work so constant, so exacting and of such vital importance as ours, inevitably draws us together by ties of the closest character which cannot be dissolved without emotions of deep sadness and regret. We feel that our parting involves not simply the deprivation of the assistance afforded by your learning, your vast experience and your earnestness in advocacy of your convictions, but the severance of those relations which have contributed so much to lighten the hardest labors of the road.
This is not the time or place to dwell on the reputation you have achieved as a jurist. The record is made up, and may safely be committed to the judgment of posterity.
But we cannot part with you as an active member of the court without the fervent expression of the hope that you may be spared for many years to enjoy the repose you have so thoroughly earned, and the commendation bestowed on good and faithful service.
We are, dear brother Field,
Your affectionate brethren,
MELVILLE W. FULLER, JOHN M. HARLAN,
DAVID J. BREWER, HENRY B. BROWN, GEORGE SHIRAS, JR.,
E. D. WHITE,
R. W. PECKHAM.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the Circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz. :
For the First Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, RUFUS W. PECKHAM, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, GEORGE SHIRAS, JR., Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, MELVILLE W. FULLER, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, EDWARD D. WHITE, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, HENRY B. BROWN, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice. December 13, 1897.
COSTS IN CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCTOBER TERM, 1897.
Ordered, in pursuance of the act of Congress of February 19, 1897, 29 Stat. 536, c. 263, that the following table of fees and costs in the Circuit Courts of Appeals be, and the same is, hereby established, to take effect on the first day of March, A.D. 1898, and no other fees and costs than those therein named shall thereafter be charged : Docketing a case and filing the record.
Entering any rule, or making or copying any record or other
paper, for each one hundred words
Entering a judgment or decree
Every search of the records of the court and certifying the
Affixing a certificate and a seal to any paper
Receiving, keeping and paying money, in pursuance of any statute or order of court, one per cent on the amount so received, kept and paid.
Preparing the record for the printer, indexing same, supervising the printing and distributing the copies, for each printed page of the record and index.
Making a manuscript copy of the record, when required by the rules, for each one hundred words (but nothing in addition for supervising the printing)
Issuing a writ of error and accompanying papers, or a mandate or other process
Filing briefs, for each party appearing
Copy of an opinion of the court, certified under seal, for each printed page (but not to exceed five dollars in the whole for any copy)
1. The Johnson, an American ship, was chartered at Valparaiso to carry a
cargo of nitrate of soda, of 1938 tons, from Caleta to Hamburg con- signed to a London firm. On the way she sprang a leak, and put into Callao. There 1200 tons of the cargo were transferred to the Leslie, a British bark, and the Johnson was repaired, the master executing a bottomry bond to meet the expenses of the repairs. That bond bound the Johnson, cargo and freight, hypothecated the portion of the cargo transhipped to the bark and further provided that "if during the said voyage an utter loss of the said vessel" [in the singular] "by fire, enemies, pirates, the perils of the sea or navigation, or any other casu- alty shall unavoidably happen,' ""then and in either of the said cases this obligation shall be void." Both vessels sailed for Hamburg. The Johnson collided at sea with the Thirlmere, a British vessel, and was sunk with a total loss. The bark reached Hamburg safely. The con- signees, in order to obtain the cargo, agreed to refer to arbitration by German lawyers the question of its liability for the whole amount of the bond. They decided that it was so liable, and the consignees paid the amount of the bond and received the cargo. The owners of the Johnson libelled the Thirlmere and its owners. The latter were held not to be personally liable, and judgment was rendered only for the value of the Thirlmere. The insurers of the Johnson also paid to its owners the amount of the policies of insurance, and the latter, after receiving the amount of the judgment against the Thirlmere, paid to the insurers their proportionate part of it. This suit was then insti- tuted by the consignors and the consignees of the cargo of the bark to recover from the owners of the Johnson their share of the sum paid on the bottomry bond. Held, (1) That the terms of the bottomry bond included not only the Andrew Johnson and her cargo, but the cargo transhipped to the Leslie; (2) That the owners of the Johnson, to the extent of the damages paid on account of the collision, were liable to the libellants, as creditors of the ship. O'Brien v. Miller, 287. 2. In interpreting a contract the whole contract must be brought into view, and it must be interpreted with reference to the nature of the obliga- tions between the parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming them: and this rule is especially applicable to the interpre- tation of contracts of bottomry and respondentia. Ib.
3. In an action to recover on a bottomry bond from the shipowner for advances made for his benefit and charged upon the property of the cargo owners by the master, if he questions the power of the master to execute the instrument of hypothecation, it is his duty to plead it in defence. Ib.
4. The action of the district judge in refusing to permit the respondent to amend his answer by setting up the plea of laches and res judicata was not error. Ib.
5. On the facts, which are detailed in the statement of the case, respect- ing the navigation and the conduct of the Victory and the Ply- mothian just previous to the collision which caused the injuries and damage herein complained of, Held; (1) That as a general rule, vessels approaching each other in narrow channels, or where their courses diverge as much as one and one half or two points, are bound to keep to port and pass to the right, whatever the occasional effect of the sinuosities of the channel; (2) That the Victory was grossly in fault, and that the collision was the direct consequence of her disre- gard of that rule of the road, and of her reckless navigation; (3) That the fault of the Victory being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish fault on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and con- vincing in order to make a case for apportionment; the burden of proof being upon each vessel to establish fault on the part of the other; (4) That as the damage was occasioned by collision and was within the exceptions in the bills of lading, it rested upon the underwriters to defeat the operation of the exception by proof of such negligence on the part of the Plymothian as would justify a decree against her, if sued alone; (5) That the Plymothian was on her proper course, that she was not bound to anticipate the conduct of the Victory, and that she took all proper precautions as soon as chargeable with notice of risk of collision. The Victory & The Plymothian, 410.
This was an action of ejectment. The plaintiff claimed under one Hall, former owner of the land. The defendants claimed under one Doug- las, who bought it at a tax sale in 1865. The defendants set up ad- verse possession in defence. The court instructed the jury that to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs upon the defence of adverse posses- sion the jury must find from the evidence that the defendants, in per- son or by their tenants, have for more than twenty years prior to the 31st day of May, 1889, held actual, exclusive, continuous, open, noto- rious and adverse possession of the said premises, and they cannot extend their possession by tacking it to the prior possession of any person who, during such prior possession, did not claim any title or right to the premises; and, on the request of the defendants, that "if the jury find from the evidence that William Douglas, the ancestor
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