the highest respect for the distinguished men who composed that Convention, and would consider their views on the subject of high authority; but he was persuaded the statement now made was founded in error, and that reasons of a very opposite nature induced that Convention to associate the chancellor and judges with the governor in the council of revision. By looking into the proceedings of that Convention, and from the best information he could obtain, it appeared that they considered the executive as a weaker department of the government-as too dependent in his office both on the legislature and the people for a firm exercise of this power, and therefore they sought for more independent men to exercise it, and made the chancellor and judges, holding their offices by a permanent tenure, members of the council. This he understood was the true reason of introducing the chancellor and judges into the council of revision. But whilst that Convention was anxious thus to strengthen and fortify this department, they seem not to have been aware that they committed a greater error in connecting the judiciary with the legislative and executive departments, than they would have done if they had confided this power to the executive alone. The policy of that Convention seems to have been to endeavour to strengthen the hands of the executive. They had various propositions as to the term of his office, and with the same view they finally adopted the longest term, that of three years.

He did not think there was any danger that this power of a qualified negative would be often abused in the hands of the executive, and he agreed in the opinion expressed by other gentlemen, that there was more reason to fear, that it would not be exerted as often, and energetically, as it ought.

How, enquired Mr. R. is this power to be exercised? Not in private, nor by any secret cabal; but openly and publicly, in the most responsible manner. The reasons of the governor for objecting to a bill must be in writing, and they are to be placed on the journals of the legislature, and published to the world. Even with bad men, this would be an effectual check against the abuse of such a power.

The honourable gentleman from Dutchess (Mr. Livingston,) had called the attention of the committee to the constitutions of several other states in the union, and seemed to suppose that their authority added great weight to the argument in favour of his amendment. The gentleman has placed too much stress on these examples. It will not be difficult to shew, that no inference favourable to his position can be drawn from them. The constitution of Virginia had been placed foremost in the list of those to which he directed the attention of the committee, and the gentleman took occasion to pronounce a handsome eulogium on the statesmen and civilians of that state, to which Mr. R. was ready to subscribe, but the gentleman would find little support to his argument from this example. The constitution of that state is so different from ours and from any that our people would submit to, that it can afford no reason by analogy in favour of his amendment-It is one of the most aristocratic or high toned governments in the union. The right of suffrage is there limited to the higher class of freeholders, and the governor is not elected by the people but appointed by the legislature, and that annually-He is, therefore, the immediate agent or representative of the legislature, and entirely dependent on them for his support and continuance in office. To give to a governor, thus appointed, a negative on the acts of the legislature, would be inconsistent and absurdIt would be to give to the agent, the creature of the legislature, a power to control his political creator. The same obserations apply to the states of NorthCarolina, South-Carolina, Maryland, and New-Jersey, in all of which the governors are appointed by the legislature, and yet the gentlemen seems to have relied on some or all of those states in support of his position.

In Delaware and Rhode-Island, it is true, the governor is chosen by the pcople, and he has no negative, but these states are so limited in their territory and population, that nothing on this subject contained in their constitutions, can well be considered applicable to the state of New-York. These considerations, and the observations already made in regard to small states, by gentlemen who preceded him, furnished a full and satisfactory answer to any inferencos drawn from these examples. In Ohio the governor is also elected by the

people, and he has no negative; but before we recognize her example as proper to be imitated by us, we should inquire into the operation of her government in this respect. It has been justly said that experience is the guide to wisdom. Can the gentleman inform us what has been the practice or experience under the constitution of the state of Ohio, so as to throw light on this subject? He believed we could have little information as to the conduct of the government of that state in relation to the particular question now before us, but we knew enough of the proceedings of her legislature, on some subjects, to admonish us to be on our guard against imitating her example. Has she not passed laws impairing the obligation of private contracts, and in different forms invading the rights of property. Nay, has she not passed laws in direct hostility to laws of the United States, and is she not now engaged in a controversy with the government of the union on the subject of those laws? Let us beware of such an example.

These are all the states in the union the constitutions of which have no checks on the legislature. Let us next recur to those which have checks similar to that proposed by the gentleman from Dutchess.

The first and oldest of that class is Tennessee, the next Kentucky. The first of these was set apart from North-Carolina, the latter from Virginia. The people of these states may well be supposed to have had a partiality for the institutions of the states to which they formerly belonged; and yet, in the formation of their constitutions, they departed from them, and adopted the principle of a qualified check, as now proposed by this amendment. Thus far they furnish an argument in favour of the correctness of the principle. But has the experience of these states been shewn to be such as to recommend their governments as models proper for us to adopt ?-Have their laws in all respects been wise and salutary? Some of them of a recent date, must be considered by all of us of a very different character, and the observations already made in regard to Ohio, in a great degree apply to them. But we have the states of Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Alabama, and what, inquired Mr. R., do we know of their laws, or the operation of the particular provision in question, in their constitutions? They are all of recent origin, without experience, and some of them scarcely organized. The constitution of Connecticut is but of yesterday, and can furnish no guide.

Mr. R. next called the attention of the committee to the states which had adopted the check as recommended by the report of the committee. They were Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maine, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The constitution of Massachusetts had long contained this provision, and lately, on a revision of her constitution, they had continuedit. Maine, on separating from her, had also adopted it. Pennsylvania had at first been without it, but in forming her present constitution, she too bad adopted it. These were principally old states, and if the authority of new states was better in the opinion of any gentlemen, three of them were among the number. From this review it appeared, that the argument drawn from the experience of our sister states, was manifestly in favour of the proposition recommended by the report of the committee.

He had hoped there would have been the same unanimity in adopting this report of the committee, that there had been in abolishing the council of revision. Such a result would have made the most favourable impression on the public min. He thought it unwise to hazard important changes upon theory alone, and dangerous to refine too much on the established principles of government. This he apprehended was the error committed by the framers of our present constitution. A spirit of too great refinement, he believed, had been the cause of some of the provisions contained in that constitution, of which we principally complained. When the regular departments of government are once arranged and truly organized, we ought not to be apprehensive of trusting each with the powers properly belonging to it. We ought to avoid a spirit of innovation. The power now under consideration properly belonged to the executive department; and whilst he was in favour of making every proper amendment to the constitution, called for by the occasion, he was unwilling to remove ancient land-marks, and resort to new and untried expedients. He hoped the report of the committee would prevail.

MR. HOGEBOOM, wished to assign his reasons for the vote he was about to give on the question before the committee. He was not in the habit of speaking in public assemblies, and would not therefore probably be able to communicate his sentiments with as much facility and clearness, as some other gentlemen on the floor. He had, he said, voted to abolish the council of revision, because he considered that an improper body to have a voice directly or indirectly in the enactment of laws. That a check on the proceedings of the legislature was necessary, he was fully persuaded, and one at least as efficient as that contemplated by the report of the select committee: What its operation would be could not be foreseen; he was, however, willing to make the trial of it, as at present he could think ofno better, and he was sure it could not be worse than the old one, that had been weighed in the balance, and found wanting.

The state, said Mr. Hogeboom, once owned a vast and very valuable property in land; a property, which if it had been husbanded with ordinary care and prudence, would have produced an income adequate to meet all our public burthens; and also provide a fund for the support of schools, sufficient to educate all our children to the latest posterity, free of expense. A law had been passed authorising the sale of this land. This law the council had not objected to. The land had been sold for a mere trifle. This great property had been squandered and lost. He did not impute improper motives to the council for not objecting to the law-the legislature were more to be blamed than they. This among other reasons, convinced him that a check was necessary, and one different from what had hitherto existed.

Not many years ago, a law had passed the legislature, enabling all who were dishonestly inclined, to defraud their creditors of their honest dues. The couneil made no objection to this law; and the consequence was, very many honest men lost their property, and roguery and corruption were encouraged.

The

Banks had also been a fruitful subject of legislation: These were forced through the legislature in rapid succession, until the state was literally overrun with them. And these were all approved by the council of revision. At the onset, a few of these institutions were in the hands of one political partythe federalists. They were enabled to make liberal accommodations. republicans got into power, and said we too must have banks; and unless we have, we shall be ruined our opponents derive great influence and power from them they will destroy us if we have not the means put in our hands to resist them. In this way, bank after bank was erected until the credit and currency of the state was ruined.

We boast of our state as large and powerful, we are wealthy, populous, and enterprising. But have we'honesty? No, we have no honesty.

Some years ago he had the honour of a seat in the legislature; we then had some lands left, and he wished to have them set apart for the purpose of erecting a fund for the support of common schools-the measure was popular, and approved by many. But there was also a college to be endowed; and it was insisted that a provision should be made for this college at the same time. To the endowment of colleges he had no great objection, though he supposed they could be well enough supported without. However, to secure the great object of getting a permanent fund for common schools, he had consented, among others, to the endowment of the college.

Another evil existed in the state, created by the legislature, and approved by the council of revision-he meant lotteries. To be sure it has been attempted to sanctify the object by appropriating the avails to the advancement of literature. In every city and village you see public advertisements of the places where, and the persons by whom, this legalized gambling is conducted. This he considered disgraceful to the state, and destructive of the morals of the community. He did not mean to say that the council of revision were alone to blame for these improper acts of legislation-the legislature were undoubtedly most in fault; and it was therefore that he wished to have a check on their proceedings, and a different one from what we have heretofore had. He begged that he might not be misunderstood; he meant not to insinuate any thing against the integrity of the judicial members of the council of revision--they were highly to be commended for their faithful, intelligent, and upright discharge of

their official duties; all he intended to say, was, that they were not proper per sons to exercise the power of a qualified negative on the passage of laws.

MR. Hogeboom thought it safest and best to lodge this power in the hands of the executive singly. He was not disposed to withhold from the legislature a reasonable confidence. In the choice of the executive he had a voice; he had none in the election of members of assembly, other than those from his own county; it was therefore but reasonable that he should be willing to put greater confidence in an agent in whose selection he had a voice, than in those who were chosen without his concurrence. He should therefore vote against striking out. GEN. ROOT had hoped, from the unanimous vote on this question a few days since, that the debate would have been confined to narrow limits. But notwithstanding the remark of the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Spencer) that the subject was exhausted, and that of the gentleman from Dutchess, (Mr. Livingston) that there is not a flower left unculled in the garden of fancy; yet as the gentleman from Oneida (Mr. Platt) had thought proper to defend the council of revision-to give a history of its acts-and to chant a requiem over its tomb, the discussion had taken a wide range, and did not yet appear to be exhausted. The object now seemed to be, to discuss the merits and demerits of the council of revision. The question on striking out was indeed confined to one point; but different opinions were entertained with respect to filling the blank. The honourable mover wished it filled in one way, and the gentleman from Richmond (Mr. Tompkins) in another; and other gentlemen perhaps would be in favour of filling it with three-fifths. It is not known preciely what majority would be finally agreed on, whether two-thirds or three-fifths, or any other proportion.

His honourable and venerable friend from Rensselaer (Mr. Hogeboom) had had experience enough to induce him to try a new course. Sufficient information might be gathered from the legislative journals to justify such sentiments. He should not inquire whether party views had mingled in the proceedings of the council-it was enough that its acts afforded just grounds for the opinion expressed by the gentleman from Rensselaer. But he asked if the course now proposed would remedy these evils. Would the governor be more safe than the council of revision, in checking bills for the sale of state property, in passing insolvent laws, and the establishment of a multitude of banks? Would not these bills have passed if the veto had been deposited solely with the governor ? When we apply a remedy to any defect in the constitution, he wished it might be effectual; and such he did not think the one proposed by the committee.

Having been on a short excursion out of town, he took his seat too late yesterday to hear the whole of the argument of the honourable gentleman from Otsego (Mr. Van Buren); but he was in season to hear some positions, which appeared to him untenable. Because, forsooth, certain concurrent resolutions, which were unconstitutional, had passed the legislature, it was therefore necessary that the veto should be taken from that body and given to the governor. This appeared to be a non sequitur. He denied that money had been drawn from the treasury by concurrent resolutions, and explained the case of $50,000, said to have been drawn on such authority in 1812. Neither the late nor the present comptroller would dare to draw a warrant on the treasurer under such circumstances. He believed the legislature had never gone farther in this respect, than to authorize the clerks of the two houses to make some slight expenditures of the public money in fitting up committee rooms. But what if such abuses had happened? Would it take two-thirds of both houses to correct them? By no means-a simple majority would be sufficient.

In 1814 a law passed the legislature to aid in apprehending deserters from the United States army and navy. It was objected to by the council of revision, upon the ground that it was an infraction of personal rights, which ought in all cases to be held sacred. Then it was, if ever, when the council should have bent from its strictness, in aid of the country involved in war, and in apprehending deserters, who were stalking through the state in their laced coats with impunity; and when apprehended, sheriffs and jailors refused to receive them. This was in September, 1814. In 1801 and in 1813, all the acts of the legislature were carefully revised; yet a law to prevent vice and immorality

was suffered to remain on our statute book, authorising the arrest of a person who was found travelling on the Sabbath, and that without warrant founded on oath or affirmation. The law entitling mortgagors and mortgagees on the same property to vote at elections; the law authorising trials for pettit offences without jury; and the law authorising sheriffs to hold their offices more than four years, had passed the council without objections. We had had a council that had been governed by circumstances, and we were about to place the veto in hands, where it will be administered in the same manner.

The honourable gentleman from Otsego was in favour of having the qualified negative placed with the governor, although he admitted it would rarely if ever be exercised. It was said the governor would not dare oppose the will of the legislature, on which he was dependent for support; and because he would not do it, he must therefore be invested with a portion of the prerogative of a sove reign. If this were the case, it was quite immaterial whether one half or twothirds of the legislature were required for the passage of a law.

The gentleman from Oneida, in his history of the council of revision, had not informed us how many bills have been lost for the want of two-thirds. Twothirds were not found to pass the Convention Bill last fall, although public sentiment called loudly for the measure; and in such cases, no power under heaven should be able to resist the will of the legislature.

He admired the facility with which the honourable gentleman from Otsego can lately resort to European governments for precedents. He had traversed. the waves of the Atlantic for models to teach us how to frame and administer republican governments. That gentleman has informed us, that from a writer he has seen, it appears that the royal assent to a bill which had passed the two houses of parliament, had not been refused since about the year 1692. Hence he concludes that this qualified negative will be quite harmless here. Whether this fact in the parliamentary history of that country be correctly stated or not, he could not say; it had not come within his particular examination. But admitting it to be a fact, will the honourable gentleman pretend to deny, that the royal dissent was not very freely exercised in the latter part of the reigns of the Tudor family, and during the reign of the Stewarts. In those days, the commons of England were stoutly contending for the rights of the people, in opposition to the usurped prerogatives of the crown. Whigs could then raise their voices with effect. The same principles which brought the first Charles to the block, and compelled the last of the Stuarts to abdicate his throne, procured the passage of bills which met the royal dissent. But upon the revolution of 1688, when William of Orange was called to the throne, a whig ministry was formed. There being no political conflict between the parliament and ministry, of course there was no exercise of the royal dissent. A whig ministry was continued, with the exception of a few freaks of Queen Anne, till the Hanoverian branch of the house of Brunswick was called to the British throne. Soon after, a tory ministry was formed, with a tory parliament at its command, which has continued to the present day. When the greatest statesman that ever directed the British sceptre or guided the two houses of parliament, was at the head of the ministry, there was no occasion for the exercise of the royal dissent. Sir Robert Walpole could prevent the passage of any bill which would not meet the approbation of his sovereign. Since that time no bill of public importance has passed the two houses of parliament which was not in accordance with the views of the ministry.

Let us, said Mr. Root, apply this to our case. It has been correctly said, that the governor will always be a partisan, and will probably have the two houses with him. In that case, should an improper bill be originated, would he not advise some friend that it be withdrawn? if against his party, he would oppose it. Should only one house be with him, the other house would operate as a check, and there would be no need of the qualified negative. The governor would be more likely than the council of revision to be actuated by party views, and to resist the will of his political opponents. But we have been told, that some check upon the representatives of the people will be salutary, in order to preserve them from their own worst enemies themselves. The honourable member from New-York, (Mr. Edwards,) while descanting on this