Opinion of the Court. under his agreement with Mrs. Douglas, acknowledged her right and paid her rent, and it was immaterial, so far as the heirs are concerned, that Rothwell had before that time entered upon the lot, although under no claim of title and presumably in subordination to the title of plaintiff's predecessors. Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328. If Rothwell were himself asserting a title by adverse possession, while coming into possession in acknowledgment of and under the title of the owners, there might be an opportunity for the application of the doctrine contended for by plaintiff, and in such case Rothwell could not set up title by adverse possession while entering in subordination to the title of the owner, unless he first vacated and then retook possession as a hostile entry, or did some act necessarily evincing an intention to put an end to his tenancy. We are not dealing with Rothwell's rights or title. The defendants did all they were called upon to do in order to take possession and inaugurate an adverse holding, when they came with their tax deed, claimed to own the property described in it and exercised an act of ownership by letting the lot to Rothwell as a tenant at a certain rent. When Rothwell recognized the claim of ownership and remained in possession from that time in subordination to the rights of Mrs. Douglas and the heirs-at-law, their adverse possession, so far as this point is concerned, was sufficiently inaugurated. Mrs. Douglas was no party or privy to the prior entry of Rothwell, and, therefore, whatever the circumstances as proven in this case regarding such prior entry, her rights and those of the heirs cannot be in any way affected thereby. There is no pretence of any fraud or concealment in the case by any one, certainly not by Mrs. Douglas. Neither she nor the heirs were bound, in order to maintain their rights, to give any written or verbal notice to the former owners that they were in possession through Rothwell; nor did the possession of Rothwell, as tenant of the Douglas heirs, fail to commence at the time of this agreement because he did not give notice to the former owners of his recognition of the title and right to the possession as claimed by Mrs. Douglas. We are also of the opinion that there was evidence to be Opinion of the Court. submitted to the jury, that the possession of the defendants was in all other respects adverse within the meaning of the law upon the subject for more than twenty years before the commencement of this action. There is no doubt that the entry of defendants by means of the agreement mentioned was under a claim of title on the part of Mrs. Douglas and those whom she represented as the heirs-at-law of William Douglas. There was enough to authorize the jury to find that the possession was notorious and exclusive, continuous, actual, open and adverse. Ward v. Cochran, 150 U. S. 597. Payment of the taxes, as described in the above statement of facts, is very important and strong evidence of a claim of title; and the failure of the plaintiffs' predecessors to make any claim to the lot or to pay the taxes themselves, is some evidence of an abandonment of any right in or claim to the property. In Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, it was held by this court that the payment of taxes on land for twenty-four successive years by the party in possession was powerful evidence of the claim of right to the whole lot upon which the taxes were paid. The same principle is held in Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534, 552. It is some evidence that the possession was under a claim of right and was adverse. Although there was no fence around this lot during the period in question, yet it was occupied by the tenant for the purposes of his business, that of marble and stone cutting, and although every foot of the property was not covered by his material, yet it was placed upon the lot in a convenient manner to be used by him in the prosecution of his business, and in a manner which showed that his possession was not in connection with any others, but was exclusive and perfect in himself. We agree with the court below when, speaking through Mr. Justice Morris, it says that: "Short of an actual inclosure, it is not easy to conceive of a use and occupation more sharply distinctive and adverse than the conversion of the property into a stone yard, with the stone practically scattered all over it, according to the testimony of one or more of the witnesses. Nor should the fact be ignored in this connection that for Opinion of the Court. upwards of twenty years the record owners of this property wholly neglected their duties to the public in regard to it, never sought to pay the taxes, and permitted the defendants to discharge the burden which it was incumbent upon themselves to bear, and it might well be supposed that they had abandoned the property and acquiesced in the title which the defendants had acquired." At the request of the plaintiff, the judge charged the jury that, "to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs in this action upon the defence of adverse possession, the jury must find from the evidence that the defendants, in person or by their tenants, have for more than twenty years prior to the 31st day of May, 1889, held actual, exclusive, continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the said premises, and they cannot extend their possession by tacking it to the prior possession of any person who, during such prior possession, did not claim any title or right to the premises." Ward v. Cochran, 150 U. S. 597. This charge contains a statement of all the requisites for constituting an adverse possession according to the abovecited case. And the jury were instructed that the defence of adverse possession was an affirmative one, and that it was incumbent upon the defendants to establish it by a clear preponderance of proof, and if the proof were equally balanced, they must find for the plaintiff.. At the request of the defendants the court gave the following instructions to the jury: "If the jury find from the evidence that William Douglas, the ancestor of the defendants, bought at a tax sale held by the late corporation of Washington, so called, the property in controversy in this case and paid the price bid by him at such sale and received from the corporation of Washington a deed to said property, which was by him duly filed for record and recorded in the land records of the District of Columbia more than twenty years prior to the commencement of this suit; that thereupon the said property was assessed to the said William Douglas on the tax books of the city of Washington Opinion of the Court. and the taxes thereon from that time until the beginning of this suit paid by the said William Douglas or his successors in title, the defendants in this case; that at a period of time more than twenty years before the commencement of this suit the said property was rented on behalf of the defendants to a person who took the same and held possession thereof as tenant of the defendants for the purposes of a stone yard, paying rent therefor from the date of making such arrangement with the defendants, and that, although the said property was not inclosed by a fence, yet the person so renting the same, either upon the whole or a part thereof, during his occupancy, deposited stone used by him in his business, and that such use and possession of the said property was continued by the occupant thereof actually, exclusively, continuously, openly, notoriously, adversely and uninterruptedly for a period of twenty years next before the commencement of this suit, then the jury is instructed that the defendants are entitled to recover." The plaintiffs excepted to the granting of such request and to the charge as given. For the reasons already suggested, we think the exception not well founded. The charge as given was substantially correct, and there was evidence in the case upon which to found it. The first, second and third requests to charge, made by counsel for plaintiffs, involve the questions above discussed, and were properly refused. There are no other questions of sufficient doubt to render their discussion necessary. We are of opinion there is no error in the record, and the judgment must be Affirmed. Syllabus. O'BRIEN v. MILLER. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 40. Argued April 2, 1897. - Decided November 29, 1897. The Johnson, an American ship, was chartered at Valparaiso to carry a cargo of nitrate of soda, of 1938 tons, from Caleta to Hamburg consigned to a London firm. On the way she sprang a leak, and put into Callao. There 1200 tons of the cargo were transferred to the Leslie, a British bark, and the Johnson was repaired, the master executing a bottomry bond to meet the expenses of the repairs. That bond bound the Johnson, cargo and freight, hypothecated the portion of the cargo transhipped to the bark and further provided that "if during the said voyage an utter loss of the said vessel" [in the singular]" by fire, enemies, pirates, the perils of the sea or navigation, or any other casualty shall unavoidably happen," "then and in either of the said cases this obligation shall be void." Both vessels sailed for Hamburg. The Johnson collided at sea with the Thirlmere, a British vessel, and was sunk with a total loss. The bark reached Hamburg safely. The consignees, in order to obtain the cargo, agreed to refer to arbitration by German lawyers the question of its liability for the whole amount of the bond. They decided that it was so liable, and the consignees paid the amount of the bond and received the cargo. The owners of the Johnson libelled the Thirlmere and its owners. The latter were held not to be personally liable, and judgment was rendered only for the value of the Thirlmere. The insurers of the Johnson also paid to its owners the amount of the policies of insurance, and the latter, after receiving the amount of the judgment against the Thirlmere, paid to the insurers their proportionate part of it. This suit was then instituted by the consignors and the consignees of the cargo of the bark to recover from the owners of the Johnson their share of the sum paid on the bottomry bond. Held, (1) That the terms of the bottomry bond included not only the Andrew Johnson and her cargo, but the cargo transhipped on the Leslie ; (2) That the owners of the Johnson, to the extent of the damages paid on account of the collision, were liable to the libellants, as creditors of the ship. In interpreting a contract the whole contract must be brought into view, and it must be interpreted with reference to the nature of the obligations between the parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming them and this rule is especially applicable to the interpretation of contracts of bottomry and respondentia. In an action to recover on a bottomry bond from the shipowner for ad |