teenth day of February next, assemble at the office of the said secretary, and proceed to calculate and ascertain the whole number of votes given at such election for, and against, the said amended constitution; and shall thereupon, within six days thereafter, determine conformably to such transcripts the number of votes given for, and against the amended constitution respectively, and whether a majority of the said votes are for or against, the said amended constitution. And they shall, without delay, make, and subscribe, with their proper names, a certificate of such determination, and file the same in the office of the secretary of state, which shall remain therein of record; and shall, without delay cause to be delivered a true copy thereof, so subscribed as aforesaid, to the president of this Convention; to the person administering the government of this state; to the president of the senate; and to the speaker of the house of assembly; and shall also cause a copy of such certificate to be published in the newspaper, printed by the printers to this state. And if it shall appear by the said canvass last mentioned, that the majority of votes, given and returned as aforesaid, are against the amended constitution, then the said amended constitution shall be deemed to be rejected by the citizens of this state: But if a majority of the said votes are for the amended constitution, then the same shall be deemed to be ratified, and confirmed, by the citizens of this state. Resolved, That five thousand copies of these resolutions, with the amended constitution subjoined, be printed; and that the comptroller cause the same to be transmitted, without delay, at the expense of the state, to the county clerks; whose duty it shall be, to distribute the same among the different towns. Resolved, That five thousand copies of the address of the Convention, to their constituents, be printed, and distributed in like manner; and that two copies of the amended constitution, be transmitted, by the comptroller, by mail, to cach of the delegates to the Convention. By order of the Convention. DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, President, JOHN F. BACON, Secretaries. SAMUEL S. GARDINER, STATE OF NEW-YORK, Secretary's Office, I certify the preceding to be a true copy of certain resolutions of the Convention of this state, filed this day, in this office. J. V, N. YATES, Secretary of State, Remarks of Mr. Van Vechten, on the proposition of Mr. Root, for abolishing the Court of Chancery-Oct. 23. MR. VAN VECHTEN said, that he would offer no apology for troubling the committee with a few observations in reply to what had been urged in support of the amendments of the gentleman from Delaware, (Gen. Root). He should confine his remarks to two of the propositions which the amendments contain. ed, and invert their order. The first is, the proposition to abolish the present court of chancery, and to transfer its jurisdiction to the supreme court-Why is this transfer proposed? It has been said by the gentleman from New-York (Mr. Radcliff) that our equity jurisdiction is too enormous to be safely entrusted to a single judge. Let me ask whether it will be safer to vest it in the supreme court? That court already possesses the most comprehensive legal jurisdiction. Will the union of enormous equity and legal jurisdictions in the same tribunal, produce the greatest safety? The sound republican maxim is, that it is safer to divide than to accumulate power in the same hands. With a view, therefore, to safety, the proposed transfer of equity jurisdiction to the supreme court, is wholly inadmissible. The gentleman has also urged that the proceedings in the court of chancery are extremely dilatory and expensive. For the sake of the argument I will admit the truth of his assertion, but must beg the gentleman to explain how vesting equity jurisdiction in the supreme court will expedite the decision, or diminish the expense of chancery causes? The forms and course of proceedings are not proposed to be altered, nor is it pretended that the supreme court can despatch more business than the court of chancery. It is a notorious fact, that the latter court is unable to dispose of its legal business with requisite expedition. How then will it be able, when charged with equity jurisdiction also, to perform its multiplied duties more expeditiously? But the gentleman from Saratoga (Col. Young) is in favour of the amendment because the court of chancery is generally held in New-York and Albany, and he wishes to bring equity nearer home to remote suitors. Is not the gentleman aware that the terms of the supreme court are held at precisely the same places where the court of chancery sits? In what way does he contemplate to bring equity nearer home to remote suitors by transferring equity jurisdiction to the supreme court? Does he purpose that equity causes shall be sent to the circuits to be argued? Will that accommodate suitors? In the first place the clerk in chancery must either attend with the pleadings or furnish certified copies. Each party must have copies of the depositions and exhibits, and pay liberal fees to counsel for attending the circuit to argue his cause. These will be heavy items in the bills of expense. And it must not be forgotten that the cause must be prepared for argument by the solicitor and counsel who conduct it wherever their residence may be. Of course sending it to the circuit to be argued will not relieve the suitors from the inconvenience of long journeys to attend their solicitors and counsel in case they reside where the supreme court terms are usually held. Again, if equity causes are to be heard and decided at the circuits, it must be by a single judge, which is liable to the same objection made by the gentleman from New-York to the chancellor. But waiving this objection, will it conduce to the convenience of suitors either on the law or equity sides of the circuits to have issues triable by juries and causes in equity placed on the same calendarto have jurors, witnesses and parties, kept waiting while long chancery causes are heard? Or will it promote the convenience of the public to have the courts of oyer and terminer, in which the circuit judge must preside, delayed during the hearing of chancery causes? Suppose, however, that all these in conveniences are overlooked, when is the circuit judge to make his decrees in complicated equity causes? Is this to be done in the hurry of a circuit? Or is he to report the case and arguments of counsel to the supreme court for their decision thereon? Or is he to report the case merely in order to have it re-argued at the bar of the supreme court? This will indeed be a notable mode of administering equity, with due deliberation, with great convenience and with economy and expedition? Is the committee prepared to approve it? Is it willing to abandon a system long tried, and which has been found eminently beneficial-a system highly prized and admired by impartial and enlightened men wherever it is understood, for a project which has nothing besides its novelty and incongruity to recommend it? I should hope not. But, said Mr. Van Vechten, let me examine a little further some of the arguments which have been urged in favour of the project alluded to--and first I ask what danger there is in our equity jurisdiction being vested in a single judge. May not the proceedings of the chancellor be arrested by appeal and reviewed in the court of errors at every step, which involves the rights of parties? Is not this a perfect safeguard? What other judicial tribunal is so guarded? Again, cannot a single judge expedite business more than a numerous bench? And, are our chancery decisions less profound, or less admired and approved than the decisions of the supreme court? I put it to every candid and enlightened man who has read both, to answer these questions; and am willing that their answers to them shall determine the fate of the proposition before us. The gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Radcliff,) has told us, that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery has been greatly, and, as I understood him, unwarrantably extended. How is this proven? Has a single fact been stated to verify it? Is it credible that such extension would have been acquiesced in, when there was a competent power to restrain it? This suggestion can hardly have been intended as an argument addressed to the good sense of this com mittee. But it is urged that the judicial system of the United States, furnishes a precedent for the proposed amendment. To this it has been already answered by my honourable colleague, (Mr. Kent,) that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States embraces few cases of equity, and we have the testimony of eminent judges, who preside in those courts, to prove, that if their equity jurisdiction was extensive, it would be impracticable for them to administer it. The truth is, said Mr. V. V. that the systems of law and equity in this state, are essentially distinct in their nature. Each is sufficiently comprehensive to occupy the whole time and talents of the ablest jurists. Very few men can be found, who are competent to sit one day as judges of law, and the next as judges of equity, and to separate correctly in their own minds, between the appropriate jurisdiction of each. There would therefore be great danger, that by uniting the two jurisdictions in the same tribunal, the boundary line between them would soon be lost sight of, and that every thing would slide into the equity jurisdiction, to the utter subversion of mere law. But the gentleman from Saratoga, (Col. Young,) has informed us, that the present chancellor was taken from the bench of our supreme court, and all agree that he acquits himself well in his new station. This is freely admitted, but was his honour the chancellor to be interrogated on the subject, he would frankly tell the committee, that upon accepting his present office, he found himself constrained to pursue a course of intense study, to enable him to perform the duties of it with promptness and satisfaction; and that experience has taught him, that it requires something more than the qualifications of an able common law judge, to make an able chancellor. The next proposition, said Mr. V. V. he should notice, is that which proposes to separate the chancellor and judges of the supreme court, from the court of errors. What renders this separation desirable? Will the court of errors be better fitted for its important duties, when deprived of the talents and learning of its present judicial members? This cannot be pretended. But it is urged that the court may obtain the opinions of the chancellor and judges in every case, without making them constituent members. Be it so, and does that prove that it is not wiser to have them attached to the court, that they may have the benefit of the arguments of eminent counsel on the final hearing, and the senators may have the advantage of conferring with them in the progress of the argument. On this point there can be no serious difference of opinion. Mr. V. V. concluded by observing that he should not detain the committee, with any remarks upon the other parts of the amendment. Remarks of Mr. Van Vechten, on the amendment offered by Mr. Tompkins, for abolishing the court of chancery, &c. October 26. MR. VAN VECHTEN. I will not enquire into the motives which have produced this proposition. Its obvious effect is indisputable. If adopted, the offices of the chancellor and judges of the supreme court will become vacant whenever it is ratified by the people. Is this one of the objects for which the Convention was chosen? It can hardly be considered an amendment of the constitution; for the purpose of constitutional amendments, is to settle general and permanent fundamental provisions. The office of the article under consideration will have been performed the moment it is ratified-what necessity is there for it? The tenure of office of the Chancellor and judges is not altered, nor is the organization of the courts in which they preside changed. Hence, it seems that the only end to be attained by it, is to vacate their offices. Is this Convention prepared to incur the just reproach which such a step will merit? The majority has already agreed to an amendment by which the Chancellor and judges are made removable, upon the application of the two houses of the legislature, provided two-thirds of the members concur therein. If then your Chancellor, or any of the judges of your supreme court have done aught for which they deserve to be removed, the legislature will have competent power to effect their removal. I entreat the committee not to tarnish the character of the Convention, by sanctioning a proposition so wanton, so violent, and so unbecoming its dignity. But let me examine the prominent reasons which have been urged to support it. It has been alleged that some of the judges have lost the confidence of the public by becoming political partizans. I will not stop here to investigate the truth of their partizanship; but admitting it to be true, I ask the committee to consider dispassionately whether it justifies the proposition before us. Let it be remembered, that all our public officers from the highest to the lowest have taken an open, avowed and decided part in political conflicts for many years past. The judges are men of like passions and infirmities as other men-when I say this, I wish not to be misunderstood. I am free to declare that in my judgment, it is desirable and highly proper that the judiciary of the state should stand aloof from the violence of party collisions; but I must beg leave to add, that with the examples and excitements which have been made to bear upon some of its members, it was more to be desired than expected that they should have done so. Have they not again and again been invited to party councils-to aid in the formation of party plans, and to lend their influence to carry them into operation? And have not those invitations proceeded from men holding distinguished stations in the different departments of the government? Will gentlemen candidly tax their memories, and ponder on these questions; and if they do not admit of negative answers, with what propriety can we agree to a proposition for vacating the seats of any of the judges because they have participated in our party conflicts. Nor is this all-one of the judges against whom the proposition before us is directed, has been appointed by the legislature a party elector of president and vice president of the United States. Let me ask, would that appointment have been made, had he not been a firm and tried partizan? Did not some prominent republican members of this Convention assist in promoting and making it? If they did, is it consistent now to urge the removal of any of the judges for having taken a part in our political conflicts? The procedure appears to me unseemly, and cannot I apprehend escape the observation and reprobation of our constituents. I shall therefore vote against it from a sense of duty, uninfluenced by either party attachments or party resentments. GEN. TALLMADGE's speech on the motion made by him in Convention, on the 314 day of October, to strike out the word "senate," and to insert" council,” to the end, that a council of appointment be formed, consisting of the first eight senators elected under the new constitution; and so for the other three classes of senators, in rotation. In support of this motion, Mr. Tallmadge said that the object of his present motion, to strike out "senate," and insert "council," was to call the attention of the house to the great and important principle of separating the departments of government. He wished, as far as possible, to disconnect the legis lative from the executive powers; and, above all, he was unwilling to impose upon and connect the senate with the appointing power, which was the worst and most corrupt and corrupting portion of the executive duties. He believed that we had already gone so far as to injure the constitution by the plans proposed: and he was fearful that in the end a worse constitution would be presented than the one which we had been endeavouring to amend. The Convention had started upon the principle that it was necessary to keep the great departments of the government separate. It had been determined that the judiciary should be a distinct branch; and, therefore, it had been taken from the council of revision. And it was likewise conceded, that it was equally imporportant for the legislature to be a separate and an independent branch-the law-making power, and to interfere with no other department. It would be extremely desirable that neither branch of the legislature should interfere with the appointing power; and, therefore, he would gladly provide for a council of eight to be elected, one from each senate district; but, as various other plans had been suggested to this Convention without success, it appeared there was no other acceptable mode than to have the legislature exercise it in some way; and as a less evil than the plan at present established, he would recommend that the eight senators annually elected, constitute a council, who, together with the governor, should be an appointing power, instead of the governor and whole senate. Mr. T. was not disposed to break in upon the arrangement that had already been established, with respect to the appointment of officers in the different towns and counties of the state-he was an advocate for dispersing the appointing power, and sending to the several counties all the officers which were proper to be sent to be there elected, or otherwise appointed in the counties. He wished he might not be misunderstood. The proposed council was intended only to come in the place of the whole senate. He would only go so far as to include those who, by the present arrangement, must be appointed at the seat of government. These eight senators, coming immediately from the people, bring. ing with them their wishes and feelings, would be well prepared to exercise this power; and if the excrcise of it is calculated to injure the character of our legislature, it would certainly be better in the hands of eight than thirty-two. By the provisions already adopted, we leave to the governor and senate the appointment of more than one thousand officers, and, because we cannot suit ourselves as to the mode of appointment for numerous classes of officers yet unprovided for, and feeling ashamed to impose all upon the senate, we flee the difficulty; and we have gravely determined that all officers, not provided for by this constitution, shall be appointed in such manner as the legislature shall direct. Let it be remembered that we have made no arrangement for the appointment of any of the inspectors, auctioneers, surrogates, health-officers, &c. &c. nor for the numerous class of officers who are to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and with various others, amounting to upwards of two thousand. All this has been left for the legislature to determine upon hereafter; and what can they do if the power is not marked out by the constitution? Was it intended to have these officers as the bantlings of party, as a sure source of legislative disorder, and to vibrate from one extreme to the other, as should best suit the corruption of the times? On a former occasion a proposition was presented to provide for the appointment of those minor officers, in the counties, and without placing any share of them in the bands of the senate; but this was rejected. What is the result of all our determinations, to separate and preserve the dif ferent branches of our government, independent of each other? - After having |