station, Nov. 7, 1877.] Received from Paris Myrick, in apparent good order, consigned to order Paris Myrick. Notify J. and W. Blaker. Philadelphia, Pa. Articles. Two hundred and two (202). Marked. Weight and Measure. 240,000. Advanced charges, $1,200, marked and described as above (contents Myrick vs. M. C. R. R. Co. and value otherwise unknown) for transportation by the Michigan Central Railroad Company, to the warehouse at This receipt can be exchanged for a through bill of lading. Indorsed, PARIS MYRICK. The only rule on the back of the receipt which affects this question, is rule 11, which is as follows: "Goods or property, consigned to any place off the company's line of road, or to any point or place beyond its termini, will be sent forward by a carrier or freightman, when there are such, in the usual manner, the company acting, for the purpose of delivery to such carrier, as the agent of the consignor or consignee, and not as carriers. The company will not be liable or responsible for any loss, damage or injury to the property, after the same shall have been sent from any warehouse or station of the company." It is claimed by the plaintiff, that by the terms of the shipment it became the duty of the defendant as a common carrier, to notify J. and W. Blaker, of the arrival of said cattle at the place of destination, and that no rightful delivery could be made, except upon the order of Myrick and the surrender of the bill of lading, but that without the order of Myrick the cattle were wrongfully delivered to the Blakers, who sold them and converted the proceeds to their own use, whereby the cattle were wholly lost to the plaintiff and the bank which had advanced money on them. The first question is, did the defendants make a contract to transport these cattle from here to Philadelphia? It was competent for the defendant as a common carrier, to contract for the transportation of these cattle beyond its own terminus, and to Philadelphia. If such contract was in fact made, the carriers beyond the defendant's terminus, that is, beyond Detroit to the place of destination, became the agents of the defendant to complete the contract, and the defendant is Myrick vs. M. C. R. R. Co. liable for any breach of it whereby the plaintiff sustained damage. Considerable discussion has been had before the court upon the questions of law raised, whether these receipts are, or are not, a through contract or bill of lading. At first I was inclined to submit this as a question of fact to the jury; that is, to submit all the testimony, including the shipping receipts, and allow the jury to say, as a question of fact, whether the defendants did contract to transport these cattle through to Philadelphia, or not, but upon further reflection, I have concluded that this is solely a question of law for the court. In construing a written contract, courts have the right to hear, to a certain extent, parol evidence as to the circumstances under which a contract was made, for the purpose of putting themselves in the place of the contracting parties, and determining the purport and effect of the language used; that is, the court has the right to ascertain what the surrounding circumstances and facts were, in order to determine the intention of the parties, and the full legal purport of the contract made. Perhaps the rule asserting the right of the court to look into the surrounding facts connected with the making of a contract, for the purpose of determining its meaning has never been more lucidly stated than by Mr. Justice CATON, of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in the case of Doyle vs. Teas, 4 Scammon, 256: "But the true rule, clearly deducible from the cases, I think, is where the language is of such a character as to show that the parties had a fixed and definite meaning which they intended to express, and used language adequate to convey that idea to persons possessed of all the facts which they had in view at the time they used the language, it then becomes the duty of the court to learn those facts, if need be, by parol proof, and thus, as far as possible, by occupying the place of the partics Myrick vs. M. C. R. R. Co. employing the expressions, ascertain the sense in which they were intended to be used.” Now, taking into consideration the circumstances, as shown in the proofs, surrounding the making of these shipping receipts or bills of lading, I come to the conclusion, and say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that they are through contracts, whereby the defendant agreed to transport the cattle in question from Chicago to Philadelphia, and there deliver them to the order of Paris Myrick, and to notify J. and W. Blaker of their arrival. This was the undertaking on the part of the defendant with the plaintiff, and with whoever might be made the assignee or holder of this contract. It thus became the duty of the defendant, if the defendant's road did not reach the place of destination of the property, to properly notify or inform each of the carriers beyond the defendant's terminus, of the terms upon which that shipment was made, and each of the carriers beyond the defendant's terminus is, for the purpose of executing this contract, the agent of the defendant, and as completely bound to carry out the terms of the contract as if defendant's road extended from here to the place of destination, and the agents of the last carrier that transported these cattle are the agents of the defendant for the purpose of executing this contract and seeing that its terms were complied with. This, then, being a through contract, the only question is, whether there has been a breach of it. The defendants insist that owing to the peculiar nature of live stock as freight, it is not to be considered as ordinary merchandise; that it must be yarded, watered and fed, not only along the route, but at the terminus, or place of destination, and that peculiar accommodations are required for that purpose, such as railroad companies do not usually have; and that the plaintiff knew when he shipped this stock that the railroad Myrick vs. M. C. R. R. Co. at the place of destination had no facilities of its own for caring for cattle, but that its course of business was to deliver to this Drove Yard Company, and that, therefore, the contract of carriage was completed when the delivery was made to the Drove Yard Company. Undoubtedly this kind of freight must have accommodations adapted to it, and railroad companies that become carriers of live stock may provide such accommodations themselves, or may adopt those provided by other independent companies or persons. But if they adopt the yards of another, they thereby make them their own for the purpose of performing their contract, the same as if they were their own depot, and the managers of the yards their servants and agents. As with merchandise, they are bound to provide a depot or freighthouse in which the goods may be safely kept for a reasonable time until the consignee can take them away; so, in regard to cattle, they must make some preparation whereby they can be safely and properly kept and cared for, until a delivery can be made to the consignee, according to the terms of the shipment. For this purpose, as I have already intimated, the railroad company, as a common carrier, had a right to make this drove yard its warehouse or place for the storage of these cattle, and the drove yards were required to hold the cattle, as the railroad company itself would have been compelled to hold them until the consignee called for them, or until a reasonable time elapsed. The cattle being, of course, expensive to keep, they would be kept at the cost of the consignee, and the charges upon them would be additional charges to be paid whenever they were taken away; and if they were detained an unreasonable time, then, under the law pertaining to the rights and duties of common carriers, the Drove Yard Company would be entitled to sell the cattle as perishable property for their advances and charges thereon. They would not be obliged to keep them indefi |