Opinion of the Court.

forest preserve," and "to maintain and protect the forests now in the forest preserve, and to promote as far as practicable the further growth of forests thereon;" and authorized them to appoint a warden and other officers, and to exercise various powers to carry out its object.

At the date of the passage of that statute, the time allowed by law for the redemption of lands from sale by the comptroller for non-payment of taxes was two years from the time of sale. New York Stat. 1855, c. 427, § 50.

On June 9, 1885, the legislature of the State passed the statute of 1885, c. 448, to take immediate effect, which provided that all conveyances, thereafter executed by the comptroller, of lands, in the same counties, sold by him for non-payment of taxes and having been recorded for two years in the clerk's office of the county in which the lands lay, should, "six months after this act takes effect, be conclusive evidence that the sale and all proceedings prior thereto, from and including the assessment of the land, and all notices required by law to be given previous to the expiration of the two years allowed by law to redeem, were regular" and as required by law; but that all such conveyances and the taxes and tax sales on which they were based, should "be subject to cancellation, as now provided by law, on a direct application to the comptroller, or an action brought before a competent court therefor, by reason of the legal payment of such taxes, or by reason of the levying of such taxes by a town or ward having no legal right to assess the land on which they are laid.”

The land now in question was sold by the comptroller to the State October 12, 1877; the time allowed by law for redeeming the land from that sale expired October 12, 1879; the comptroller's deed to the State was made June 9, 1881, and recorded June 8, 1882. It had therefore been on record for three years when the statute of June 9, 1885, was passed and took effect; and by the terms of this statute, on December 9, 1885, the comptroller's deed became conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assessment of any of the taxes for non-payment of which the land had been sold and

Opinion of the Court.

conveyed to the State. This action was brought April 11, 1887.

The statute, according to its principal intent and effect, and as construed by the Court of Appeals of the State, was a statute of limitations. People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227; Same v. Same, 145 N. Y. 451. It is well settled that a statute shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional power of the legislature, provided a reasonable time, taking into consideration the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632, 633; In re Brown, 135 U. S. 701, 705–707.

The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to the State for non-payment of taxes; it applies to those cases only in which the conveyance has been of record for two years in the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are recorded; and it does not bar any action begun within six months after its passage. Independently of the consideration that before the passage of the statute the plaintiff had had eight years since the sale, and three years since the recording of the deed, during which he might have asserted his title, this court concurs with the highest court of the State in the opinion that the limitation of six months, as applied to a case of this kind, is not repugnant to any provision of the Constitution of the United States.

It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the statute was unconstitutional, because it did not allow him any opportunity to assert his rights, even within six months after its passage. But the statute did not take away any right of action which he had before its passage, but merely limited the time within which he might assert such a right. Within the six months, he had every remedy which he would have had before the passage of the statute. If he had no remedy before, the statute took none away. From the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar, and in the subsequent case of People v. Roberts, 151 N. Y. 540, there would appear to have been some difference of opinion in that court upon the question whether his proper remedy was by direct appli

Syllabus.

cation to the comptroller to cancel the sale, or by action of ejectment against the comptroller or the forest commissioners. But as that court has uniformly held that he had a remedy, it is not for us to determine what that remedy was under the local constitution and laws.

It was also argued that the plaintiff in error was in possession of the land and could not be put to his action. But the decision below that he was not in possession involved no Federal question, or any other question of law, but a mere inference of fact from the evidence, which this court is not authorized to review on writ of error. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188.

Judgment affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. GOLDENBERG.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 35. Argued and submitted October 14, 1897. Decided October 25, 1897.

Where imported foreign goods are entered at a custom house for consumption, the payment by the importer of the full amount of duties ascertained to be due upon the liquidation of the entry of the merchandise, as well as the giving notice of dissatisfaction or protest, within ten days after the liquidation of such duties, is not necessary in order to enable a protesting importer to have the exaction and classification reviewed by a board of general appraisers and by the courts, under the provision in section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, 26 Stat. 131, 137,"That the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges, and as to all fees and exactions of whatever character (except duties on tonnage), shall be final and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of such merchandise, or the person paying such fees, charges, and exactions other than duties, shall within ten days after, but not before,' such ascertainment and liquidation of duties, as well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as for consumption, or within ten days after the payment of such fees, charges and exactions, if dissatisfied with such decision, give notice in writing to the collector, setting forth therein distinctly and specifically, and in respect to each entry or pay

Statement of the Case.

ment, the reasons for his objections thereto, and if the merchandise is entered for consumption shall pay the full amount of the duties and charges ascertained to be due thereon."

The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the law-maker is to be found in the language that he has used; and the cases are few and exceptional in which the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling, and only arise when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully justify and accurately disclose the intent.

THE 14th section of the act of Congress, approved June 10, 1890, c. 407, 26 Stat. 131, 137, is as follows:

"That the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges, and as to all fees and exactions of whatever character, (except duties on tonnage,) shall be final and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of such merchandise, or the person paying such fees, charges, and exactions other than duties shall, within ten days after 'but not before' such ascertainment and liquidation of duties, as well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as for consumption, or within ten days after the payment of such fees, charges, and exactions, if dissatisfied with such decision give notice in writing to the collector, setting forth therein distinctly and specifically, and in respect to each entry or payment, the reasons for his objections thereto, and if the merchandise is entered for consumption shall pay the full amount of the duties and charges ascertained to be due thereon. Upon such notice and payment the collector shall transmit the invoice and all the papers and exhibits connected therewith to the board of three general appraisers, which shall be on duty at the port of New York, or to a board of three general appraisers who may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for such duty at that port, or at any other port, which board shall examine and decide the case thus submitted, and their decision, or that of a majority of them, shall be final and conclusive upon all persons interested therein, and the record shall be transmitted to the proper collector or person acting as such who shall liquidate the entry accord

Argument for the United States.

ingly, except in cases where an application shall be filed in the Circuit Court within the time and in the manner provided for in section fifteen of this act."

Upon this section, after stating the facts of this case showing its pertinency, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has certified to us the following question:

"Was the payment of the full amount of the duties ascertained to be due upon the liquidation of the entry of the merchandise, required to be made by the importers, as well as the giving notice of dissatisfaction or protest, within ten days after the liquidation of such duties, where the goods, as in the present case, were entered for consumption, in order to enable the protesting importers to have the exaction and classification reviewed by the board of general appraisers and by the courts?"

Mr. Attorney General, for the United States, submitted upon the brief filed April 1, 1897, by Mr. Edward B. Whitney, then Assistant Attorney General.

Upon the present record the point appears very technical. The importer failed by but a single day to pay his dues within the time limited. Such accidents are rare and due to the importer's own carelessness or that of his agents. The question is an important one, however, because under the importers' construction of the statute they may and sometimes do indefinitely postpone a review of the collector's decision. by simply refusing to pay the duties.

The practice was stated as follows by the Secretary of the Treasury to Attorney General Miller. "The practical result of this ruling is an accumulation in the custom houses of large numbers of protests, which may be made for speculative purposes, and which are not promptly transmitted to the Board of General Appraisers because of the failure of the importers to pay the increased duties against the exaction of which they file their protest. The importers are thus enabled to take the initiatory step in suits for recovery of duties, full payment of which has not been made, and delay indefinitely

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