meant no other wrong than obtaining a better price than the gun was worth; probably he hoped it would be good enough not to burst, though not so good as he said it was; but he has put another in danger of life and limb by his falsehood, and he must abide the risk. We have to follow the authorities yet farther.

Representations to a class of persons: Polhill v. Walter. A statement circulated or published in order to be acted on by a certain class of persons, or at the pleasure of any one to whose hands it may come, is deemed to be made to that person who acts upon it, though he may be wholly unknown to the issuer of the statement. A bill is presented for acceptance at a merchant's office. He is not there, but a friend, not his partner or agent, who does his own business at the same place, is on the spot, and, assuming without inquiry that the bill is drawn and presented in the regular course of business, takes upon himself to accept the bill as agent for the drawee. Thereby he represents to every one who may become a holder of the bill in due course that he has authority to accept; and if he has in fact no authority, and his acceptance is not ratified by the nominal principal, he is liable to an action for deceit, though he may have thought his conduct was for the benefit of all parties, and expected that the acceptance would be ratified (2).

Denton v. G. N. R. Co. Again the current time-table of a railway company is a representation to persons meaning to travel by the company's trains that the company will use reasonable diligence to despatch trains at or about the stated times for the stated places. If a train which has been taken off is announced as still running, this is a false representation, and (belief in its truth on the part of the

(x) Polhill v. Walter (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 114.

The more recent doctrine of

implied warranty was then unknown. [Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 Miss. 432.]

company's servants being out of the question) a person who by relying on it has missed an appointment and incurred loss may have an action for deceit against the company (y). Here there is no fraudulent intention. The default is really a negligent omission; a page of the tables should have been cancelled, or an erratum-slip added. And the negligence could hardly be called gross, but for the manifest importance to the public of accuracy in these announcements.

Peek v. Gurney. Again the prospectus of a new company, so far forth as it alleges matters of fact concerning the position and prospects of the undertaking, is a representation addressed to all persons who may apply for shares in the company; but it is not deemed to be addressed to persons who after the establishment of the company become purchasers of shares at one or more removes from the original holders (z), for the office of the prospectus is exhausted when once the shares are allotted. As regards those to whom it is addressed it matters not whether the promoters wilfully use misleading language or not, or do or do not expect that the undertaking will ultimately be successful. The material question is, "Was there or was there not misrepresentation in point of fact?" (a). Innocent or benevolent motives do not justify an unlawful intention in law, though they are too often allowed to do so in popular morality.

(y) So held unanimously in Denton v. G. N. R. Co. (1856), 5 E. & B. 860, 25 L. J. Q. B. 129. Lord Campbell C. J., and Wightman J., held (dubit. Crompton J.) that there was also a cause of action in contract. The difficulty often felt about maintaining an action for deceit against a corporation does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Court. It is of course open to argument that this case is overruled by Derry v. Peek, 14

App. Ca. 337, 58 L. J. Ch. 864; and now Low v. Bouverie, '91, 3 Ch. 82, 60 L. J. Ch. 594, seems to point in the same direction.

(z) Peek v. Gurney (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 377, 400, 411, 43 L. J. Ch. 19.

(a) Lord Cairns, L. R. 6 H. L. at p. 409. Cp. per Lord Blackburn, Smith v. Chadwick, 9 App. Ca. at p. 201; Lord Herschell, Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Ca. at pp. 865, 371.

Reliance on the representation. (d) As to the plaintiff's action on the faith of the defendant's representation.

A. by words or acts represents to B. that a certain state of things exists, in order to induce B. to act in a certain

Reliance on representation. To sustain an action for deceit it must be proved by evidence that the plaintiff in doing that which resulted to his injury acted upon the false representation of the defendant and not independently, to his injury. It is essential that such misrepresentation be the promoting and proximate cause of the injury, otherwise the deception has not accomplished its purpose and an action will not lie. Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend. 374; Fishback v. Miller, 15 Nev. 428; Lebby v. Ahrens, 26 S. C. 275; 2 S. E. Rep. 387; Winter v. Bandel, 30 Ark. 362; Black v. Black, 110 N. C. 399; 14 S. E. Rep. 971; Lewis v. Jewell, 151 Mass. 345; 24 N. E. Rep. 51; Ming v. Woolfolk, 116 U. S. 599; Ledbetter v. Davis, 121 Ind. 119; Roseman v. Canovan, 43 Cal. 110; Webster v. Bailey, 31 Mich. 36; Parmlee v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St. 10; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27; Rish v. Von Lillenthal, 34 Wis. 250; Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill. 469; 12 N. E. Rep. 247; Fowler v. McCann (Wis.), 56 N. W. Rep. 1085; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. St. 365; Pratt v. Philbrook, 41 Me. 132.

Where a purchaser decides not to rely upon the statements of the vendor, but seeks independent means of investigation of his own, there is no deception, though he fails to discover an important fact, provided the vendor interposes no obstacles to a full and free investigation, and does nothing to mislead the purchaser. Halls v. Thompson, 1 Smed. & M. 443. So, if the complainant did not rely upon the representations of the defendant because he did not believe them, or because he chose to act on his own judgement, he has no ground for relief. Nye v. Merriman, 35 Vt. 438; Hagee v. Grossman, 31 Ind. 223; Proctor v. McCoid, 60 Ia. 153; Doran v. Eaton, 40 Minn. 35. See Alden v. Wright, 47 Minn. 225; 49 N. W. Rep. 767; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438; Veerol v. Veerol, 63 N. Y. 45; Fulton v. McDaniel, 23 Ga. 354; Byard v. Holmes, 34 N. J. L. 296; Redding v. Goodwin, 44 Minn. 355; 46 N. W. Rep. 563; Hanson v. Edgerly, 29 N. H. 343; Abbey v. Dewey, 25 Pa. St. 413; Fuller v. Hodgden, 25 Me. 243; Boyce v. Watson, 20 Ga. 517; Garrow v. Davis, 15 How. 272; Ely v. Stewart, 2 Md. 408; Ming v. Woolfolk, 116 U. S. 599; Runger v. Brown, 29 Neb. 116; 37 N. W. Rep. 660; Anderson v. Burnett, 6 Miss. 165; Taylor v. Guest, 58 N. Y. 266; Rutherford v. Williams, 42 Mo. 24; Shackelford v. Hendley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 496; Duncan v. Hogue, 24 Miss. 671; Slidel v. Rightor, 3 La. An. 199; Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305; Bowman v. Corithens, 40 Ind. 90.

The false statement must relate and be material to the subject of the transaction and be a "substantial inducement" thereto to constitute a deceit; but it is not necessary that they be the sole inducements that led

way. The simplest case is where B., relying wholly on A.'s statement, and having no other source of information, acts in the manner contemplated. This needs no further comment. The case of B. disbelieving and rejecting A.'s assertion is equally simple.

to the close of the transaction. Ingraham v. Jordan, 55 Ga. 356; Selma v. Railroad Co., 51 Miss. 829; Hill v. Carley, 8 Hun, 636; Hull v. Fields, 76 Va. 594; Winter v. Bandell, 30 Ark. 362; Safford v. Grant, 120 Mass. 20; James v. Hodsden, 47 Vt. 127; Mathews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48; Whiting v. Hill, 23 Mich. 399, 405.

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"The maxim caveat emptor, is a rule of the common law, applicable to contracts of purchase of both real and personal property, and is adhered to, both in courts of law and courts of equity, where there is no cases of positive fraud a different rule applies. The law presumes that men will act honestly in their business transactions, and the maxim of vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subvenient only requires persons to use reasonable diligence to guard against fraud; such diligence as prudent men generally exercise under similar circumstances. But the rules of law do not require a prudent man to deal with every one as rascal, and demand covenants to guard against the falsehood of every representation, which may be made as to facts which constitute material inducements to the contract. There must be a reasonable reliance upon the integrity of men, or the transactions of business, trade and commerce could not be conducted with that facility and confidence which are essential to successful enterprise and the advancement of individual and national wealth and prosperity. * If representations are made by one party to a trade which may be reasonably relied upon by the other party, and they constitute a material inducement to the contract — and such representations are false within the knowledge of the party making them - and they cause loss and damage to the party relying on them, and he has acted with ordinary prudence in the matter, he is entitled to relief in any court of justice." Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 237. See Oswald v. McGehee, 28 Miss. 340; Fields v. Rouse, 3 Jones L. 72.

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"It is as much an actionable fraud wilfully to deceive a credulous person with an improbable falsehood as it is to deceive a cautious, sagacious person with a plausible one. The law draws no line between the two falsehoods." Barndtv. Frederick, 78 Wis. 1; 47 N. W. Rep. 9. So, it has been said: "The law takes note of the ignorant, the credulous, and the unwary, and will make their ignorance and want of cunning their innocence, and protect them." Pearl v. Walter, 80 Mich. 322, citing McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454; Davis v. Seeley, 71 Id. 209; followed in Leland v. Goodfellow, 84 Mich. 357; 47 N. W. Rep. 591. See Ingalls v. Miller, 121 Ind. 188; 22 N. E. Rep. 995.

Another case is that A.'s representation is never communicated to B. Here, though A. may have intended to deceive B., it is plain that he has not deceived him; and an unsuccessful attempt to deceive, however unrighteous it may be, does not cause damage, and is not an actionable wrong. A fraudulent seller of defective goods who patches up a flaw for the purpose of deceiving an inspection cannot be said to have thereby deceived a buyer who omits to make any inspection at all. We should say this was an obvious proposition, if it had not been judicially doubted (b). The buyer may be protected by a condition or warranty, express or implied by law from the nature of the particular transaction; but he cannot complain of a merely potential fraud directed against precautions which he did not use. A false witness who is in readiness but is not called is a bad man, but he does not commit perjury.

Means of knowledge immaterial without actual independent inquiry. Yet another case is that the plaintiff has at hand the means of testing the defendant's statement,

(b) Horsfall v. Thomas (1862), 1 H. & C. 90, 31 L. J. Ex. 322, a case of contract, so that a fortiori an action for deceit would not lie; dissented from by Cock

burn C. J., L. R. 6 Q. B. at p. 605. The case was a peculiar one, but could not have been otherwise decided.

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Means of knowledge immaterial without actual inquiry. "The proposition has now become very widely accepted at law as well as in equity, at least as a general doctrine, that a man may act upon a positive representation of fact notwithstanding the fact that the means of knowledge were specially open to him. If the representations were of a character to induce action, and did induce it that is enough." Cottrell v. Crum, 100 Mo. 397; 13 S. W. Rep. 753. In the New York case of Mead v. Bann (32 N. Y. 279), the court speaking through Porter J. went so far as to say: "every contracting party has an absolute right to rely on the express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is known to the opposite party, and unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual engagement; and he is under no obligation to investigate and verify statements, to the truth of which the other party to the contract, with full means of knowledge, has deliberately pledged his faith."

See