the distance of every ten years, with a census of the United States taken in 1820, and to be repeated every ten years, will hereafter show the number of the inhabitants of this state every five years. I have no such skill in political arithmetic, as to be able to calculate all the effects which this apportionment may be likely to produce. It sufficed, in the opinion of the committee, that the former unequal districts should be abolished; and that it may be hoped, that the adoption of the smaller districts which are proposed, will diminish the great and acknowledged disadvantages which hitherto have been experienced. Single districts might have been deemed preferable, and for the sake of a personal acquaintance between the electors and elected, I was inclined to prefer them; but the enumeration of the inhabitants of the several towns was wanting, to enable the committee geographically to establish single districts; and unless single districts, composed of contiguous territory, can be formed, without breaking up the integrity of the counties, it may well be doubted whether it would be expedient to form them-but the Convention have just now refused their sanction of single senate districts. The select committee, as has before been stated, have no attachment to the senate districts which they have reported, and are ready to agree to any other and better plan. The question before the committee makes it necessary for them to decide, whether they will confirm the report of the select committee, or refer the subject to the legislature; or will adopt the scheme now proposed of dividing the state into eight small districts, of equal numbers of inhabitants, each district to elect four senators, which, by being classed, will require one to be hereafter elected annually. The proposal of referring the subject to the legislature, has no other merit than that of referring an important measure to others, and in this way relieving the Convention, which is equally or more able to decide it themselves; the legislature will meet with the same difficulties as we ourselves do; they will have no better information than we have, or if in a more recent account of numbers it may be better, it will still be nearly as defective as the census before us; besides, the legislature will consist of two branches, and the bill will be subject to the executive veto-these are embarrassments to which the Convention are not liable; the provision is in the nature of an organic law, which should be made by those who amend the constitution. The plan of eight districts possesses some properties which no other scheme contains. It doubles the number of the old districts; the new ones will contain an equal number of inhabitants, or nearly so; the lines of counties will be preserved unbroken, and each district will annually elect one senator; these, and other advantages, seem to give the preference to this plan. A good deal has been said respecting public opinion, on certain great points there has probably existed a public opinion which extended itself throughout the state; thus the equalization of the rights of suffrage, the abolition of the council of revision and of the council of appointment, in which the Convention have been almost unanimous, evince the tone and unanimity of public opinion. In other questions that have been debated, or are yet to be discussed in the Convention, and concerning which the public cannot be supposed to have formed an opinion, the best standards of public opinion are the votes of the Convention-an assembly brought together from every part of the state, men who know and are known by the inhabitants of their respective counties, and who were recently elected for the purposes for which we are convened, are well qualified to ascertain public opinion, and are capable, after mature reflec, tion, to pronounce the same. If the Convention dispassionately, and without prejudice, debate, and honestly vote on the questions brought under their consideration, we may hope that our proceedings will be approved by our constituents; and in any event, by pursuing this course, we shall have the consolation to know, that on a great occasion, we have acted from motives, the purity whereof ought to protect us from censure. Ma. Ross was at first in favour of thirty-two districts; but on further examination he believed it impracticable. The proposition of the gentleman from Dutchess struck him in a more favourable light than any thing he had seck, and he wished it might be adopted. MR. SHARPE had first supposed, that to divide the state into thirty-two senatorial districts would be advisable; but on reflection, he had satisfied himself that the plan could not be effected without dividing counties more than he con sidered it prudent. He then turned his attention to the report of the select committee, and found that possessing similar disadvantages. There were before the house other propositions-to divide the state into eight districts, and to defer it for the consideration of the legislature. To these propositions he thought there could be no great objections; but of the two, he should prefer that suggested by the gentleman from Dutchess. Having had the honour of a seat in the legislature at a time when a similar opportionment and division took place, he was satified that it must lead to party feelings and measures. To avoid this would be very desirable. He had examined the plan proposed for eight districts, as exhibited on the map, and found that without dividing counties there would be less fractions than in any plan yet proposed. There would be a larger fraction wanting in the western part of the state than any where else; but this would be no more than justice, as that part of the state was increasing so fast in population that the deficiency would be soon made up. This mode was preferable to the report of the committee, because each district would annually elect one senator, and of course no section of the state would be without a fresh representation annually. As much time had been squandered unnecessarily, he hoped that this question would be taken without debate, and receive the unanimous vote of the committee. MR. FAIRLIE made a few remarks in favour of the proposition. MR. BUEL offered the following proposition for consideration, after the question now before the committee had been disposed of : 1st. That it shall be the duty of the first legislature, or as soon as a census of the state can be obtained under the amended constitution, to divide the state into not more than nor less than districts, to be denominated senatorial districts, and to make a just apportionment of the thirty-two senators among the said districts; that the number of said districts shall not thereafter be less than more than and shall consist of as equal a number of inhabitants as may be (excluding aliens, paupers, persons of colour not taxed, and convicts.) If a district shall consist of more than one county, the counties shall be contiguous, and no county shall be divided in forming a district. nor 2d. The 3d of Mr. Van Buren's amendments-that the first senate under the amended constitution shall be chosen by the present four great districts-giving to the three first, seven senators each, and to the fourth, or western district eleven. 3d. The 4th of do. requiring the senate to be divided by lot into four classes, and that the seats of the members of the first class be vacated at the expiration of the first year, and of the others, at the expiration of each year in succession, so that one-fourth of the senators be chosen annually. 4th. The 5th of do. requiring a just apportionment of the senators to be made among the respective districts, whenever the state shall have been divided into senatorial districts by the legislature, as provided for in the first amendment. GEN. TALLMADGE said, when the house first took the report of the committee under consideration, he had early made his objections to that report, and pointed out some of its imperfections, and the inequalities in representation which would be produced by it; and he had then expressed his belief, that the state could not be divided into thirty-two districts, for the choice of senators, without the plan containing within itself such inconvenience in the divisiou of towns and counties, or such injustice and violation of the principle of equal representation, arising from the inequalities of the single districts, as to render it wholly inadmissible. He had then given in part his reasons against the report of the committee, and he had suggested a division of the state into eight equal districts of contiguous territory, and entire counties, as the only practical division which would produce equality of representation, and an annual election, and also be in accordance with the great principle adopted in the formation of our state governments; that the popular branch should be composed of the immediate representatives of counties, and local interests and feelings: while the senators should come from districts composed of different counties, and making a diversity in the representation in that body. From respect to the house, he had forborne to repeat this day the reasons he had assigned on a former occasion; but he presumed the gentleman from Columbia (Mr. Williams) must have forgotten his former remarks, and that his plan of eight districts had been submitted in the outset of the business, or he would not have so unjustly imputed to him any change of opinions on this subject since the former debate. The plan this day submitted by him in detail, was the same suggested by him in the first instance. He had not undergone any change of opinion; and he was confident no other plan but this of eight districts, would secure equality of representation, provide for annual elections to the senate from each district, and preserve the proportion and harmony in the formation of the government, being based upon representation from counties in one branch, from districts in the other, and terminating in the third branch in one executive elected from the whole state. Mr. T. said, the gentleman from Columbia had urged as an argument against eight districts, that it produced the election of unfit and unworthy persons to the senate, and he had detailed, in strong terms, the practices of district nominations, which he had described, in conjunction with high salaries, as the source of all the evils arising from our legislature. Mr. T. said, he greatly differed from the reasoning of the gentleman; whether candidates were nominated by counties or districts, probably the same result would be produced. The county sent delegates to make the district nomination, and there the voice of those delegates would be regarded; and whether that voice was expressed in single counties, or by districts, the same nomination would be produced. Mr. T. said, the evils felt from our present system did not arise, as had been suggested, from district elections to the senate. Those evils were more deeply planted, and are so from other and far different causes. It was from the operation of the appointing power, as had been heretofore practised, and from the high salaries and perquisites attached to offices. He took this occasion to unite with the gentleman from Columbia, (Mr. W.) in deprecating the high salaries and perquisites which had been allowed, and he thought, much to the discredit of former legislatures. He had, a few days past, given his earnest on this subject, by voting for two dollars per day as the future wages for members of the legislature, and it such measure could be brought about, it would, as its consequence, secure a general reduction in the expenses of the state. But the evil of the times would not be effectually remedied, unless this Convention should pursue the good work on this point, which had been in part executed : he meant the purification of the legislative branches. We have already provided, said Mr. T., a clause prohibiting any member of the legislature from receiving an office, and had also, as he thought, improvidently rejected another clause, which provided that no member of the legislature should hold an office and continue a member. Without such a provision it can never be hoped, that a proper and rigid scrutiny will be observed by the legislature over the conduct of persons in office. There must be a complete separation of the different departments, or the public will not have justice. He fondly hoped such a provision might be yet adopted, when the proceedings came to be taken up for final revision, in Convention. But, said Mr. T., even this will not be sufficient, unless you take the appointing power from the senate. Heretofore appointments were made by a council chosen by the assembly from the senate, and it had confessedly corrupted the whole body politic, and disgraced the moral character of the state. Disperse." said Mr. T., the appointing power as much as possible to the several counties, and remove the residue from the senate to some proper authority created for such purposes; and then take away the inducements for competition for office. by graduating salaries and perquisites to a fair subsistence of the incumbent : which he contended was the surest standard: and then, and not till then, can you expect a removal of those causes of contention, and of the public disquiet. which were now so much the subject of complaint. When this was accomplished, and he fondly anticipated its consummation, we could hope a quiet state, a moral character for our people, and private representation to individuals. The inducements to calumny and detraction would be removed. It was a combination of causes, arising from the defects in our form of govers ment; and especially as connected with the old council, taken from the senate, and not from the district election of senators, as bad been imputed by the gentleman from Columbia, which had so much disorganized and disgraced this state. He believed the election of senators by districts would produce as fit men, and that the plan better accorded with the theory of our government. MR. E. WILLIAMS replied, when the question was taken on the first section of the resolution of Mr. Tallmadge, and carried. MR. DODGE moved that the committee now rise and report; and that Mr. Tallmadge's proposition be referred to the select committee on the legislative department. The Chairman stated, that such reference might be made in Convention, but not in committee of the whole. MR. KING hoped that that part of the report which relates to the assembly, would be disposed of before the committee rose, which course was agreed to. MR. YOUNG moved that the number of the members of the assembly be fixed at one hundred and twenty-eight. MR. E. WILLIAMS said this was a subject of too great importance to be disposed of in haste, and moved to rise and report. It was finally agreed to postpone the further consideration of this subject, and the committee rose and reported without asking leave to sit again. In Convention, ordered, that the report, as amended, be printed; and that Mr. Tallmadge's proposition be referred to a committee of thirteen for revision. On motion of MR. I. SUTHERLAND, ordered that the report on the appointing power be made the order of the day for to-morrow.-Adjourned. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1821. Prayer by the REV. DR. CUMMING. The President then, at the usual hour took his seat, and the minutes of yesterday were read and approved. The Presdent thereupon announced the nomination of the following gentlemen as a committee of thirteen, to whom yesterday the subject of the senate districts was directed to be referred. MR. KING, of Queens, MR. SHARPE, of New-York, MR. TALLMADGE, of Dutchess, MR. TOWNSEND, of Washington, MR. BREESE, of Oneida, MR. FENTON, of St. Lawrence, MR. BRINKERHOFF, of Cayuga, THE APPOINTING POWER. On motion of MR. SHARPE, the Convention went into committee of the whole on the Appointing Power-Mr. Wheaton in the chair, Mr. Lawrence being absent. The question recurred upon the 6th section of the report, relating to the appointments unprovided for, in the city of New-York. MR. RADCLIFE proposed, as a substitute therefor, the following: "That the clerks of the courts of oyer and terminer and general sessions of the peace, and of the sittings in the city of New-York, and all justices or judicial officers of courts inferior to the court of common pleas or general sessions of the peace in said city, and the clerks of such courts respectively, and the officers of the health department for said city, and the officers of the harbour and port of said city, and the commissioner or officers of excise therein, which are or may be created or established in and for said city, shall be appointed by the common council thereof, and hold their offices during the pleasure of the said common council, except that the said justices shall hold their offices for four years, unless removed in the manner provided for the removal of the justices of the peace in the other counties of this state, and that all other officers in said city, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for by this constitution, shall be chosen or appointed in such manner as the legislature may from time to time direct." Mr. R. stated his object to be, to preserve to that city the same mode of election as was given to the country, in relation to such officers as were common to both, and to provide a proper mode of election for the residue, which were peculiar to the city. He stated in detail the reasons which had induced him to think the foregoing as correct and proper a mode, as would be practicable and convenient. He also adverted to the communication made by the secretary of state, in relation to the number of officers in the city of New-York, and stated that there had been a great misconception as to that subject. In examining the matter minutely, it would be found that instead of seven hundred offices, there were not more than forty that were, or ought to be, peculiar to that city. The first judge and recorder were the only officers whose duties were exclusively judicial; whereas, each of the other counties had five. There was but one coroner; whereas, other counties have ten or twelve. With respect to masters in chancery, commissioners to acknowledge deeds, and notaries public, there had been an abuse and imposition upon that city,by creating a number altogether greater than the public good required. It was one of the inverted blessings which the council of appointment had dispensed, and he hoped most sincerely that the number would be reduced. With respect to the public notaries, three hundred forty-three were stated to exist in the city, but on examination, he had ascertained that this number included all that had been appointed since the year 1784. The present number of these officers, therefore, was greatly misunderstood, although he agreed they were too numerous. He also examined at length the other various parts of that communication, and concluded by insisting that no danger could arise from adopting the amendment. MR. TOMPKINS did not wish to interfere with such officers as were peculiar to the city of New-York; but with respect to the resident physician, the health officer, and commissioner of the health office, if they were local officers, they belonged rather to the county of Richmond, than to the city of New-York; but in fact they were officers of the state at large. The revenues and disbursements of the establishment, were general to the state, although placed within the local limits of the county which he had the honour to represent, He therefore moved to strike out the words " and the officers of the health department for said city." MR. JAY. Before the committee decide upon the questions now before them, I beg leave to call their attention to the patronage now exercised by the mayor and common council of the city of New-York. It is proposed that the mayor, who has heretofore been appointed by the state, shall hereafter be appointed by the common council, and of course be dependent upon it. Should this proposition be adopted, you will increase the patronage of that body, not only by enabling them to bestow the office of mayor, but also by placing virtually at their disposal, all the patronage now vested in him. This, though consisting of small appointments, is of a nature to give immense influence to him who possesses it. The mayor grants, or refuses, at his own pleasure, all tavern licences, and these exceed two thousand. He grants and revokes at his own pleasure licences to about fifteen hundred carmen, and I believe, though I am not certain, to several hundred other carmen, who carry earth, and are called dirt carmen. He in like manner licences all the hackney coaches and |