actionable; for unless the words spoken impute a continuance of the disorder at the time of speaking them, the gist of the action fails; for such a charge cannot produce the effect which makes it the subject of an action, namely, his being avoided by society" (y). There does not seem to be more than one reported English case of the kind within the present century (z).

Evil speaking of a man in the way of his business. Concerning words spoken of a man to his disparagement

(y) Carslake v. Mapledoram (1788), 2 T. R. 473, Bigelow L. C. 84, per Ashhurst J.

(z) Bloodworth v. Gray (1844), 7 M. &

Gr. 334. The whole of the judgment runs thus: "This case falls within the principle of the old authorities."

Evil speaking of a man in the way of his business, Defamatory words spoken of a person in relation to his trade, profession or office are actionable per se; provided, they are spoken while he is following such trade or profession or holding such office. McKenzie v. Denver Times Pub. Co. (Colo. App.), 34 Pac. Rep. 577; Kinner v. Grant, 12 Vt. 456; Davis v. Davis, 1 Nott. & M. 290; Ostrom v. Calkins, 5 Wend. 263; Williams v. Davenport, 42 Minn. 393; 44 N. W. Rep. 311; Lotto v. Same, 42 Minn. 395; 44 N. W. Rep. 31; Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567; 25 N. E. Rep. 74; McKee v. Wilson, 87 N. C. 300; Brown v. Mims, 2 Mill Const. 235; Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. St. 522; Fitzgerald v. Redfield, 51 Barb. 484; Rammell v. Otis, 60 Me. 365; Craig v. Brown, 5 Blackf. 44; Seely v. Blair, Wright, 358; Buck v. Hersey, 31 Me. 558; Decker v. Shepherd, 22 Md. 299; Windsor v. Oliver, 41 Ga. 538; Harris v. Bailey, 8 N. H. 216; Allen v. Hillman, 12 Pick. 101; Brown v. Vannaman (Wis.), 55 N. W. Rep. 183; Lapham v. Noble, 54 Fed. Rep. 108.

Attorney. To say of an attorney at the time he is engaged in the trial of a case, "You are the dirty sewer through which all the slums of this embezzlement have flowed," is actionable without proof of special damages. Mains v. Whiting, 87 Mich. 172; 49 N. W. Rep. 559.

So, to call an attorney "a cheat." Rush v. Cavanaugh, Pa. St. 187. Or, to say that an attorney "will take fees on both sides of a case." Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyler, 456; or, that an attorney is particularly incompetent. Mattice v. Wilcox, 59 Hun, 620; 13 N. Y. S. Rep. 330; or, to call an attorney "shyster." Gribble v. Pioneer Press Co., 34 Minn. 342. Or, to charge that an attorney will betray his clients' secrets and overthrow their cause. Garr v. Selden, 6 Barb. 416; Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns. 64; Riggs v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198.

Clerk. To impute incompetency, dishonesty or special unfitness to a

in his office, profession, or other business: they are actionable on the following conditions:- They must be spoken of

clerk is actionable per se.

Wilson v. Cottman, 65 Md. 190; Fowles v.

Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Ware v. Clowney, 24 Ala. 707.

Clergyman. Calling a preacher "a drunkard" is slanderous per se. McMillian v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178. See Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292; 22 Am. Rep. 303; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 248; Buck v. Hersey, 31 Me. 558; O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. 128.

Physician. To say of a physician, that " he has killed six children in one year" is slander per se. Carroll v. White, 33 Barb, 615; 42 N. Y. 161. Or, "he is no good, only a butcher, I would not have him for a dog!" Cruikshank v. Gorden, 118 N. Y. 178; 23 N. E. Rep. 457. Or, that a physician caused the death of a patient through his ignorance or culpable negligence. Foster v. Scrippes, 39 Mich. 376; Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425. See Sumner v. Utley, 7 Conn. 258; Camp v. Martin, 28 Conn. 86; Foster v. Small, 3 Whart. 138; Lynde v. Johnston, 39 Hun, 12; Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Mass. 808; Hargan v. Purdy (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 432.

But it is not actionable to say that a physician destroyed the life of a patient by mistake, but legal and well meant efforts to save his life. March v. Davison, 9 Paige, 580. Or, to give as an opinion that a physician gave medicine to another which caused the death of the latter. Jones v. Diver, 22 Ired. 184.

Public Officer. Spoken words which impute to a person a want of capacity or integrity in office or which are calculated to diminish public confidence in him are actionable per se. Russell v. Huthony, 21 Kan. 450; State v. Schmidt, 49 N. J. L. 579; Kinney v. Nash, 3 N. Y. 177; Spiering . Andrews, 45 Wis. 332; Knight v. Blackford, 3 Mackey, 117; Am. Rep. 772; Maises v. Thornton, 8 Tenn. Rep. 303; Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540; Truth Pub. Co. v. Reed, 13 Ky. Law R. 323. As to charge a sheriff with malpractice in office. Dele v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Cas. 330. Or, a town clerk with destroying votes at an election. Dodds v. Henry, 9 Mass. 262.

Spoken words are not actionable without proof of special damages, if relative to the discharge of official duties, where the office has ceased at the time of the speaking of the words. Forward v. Adams, 7 Wend. 204. Nor, are words spoken of a magistrate unless he is described as a magistrate. McGuire v. Blair.

To say of a legislator who has changed his opinion, that "sometimes the change of heart comes from the pocket," is not actionable per se. Sillars v. Collier, 151 Mass. 50; 23 N. E. Rep. 723.

So are words spoken of a candidate which cause others to not vote for him at an election. Brewer v. Weakley, 2 Overt. 99. See Seely v. Blair, Wright, 358, 683; Burke v. Mascarich, 81 Cal. 302; 22 Pac. Rep. 673; Field v. Colson (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 264. But it is not actionable, with

him in relation to or " in the way of " a position which he holds, or a business he caries on, at the time of speaking. Whether they have reference to his office or business is, in case of doubt, a question of fact. And they must either amount to a direct charge of incompetence or unfitness, or impute something so inconsistent with competence or fitness that, if believed, it would tend to the loss of the party's employment or business. To call a stonemason a "ringleader of the nine hours system" is not on the face of it against his competence or conduct as a workman, or a natural and probable cause why he should not get work; such words therefore, in default of anything showing more distinctly how they were connected with the plaintiff's occupation, were held not to be actionable (a). Spoken charges of habitual immoral conduct against a clergyman or a domestic servant are actionable, as naturally tending, if believed, to the party's deprivation or other ecclesiastical censure in the one case, and dismissal in the other. Of a clerk or messenger, and even

(a) Miller v. David (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 118, 43 L. J. C. P. 84.

out proof of special damages, to impute weakness of understanding to a candidate for Congress. Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott. & M. 347. Or to call such a candidate "a corrupted old tory." Hogg v. Dorrah, 2 Port. 212.

Trader. To say of a drover, who buys and sells cattle, that "he is a bankrupt, and not able to pay his just debts" is actionable without alleging special damages. Lewis v. Hawley, 2 Day, 495. Or, that a merchant cannot pay his debts and does not deserve credit. Sewell v. Catlin, 3 Wend. 291; Mott v. Comstock, 7 Cow. 654. See 5 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 643, note; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co. (Mo.), 22 S. W. Rep. 358. Other instances. To say of a man in reference to his business that he is a notorious liar and dishonest, is actionable per se. Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20. So it is to say of a blacksmith that "he keeps false books," of his business. Burtch v. Nickerson, 17 Johns. 217. But not to charge a person with keeping false books of account unless a credit business is done. Rathburn v. Emigh, 6 Wend. 407. Or, to say that a plaintiff is a "loafer" and a "pimp" and "don't understand his business" that his wife is not virtuous, and to threaten to ruin him. Flatow v. Von Bremsen, 19 Civil Proc. R. 125, 131; 11 N. Y. S. Rep. 680.

of a medical man, it is otherwise, unless the imputation is in some way specifically connected with his occupation. It is actionable to charge a barrister with being a dunce, or being ignorant of the law; but not a justice of the peace, for he need not be learned. It is actionable to charge a solicitor with cheating his clients, but not with cheating other people on occasions unconnected with his business (b).

It makes no difference whether the office or profession carries with it any legal right to temporal profit, or in point of law is wholly or to some extent honorary, as in the case of a barrister or a fellow of the College of Physicians; but where there is no profit in fact, an oral charge of unfitness is not actionable unless, if true, it would be a ground for removal (bb). Nor does it matter what the nature of the employment is, provided it be lawful (c); or whether the conduct imputed is such as in itself the law will blame or not, provided it is inconsistent with the due fulfilment of what the party, in virtue of his employment or office, has undertaken. A gamekeeper may have an action against one who says of him, as gamekeeper, that he trapped foxes (d). As regards the reputation of traders the law has taken a broader view than elsewhere. To impute insolvency to a tradesman, in any form whatever, is actionable. Substantial damages have been given by a jury, and allowed by the court, for a mere clerical error by which an advertisement of a dissolution of partnership was printed among a list of meetings under the Bankruptcy Act (e).

Words indirectly causing damage to a man in his business. There are cases, though not common in our

(b) Doyley v. Roberts (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 835, and authorities there cited.

(bb) Alexander v. Jenkins, '92, 1 Q. B. 797, C. A.

(c) L. R .2 Ex. at p. 330. Vide, Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242.

(d) Foulger v. Newcomb (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 327, 36 L. J. Ex. 169.

(e) Blake Odgers 80; Shepheard v. Whitaker (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 502.

books, in which a man suffers loss in his business as the intended or "natural and probable result" of words spoken in relation to that business, but not against the man's own character or conduct: as where a wife or servant dwelling at his place of business is charged with misbehaviour, and the credit of the business is thereby impaired. In such a case an action lies, but is not, it seems, properly an action of slander, but rather a special action (on the case in the old system of pleading) analogous to those which have been allowed for disturbing a man in his calling, or in the exercise of a right in other ways. It is doubtful how far the rule that a man is not liable for unauthorized repetition of his spoken words applies to an action of this kind (ƒ). On principle the conditions of liability would seem to be that the defendant made the original statement without belief in its truth (for the cause of action is more akin to deceit than to defamation), and that he expected, or had reasonable cause to expect, that it would be repeated in such a manner as in fact it was, and would lead to such damage as in fact ensued.

2.- Defamation in general.

Rules as to defamation generally. We now pass to the general law of defamation, which applies to both slander and libel, subject, as to slander, to the conditions

(f) Riding v. Smith (1876), 1 Ex. D. 91, 45 L. J. Ex. 281; see Mr. Blake Odgers and Mr. J. D. Mayne thereon.

Slander of property used in business. One may be as seriously injured by the disparagement of his property connected with the business in which he is engaged as by the slander of himself in respect to his business. Snow v. Judson, 38 Barb. 210, supra, S. P., Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; 23 Am. Rep. 322; Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Boynton v. Shaw Stocking Co., 146 Mass. 219; Weir v. Allen, 51 N. H. 171; Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio, 531; 27 Am. Dec. 271; Paul v. Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46.